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Jersey law, and within it Jersey property law, has received little academic attention. 
This thesis seeks to examine, and provide a systematic account of, the Jersey law of 
property. Specific aspects of substantive law are explored. From these, general 
observations about the nature and structure of property law are made. 
 
Unsurprisingly, given the small size of the island, Jersey has a relatively limited 
amount of indigenous legal material to offer, much of it in French. Inevitably, there 
are gaps in the sources and some way of addressing these has to be determined 
before a systematic account of the law is possible. Juristic writing and modern case-
law demonstrate consistent recourse to the laws of other jurisdictions when gaps are 
encountered. Norman law, modern French law, and English law (to a much lesser 
extent and mainly where it conforms to Roman law) are used in the cases on property 
law, and thus also in this thesis. Reference is also made to the law of Guernsey 
(Jersey’s sister jurisdiction) but the difficulties ncountered in researching Jersey law 
are no less evident there. 
 
In areas such as the law of servitudes, Roman law is often referred to explicitly by 
the Jersey jurists and by the commentators on Norman law. The influence of Roman 
law is also evident in the division between real rights and personal rights, sometimes 
barely visible in Jersey law, and is also a general b ckdrop to the rules on 
classification of things. Norman feudal law remains vestigially in place but the 
structure of the law and its individual rules bear many civilian characteristics. For 
this reason, in addition to Jersey sources, Norman law, modern French law, and any 
other materials used by the courts, other jurisdictions with civilian systems of 
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Jersey is an Island in the English Channel, located round one hundred miles south of 
England and fourteen miles west of the French Cotentin peninsula. It is the most 
southerly of the Channel Islands and, at nine miles from west to east and five miles 
from north to south, it is also the largest. Its forty-five square miles support around 
92,500 permanent residents.1 The main settlement is the town of St Helier, on the
south coast of the Island. The main language is English.2 
 
The Channel Islands are “possessions of the English Crown – dependencies of the 
Crown, outside of the United Kingdom”.3 The Duchy of Normandy, of which the 
Channel Islands were formerly part, became united with the English Crown in 1066. 
In 1204, King John lost Continental Normandy to the Fr nch King, Philip Augustus. 
The Channel Islands, however, retained their allegiance to the English King.4 Despite 
this separation from Continental Normandy, significant influence from English law 
has come only relatively recently, and not to all areas of the law. Jersey has its own 
legislative assembly: the States of Jersey.5 
 
Jersey law has its own distinctive character, which is now being re-interpreted 
through the medium of the English language, and by largely English-speaking 
lawyers and judges. Related to this, Jersey is a mixed jurisdiction, that is to say, 
Jersey law has been influenced by both (English) comm n law and the civil law.6 
Therefore, in addition to considering French law (pre- and post-codification) and 
English law alongside Jersey law, reference to other mixed jurisdictions can usefully 
be made. 
 
                                                 
1 States of Jersey, Statistics Unit, population estimate for 2009. 
2 For further general information (for example): Le Quesne, ch 1; Kelleher, chs 1, 2. 
3 J Jowell “The UK’s Power Over Jersey’s Domestic Affairs” in Bailhache 800 Years. Consider also: 
Interpretation Act 1978, s5, schedule 1.  
4 See further, for example: Le Quesne, 297. 
5 For history, see: Le Quesne, 99 et seq; Le Patourel, 117 – 118; Lemasurier, 205 – 220, 273 – 293. 
6 See generally: Palmer Mixed. 
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The first chapter in this thesis provides a general overview. Thereafter, some specific 
areas are considered. For reasons of time and space, as well as seeking to balance 
breadth and depth, many areas have not been covered. “T op vouloir à la fois, c’est 
s’exposer à ne rien obtenir”.7 The specific areas examined reflect the approach tken 
to the research. There are three chapters on aspects of the law of servitudes. This was 
where research began, on the basis that the law of servitudes tends to have been 
present in western legal systems for several centuri s. (Jersey law proved to be no 
exception.) Thus, the law of servitudes is an area where a reasonable body of legal 
sources has had time to build up. Not only did thisfacilitate research, but it also 
provided the important additional benefit of conveying something of the nature and 
sources of Jersey property law as a whole. 
 
As the feudal system of land tenure has never been abolished in Jersey, research into 
the history and present-day extent of that system was clearly also important, both for 
its own sake and – again – in order to build a picture of the nature of property law as 
a whole. 
 
The remaining chapters which cover specific areas rathe  than matters of structure or 
sources concern the voluntary transfer of immoveable property, and voisinage and 
nuisance. The former was chosen because the process f transfer is a fundamental 
part of any system of property law. It is regretted hat a corresponding chapter on 
moveable property could not be included; some reseach on the topic was carried out, 
but constraints of time and space prevented its inclusion. The latter was chosen 
because, during the course of research, two cases reached the level of the Court of 
Appeal in Jersey and raised interesting taxonomical questions about the boundary 
between property law and the law of tort. 
 
The focus of the thesis is principally on immoveabl property as can be seen from the 
chapters on feudal land tenure, transfer of immoveables, servitudes, and voisinage. 
Nonetheless, this is not a thesis on land law. The c apters on real rights and 
classification include consideration of other types of property. Broadly, what is 
                                                 
7 Le Gros, 201. 
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considered is property law, or the “law of things”: the law of items with pecuniary 









D. JURISTIC WRITING 
E. CUSTOMARY LAW 
F. GAPS 
G. JERSEY: A MIXED JURISDICTION 
H. FOREIGN LAW: SOME PROBLEMS AND SOME MERITS 
I. WHICH SYSTEMS TO LOOK AT? 





Legislation, judicial decisions (cases), juristic writing, and customary law all 
contribute to an account of Jersey property law. Can these all be described as sources 
of law? Are they of equal “weight”? What can be done to illuminate and support 
these sources when they are few in number? Can a geeral overview of property law 
be constructed? If foreign law is to be used to facilit te these ends, when and how 




A number of Laws impact on Jersey property law, but nothing which amounts to any 
sort of codification. In 1771, a “Code” was introduced, but it brought together 
existing legislation rather than attempting any overall systematisation.1 Some of its 
provisions are of relevance to property law.2 
 
                                                 
1 1861 Report, vi – vii. Le Quesne, 102 “a selection of laws and ordinances which had been passed by 
the States and of United Kingdom statutes which had been registered in the Island” (the 1771 Code 
removed the Royal Court’s power to legislate); Mautalent-Reboul, 417 – 418; Nicolle Origin 78, para 
17.3. On the circumstances leading up the Code, see: Le Quesne, 395, 440 – 442; Lemasurier, 95 – 
98; Kelleher, 18 – 19. 
2 For example: “A la Cour du Samedi”, “Regîtres”. 
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The total number of Laws in force on “Land and Housing” (which, obviously, 
excludes moveables)3 as collated by the Jersey Legal Information Board is 22.4 Some 
of these are of narrow scope.5 Among them must be mentioned the Loi (1880) sur la 
propriété foncière, which reformed the law of hypothecs and insolvency proceedings 
and which, in terms of technical law reform, is probably the finest piece of 
legislation on Jersey property law. The law on transfer of moveable property is 
mainly governed by the Supply of Goods and Services (Jersey) Law 2009. The 
Jersey law of property remains, however, largely non-statutory. 
 
As with other materials on Jersey law, older legislat on is in French. Although most 
modern legislation is in English,6 occasionally French is still used. It seems that tis 
is done when it concerns concepts already established in French, such as 
hypothèque.7 The use of French presents a linguistic barrier for the Island’s majority 
English-speaking population.8 Although much legislation is available on the 
internet,9 laws no longer in force are not currently available except in hard copy, 




Prior to 1950, there was no system of case reporting in Jersey. Decisions are 
available in large volumes, stored at the Jersey Archive.10 Separate series exist for 
                                                 
3 The spellings “moveable” and “immoveable” are used throughout this thesis, following, for 
example: Poingdestre Remarques on art 506; Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 3, 317; Hemery & Dumaresq, 
27; Matthews & Nicolle, 78, para 7.52 (quoting In re Désastre Overseas Insurance Brokers Ltd
(1966) 1 JJ 547); Royal Court Rules 2004; JLC CP8. “Movable” and “immovable” are, however, also 
used in Jersey. See: Nicolle Immovable Property and Nicolle Conveyancing where both spellings are 
used. 
4 Excluding regulations and orders. See: www.jerseylaw.je.  
5 Such as: F.B. Playing Fields (Sports Hall) (Jersey) Law 2007; Howard Davis Farm (Abrogation of 
Covenant) (Jersey) Law 2008; Jersey College for Girls (Removal of Covenant) (Jersey) Law 2006; 
Loi (1839) sur l’acquis de propriété foncière par les Rectorats. 
6 The transition appears to have taken place by the 1940s: from Loi (1832) sur les décrets, to 
Dwelling-Houses (Rent Control) (Jersey) Law 1946, Housing (Jersey) Law 1949. 
7 Loi (1996) sur l’hypothèque des biens-fonds incorporels. Also: Loi (1959) touchant les 
remboursement des rentes et l’extinction d’hypothèques conventionelles simples; Loi (1959) touchant 
la vente des immeubles de mineurs; Loi (1991) sur la copropriété des immeubles bâtis. 
8 See: ch 1 n132. 
9 At www.jerseylaw.je. 
10 Clarence Road, St Helier, JE2 4JY. Open access catalogue at 
www.jerseyheritagetrust.jeron.je/reference.html, cole tion reference “D/Y”. 
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each part of the old structure: Cour de Billet, Cour de Cattel, Cour d’Héritage, and 
Cour de Samedi.11 Decisions are in chronological order. The records recite the Order 
of Justice,12 the arguments made for each side, and the decision of the court.13 
Consequently, the reasons for a decision are difficult, or impossible, to ascertain. The 
court records are in French until well into the twenti th century. Some go back to the 
sixteenth century. They are almost all handwritten, in hands of varying legibility; 
printing began to be used in the first half of the w ntieth century. A partial index 
exists, covering the period from 1885 to 1950,14 in which notable cases are ordered 
under subject headings. Jurists provide further assistance. Le Geyt in his Manuscrits 
(written around the turn of the eighteenth century, published in 1846)15 sometimes 
identifies cases relevant to a particular point of law. Le Gros (circa 1943)16 does this 
more often, and that is a great advantage of his Treatise. Otherwise, there is little to 
guide the researcher (or practitioner) through the volumes of the court records. 
 
One way of dealing with the unindexed material would be to read through each 
volume systematically. This approach has not been adopted, principally because of 
the time which would be involved. Also, the rewards would be relatively few 
because no reasons are given for the decisions and legal materials are only very 
rarely alluded to. Pre-1950 cases have been used whrever they could be discovered, 
but only the reasoned, post-1950 judgments are examined in detail. 
 
In 1950, the English-language Jersey Judgments series of case reports began. As an 
unofficial series17 it was not subject to rigorous editing, but these reports are 
nevertheless extremely useful in comparison to the court records, for they give the 
court’s reasons for its decisions.18 The Jersey Judgment series ended in 1984 and a 
professional series of case reports began in 1985: the Jersey Law Reports (also in 
                                                 
11 Nicolle Origin 94 – 95. Also: Hemery & Dumaresq, 5; Pipon & Durell, 41 – 42; Le Quesne, 30; 
Havet, 142 – 143; Lemasurier, 191 – 200. 
12 The document which starts the action and sets out the parties, the facts (including the wrong 
alleged), and the remedy requested.  
13 On practice in Normandy: Dawson Oracles 292. 
14 Tables des Décisions de la Cour Royale de Jersey, 8 volumes covering: 1885 – 1888; 1889 – 1893; 
1894 – 1900; 1901 – 1907; 1908 – 1916; 1917 – 1930; 1931 – 1940; 1941 – 1950.  
15 See: ch 1 D. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Although they were compiled from the court’s written judgments. 
18 Of related interest: Matthews “Theirs”. 
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English). Unlike the court records, the case reports (that is, the Jersey Judgments and 
the Jersey Law Reports) frequently refer to legal mterials cited to the court, and are 
consequently a valuable resource for identifying the sources of property law. 
 
The doctrine of precedent applies in Jersey though, it is stated, less strictly than in 
English law: if a decision is patently wrong, a judge may depart from it in a 
subsequent case on the same point.19 A comparison has been made with the doctrine 
of precedent as it operates in Scotland.20 In that jurisdiction, cases are a source of 
law,21 and it seems likely that this is the position in Jersey also. Perhaps a distinction 
could be made between reasoned decisions (including reasoned unreported cases, 
which have been recorded), and those decisions in respect of which reasons are not 
given (pre-1950). While the reasoned decisions are a source of law, the unreasoned 
decisions may be persuasive only. 
 
For property matters, the hierarchy of the courts is broadly from lowest to highest:22 
the Inferior Number of the Royal Court (judge of law with two Jurats);23 the Superior 
Number of the Royal Court, or Corps de Cour (Bailiff as the judge of law, with a 
minimum of five Jurats);24 the Court of Appeal;25 and the Privy Council.26 In 
practice, the involvement of the Superior Number in civil cases is minimal, and most 
cases are heard before the Inferior Number. Property law cases are usually heard by 
the Héritage or Samedi divisions of the Royal Court.27 In some circumstances, the 
Bailiff may sit as sole judge.28 On average, a handful of property cases are decided 
                                                 
19 State of Qatar v Al Thani 1999 JLR 118, 124 – 127, per Bailhache, Bailiff (see also: Nicolle Origin 
97 – 99), but consider In re Barker 1985 – 86 JLR 186, 191, per Hoffmann, JA. Also, see g nerally: 
Mautalent-Reboul, 708 – 717; (Guernsey) Dawes Laws 13 – 16. 
20 State of Qatar, ibid 124. 
21 For example: SME vol 22, 247 et seq. Consider also: (Quebec) Gall, 275 – 276. 
22 See also: Nicolle Origin 99 – 100. 
23 The judges of law are the Bailiff, the Deputy Bailiff, a Lieutenant Bailiff, or a Commissioner. See: 
Bois History 2/2; Royal Court (Jersey) Law 1948, arts 10 – 12. The Jurats are lay justices, and judges 
of fact. See further: Hanson “Jurats”. 
24 Royal Court (Jersey) Law 1948, art 16(1). The 1948 Law restricted the Jurats to judges of fact 
alone: art 15. See also: Metzner v AG 2010 JLR N22 (summarising law on doléance); Le Gros, 151, 
479. 
25 Court of Appeal (Jersey) Law 1961, art 1. Comment: Olsen “Court”; Sowden “Origin”; Hanson 
“Civil”.   
26 Court of Appeal (Jersey) Law 1961, art 14. Comment: Southwell “Appeals”. 
27 The other divisions are Probate and Family: Royal Court Rules 2004, r3/1. 
28 Where the issues raised are of law only: Royal Court (Jersey) Law 1948, art 17. 
 9 
each year. Many of these are decided by the Royal Court (Inferior Number) and so 
are not binding precedents, but where, as here, sources are few such cases clearly 
merit consideration.  
 
In addition to hard copy, the Jersey Law Reports are available on the Jersey Legal 
Information Board website, together with unreported ju gments from 1997 onwards 
(which are password protected). The process of uploading the Jersey Judgments to 
that site is ongoing. Thus, there has been a revolution in access to Jersey cases in the 
years since 1950. Since its inception in 1999, the Jersey Legal Information Board 
website has done a great deal to further this work. This improved accessibility 
facilitates the doctrine of precedent. 
 
D. JURISTIC WRITING 
 
Law gives rise to comment,29 and where comment is made in written form, by 
lawyers, in a scholarly fashion, this may be called juristic writing. In civilian 
systems, juristic writing has traditionally been held in high regard or even viewed as 
authoritative.30 Historically, mixed systems have tended towards this civilian 
practice,31 and Jersey is no exception among their number.32 Juristic writing plays an 
important part in the elucidation of Jersey property law. Most significant are the 
contributions of three local writers on Jersey law: Jean Poingdestre, Philippe Le 
Geyt, and Charles Sydney Le Gros.33 Some non-native writers have also achieved 
prominence,34 and reference to works on Continental Norman law in the present 
work is guided by those referred to in the cases considered,35 such as Terrien,36 
                                                 
29 For example: Dickens Oliver 354. 
30 For example: Tunc “Methodology” 468 – 472; Jestaz & Jamin Doctrine; Steiner Comparative ch 9. 
Consider also: Cohn German vol 1, 6, para 8. 
31 For example: (Louisiana) Barham “Methodology”; (Quebec) Gall, 276; (South Africa) 
Zimmermann & Visser Southern 11 – 12; (Scotland) SME vol 22, paras 433 – 445, 534 – 538. 
32 See: ch 1 G. Matthews & Sowden, Foreword by LH Hoffmann (Feb 1988): “Furthermore, Jersey 
preserves the Continental tradition by which learned treatises can acquire an authority beyond 
anything accorded to writers in England.” On the beginning of this practice, see 1861 Report, iv. 
33 On Poingdestre and Le Geyt: Mautalent-Reboul, 283 – 314. 
34 See, for example: Nicolle Origin, particularly sections: 6, 7, 9, 10. 
35 Also: Le Geyt on his sources in his own preface to the Manuscrits, ii. On the Continental 
commentators on the Reformed Custom: Mautalent-Reboul, 273 – 283. 
36 See: Nicolle Origin 13 – 15, 7.6 – 7.14; Dawes Terrien. References to Terrien are given as [book 
number].[chapter number]. 
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Basnage,37 Bérault, Godefroy, d’Aviron,38 and Houard.39 For the same reason, the 
work of Pothier is considered, although it is not cn erned with Norman customary 
law.40 
 
As with other older legal materials considered by the Jersey courts, the relevant 
works of all of these authors are in French. References to Roman law and its later 
development in the ius commune are common, and following these up often gives a 
greater understanding of the points being made. While t is is of interest and value to 
the scholar, it makes using these texts time-consuming, particularly as, for example, 
the older method of citing Roman sources is employed (modern references are given 
in this thesis).  
 
Jean Poingdestre (1609 – 1691), Lieutenant Bailiff41 o  Jersey from 1668 to 1676,42 
was the first of the Jersey writers.43 He wrote three accounts of the law.44 His 
Commentaires sur l’Ancienne Coutume de Normandie45 and Remarques et 
Animadversions sur la Coutume Reformée de Normandie46 w re commentaries on 
two of the Norman law customals (the Grand Coutumier and Coutume Reformée, or 
Reformed Custom, respectively)47 in which he detailed which parts represented 
Jersey law. Les Lois et Coutumes de l’Ile de Jersey,48 his “magnum opus”,49 
comprises short commentaries on particular topics. Some headings are meaningfully 
                                                 
37 Basnage Oeuvres (1st edn, 1678). See: Nicolle Origin 17 – 19. 
38 Whose commentaries were published together: Bérault, Godefroy, Bathelier d’Aviron 
Commentaires. See: Nicolle Origin 17 – 19. Poingdestre’s view of Bérault and Godefroy is mixed, but 
generally positive: Remarques Preface. 
39 Houard Dictionnaire. See: Nicolle Origin 20 – 21. 
40 Pothier was used as a source in, for example, Searley v Dawson (1971) 1 JJ 1687, and is 
authoritative in the law of obligations (see, for example: Kelleher “Sources”). Le Gros (18) describes 
Pothier as “cet auteur si éminemment judicieux, et si conciencieux dans les motifs de ses opinions”. 
On the use of non-Norman, French writers, see: Nicolle Origin 50, 14.10. Also: Mautalent-Reboul, 
663 – 684; (Guernsey) Jeremie, ch 1. 
41 A Lieutenant(-)Bailiff discharges the functions of the Bailiff in his absence: Bois, 25 – 27. 
42 “Notice Biographique sur Jean Poingdestre, Lieutenant-Bailli de Jersey” in Poingdestre 
Commentaires viii, x (reprinted: (1998) JLRev 134). 
43 Ibid v – xii. Landers “Poingdestre”. 
44 He is also the author of Caesarea, or a discourse of the Island of Jersey (1889). 
45 Published 1907. 
46 Never printed. Written circa 1680: Jersey Financial Services Commission v AP Black (Jersey) 
Limited 2002 JLR 294, 298, para 7, per Bailhache, Bailiff.  
47 See: ch 1 E. 
48 Published 1928. 
49 Poingdestre Lois preface. The work is 347 pages long. 
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grouped together (such as on public law, prescription, rentes, and things in common), 
but no overarching structure is imposed. 
 
Philippe Le Geyt (1635 (baptised) – 1716) succeeded Poingdestre as Lieutenant 
Bailiff in 1676.50 He was the author of Privileges, Loix & Coustumes de l’Isle de 
Jersey51 (known as the “Code Le Geyt”)52 and Les Manuscrits sur la Constitution, 
les Lois, et les Usages de cette Ile (his “Manuscrits”).53 The Code Le Geyt is an 
attempt to systematise the law. The Manuscrits comprise a great number of 
ruminations (“petites Remarques”)54 on specific points, and four short “treatises”, 
and were intended for Le Geyt’s personal use and assist nce, not for publication.55 
By his own admission, the Manuscrits are “sans liaison et sans ordre”.56 
 
Charles Sydney Le Gros (1867 – 1947) finished his Droit Coutumier de l’Ile de 
Jersey in 1943, during the German Occupation of Jersey, but it was not publicly 
available until after the Liberation.57 Like Poingdestre and Le Geyt, he too held the 
office of Lieutenant Bailiff.58 Like Poingdestre’s Lois et Coutumes and Le Geyt’s 
Manuscrits, his work evidences no overarching structure. Consequently, even taking 
all three writers’ works together, treatment of a number of questions and areas is 
absent.59 
                                                 
50 “Notice Biographique sur Jean Poingdestre, Lieutenant-Bailli de Jersey” in Poingdestre 
Commentaires xi. According to the 1861 Report (iv) he was Lieutenant Bailiff until 1711. Marett 
records that he resigned the office of Jurat in March (1710 –) 1711: RP Marett “Preface” in Le Geyt 
Manuscrits xix. 
51 Published 1953. On the job of reconstructing the Code Le Geyt, see the “Avis aux Lecteurs” to it. It 
is thought that the original manuscript no longer exists: Code Le Geyt “Avant-Propos” v. See also, 
1861 Report, iv. The Code Le Geyt is reviewed in (1955) 4 ICLQ 574. The reviewer’s name is not 
given, but it could have been the comparatist Charles d’Olivier Farran, who wrote “Judicial 
Machinery in the Channel Islands” in the same volume (46). 
52 “Avant-Propos” in Code Le Geyt v. References to the Code Le Geyt are given as [book 
number].[title number].[article number]. 
53 Published 1846 (by the States). RP Marett in his “Preface” to the Manuscrits records that various 
parts were finished in 1696, 1697, 1698, and 1701 (xxxiii, xxxv – xxxvi). 
54 Manuscrits Le Geyt’s preface, ii. 
55 Ibid: “Mon seul but n’a esté que de me diverter et de m’instruire moy-même.” Although the 
existence and tone of this preface indicate he expected others to read his work. 
56 Ibid. Also: 1861 Report, iv; RP Marett “Preface” in Le G yt Manuscrits vol 1, xl. 
57 PM Bailhache “Introduction” in Le Gros. The 2007 facsimile is reviewed by GL Gretton: (2009) 1 
EdinLR 170. Le Gros also wrote an “Etude compare du droit des gens mariés d’après l’ancienne 
coutume de Normandie et d’après le droit de Jersey” available in Vernon & Pilon Travaux 239. 
58 5 January 1946 – 17 March 1947 (when he died). 




There is a conspicuous time-gap between Le Geyt’s and Le Gros’s times of writing 
(circa 1716 – 1940s). During this period, legal systems elsewhere were undergoing 
significant legislative development60 and were the subject of much scholarly writing. 
Some descriptive accounts of Jersey law appeared during this period,61 and 
legislative reforms were also introduced,62 but there was nothing on the scale seen 
elsewhere in Europe. It is regrettable that no treatis s were produced locally of the 
like of Poingdestre’s Lois et Coutumes or Le Geyt’s Code or Manuscrits.63 This is 
perhaps particularly to be regretted of Robert Pipon Marett, the author of the 1880 
Law, and the Explanatory Letter to it,64 both of which demonstrate an impressive 
technical understanding of Jersey law. Marett is described by Le Gros as “[t]rès versé 
dans la science du droit”.65 In any event, there was comparatively little written on 
Jersey law and the pace of legislative change was considerably slower than 
elsewhere in Europe. Consequently, indigenous sources on a given point of law 
beyond the eighteenth century are often sparse, and old sources, often rooted in an 
ancient Norman customary law long abandoned in France itself, may have little to 
contribute to developing rules fit for the twenty-first century.  
 
In 1865, the Privy Council described Le Geyt as “as high an authority as can be 
produced on the local law of Jersey”66 and Terrien’s Commentaires as “a Book of 
                                                 
60 Such as codification in France (1804) and Germany (1900). 
61 Such as: 1861 Report; the First Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Enquire into the State of 
the Criminal Law in the Channel Islands (1847); Hemery & Dumaresq; Pipon & Durell. Regarding 
the circumstances surrounding the production of the reports of Hemery & Dumaresq and Pipon & 
Durell, see: Foster v AG 1992 JLR 6, 15 – 16, per Le Quesne, JA.  
62 For example: Loi (1832) sur les Décrets; Loi (1851) sur les Testaments d’Immeubles; Loi (1862) sur 
les Teneures en Fideicommis et l’Incorporation d’Associations; Loi (1880) sur la Propriété Foncière. 
Consider also: Lesaffer, 284.  
63 Aubin Digest (which was published during this period) is not of he same order. 
64 The Lettre explicative du projet de loi amendé sur la propriété foncière was reprinted in (1999) 
JLRev 41.  
65 Le Gros, 201 (also, of Marett (202): “L’hypothèque a été traité avec science et méthode”). 
66 Godfray v Godfray (1865) 3 Moo PC (NS) 316, 338, per Turner, LJ (see also: 340). Also: 1861 
Report, iv “Le Geyt’s essays, as is not surprising, are characterized by the multifariousness of the 
authorities cited, and the uncertainty of the conclusions. As these defects are imputable not so much to 
himself as to the obscurity of the subject at that period, and to the fact that these writings were not 
prepared by the author for publication, they only show a dread on his part of hasty and peremptory 
judgement, and we therefore feel justified in attaching the greater value to any such clear information 
of reasonable customs, consistently followed, as may be gathered from him, from Poingdestre, and 
from contemporary records”; RP Marett “Preface” in Le Geyt, Manuscrits, vol 1, xii, xxi; Code Le 
Geyt “Avant-Propos” vi (on the influence of Le Geyt); Nicolle v Wigram [1954] AC 301, 305. 
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authority in the Courts of Jersey”.67 The Privy Council’s description of Le Geyt 
could be interpreted as elevating him to the status of binding authority.68 Heavy 
reliance on one text is understandable when indigenous sources are few, but the work 
of one man should not be approached uncritically. Le Geyt himself would not have 
been in favour of such treatment, given his stated purpose of writing.69 Poingdestre’s 
work, although respected,70 has not been judicially described in the same way. Does 
this mean that his work is of lesser authority? Perhaps the difference is only due to 
Le Geyt’s Manuscrits having been printed around sixty years before Poingdestre’s 
Commentaires (1846 and 1907, respectively), and almost eighty years before Lois et 
Coutumes, the equivalent text to the Manuscrits. Compared to Poingdestre, Le Geyt 
is generally more discursive. The view has been expressed that when Le Geyt is sure 
on a point, his view carries more weight as it is the product of greater 
consideration,71 but this seems unfair to Poingdestre, who was clearly an able jurist. 
 
Compared to that of Poingdestre and Le Geyt, the work of Le Gros has attracted less 
praise. In part, this may be because it is much more recent, so such comment has not 
had the opportunity to accumulate, but there is also  perception that as a jurist Le 
Gros was not of the same order as Poingdestre and Le Geyt. Perhaps surprisingly, he 
does not demonstrate the same level of familiarity with Roman law and the ius 
commune as his predecessors, although he does make some refer nce to foreign 
sources such as Halsbury’s Laws of England and the French Civil Code. He 
frequently copies out court records and other works, from which he has derived the 
law on the point in question. Consequently, there is often no need to rely on Le Gros 
himself because his source can be relied upon. Le Gros’s work has been followed,72 
                                                 
67 La Cloche v La Cloche (1870) 6 Moo PC NS 383, 399, per Lord Westbury. Comparing Terrien, 
Bérault, and Godefroy: Poingdestre Remarques preface “Si bien que leur prefere, Terrien de bien 
loing”. 
68 Compare: Blackie Stair. But see also: Reid Third 46 – 49. 
69 See: ch 1 n55. 
70 On Poingdestre’s reputation: RP Marett “Preface” to Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, xii; ET Nicolle 
“Notice Biographique sur Jean Poingdestre, Lieutenant-Bailli de Jersey” in Poingdestre Commentaires 
particularly xii. 
71 1861 Report, iv. 
72 For example: Snell v Beadle 2001 JLR 118; Colesberg v Alton 2003 JLR 47; Gale v Rockhampton 
2007 JLR 332. 
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as well as criticised.73 This criticism is an example of juristic writing being treated as 
a contribution to legal thought: as persuasive, not binding, authority. 
  
The civilian view that juristic writing is a valuable resource is present in Jersey also, 
and it is in keeping with that culture that juristic writing – whether old (such as 
Terrien, Poingdestre, and Le Geyt) or relatively new (such as Le Gros, and Matthews 
and Nicolle) – should be treated as persuasive authority. Limits of time and resources 
have hampered critical engagement with juristic writing, but the establishment of the 
Jersey Law Commission74 and the Jersey and Guernsey Law Review75 have 
stimulated greater engagement in recent times. 
 
E. CUSTOMARY LAW  
 
A serviceable definition of customary law is given by Routier76 (a Continental 
commentator on Norman law), which Nicolle renders as: “unwritten law which has 
been introduced with the tacit agreement of the sovereign and the people as the result 
of having been observed for a considerable time”.77 “Customary law” also describes 
the law in the customals of Normandy.78 There are three great distillations of 
Norman customary law into written form: the Très-Ancien Coutumier (late twelfth – 
early thirteenth century), the Grand Coutumier (mid-thirteenth century), and the 
Coutume Reformée (or Reformed Custom, 1583).79 
 
                                                 
73 Mendonca v Le Boutillier 1997 JLR 142. 
74 www.lawcomm.gov.je. See also: Binnington “Gathering”. 
75 Began in 1997 as the Jersey Law Review and changed to its present name in 2007. 
76 1: “La COUTUME n’est autre qu’un DROIT non écrit, qui s’est introduit par un tacite 
consentement du SOUVERAIN & du PEUPLE, pour avoir été observée pendant un tems 
considérable.” 
77 Origin 31, 12.1. Also: Snell v Beadle 2001 JLR 118, 127, para 17, per Lord Hope of Craighead; A 
Binnington “The Law of Contract – Which Way?” in Bailhache 800 Years 59; J Kelleher “Cause for 
Consideration: Whither the Jersey Law of Contract?” in Bailhache 800 Years 69. Compare, for 
example: Erskine Institute 1.1.43. 
78 Consider also: Lemasurier, 28 – 42. 
79 See: Nicolle Origin 8, 9, 16; Everard, xviii – xx. Grand Coutumier is the title of the French version, 
which was predated by a Latin version: the Summa de Legibus ( ee: Everard “Introduction”; Nicolle 
Origin 9). Dobozy Mirror  28 et seq is of interest on customals in the 12th and 13th centuries. See 
generally: Besnier. 
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A related question is to what extent the customals of Normandy can be considered to 
be Jersey law. For Jersey, each of the three is an unofficial compilation. (The 
Reformed Custom was promulgated by the French king in 1585, but that was long 
after the separation of 1204.) As the general consensus is that the Très-Ancien 
Coutumier was compiled prior to the separation, it ought to represent the Jersey law 
of the time (in so far as local usage did not differ rom its terms). However, Kelleher 
warns that “There is no evidence that the [Très-Ancien Coutumier] was used as a text 
in Jersey at the time of its publication [although it] is clear […] that the [Grand 
Coutumier] was used.”80 Even if the Très-Ancien Coutumier had been used, it seems 
to have been superseded by the Grand Coutumier, aspects of the Reformed Custom, 
Jersey custom, Jersey legislation, and Jersey case-law, in respect of property law. 
 
The Grand Coutumier is thought to date from the middle of the thirteenth century.81 
Although it appeared after the separation of 1204, the gap was only of a few decades, 
and the Grand Coutumier is seen as a source of Jersey law.82 By contrast, the 
Reformed Custom did not appear until 1583, centuries after the separation. One view 
is that the Reformed Custom is merely a written illustration, or exposition, of aspects 
of customary law, but without authority in Jersey.83 While this was certainly true 
initially,84 it may be questioned whether such a description is still accurate. Based on 
Le Geyt,85 Nicolle draws the persuasive conclusion that the tradition of relying on 
the Reformed Custom has assimilated it into Jersey law.86 Obviously, this could only 
apply to those areas in which such reliance has been placed, but two examples (used 
later in this thesis) are the titles on servitudes and on things deemed moveable or 
immoveable. 
 
                                                 
80 J Kelleher “Cause for Consideration: Whither the Jersey Law of Contract?” in Bailhache 800 Years 
69. 
81 See: ch 1 n79. 
82 La Cloche v La Cloche (1870) 6 Moo PC NS 383, 398 – 399, per Lord Westbury.  
83 Le Quesne, 98. La Cloche v La Cloche (1872) LR 4 PC 325, 334, per Lord Justice James. Att Gen 
and Receiver Gen for Jersey v Turner (Sol Gen for Jersey) [1893] AC 326, 333, per Earl of Selbourne. 
84 Similar points are made about the 13th century German customal, the Sachsenspeigel, in Dobozy 
Mirror  7 et seq. See also: Lesaffer, 273 – 274. 
85 Manuscrits vol 1, preface i – ii. 
86 Origin 27, 11.14. 
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When using the customals to help to construct the modern law, as is sometimes done 
in this thesis, they present some obstacles to understanding: they are ordered in a 
fashion unfamiliar to a modern lawyer; and they contain some legal concepts which 




Legislation, cases, juristic writing, and customary law do not alone provide as 
complete a view of a modern system of property law as is achieved in many other 
legal systems. The problems are two-fold: some areas of detail are missing, and the 
structure of the law is itself often unclear.87 One way of addressing these gaps is by 
reference to foreign law. All legal systems borrow from others at some point, smaller 
ones more than others. The question is: from where? There is no single answer, but 
classifying a system assists the finding of foreign law which is most compatible. 
 
G. JERSEY: A MIXED JURISDICTION 
 
Houard states that Roman law was not followed in Normandy under the first Dukes88 
in the tenth century. The renaissance of Roman law began in the late eleventh 
century,89 and by Poingdestre’s time, reference to Roman law appears habitually to 
have been made: 
  
“[…] Droict Romain, qui est celuy que tout le monde suit en matière de 
Contracts, & autres, ou les coustumes n’ont rien pourvu de plus particulier.”90  
 
Underlying this is the common European view of Roman law as written reason.91 In 
Jersey, Poingdestre’s Lois et Coutumes and Le Geyt’s Manuscrits evidence frequent 
references to Roman law and its later development. Some areas of the law show quite 
                                                 
87 Consider, for example: Mautalent-Reboul, 616 – 617, 625. 
88 Houard Dictionnaire vol 1, preface, xxxviii. Also: Le Quesne, 77 – 78.
89 See: ch 3 C. There are some traces of Roman law in the Summa de Legibus: R Généstal “La 
Formation et le Développement de la Coutume de Normandie” in Havilland & Nézard Travaux 53 – 
55. Consider also: Dawson Oracles 263 – 266, 348 – 350. 
90 Poingdestre Remarques preface. Also: Poingdestre Lois 261; Poingdestre Commentaires 4. 
91 For example: Nicolle Origin section 13; Robinson & Fergus European Legal History 115. On 
Scotland (and Holland, and through it South Africa) see: Birks & McLeod “Introduction” 21. 
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full Roman influence,92 such as the chapter on the law of servitudes in the Reformed 
Custom (not present in the Grand Coutumier), which has been influential in Jersey.93 
Other examples are the law on accession,94 and on the classification of property.95 
The overall picture is that Jersey law has absorbed a significant amount of Roman 
law.96 
 
Influence from English law was resisted in the centuries following the separation. 
However, English law has gradually risen in importance, most significantly in areas 
such as tort and criminal law.97 Consequently, Jersey law bears, inter alia, significant 
evidence of civilian influence and English law influence. Therefore, Jersey can be 
described as a “mixed jurisdiction”, that is to say, a jurisdiction which draws 
inspiration both from (English) common law and from the civil law. It is increasingly 
understood that the mixed jurisdictions form a distinct legal family with 
commonalities in their structure and individual legal rules in spite of different legal 
histories. The mixed jurisdictions include Israel, Louisiana, the Philippines, Puerto 
Rico, Quebec, Saint Lucia, Scotland, the Seychelles, South Africa, and Sri Lanka.98 
 
It is noteworthy that property law in other mixed jurisdictions is not itself “mixed” 
but is almost entirely civilian.99 This thesis shows that that is true of Jersey property 
law also.100 Of course, there are points of similarity between civilian property law 
and common law property law, but usually only where th  latter has borrowed rules 
from Roman law.101 More frequently the detail does not converge. Unlike in English 
law, Jersey law has not developed on the basis of a sep ration between Law and 
                                                 
92 See also: Houard Dictionnaire vol 1, xxxviii et seq; Nicolle Origin section 13.  
93 See: ch 6 A(1). See also: nemo plus principle in Mendonca v Le Boutillier 1997 JLR 142 
(D.50.17.54). 
94 See: ch 4 E. 
95 See: ch 4. 
96 Consider, on Roman influence evidenced in Terrien’s work: Besnier, 152 – 157. Also, on Roman 
law influences which pre-date the ius commune: Mautalent-Reboul, 255 – 268, 318 – 327; Besnier, 47 
– 50. 
97 Nicolle Origin section 15; Southwell “Sources”; Le Geyt Manuscrits author’s preface, ii; 
Mautalent-Reboul, 643 – 660. 
98 Consider: Palmer Mixed; Papers from the First Worldwide Congress on Mixed Jurisdictions in 
(2003) 78 TulLRev; Gretton & Reid “Thoughts” 297, para 29 et seq. 
99 See, for example: Palmer Mixed 57.  
100 See: ch2 F, I(2), I(3); ch3 E(2), E(3), E(4), F(2), G; ch6 A(1), C(1), C(4)(a); ch7 I; ch8 C. 
101 See: ch3 E(1); ch7 E(1); ch9 A(4). 
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Equity,102 which underlines and partly explains the doctrinal differences between the 
two. Another point of difference, the nature and declin  of feudalism in Jersey, is 
explored in chapter four. 
 
H. FOREIGN LAW: SOME PROBLEMS AND SOME MERITS 
 
The sources of Jersey law are the subject of a debate, which focuses on the law of 
contract. The debate is ideological, rather than historical, and opinion is broadly 
divided over whether to develop the law of contract on the basis of English law, or of 
pre-codification French law (of which the work of Pothier is frequently taken to be 
the embodiment).103 The same debate does not arise over property law, because 
English law is too remote to be of much relevance.104 Indeed, contract law in 
common law and civil law jurisdictions is relatively close compared with the 
respective laws of property. Nonetheless, consideration of some issues raised 
regarding the sources of contract law brings further definition to the sources of the 
law of property.  
 
Various concerns have been voiced in the contract law debate: that the old customary 
law sources are insufficient to meet the needs of a modern legal system;105 that 
indigenous materials are insufficiently accessible;106 regarding the evils of “cherry 
picking” from other legal systems; and regarding the expense associated with 
researching foreign laws. Questions arising relative o the use of foreign law are: the 
place of French law, particularly post-codification; the place of other foreign laws; 
                                                 
102 See, for example: Ex parte Viscount Wimborne (1983) JJ 17; Trollope v Jackson 1990 JLR 192; 
Fiduciary Management v Sheridan 2002 JLR N11. For England, see: Carter History ch 8; Pollock & 
Maitland History vol 1, 189 et seq.  
103 See generally: Binnington “Frozen”; Southwell “Sources”; Kelleher “Sources”; Southwell “Note”; 
Southwell “Citation”; Dawes “Citation”; Hanson “Legal”; Dawes “Code”; R Southwell “The Sources 
of Jersey Law” in Bailhache 800 Years; P Hodge “The Value of the Civilian Strand” in Bailhache 800 
Years; A Binnington “The Law of Contract – Which Way?” in Bailhache 800 Years; J Kelleher 
“Cause for Consideration: Whither the Jersey Law of Contract?” in Bailhache 800 Years; A Ozanne & 
G Dawes “Guernsey Contract Law: Which Way?” in Bailhache 800 Years; Hanson “Jersey”. 
104 Rejection of English property law in Jersey: De Carteret v Baudains (1886) LR 11 App Cas 214, 
219, per Lord Blackburn. Also: Kwanza v Sogeo (1981) JJ 59, 76, per Ereaut, Bailiff; Nicolle Origin 
67, 15.26; Binnington “Frozen” 27. 
105 Binnington “Frozen”. 
106 Ibid; and, A Binnington “The Law of Contract – Which Way?” in Bailhache 800 Years 62 – 63. 
(Guernsey) Dawes “Citation” 76, para 13. 
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and when and how foreign law should be used. To these latter points, a preliminary 
question is whether it is necessary – or legitimate – to consider foreign law at all. 
 
Jersey law has a long-standing tradition of reference to, and adoption of, foreign law. 
Jersey continued to look to legal developments in co tinental Normandy after the 
separation of 1204. In customary law jurisdictions generally, it was common practice 
to refer to other customs (and also to Roman law) where local law did not provide an 
answer.107 The tendency of Jersey lawyers to look to France was observed by Royal 
Commissioners in their report of 1861,108 and this tendency has continued. English 
law is now also a point of frequent reference in some areas (but not property law).109 
 
Jersey’s use of foreign law is typical of many, and particularly of small, legal 
systems.110 The question is usually not whether to borrow, but which systems to look 
at (and when and how to do this). England will someti s refer to other 
Commonwealth countries, which makes sense because of the closeness of their 
laws.111 In the area of tort law, English law also borrows from Scots law (where 
“tort” is known as “delict”) and vice versa, because the two systems are very similar 
in that area.112 On the other hand, English property law is largely alien to Scots 
property law – as it is also to Jersey property law– so that reciprocal borrowing 






                                                 
107 On the common practice of looking at other customs see, for example: de Ferrière Fiefs preface, 1 
– 2; La Cloche (1870) 6 Moo PC NS 383, 401, per Lord Westbury. Also, works such as Lalaure. 
108 1861 Report, iii. Also: Nicolle Origin 52, 14.17. 
109 Nicolle Origin section 15 (compare with 1861 Report, iii: “It was indeed contended before us, that 
the common law of England has been introduced into Jersey. We do not see any proof of this […]”)  
110 A point made in respect of English law by Dawes “Citation” 72 – 73, para 8. Consider the 
influence of the French and German Civil Codes (see, for example: Zweigert & Kötz). 
111 A prominent example is: Overseas Tankship v Morts Dock and Engineering Co (The Wagon 
Mound) [1961] AC 388. 
112 The obvious example is Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31, [1932] AC 562.  
113 See, for example: Sharp v Thomson 1997 SC (HL) 66; Reid “Equity”; Gretton “Equitable”; SLC 
DP 114; SLC R 208. 
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I. WHICH SYSTEMS TO LOOK AT? 
 
Given the long-standing relationship, French law is an obvious possibility for legal 
“borrowing” in the area of property law. Mixed jurisdictions also fall to be 
considered. 
 
French law, loosely so called, can be separated into that of the period 1204 to 1804, 
and from 1804 to the modern day. 1204 was the date of the separation of the Channel 
Islands from continental Normandy, thus rendering continental Norman law foreign. 
However, Jersey law continued to follow legal developments in Continental 
Normandy. In 1804, there occurred a “second separation”114 when the laws of France 
were united and codified, and Norman law was abrogated in Normandy. Nicolle 
notes some Jersey legislation which has been modelled on the French Civil Code.115 
This echoes the way in which Jersey law developed following the first separation. 
There is some sense in this, for in some respects the French Civil Code represents the 
natural development of the previous law adapted to modern times.116 Additionally, 
aspects of property law (elements of the law of servitudes, for example) which were 
the same in Norman law and in Jersey law find close counterparts in the Code.117 
Obviously, there are many significant differences, of which the abolition of feudal 
land tenure in France is one.118 Nonetheless, French legal materials, both pre- and 
post-codification, continue to be an important resource for Jersey property law.119 
 
The mixed jurisdictions are also of interest, not simply because they are from the 
same legal family as Jersey, but also because the nature of the “mix” is similar in 
every case. As already mentioned, property law is always heavily civilian.120 Of the 
                                                 
114 Gretton & Reid “Thoughts” 289, para 7. 
115 Nicolle Origin 52, 14.17.  
116 Dawes “Code” 270, para 32. 
117 Consider, for example: arts 637, 640, 646, 647, 653, 82, 684, 687, 688, 689, 696, 701, 705, 708 
CC. Pannier Ruines; Nicolle Origin 52, 14.17. Dawes “Citation” 74 – 75, para 10, (3). Dawes “Code” 
270, para 32 (“Taking all the above into account it is suggested that the Code civil is best seen as 
being itself a new coutume”), 271, para 33, 272 – 277, paras 39 – 60. Also considered in: Southwell 
“Sources” 228. 
118 Consider also: Maynard v Public Services Committee 1996 JLR 210, 218, per Southwell, JA (but 
also: Nicolle Origin 47, 14.2). See: ch 2. 
119 Kwanza v Sogeo (1981) JJ 59, 76, per Ereaut, Bailiff. 
120 See: ch 1 n99. Also: Gretton & Reid “Thoughts” 289, para 8, 296 – 297, para 27.  
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mixed jurisdictions, Guernsey law is an obvious resource for Jersey law,121 a point 
not lost on Le Geyt.122 However, both systems share a lack of comprehensiv legal 
development in a number of key areas.123 Therefore, whilst Guernsey law may be a 
first port of call, it is likely that other systems will more frequently provide 
assistance. 
 
Among the most prominent mixed jurisdictions are Louisiana, Quebec,124 Scotland, 
and South Africa. All four are referred to in this thesis. As for Jersey (and Guernsey), 
the civilian aspect of the laws of Louisiana and Quebec came through the influence 
of French law.125 By contrast, the civilian elements of South African law came 
through Roman-Dutch law.126 Having derived civilian influence from the French and 
the Roman-Dutch traditions, Scotland sits somewhere in the middle.127 Unlike 
Jersey, Louisiana and Quebec are codified systems, while Scotland and South Africa 
are uncodified. Given the influence of French law (pre- and post-codification), 
Louisiana and Quebec appear to hold greatest interest for Jersey property law. 
However, it appears that, generally, more frequent r ference has been made to Scots 
law (and secondly to that of South Africa) albeit that the total number of instances is 
not great.128 
 
Geographical proximity is certainly part of the reason for this trend. A reference was 
made to Scots law in the 1861 Report,129 written at a time when people and books 
were less likely to make long journeys. For Jersey, an attraction of Scots and South 
African law, whether consciously appreciated or not, is their overall structure as 
                                                 
121 See, for example: Dawes Laws ch 1. 
122 RP Marett “Preface” in Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, xxvi. See also: Nicolle Origin 71, 16.2.1. 
123 A similar point is made by Dawes “Citation” 70, para 3. 
124 See also: Nicolle Origin 74, 16.4. 
125 Palmer Experience; Gall, 266 et seq. 
126 Zimmermann & Visser Southern ch 1. 
127 JW Cairns “Historical Introduction” in Reid & Zimmermann. 
128 For example: AG v Foster 1989 JLR 70, 1992 JLR 6 (CA) (reference made to South Africa also); 
Maynard v Public Services Committee 1995 JLR 65; State of Qatar v Al Thani 1999 JLR 118; Snell v 
Beadle 2001 JLR 118; Haas v Duquemin 2002 JLR 27 (reference is also made to South Africa). Also, 
Terrien in Scotland: Ford Scotland 257, 263, 271 – 272 (and J McNeill’s review in (2008) JGLR 385); 
R MacLeod, review of “George Joseph Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland” (2011) JGLR 260; a 
copy of Terrien was in the library of Charles Aerskine, professor at the University of Edinburgh from 
1707 (Baston Library Appendix A, F146). 
129 Evidence, 278 – 279, question 6286. 
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uncodified systems with case law which can readily be borrowed.130 Further, 
Louisiana, South Africa, and Scotland offer legal materials in English,131 which are, 
therefore, readily accessible to lawyers in Jersey for whom French is no longer the 
working language.132 Also, accessibility of foreign law has been revoluti nised 
through the internet. Legal databases serve greatly to augment law libraries. 
 
The Court of Appeal in Attorney General v Foster,133 a criminal appeal,134 was 
critical of references to Scots and South African lw, which had been based on the 
common link of Roman law between these jurisdictions a d Jersey. The scepticism 
expressed by the court may be justified in criminal law,135 but cannot be applied 
more widely without justification. Nevertheless, a note of caution may rightly be 
sounded. There is a time and a place for consideraton of foreign law.136 
 
J. WHEN AND HOW TO LOOK AT OTHER SYSTEMS 
 
Dawes suggests four guiding principles for the use of sources: (1) look at, and 
follow, home authorities first; (2) if these are insufficient or lacking, look at other 
Channel Islands authorities; (3) if these are insufficient or lacking, look at “the non-
Channel Island system of law most closely connected with the matter at issue”; and 
(4) “consider legal solutions to legal problems adopted by any other jurisdiction.”137 
This is a common-sense hierarchy, so it is unsurprising that it echoes a similar plan 
                                                 
130 On the nature of precedent in Scotland and South Africa, see, for example: (Scotland) SME vol 22, 
247 et seq; (South Africa) Zimmermann & Visser Southern 15. On Jersey, see: ch 1 nn19 – 21. 
131 Quebec is a partial exception as most commentary is in French. On these points generally: Gretton 
& Reid “Thoughts” 286, 299, para 35. 
132 JLC R10, 4; Hanson “Language”; Trotter; Hanson “Postscript”; Falle “Pen”; Royal Court Rules 
2004, r20/9. At the 2001 census, around 21% of Jersey residents spoke French or Jersey French either 
as a first or a second language. The figure drops significantly when considering only those with 
French or Jersey French as a first language: 0.5%. The results of the 2011 census are not yet available. 
Also: Kelleher, ch 5. 
133 1992 JLR 6, 30 – 31, per Le Quesne, JA. Comment: Southwell “Citation”; Dawes “Citation” 73 – 
75. 
134 See also: Nicolle Origin 75 – 77. 
135 Although for Scots criminal law, at least, the point is dubious. 
136 Nicolle Origin 75, 16.5.6: “Where there is no true link between the law of Jersey and the law of a 
foreign jurisdiction, the courts will be unlikely at the present day to seek guidance from the law of that 
jurisdiction.” See also, for example, the use of foreign law by the Privy Council in: Spread Trustee 
Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13 (Guernsey appeal). 
137 Dawes “Citation” 73 – 75, para 10. Compare: Official Solicitor v Clore (1983) JJ 43, 50 – 51, per 
Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
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set out by Routier, some 250 years earlier, for the interpretation of customary law,138 
and is consistent with the approach of the Court of Appeal in Haas v Duquemin,139 a 
case on property law. Following this pattern, the order for property law is: (1) Jersey; 
(2) Guernsey; (3) France and the mixed jurisdictions; and (4) anywhere else. While 
the fourth stage could be reached in a comparative cademic study of Jersey law, it is 
unlikely that it will be necessary to go to that level in the ordinary course of legal 
practice. 
 
According to Southwell, “citation of cases from other jurisdictions […] must be to 
the point, and informed by a sufficient understanding of the jurisdiction in 
question.”140 But if “a sufficient understanding” means undertaking study in a 
system,141 that would lead to potentially absurd results, with one set of advocates 
being qualified to cite only Jersey law and English law – having qualified in both 
jurisdictions – and the other only able to cite Jersey law and Scots law, for the same 
reason. Lord Hodge – who served as a Court of Appeal judge – has suggested all that 
is needed is “access to the leading textbooks on the property law of analogous 
jurisdictions”.142 This is a sensible approach, which takes account of the concerns 
expressed over increased burden of research on practitioners and consequent 
increased costs.143 
 
The “when” and “how” of looking at other systems have another aspect. From a 
scholarly perspective, an account of the law must aim to be systematic, lest the 
reader be “lost in a totally indigestible mass of casuistry”.144 The mass of casuistry 
(quite a small mass in Jersey’s case) is like scattered bones, which give little sense of 
the overall shape of the organism. Therefore, for the academic writer, the stage of 
considering foreign law is reached almost immediately. This is a second, most useful, 
employment for foreign law. Following the identification of broadly similar systems, 
                                                 
138 Routier, 3 – 9. Nicolle Origin 32 – 35. 
139 2002 JLR 27. Also: P Hodge “The Value of the Civilian Strand” in Bailhache 800 Years 42 – 43, 
48. 
140 R Southwell “The Sources of Jersey Law” in Bailhace 800 Years 31. 
141 Southwell “Citation” 68 – 69, para 10. 
142 P Hodge “The Value of the Civilian Strand” in Bailhache 800 Years 49. 
143 Southwell “Citation” 67 – 68, para 8.  
144 Zimmermann Obligations 24. 
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such systems can be plundered for their structure, ev n where individual rules may 
differ.145 The chapter of this thesis on real rights is an example of the use of foreign 
law to establish the structure of the law. When individual rules and statements are set 
against the backdrop of the civilian structure, it is seen that Jersey law fits readily 
into that structure. 
 
With a view of the whole, dealing with new cases becomes a much easier task, as 
does assessing the law for suitability to its modern purpose146 (avoiding taking “a 
medieval solution as if it were the last word in legal thought”).147 Foreign law 
presents the principal options for development. 
 
K. CONCLUSION  
 
Legislation, cases, juristic writing, and customary law provide the foundation for an 
account of property law. However, if looked at alone, the account is incomplete, in 
terms of individual rules, and particularly in terms of overarching structure. 
Therefore, the approach taken in this thesis is to use foreign law to assist in 
elucidating Jersey law. Sometimes, foreign law may be used to provide possible 
solutions where none exist.148 However, even indigenous material is illuminated 
when set against the backdrop of the European civilian legal tradition.149 
                                                 
145 As they often do. P Hodge “The Value of the Civilian Strand” in Bailhache 800 Years 42 – 43. 
Compare: Vaudin v Hamon [1974] AC 569, 582, per Lord Wilberforce (Guernsey appeal). Also: 
Southwell “Citation”; Dawes “Code” 281, para 68. 
146 Hanson “Jersey”. 
147 Dawes “Citation” 73 – 75, para 10. See similar comment: In re Barker 1985 – 86 JLR 186, 195, 
per Hoffmann, JA. 
148 For example: ch2 I(1), I(5), K; ch3 B; ch5 B; ch6 A(2)(a); ch7 H(2), K; ch8 F, I, J, K, L. 
149 For example: chs 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. 
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CHAPTER 2 – FEUDAL LAND TENURE 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
B. FEUDAL LAND TENURE 
C. DECLINE OF FEUDALISM 
D. REFORMS IN JERSEY 




What is feudal land tenure and what exactly of it remains in Jersey?1 These questions 
are considered as a precursor to examining the transfer of immoveable property inter 
vivos. The aim is to ascertain the content of the “ownership” of those holding feudal 
land: what is held and what transferred? The account f feudal law which follows is 
intended only to sketch the background to the current J rsey law. Consequently, it is 
brief. 
 
In his Medieval Land Tenures in Jersey, de Gruchy describes the medieval method of 
transfer as a “non-feudal act”,2 apparently because transactions took place without 
the necessary involvement of a feudal overlord (or seigneur).3 If true, “non-feudal” 
must also describe modern land transactions.4 Crucially, however, even if the 
mechanism is not feudal, the content of what is transferred still may be. 
 
B. FEUDAL LAND TENURE 
 
Meaningful generalisations about feudalism and feudal land tenure are difficult or 
impossible to make, for both span many centuries and have been subject to 
                                                 
1 See generally, for example: Tabuteau; Le Patourel, 26, 74 – 88; Ganshof; Lemasurier, 52 – 53, 115, 
127 – 144, 307 – 315; Mautalent-Reboul, 443 – 463; Lesaffer, 150 – 155, 199 – 200, 227 – 232; chs 
28 – 32, 44 GC (for example); Terrien, 5.2 et seq; arts 99 – 212 RC (and Poingdestre’s Remarques); 
Poingdestre Lois 308 – 309; Code Le Geyt 3.2 – 3.3; Le Gros, (for example) 135 – 144, 209 – 217, 
385 – 391, 507. Of related interest: Falle & Kelleher; Dorey “Rights”. Also (Guernsey): Le Marchant, 
vol 1, book 5; Carey, 103; Jeremie; Dawes Laws 619 – 621. 
2 De Gruchy, 158, 131. 
3 Illustrated by: de Gruchy, 147, 151. On seigneurs, see: ch 2 B. 
4 See: ch 5. 
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continuing change.5 However, the essence of feudalism could be described as a 
society structured entirely around rights and obligations intrinsically connected with 
the land. At the head of the system was the sovereign, of whom everyone held land, 
directly or indirectly, in exchange for services, analogous to a long lease.6 The 
parcels of land were “fiefs”.7 The tenant   8 of the sovereign could give rights to 
another over the land (or part of it) in exchange for services (“subinfeudation”).9 
“Feudal land tenure” describes the different types of relationship wherein possession 
of land is exchanged for particular obligations. The practice of subinfeudation meant 
that “chains” were built up, theoretically with no limit of length, although there is a 
limit beyond which lengthening is impractical, and in Jersey “chains” appear to 
involve no more than three persons,10 as in the diagram below: 
 
Sovereign 
       ↕ 
 Seigneur 
       ↕ 
  Tenant 
 
The person at the bottom of the feudal chain is the only person with the right actually 
to possess the land. A tenant (or vassal)11 is someone who holds land of another in 
feudal tenure.12 The sovereign is the ultimate superior,13 and so tenant to no-one. The 
seigneur in the diagram above is tenant to the sovereign. A seigneur is a feudal 
                                                 
5 For example, the power of the sovereign or princes wa  not static: Le Quesne, 79. Types of tenure, 
their content, and their volume of use also varied from place to place and from time to time. For this 
reason, reference to non-Jersey works – such as Terrien, 5.2 et seq – must be made with caution. 
6 Of which there were approximately 33 in 1861: 1861 Report, viii. 
7 A fief is a piece of land held in feudal tenure, which piece has been granted – at least nominally – in 
the context of a reciprocal relationship between grantor and grantee. See: Pothier Traité des Fiefs 
paras 1, 2; (on the origin of fiefs and the word “fief”) de Ferriere Fiefs 6, 8. Mollet “Contrats” 195: 
“In the 11th century the land in Jersey was divided up into about 110 fiefs, each held by a Seigneur 
who had a manor and a feudal court. The land was then sub-let to tenants”. Kelleher, 16, and 17: 
“Between the twelfth and twentieth centuries 245 fiefs are said to have existed in Jersey, though not 
all simultaneously.”  
8 “Tenant” is the usual word in Jersey, where “vassal” i  little-used: Le Quesne, 92 (but see: ch 2 n11). 
A tenant of the sovereign is called a tenant in capite: Le Quesne, 474. Also: Aubin, 260. 
9 On whether a vassal could subinfeudate without the consent of the seigneur in Normandy: Terrien, 
172. Also: de Ferriere Fiefs 61.  
10 Not explicitly stated, but implied from: Le Quesne, 2; de Gruchy, generally, and 39; Aubin; 
Kelleher, for example. Compare: (Guernsey) Ogier R formation 17 – 18. The power of the sovereign 
or princes was not always pre-eminent (for example: Le Quesne, 79). 
11 Poingdestre uses both terms: Lois 61. 
12 On this relationship: Basnage Oeuvres vol 1, 291. 
13 See: 1861 Report, viii. Also: 1861 Report Evidence, 311, question 6963 et seq. 
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superior: someone of whom land is held. Thus, in the diagram, the sovereign is 
seigneur to “Seigneur”, who, in turn, is seigneur to “Tenant” at the bottom of the 
feudal chain. 
 
Subinfeudation, although never prohibited by legislat on, as it was in England, 
ceased to be practised in Jersey from about the sevnteenth century.14 Even before 
that time, subinfeudation must have been uncommon, given that all land today is 
either held directly of the Crown or of a seigneur who holds directly of the Crown.15 
In theory, it seems that subinfeudation is still possible, but the abolition of most 
feudal rights16 has stripped it of any value. Contracts for the ali n tion of land in 
Jersey are substitutions, not subinfeudations.17 
 
As well as subinfeudation, one t nant could be wholly substituted by another, 
hitherto unfeatured, party (a substitution): one step  out and another steps in.18 The 
effect of this is to remove the original tenant completely from the feudal chain. In the 
diagram below, A makes a grant in favour of B, who now has the right to possess the 
land (as he is at the bottom of the chain) but also takes on A’s obligations to 
Seigneur. A is thus completely removed from the feudal chain. 
 








       ↕ 
Seigneur 






       ↕ 
Seigneur 








The nature of the rights and obligations varied with geographical location and over 
time. Comparison between Normandy, Jersey, and Guernsey demonstrates this,19 as 
does comparison with other areas to which feudalism spread, such as England, 
                                                 
14 1861 Report, viii; 1861 Report Evidence, 310, para 6952 et seq. Also: de Gruchy, 37. 
15 See: ch 2 n10. 
16 See: ch 2 D. 
17 1861 Report, viii. Also: Falle, 160, para 10. 
18 The consent of the sovereign is required for transfer of the fiefs Haubert (see: ch 2 n21), but not of a
seigneur: de Gruchy, 131. On whether a vassal could subinfeudate without the consent of the superior: 
de Ferriere Fiefs 42; Poingdestre Lois 181 – 183. 
19 De Gruchy, particularly 141. Also: Le Quesne, 51. 
 28
Scotland, and Quebec.20 In Jersey, there appear to be a small number of different 
types of tenure, including homage and knight’s servic  (the fiefs de Haubert),21 
grand serjeanty or service de chevalrie (a lesser form of knight’s service),22 bordage 
or sergenté (a peasant tenure),23 and aumône (church tenure, where the giver of the 
land does not retain anything except “the lordship of atronage”).24 There have been 
suggestions that there might be pockets of allodial land – land not held in feudal 
tenure – but it may simply be that the “evidence of tenure has been lost”.25 
 
Even within a particular type of tenure, rights and obligations varied,26 but some 
examples can be given. The année de succession was a right27 of the seigneur to 
possess land for one year upon the death of the tenant without lineal heirs.28 Tenant’s 
obligations also included: payment in eggs, birds, and the like;29 carting wine, hay, 
and wood;30 money payments;31 making an aveu, or record, of all the land held on 
the seigneur’s fief and all rentes due on it (or face a penalty);32 and the more 
colourful “annual dinner to the king at Michelmas” (taken by Bailiff, Viscount, and 
King’s Clerk in the King’s absence).33 There is some evidence of a long-standing 
                                                 
20 (England) Pollock & Maitland History vol 1, 89 et seq, for example; (Scotland) GL Gretton “The 
Feudal System” in Reid Property, KGC Reid “Property Law: Sources and Doctrine” in Reid & 
Zimmermann, vol 1, 186; (Quebec) Gall, 266 et seq. Feudal law was not adopted in Louisiana or 
South Africa. 
21 Le Quesne, 91; 1861 Report, viii – ix; de Gruchy, 114 – 115. On the privileges connected with this 
tenure (droit de colombier, droit de Moulin): Le Quesne, 92 – 93; de Gruchy, 86 – 87, 128 – 129). The 
fiefs de Haubert are St Ouen, Rozel, Trinity, and Samarès (Le Quesne, 93). 
22 Le Quesne, 93. 
23 See the various views of: Havet, 100 – 106; de Gruchy, ch2; Aubin. 
24 De Gruchy, 92. 
25 1861 Report, viii; ibid 145 – 146. 
26 De Gruchy, 85. 
27 This is always characterised as a right, rather than an obligation, perhaps because it is passive on the 
part of the obliged. 
28 Le Quesne, 88 – 89; 1861 Report, x, xi; Le Gros, 135 – 144; de Gruchy, 124 – 126. De Gruchy, 
125: “But the actual taking over of the tenement is now, and has long been, very rare, the practice 
being for the heir to settle for a lump sum in cash down, usually the gross rental value less 25%.” It 
has now been abolished: ch 2 D. 
29 Le Quesne, 83, 263. 
30 Ibid 93; 1861 Report, ix; de Gruchy, 47, 138. 
31 Le Quesne, 83; 1861 Report, ix; de Gruchy, 48, 52. 
32 Le Quesne, 91 – 92; 1861 Report, x; de Gruchy, 50, 134. Also: Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 2, 132 – 
133. 
33 Le Quesne, 83.  
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tendency towards commutation of feudal obligations for money.34 All of these feudal 
rights and obligations have been abolished.35 
 
Certain tenants (known as “franc tenants”)36 holding of the Crown owe suit of court 
on the first day of term of the Héritage Court.37 This obligation is still in existence, 
although it may be doubted whether three consecutive defaults would result today in 
escheat, as it once did.38 Other obligations which do not appear to have been 
abolished pertain to the fiefs de Haubert. The seigneurs of Rozel, Fief des Augrès, 
and Samarès must ride on horseback into the sea up to the girth belt to meet the 
visiting sovereign, and the seigneurs of both Rozel and Fief des Augrès must act as 
the sovereign’s butler during the visit.39 The seigneur of Trinity must present two 
mallards to the visiting monarch.40  
 
C. DECLINE OF FEUDALISM 
 
Over time, feudal law became a decreasingly accurate reflection of society. With the 
French Revolution came its abolition in France.41 Thereafter, Quebec followed suit.42 
In England, although subinfeudation was prohibited n 1290,43 the coffin continues to 
elude the final nail. In Scotland, feudal law was finally abolished comparatively 
recently, in 2004,44 by which point it had diminished to being nothing more than an 
outmoded and largely irrelevant aspect of the law relating to immoveable property.  
 
                                                 
34 Ibid 83, 86, 263; 1861 Report, ix; de Gruchy, 125. 
35 See: ch 2 D. 
36 For a list: Le Quesne, 31. 
37 Ibid 31, 33; 1861 Report, ix; Havet, 68 – 74; Mollet “Assise”. De Gruchy records an amusing error 
made in the 19th century when homage was confused with suit of court (88). 
38 Le Quesne, 31. 
39 Perhaps on a rota? Le Quesne, 82, 83; de Gruchy, 68. 
40 De Gruchy, 75; Dalido, 333. 
41 By arrêté of 11 August 1789.  
42 Abolition of Feudal Rights and Duties in Lower Canada Act 1854. 
43 Quia Emptores. 
44 By the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc (Scotland) Act 2000. “Real burdens” were preserved: Title 
Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003. Reasons for the endurance of the feudal system until that point are 
given in Reid Abolition, para 1.6. An instructive account of the Scottish feudal system in the 1990s is 
GL Gretton “The Feudal System” in Reid Property. A significant part of this account is of general 
application. Also, for comparison: Farran Principles.  
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From the nineteenth century onwards, legislative reforms have stripped away feudal 
law in Jersey, but – in spite of attempts to do so – feudalism has never been fully 
abolished. What now remains? Some significant statutory reforms are considered. 
 
D. REFORMS IN JERSEY 
 
In 1861, the view of the Royal Commissioners was tht e “basis of the Law of Real 
Property in Jersey is the general Feudal Law, as qulified by local circumstances, but 
much less altered by legislation than in England.”45 While the first part of this 
statement is still true, the second is no longer so.46 As noted by the Commissioners, 
at the time that the 1861 report was written, the States had passed a projet de loi for 
the commutation of seignorial rights, which was awaiting Royal sanction, 
presumably the Loi (1860) sur la Commutation des Droits Seigneuriax.47  
 
The preamble to the 1860 law records that the States wished to encourage “autant 
que possible l’abolition des Droits Seigneuriaux”. These words paint a picture of a 
legislature desirous to dismantle entirely the remnants of feudalism in Jersey. The 
1860 law provided a mechanism for discharge of feudal obligations by agreement 
between seigneur and tenant, in exchange for compensation.48 Further legislation on 
the commutation of seignorial rights appeared in 1923 and in 1953. The Loi (1923) 
sur la commutation des Droits Seigneuriaux provided that all feudal obligations 
could be commuted by the payment of a certain percentag  of the capital value of the 
land to the seigneur,49 distinguishing between open land (4%) and land which had 
been built upon (3%).50 The preamble to the 1923 Law expresses a sentiment similar 
to that in the 1860 Law, albeit in attenuated form, invoking the idea that the t nant’s 
ability to free himself of seignorial rights is in the public interest.51 Under this law, 
the consent of the seigneur to the redemption was no longer required: the tenant 
                                                 
45 1861 Report, viii. 
46 For example: Le Gros, Préface, IV; Dalido, 336 et seq. 
47 This loi was sanctioned, in accordance with the commissioners’ r commendation: 1861 report, 83. 
48 Art 1. Various feudal rights are described in 1861 Report, xi. 
49 Compare the fate of the French seigneurs: Maine Early 323 – 324. 
50 Art 1. 
51 “Considérant qu’il est d’intérêt public de donner aux propriétaires d’héritages en cette Ile la faculté 
de tenir leurs propriétés franches de tous droits, redevances et services Seigneuriaux”. 
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could initiate the process unilaterally.52 Article 8 extends the application of the Law 
to tenants holding of the sovereign, but only in respect of the right of année de 
succession.53 The Seignorial Rights (Commutation) (Amendment) (Jersey) Law 1953 
changed the percentages of land value given by the 1923 Law to 1½% and 1%, 
respectively.54 
 
A further incursion on seigneur’s rights followed the introduction of the Loi (1862) 
sur les teneures en fidéicommis et l’incorporation d’associations.55 The Law 
provided that juristic persons could own immovable property.56 When this happens, 
the immovables are permanently purged of all seignor al rights and obligations, 
excepting rentes, but the seigneur of the fief on which the land is situated is 
compensated.57 
 
The States attempted to abolish feudal rights and obligations fully in 1886. In that 
year, a projet de loi58 sought “completely [to] abolish feudal rights”,59 with 
compensation to be paid to the s igneurs.60 The lengthy preamble denounces the 
feudal system as, among other things, “contrary to any idea of natural equity and 
condemned by public opinion and by reason”.61 The projet failed to receive Royal 
sanction following the filing of a petition against it by a number of seigneurs.62 
 
The most recent law to impact on the feudal system is the Seignorial Rights 
(Abolition) (Jersey) Law 1966. It abolished the remaining rights generative of 
significant revenue for the seigneur: the année de succession63 and “the right to the 
                                                 
52 Art 1. 
53 See: ch 2 n28. This right has since been abolished entirely: ch 2 D. 
54 Art 2. 
55 The same year as the first full-scale UK Companies Act: Companies Act 1862. 
56 Art 1. 
57 Art 13. 
58 Projet de Loi abolissant les Droits et Services Féodaux ou Seigneuriaux. 
59 Preamble. 
60 Art 2. This course of action was suggested by Mr Gibaut in his evidence to the commissioners: 
1861 Report Evidence, question 7082. 
61 Preamble to the 1885 projet de loi. 
62 See: Le Gros, 139, 140, 141, 370. 
63 Art 1, para 1(a). 
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possession of property during a ‘décret’ [a type of insolvency proceeding]”.64 
Tavernage dues were also abolished,65 along with any restriction on the division or 
alienation of land that was consequential on a seignor al right.66 The rights to 
property by escheat and rights to choses gaives,67 and varech68 now vest in the 
Crown.69 Article 4 provides that “[i]n all contracts of alienation or division of land, 
the vingtaine [subdivision] of the parish,70 instead of the fief, where the land is 
situated shall be stated.” The precise boundaries of the fiefs are, in many cases, 
already uncertain,71 and the consequence of article 4 will be increasing u certainty. 
In contrast to the earlier Laws, abolition of feudal rights and obligations under the 
1966 Law required no action from either party, and no compensation was paid. 
 
Why does feudalism remain in Jersey? Kelleher observe  strong anti-seignorial 
feeling among the populace in 19th century Jersey.72 This led to reform of the feudal 
laws of succession, and progressive abolition of seigneurs’ rights, but fell short of 
dismantlement of the entire structure. Kelleher notes the seigneurs’ desire to retain 
their (valuable) rights, and also that “legislative attempts at abolition were 
undermined by a fear that this would have a profound effect on property prices and 
the land laws.”73 This explains why complete abolition was not achieved before 
1966, but not why the 1966 Law, although abolishing the remaining seignorial rights 
of significant pecuniary value, did not eradicate the feudal edifice completely. 
Interestingly, the projet de loi was much broader in its scope. Article 1 called for the 
                                                 
64 Ibid para 1(b). See also: Loi (1904) (amendement no. 2) sur la propriété foncière art 7, which 
placed a time limit of a fortnight within which the s igneur had to enforce the right if he intended to 
exercise it. On décret: Matthews & Nicolle, 69 – 72, paras 7.1 – 7.19. 
65 Art 5. On tavernage, see also: Règlement (1873) sur les Taverniers; Licensing (Jersey) Law 1950; 
de Gruchy, 135 – 136. 
66 Art 3. 
67 Abandoned things of which the owner is unknown: Le Gros, 474. 
68 Wrecks of the sea: flotsam, jetsam and lagan. 
69 Art 2. 
70 Jersey is divided into twelve parishes. They are: St Ouen, St Peter, St Brelade, St Mary, St 
Lawrence, St John, Trinity, St Helier, St Saviour, St Clement, St Martin, and Grouville. See further: 
Le Patourel, 99 – 101; Lemasurier, 53, 144 – 161, 315 – 321; Kelleher, 20 – 26. 
71 1861 Report, viii. 
72 18, 150. Also: Aubin Digest “Feudal tenures.– Feudal exactions prevail to a more extensive and 
humiliating degree at present in Jersey than even th y did centuries ago. The Royal Court lends itself 
to the influence of the feudal Lords, and in every instance sanctions their exactions. The enumeration 
of these feudal exactions would cause Englishmen and our neighbours from ‘la belle France’ to blush 
for our sake.” 
73 209 (also: 211 – 212). 
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abolition of “[a]ll seignorial rights, dues and services […] with the exception of 
rentes.” The 1966 Law as enacted provided for the abolition of specific, named rights 
only. The reason for this change appears to be that some of the francs tenants wished 
to retain the obligation of suit of court, and the legislature saw no evil in this. 
However, the final wording of the 1966 Law means that t e feudal edifice is still in 
place, and that some obligations, in addition to suit of court, remain.74 
 
E. MODERN LAW 
 
Although the rights of seigneurs are greatly reduced, they still have a right in the 
land, and ownership of land remains feudal. What does this mean in practice? The 
nature of the rights of seigneur and tenant has been the subject of debate among ius 
commune writers.75 The growing influence of Roman law brought with it a desire to 
rationalise feudal “ownership” in the Roman form.76 Thus, it was argued that the 
tenant’s right was a burden77 on the seigneur’s ownership,78 and even the converse: 
that it was the seigneur’s right which burdens the tenant’s ownership.79 Another view 
was that ownership is divided between the enant, the seigneur(s), and the ultimate 
seigneur: the sovereign.80 
 
This European debate does not appear to be recited in the Jersey sources. Two 
comments by Poingdestre could suggest that he saw the right of the tenant (he 
employs the civilian terminology: dominium utile)81 as a burden on the seigneur’s 
ownership (dominium directum),82 but the use of dominium in both cases suggests 
                                                 
74 See: ch 2 B, final para. 
75 Summarised by GL Gretton: “The Feudal System” in Reid Property para 50. 
76 Schrage, 42. 
77 Just as a servitude, usufruct or hypothec is a burden on ownership (see: ch 3 K). 
78 By Cujas. For example: JW Cairns “Craig, Cujas, and the Definition of a Feudum: Is a Feu a 
Usufruct?” in Birks Perspectives. 
79 This appears to be the view of Pothier: T aité du droit de domaine de propriété para 3. Also, for 
example: (Scotland) Heritors of Strathblane v Corporation of Glasgow (1899) 1 F 523, 531, per Lord 
President Robertson. 
80 For example: J Domat Les Loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel (1689) 1.4.10.6. 
81 Remarques art 508. Or domaine utile. Le Gros also uses this terminology: 135, 137. Also: 
Poingdestre Lois 76; Basnage Oeuvres vol 1, 291, where “le domaine direct” is described as “un droit 
incorporel”. 
82 Poingdestre Lois 304. Or domaine direct: the right of a mid-seigneur. The Crown has dominium 
eminens or domaine eminent. See: ch 2 n79 (Pothier). See generally: Houard Dictionnaire vol 1, 549; 
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that both have ownership, and thus that feudal landin Jersey is land in which there is 
more than one right of ownership. Whatever the position, Le Gros, although 
occasionally employing the civilian (feudal) terminology of “dominium” and 
“domaine directe”,83 uses “propriété” in a way which implies the modern civilian 
conception of (unitary) ownership.84 Matthews and Nicolle do not refer to feudal 
tenure, but to “ownership of land” which “may be enjoyed by a single person as sole 
owner, or by two or more persons as co-owners.”85 Arguably, this use of “propriété” 
or “ownership” is simply a convenient way of referring to the dominium utile of land, 
but it seems that a conceptual shift from dominium utile towards unitary ownership, 
although not complete, has accompanied the decline in significance of seigneur’s 
rights. 
 
A legislative desire to abolish the feudal system is shown in the defeated projet of 
1886 and in the projet relating to the 1966 Law, not to mention the less ambitious 
legislation that received Royal sanction. As seigneurs’ rights subside, the 
anomalousness of continuing to hold land in feudal tenure grows. What is the 
purpose of a right – the seigneur’s dominium directum – with no content? This 
criticism stands whether dominium directum is considered to be some form of 
ownership, or a burden upon ownership. 
 
It may be that suit of court at the Assize d’Héritage and the services due to the 
visiting sovereign are considered to have value because they are the continuance of 
long-standing practice and tradition. Le Quesne saw “no advantage in abolishing old 
customs merely because they are old and of no greatp ac ical value, if they connect 
the present with the past, and produce no practical evil or impediment.”86 There is, 
however, no reason why these traditions could not be maintained on a voluntary 
footing, and the feudal abolition programme completed. 
                                                                                                                                
Feenstra Fata “Les origins du dominium utile chez les Glossateurs (avec un appendice concernant 
l’opinion des Ultramontani)”; R Feenstra “Dominium and ius in re aliena: The Origins of a Civil Law 
Distinction” in Birks Perspectives; Akkermans, 61 – 64. 
83 135, 137. 
84 For example: 18, 173, 230. 
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Property rights form a class distinct from rights arising in the law of obligations.1 
The former are known as “real rights” (droits réels), the latter as “personal rights” 
(droits personnels). This distinction is fundamental to private law in civil law 
systems, and to a lesser extent in common law systems (although the civilian 
                                                 
1 Both are patrimonial rights (see, for example: Yiannopoulous Property para 201). On the concept of 
patrimony see, for example: Pallot; (France) Malaurie & Aynès, 7 et seq, Patault, 101, para 85; 
(Louisiana) Yiannopoulous Property para 196; (Quebec) Lamontagne Bi ns 121 et seq, arts 2, 3 CC.  
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terminology is little used).2 Property law is that part of the law concerned with real 
rights. Given this, one would expect the distinction between real rights and personal 
rights to be patent in the Jersey sources. In fact,it is not. On closer examination, 
however, the twin concepts of real right and personal right infuse much of the private 
law of Jersey. 
 
What are the characteristics of a real right? How do real rights differ from the 
English law terminology of realty, real property, and rights in rem? What are the real 
rights in Jersey law? Is the list fixed (numerus clausus) or is it open, giving parties 
freedom to devise real rights of their own (numerus apertus)? In what ways can the 
class be subdivided? 
 
B. WHAT IS A REAL RIGHT? 
 
A real3 right is a right directly in a thing (an item with pecuniary value); a personal 
right is a right against a person or a fixed class of persons.4 Classification of rights as 
either real or personal helps to explain their nature and content. However, a precise 
definition of a real right is difficult because there is more than one type of real right. 
(This is equally true of personal rights, which may rise in contract, tort, or 
unjust(ified) enrichment.)5 Nonetheless, there are shared characteristics within the 
class of real rights.6  
 
As already stated, a real right is a right mediated through a thing: it is a right directly 
in a thing. Of course, real rights are, like any other rights, ultimately enforced against 
                                                 
2 See, for example: (France) Larroumet, 11, para 11; (England) Stein Dispute 157, Hill v Tupper 
(1863) 2 H&C 121, 159 ER 51, discussion by Swadling (221 et seq); (Louisiana) Yiannopoulos 
Property 384; (Quebec) Lamontagne Biens 57 – 58; (Scotland) Reid Property 8 – 9, para 3; (South 
Africa) van der Merwe Things 35, para 42. 
3 “Real” is from Latin (“res”, meaning “thing”): New SOED vol 2, 2493.  
4 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 280. Basnage Oeuvres vol 1, 249, on art 171. Gretton & Reid “Thoughts” 
289 – 290, para 9. See also, for example: (France) Larroumet, 18 – 19; (Louisiana) Yiannopoulos 
Property 384; (Quebec) arts 904, 911 CC; (Scotland) Reid Property 8, para 3; (South Africa) van der 
Merwe Things 37, para 44. “Thing” includes incorporeals (see: ch 4 B). See also: Basnage Oeuvres 
vol 2, 58, on art 378; (Scotland) MacCormick Institutions 139. 
5 On quasi-contract, see: ch 9 D(2). 
6 See, for example: van der Merwe Things 37 – 38, para 44. 
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persons, but they are primarily a relationship betwe n person and thing.7 With a real 
right, a person has a particular kind of control over a piece of property, from which a 
number of consequences flow. If another person’s actions or omissions infringe that 
control, the real right can be enforced against that person, regardless of identity. In 
other words, real rights are in some sense good against “the world”.8 So, if the 
property is taken away from the owner unlawfully (such as by theft), the owner has a 
droit de suite.9 
 
It is possible, and common, for there to be more than one real right in the same thing. 
All real rights other than ownership will be, of necessity, at least the second right in a 
thing, for they are rights in the thing of another (jura in re aliena) and if the thing is 
“of another” there must already be a right of ownership in it. Real rights other than 
ownership are often known as “limited” (droits réels limités), or “subordinate”, real 
rights.10 For example, a servitude gives a person who is not the owner of the servient 
tenement11 a real right in that property. There are, therefor, two real rights in the 
servient tenement: ownership and the servitude. Similarly, immoveable property 
burdened by a hypothec is the object of two real rights: ownership and hypothec. (In 
principle, there is no limit on the number of real rights that can exist in one thing. In 
practice, there are limits. For example, the offer to grant a tenth hypothec is unlikely 
to be accepted.) As real rights are enforceable against the world, if the owner of land 
subject to a servitude or hypothec transfers ownership of that land, the servitude or 
hypothec can be enforced against the new owner (the droit de suite). Real rights 
(other than ownership) are unaffected by a change i owner.12 
 
Another consequence of real rights being enforceable gainst the world is that a 
creditor with a real right has a preference in insolvency. Thus a creditor who has a 
                                                 
7 Consider: Yiannopoulos Property 390, para 204. M Planiol’s and S Ginossar’s critiques of the 
traditional distinction between personal rights and real rights are summarised in Larroumet, 12 – 18. 
Of related interest: Hohfeld “Fundamental”. See also: ch 3 D. 
8 See, for example: (France) Malaurie & Aynès, 97 – 98, para 368; (Louisiana) Yiannopoulos 
Property 387; (Quebec) Lamontagne Biens 61, para 103; (South Africa) van der Merwe Things 37 – 
38, para 44; (Scotland) Reid Property 8 – 9, para 3; (England) Swadling, 220 – 221. 
9 JLC CP8, 16, 6.1(b). See also: art 2, al 3, 1880 Law; Le Gros, 323; Le Couteur 28. Additionally: van 
Vliet Transfer 29 – 30; Larroumet, 24, para 33; Malaurie & Aynès, 94, para 363.  
10 See: ch 3 K. 
11 See: ch 6. 
12 See, for example: art 442 RC; Poingdestre Remarques on art 442; Le Gros, 461. 
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(real) right in security (such as hypothec) in respect of money owed to him or her is 
in a much stronger position than a creditor of an unsecured debt. The creditor has a 
right to payment (personal right) in both cases, but when the debt is unsecured the 
creditor can only enforce that right against the debtor. If the debtor is insolvent, the 
creditor often gets little, or nothing. If the creditor has a real right in security of the 
debt, the insolvent debtor will still be unable to pay, but the creditor’s real right of 
security gives a preference because it is a property right in the creditor’s thing. A 
power of sale (where the proceeds will be used to satisfy the debt) is often associated 
with the right in security.13 The different treatment of unsecured creditors and
creditors with a real right demonstrates clearly the importance and utility of making a 
distinction between real rights and personal rights. Of course, a creditor with a real 
right is not totally secure. If the thing over whic the security is held is destroyed, the 
security is destroyed also. (This is true of all real rights: destruction of the thing 
entails destruction of the right.)14 
 
Additionally, real rights in security are affected by ante-dated real rights in security 
in the same thing. For example, if two hypothecs have been constituted over the 
same piece of land at two consecutive sittings of the Contract Court,15 the hypothecs 
rank in order of creation: the first in time is strongest in right (prior tempore potior 
jure est).16 If the hypothecs are enforced, the basic position s that the debt secured 
by the first-granted hypothec will be completely satisfied before any of the proceeds 
of sale are applied to the debt secured by the second-granted hypothec.17 
 
C. BRIEF HISTORY OF REAL RIGHTS 
 
The twin concepts of real right and personal right developed from classical Roman 
law but are not found there (although the division between real and personal actions, 
                                                 
13 See: ch 3 I(3). 
14 Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 58 on art 378 (destruction of a thing over which there is a usufruct means 
destruction of the usufruct). 
15 See: ch 5 A(2). 
16 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 282. 
17 In principle, this can be modified by contractual arrangement between the debtor and his two 
creditors: a ranking agreement. 
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or actions “in rem” and “in personam”, is).18 Rather, they were formed, much later, 
by the commentators, based on the division between actiones in rem and actiones in 
personam.19 The terms “real right” and “personal right” are deriv d from the less 
commonly used terms “ius reale” and “ius personale”. Robert Feenstra considers that 
the “first list of iura realia is probably to be found in Baldus” in the fourteenth 
century.20 By this time, Norman law was both well-developed an  well-entrenched in 
Jersey.21 Like other systems of law, however, it was not immune to influence from 
Roman law, and the subsequent development of that law which began in the late 
eleventh century, following the rediscovery of the full text of Justinian’s Digest.22 
 
Broadly speaking, this later development of Roman lw (together with the 
simultaneous, and reciprocal, development of Canon law)23 is known as the ius 
commune, and it lasted until the eighteenth century. The Roman law of this period 
was a “learned, professorial law”,24 taught in universities across Latin Europe, and it 
was in that sense a “common law” (ius commune). Ultimately, it was highly 
influential upon the laws as applied in practice in Latin Europe, and beyond.25 
Norman customary law’s adoption of the classification of incorporeals as either 
moveable or immoveable (attributed by Le Geyt to Bartolus),26 and the inclusion of a 
chapter on (real) servitudes in the Reformed Custom of Normandy, are two obvious 




                                                 
18 G.4.2, G.4.3, G.4.5; Justinian I stitutes 4.6.1; Schrage, 41; Akkermans, 23, 64 – 65. 
19 For a summary account: Yiannopoulos Property 385 – 386, para 202; Zimmermann Obligations 6 – 
7. Also Nicholas Roman 99 – 105. 
20 R Feenstra “Dominium and ius in re aliena” in Birks Perspectives 112. He also provides another 
instance of the use of iura realia, and one of ius reale. Baldus de Ubaldis: 1327 – 1400. Generally: 
Schrage, 40. 
21 Nicolle Origin sections 3 – 11. 
22 See, for example: Lesaffer, 252 et seq. 
23 On which: Hibbs “Canon”. 
24 Lesaffer, 260. 
25 See, for example: Bellomo Past chs 3, 5, 7; Lesaffer, 235 – 288; Robinson & Fergus E ropean 
Legal History ch 7; Stein Roman ch 3; Gretton & Reid “Thoughts” 286 – 287, paras 2 – 3. Also of 
interest is Vinogradoff Roman 32 et seq. 
26 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 68. See: ch 4 H.  
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D. RIGHTS IN REM AND RIGHTS IN PERSONAM, AND “REAL” AND 
“PERSONAL” IN ENGLISH LAW 
 
English law uses the terms “realty” and “real property”, which are synonymous, and 
“personalty” and “personal property”, also synonymous.27 In this context, “real” and 
“personal” broadly correspond to the civilian “immoveable”28 and “moveable”.29 
 
Excluded from this synonymity are rights in rem and rights in personam. A right in 
personam is “a right exigible against certain or determinate persons.”30 
Consequently, “rights in personam” is a synonym of “personal rights” in the civilian 
sense. Rights in rem can be defined either by stating that they are enforceable against 
the world, or as rights in things,31 which partially mirrors the civilian equivalent. 
(Defining a right in rem as a right enforceable against the whole world is inclusive of 
real right in the civilian sense, but encompasses other rights also, such as the right to 
one’s reputation.)32 
 
These two conceptions of rights in rem in English law are paralleled by two theories 
of the distinction between real rights and personal rights in civilian writing. The 
“personalist” theory, like the first (broad) definition of rights in rem, defines real 
rights by their exigibility against the world, and personal rights by their exigibility 
against a person or fixed class of persons. But according to the “classical” theory the 
defining feature of a real right is that it is a legal relationship between a person and a 
thing, not between persons (a personal right).33 The classical theory is the orthodoxy 
in civilian systems. 
 
Even if English rights in rem are defined as rights in things, their scope is broader 
than civilian real rights because equitable rights are also included. For each common 
                                                 
27 See, for example: Lawson & Rudden, 13; Swadling, 226, paras 4.14, 4.15. 
28 Including heirlooms, advowsons, tithes, franchises, and suchlike: Swadling, 226, para 4.15; Gray & 
Gray, 13, para 1.2.12. 
29 Leases are personal property. See, for example: Swadling, 226, para 4.15; Harpum & Bridge, 7. 
30 Swadling, 227, para 4.17; Pretto. 
31 Swadling ibid. See further: Hohfeld “Fundamental”; Pretto. The term “real right” is occasionally 
used in English law in this way: Lawson & Rudden, 14.
32 Swadling, 227, para 4.18. Also: Cyprian Williams “Terms” 396; Pretto. 
33 Van der Merwe Things 36 – 37, para 43. See also (on Roman law): Cyprian Williams “Terms” 395. 
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law right in rem there is a corresponding right in equity, but the reverse is not true: 
for example, an option to purchase may be an equitable right in rem, but it cannot 
have that nature as a common law right.34 Additionally, equitable rights in rem are 
probably not real rights in the civilian sense.35 All this is apt to confuse. “Right in 
rem” has also been criticised on a linguistic level.36 
 
E. REAL RIGHTS IN JERSEY LAW: INTRODUCTION 
 
To what extent has the concept of real right – in the civilian sense – been received 
into Jersey law? There is evidence of both “real” and “personal” being used in the 
civilian sense in Jersey sources and other sources which are relevant to Jersey law. 
The examination which follows is of legal writing, laws, and cases, in that order. 
Bearing in mind that exposition of Jersey law has typically not been concerned with 
meta-analysis,37 references to “real” and “personal” (in the civilian sense) are 
relatively plentiful. 
 
Unsurprisingly, “real” and “personal” are also used in a variety of other senses. 
“Real” is often used, in the English sense, to mean “immoveable” and “personal” to 
mean “moveable”,38 a usage which has been criticised.39 Sometimes the words are 
given their lay meanings of “actual”, “genuine”, or“not virtual”.40 In at least one 
instance, “real” appears to be used in the English and Roman sense of a real remedy: 
that something will be given back.41 Yet other uses are unclear.42 
                                                 
34 See further: Swadling, 229 – 230, para 4.26. 
35 For example: Webb v Webb [1991] 1 WLR 1410; Case C-294/92 Webb v Webb [1994] ECR I-1717.  
36 MacCormick Institutions 136; Markby Elements 98 – 99, section 165. 
37 Consider, for example, the works of Poingdestre, Le Geyt, and Le Gros. 
38 Poingdestre Lois 63, 237, 327 – 328; Poingdestre Remarques 40, on article 145; Le Geyt 
Manuscrits vol 2, 421, 490, and vol 3, 317; Basnage O uvres vol 1, 445 (on art 275), 196 (on art 142), 
249 (on art 171), and vol 2, 185 (on art 417), 235 (on art 433), 257 (art 442), 307 (on art 472), 360 (on 
art 520) 445 (on art 575) 446 (on art 576) 320 (on art 485) 321 (on art 485), 360; Le Gros, 21, 65 – 66; 
JLC CP6 in title, introduction at (g) and (h), and under headings A, E, F, H, I, J; JLC CP8, 1, para 2.1. 
Also: Dawes “Code” 273 – 274, para 42, and 276 – 277, nn 57, 59; Howitt, 172 (n1), 174 (para 6), 
175 (n7), 176 – 177 (para 10), 178 (para 16), 181 (para 21), 183 (n38), 184 (para 33 – 35), 189 (para 
47), 190 (para 49), 197 (n90); JLC CP8, 1 (para 2.1), 6 (para 3.1), 10 (para 4.2), 11 (paras 4.3 – 4.4),
12 (para 4.5), 23 (para 7.17), 44 (para 13.1), 50 (para 15.1). 
39 Le Couteur, 14, n1. 
40 Poingdestre Lois 250, 332; Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 3, 22, 264; Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 207 (on art 
427), 259 (on art 446), 276 – 277 (on art 452), 301 (on art 467), 353 (on art 513); Le Gros, 197. 
41 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 3, 536. 
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F. REAL RIGHTS IN JERSEY LAW: WRITERS  
 
(1) Terrien (1574) 
Terrien refers to actiones in personam and actiones in rem in the following passage: 
 
“Ce texte comprend la division sommaire des actions mobiles: c’est à sçavoir 
que les vnes procedent de dette, c’est à dire, de tout  obligation causee par 
contrat: quæ sunt actiones in personam, selon droict, les autres de choses 
adirees, c’est à dire des choses dont on auoit perdu la possession, & qu’on 
veut vendiquer, comme à soy appartenans: quæ sunt actiones in rem. Les 
autres de nantissement de choses qu’on poursuit comme obligees à sa dette, 
ou qu’on a pour gage & asseurance de sa dette, quæ sunt pignoratitiæ 
actiones. Les autres procederoyent ex delicto vel quasi delicto, c’est à sçavoir 
de damno dato, de vi bonorum raptorum, & de furto. De toutes lesquelles 
actions, & obligations est particulierement parlé aux Institutions de 
Iustinian.”43 
 
Which is commentary on part of his chapter on “posses ory complaints”44 relating to 
moveables:  
 
“De ces querelles de meuble les unes sont de dette, l s autres des choses 
adirees, les autres de dommage fait, les autres de choses tollues, les autres de 
larcin, les autres de nantissement.”45 
 
In the first passage, actiones in personam and actiones in rem clearly anticipate the 
modern civilian division between personal rights and real rights. The terms are 
employed to subdivide the category of moveable actions, demonstrating that 
“moveable” and “personal” cannot be used as synonyms in this context. The further 
explanation given in the passage confirms this: moveable actions can be divided into 
those arising from debt or contractual obligation (which are personal actions) and 
those which concern things lost, that is, things of which a person has lost possession 
and wishes to vindicate as belonging to him or her (which are real actions).  
                                                                                                                                
42 Poingdestre Lois 56, 59, 64; Poingdestre Commentaires 7; Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 281, vol 2, 
417 (also: Houard Dictionnaire vol 2, 596 – 597); Basnage Oeuvres vol 1, 249 (on art 171), 290 (on 
art 203), 291 (on art 204), and vol 2, 13 (on art 368), 115 (on art 399), 360 (on art 521), 367 (on art 
521); Basnage Hipoteques 85 (for a definition of “discussion”: Houard Dictionnaire vol 1, 494); Le 
Gros, 232 (quoting Basnage). 
43 Terrien, 8.1, 258. 
44 Everard’s translation: 354. 
45 Terrien, 8.1, 257. 
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The reader is expressly referred to Justinian’s I titutes, wherein the division 
between actiones in personam and actiones in rem is described as the primary 
division of actions.46 Actiones pignoratitiæ are actiones in personam,47 as are actions 
proceeding ex delicto vel quasi delicto, which are the province of the law of 
obligations.48 The content of the second passage indicates why these terms are 
mentioned, and also shows that Terrien’s principal concern was not to set out the 
fundamental difference between actiones in personam and actiones in rem: 
essentially he provides a Roman-law gloss on the passage on which he is 
commenting. 
 
In this part of his commentary, Terrien does not explore the personal rights and real 
rights correlative to actiones in personam and actiones in rem. (That would have 
been outside the scope of a Roman-law gloss.) Here and elsewhere,49 however, 
Terrien’s references to the Roman law actiones and to Justinian’s Institutes 
demonstrate familiarity with and reliance on Roman law, and provide an expression 
in sources authoritative in Jersey of a division which underpins civilian private law. 
 
In light of the above, it is of interest that, in an earlier passage of Terrien’s 
commentary,50 reference is made to “Droicts reels” in the printed marginal notes (the 
authorship of which is unclear).51 The part of his commentary to which this note 
relates appears to be: 
 
“C’est à sçavoir, que si elles [actions] competent52 & appartiennent pour 
chose mobil, elles sont tenues & reputees pour meuble: si pour chose 
immobil, elles sont mises au conte des biens immeubles: comme aussi sont 
tous droicts dependans de fons, comme usufruict d’heritage, rentes foncieres, 
& servitudes reelles.”53 
                                                 
46 Justinian Institutes 4.6.1. 
47 See, for example: Zimmermann Obligations 221, et seq. 
48 See, for example: Justinian I stitutes 4.1, 4.6.1. 
49 Other references to Roman law are frequent, for example: Terrien, 12, 16, 19, 25, 34, 48, […] 702, 
712, 713. 
50 Terrien, 5.1, 169. And see also Terrien, 7.12. 
51 Related to this, see: Dawes Terrien 21 – 23. 
52 3rd person plural of “competer”. Le Dictionnaire de l’Academie Françoise (1694) vol 1, 221: 
“COMPETER.v.n. Appartenir. Terme de Pratique, qui n’est en usage qu’en cette phrase. C  qui luy 
peut competer & appartenir en la succession de son pere.” 
53 Terrien, 5.1, 169. 
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It seems likely that the “Droicts reels” of the marginal note is a reference to the 
“droicts dependans de fons” and the “[servitudes] reelles” in the passage above. 
“Real” in this context is a reference to the praedil or land-related nature of the rights 
listed, and so not to real rights in the civilian sen e. The term is particularly attached 
to “servitude” in order to distinguish between servitudes which are real in this sense 
(such as a right of access) and servitudes which are pe sonal (such as usufruct). In 
spite of the appellation “personal servitude”, usufruct is, in common with a real 
servitude, a real right. The difference between real s rvitudes and personal servitudes 
is discussed below.54 
 
(2) Poingdestre (late 1600s) 
Unsurprisingly, given the nature and length of the work, the greatest number of 
references to “real” and “personal” in Poingdestre’ l gal writing are found in his 
Lois et Coutumes. Poingdestre expressly sets out his own – unusual – definitions 
(although there is also evidence of other meaning being attributed to those words). 
He states that there are some rights which are not capable of cession (or transfer) 
“par ce que (comme les Jurisconsultes parlent) elles sont attachées a la personne qui 
cede le droit, & a ses os”.55 He continues that there are two types of right peraining 
to persons: personal and real. Personal rights are those which attach to that particular 
person only; real rights are those which can be held by anyone.56 This is an 
unexceptional use of “personal”, but to use “real” in opposition to it in this context is 
unusual. (A better way of making this distinction is to call these rights called 
“personal” in this instance “non-patrimonial rights”, and real rights “patrimonial 
rights”). Poingdestre appears to attribute these meanings to “real” and “personal” in 
several other parts of his commentary also,57 particularly in relation to tithing.58 
 
                                                 
54 See: ch 3 I(2). 
55 Poingdestre Lois 112. 
56 Ibid 112: “Distinguons donc, & disons que les Droicts app rtenants a une personne sont ou 
Personels ou Reels; J’entends par droict personels ceux qui appartiennent a quelquun par raison de sa 
personne seulement; et par les Reels ceux qui peuuent competer a tout autre, aussy bien qu’a luy; & 
qui ne luy competent qu’a cause de la chose”. On “competer”: ch 3 n52. 
57 Ibid 71, 113, 114, 318. 
58 Ibid 37, 276 – 277. 
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Poingdestre does use the civilian concepts of real rights and personal rights, but tends 
to do so in Latin, often referring to writers of the ius commune development of 
Roman law: 
 
“[...] Jus in re (selon la distinction des Docteurs) un Droict en la chose; & 
ainsy il suyt inseparablement la chose chargée de la r nte, & son possesseur, 
quel qu’il soit.”59 
 
Which is contrasted with: 
 
“ius ad rem, ung Droict a la chose, mais il suit proprement la personne 
obligée, & non le fonds sinon apprez discussion, & diligences faites.”60 
 
This is the civilian distinction. The jus in rem is a right in a thing: a real right; the jus 
ad rem is a right in respect of a thing, enforceable against a person: a personal right. 
Civilian use of “real” and “personal” is in evidence in a number of other passages 
also.61 
 
(3) Le Geyt (late 1600s – early 1700s) 
There are no references to real rights in Le Geyt’s Code. “Real” and “personal” are 
found in his Manuscrits, but their use is less frequent than in Poingdestre’s Lois et 
Coutumes. At no time does Le Geyt attempt a definition of “real” or “personal” and, 
although they are used as terms of art, the meaning attributable to them varies. 
However, there is some evidence of “real” and “personal” being used in the civilian 
sense.62 In common with Poingdestre, there is also evidence of use of “personal” to 
mean “non-patrimonial”.63  
 
(4) Basnage (1709) 
In his commentary on article 522 of the Reformed Custom, Basnage provides a short 
exposition of the division between real and personal actions with reference to 
                                                 
59 Ibid 85 (also 105, 142). 
60 Ibid 86. 
61 Ibid 59, 64, 76, 77, 85, 88, 124 (probably), 173, 308. 
62 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 82 (on this topic generally: 1861 Report, xi; Le Gros, 469, 503, 509; 
Stair, 2.7.15, 4.15; Maine Early 297); Manuscrits vol 1, 82, 207, 280. See also: Pesnelle, 173, n1. 
63 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 2, 418, and vol 3, 621. 
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Justinian’s Institutes (from which the ius commune position on real rights and 
personal rights developed).64 Article 522 itself is worthy of note, being an instance in 
which “personnelle” is used in the civilian sense in the text of the Reformed Custom: 
“Toutes actions personnelles & mobiliaires sont presc ites par trente ans.”65 “Real” is 
not consistently used in the civilian sense in the Reformed Custom.66 
 
There is evidence of the civilian concepts of real and personal rights in Basnage’s 
work. Perhaps most notably, in his treatise on hypothecs he makes some observations 
on the nature of a hypothec, from which the following points can be drawn. Having a 
real right means having a droit de suite or the right to follow property no matter into 
whose hands it falls.67 This is a consequence of a real right being a right in a thing. A 
real right only subsists for as long as the object of i exists.68 A hypothec can only be 
in a thing which is in commerce (true of all real rights);69 and a hypothec can only be 
created in a thing which is owned by the creator (also true of all real rights and more 
generally stated in the maxim from the Digest that no one can give a greater right 
than he himself has).70 Elsewhere, Basnage illustrates the difference betwe n a 
personal right to repayment and a real right,71 and makes the point that it is possible 
to have more than one real right in a single thing.72 
 
Commenting on the Reformed Custom, Basnage says that a woman’s dower73 is a 
“droit réel”.74 According to article 37875 of the Reformed Custom, the heir is only 
bound to give douaire to the extent of the succession, no more. Basnage comments 
that this means that if the thing over which the usufruct is held perishes, the usufruct 
                                                 
64 Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 373. See: ch 3 C. 
65 Basnage ibid. See also: Bérault, Godefroy, & d’Aviron Commentaires vol 2, 488 (Bérault), 493 
(Godefroy). 
66 Compare arts 51, 353, 442 RC. 
67 Basnage Hipoteques 16. See also: Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 424 (on art 546), 289 (on art 453), 365 
(on art 521). See: ch 3 B. 
68 Basnage Hipoteques 16. 
69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid. D.50.17.54: nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet. Also: Mendonca v 
Le Boutillier 1997 JLR 142. 
71 Basnage Hipoteques 86 – 87. 
72 Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 336 (on art 502). 
73 See now: Wills and Successions (Jersey) Law 1993, art 5(1). 
74 Basnage Oeuvres vol 1, 167, and vol 2, 14 (on art 368), 56 (on art 377), 58 (on art 378). 
75 “L’heritier n’est tenu de doüer la femme de son prédécesseur, fors de ce qu’il a eu de la 
succession.” 
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perishes as well.76 All of this points to use of “droit réel” in the modern civilian 
sense.77 
 
Yet there is much fluidity in the meanings attributed to “personal” and “real” within 
Basnage’s text. In other places he uses those terms to ean “non-patrimonial” and 
“patrimonial”78 (like Poingdestre),79 uses their lay meanings, uses them in relation to 
servitudes, and uses them to mean moveable and immoveable.80 
 
(5) Pothier (works produced between 1740 and 1772) 
Moving to mainstream civilian writing, such as that of Pothier, the distinction 
between personal rights and real rights is clear: 
 
“Les jurisconsultes définissent ces obligations ou engagements personnels, 
un lien de droit, qui nous astreint envers un autre à lui donner quelque chose, 
ou à faire ou à ne pas faire quelque chose”81 
 
“Le jus in re, est le droit que nous avons dans une chose, par lequel elle nous 
appartient, au moins à certains égards. 
“Le jus ad rem, est le droit que nous avons, non dans la chose, mais 
seulement par rapport à la chose, contre la personne qui a contracté envers 
nous l’obligation de donner. 
“C’est celui qui naît des obligations, et qui ne consiste que dans l’action 
personnelle que nous avons contre la personne qui acontracté l’obligation 
[…]” 82 
 
“Il y a plusieurs espèces de jus in re, qu’on appelle aussi droits réels.”83 
 
Pothier presents the culmination of the real rights t eory before codification in 
France. The theory of real rights, although present to some degree, was never fully 
elaborated in Norman law. Poingdestre – and to some ext nt Le Geyt also – took 
                                                 
76 Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 58 (on art 378). 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid 199 (on art 422) (on the same page, Basnage refers to D.34.3.8.3, but note that both his citation 
of it and his quotation of it contain errors). 
79 See: ch 3 F(2). 
80 See also, for example: Basnage O uvres vol 2, 4 (on article 367) 190 (on art 422) 254 (onart 441) 
320 (on art 485) 321 (on art 485) 404 (on art 539). Connected to this: Terrien, 5.1, 170; Le Geyt 
Manuscrits vol 4, 220; Code Le Geyt 3.7.8; Le Gros, 459. On this subject, also: Matthews “Choice”. 
81 Pothier Traité des obligations para 1. 
82 Pothier Traité du droit de domaine de propriété para 1. 
83 Ibid para 2. 
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account of ius commune developments of Roman law and applied these to their
exposition of Jersey law. For Jersey, Pothier is a natural successor to the work of 
Poingdestre and Le Geyt, at least in as much as his work uses these ius commune 
concepts.  
 
(6) Pipon & Durell, Hemery & Dumaresq (1789) 
Writing in the late eighteenth century, Pipon and Durell, and Hemery and Dumaresq, 
provided accounts of court procedure for the Privy Council.84 In these, “real” is 
consistently used to mean “immoveable”,85 and “personal” to mean “moveable”.86 
Such usage is unsurprising, given that they were writing for an audience with some 
expertise in English law. 
 
(7) Le Gros (1943) 
Throughout Le Gros’s treatise there are references to the work of Terrien, 
Poingdestre, Le Geyt, Basnage, and Pothier, but menion of real rights and personal 
rights is absent from his work.87 This absence is particularly remarkable in some 
chapters, such as those on servitudes, the customary law usufructs in favour of 
widow (douaire) and widower (viduité), and the Loi (1880) sur la Propriété 
Foncière. Basnage is clear that the usufructs are real rights,88 and the 1880 Law 
describes hypothec as a “droit réel”.89 Why are the concepts of real right and 
personal right not present in Le Gros’s treatise? 
 
A likely explanation stems from the fact that Le Gros does not deal in abstract terms 
at all – he is a practising lawyer concerned with collating individual rules of 
customary law and reciting parts of relevant court decisions. He is not seeking to 
systematise, but to gather. Systematisation involves some degree of abstraction, but 
without it there is no need to seek overarching concepts and principles. Similarly, 
                                                 
84 Both reports were entitled: A Statement of the mode of proceeding, and of going t  trial, in the 
Royal Court of Jersey in all causes, Criminal, Civil, and Mixed (1789). See: Foster v Attorney 
General 1992 JLR 6, 15 – 16, per Le Quesne, JA, for “the unus al circumstances in which these 
[reports] were produced” (quotation from R Southwell, “Sources” 225 – 226). 
85 Pipon & Durell, 28, 34, 35. Hemery & Dumaresq, 5, 6, 7, 16, 26, 27, 30, 32. 
86 Hemery & Dumaresq, 6, 7, 16, 27, 30, 32. 
87 The ambiguous term “charges réelles” is used (21, 45). 
88 See: ch 3 F(4). 
89 Arts 2, 15. 
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although reference is made to real rights and personal rights by – for example – 
Poingdestre, Le Geyt, and Basnage, the concepts are not systematically applied (this 
observation also applies, to a lesser extent, to Pohier). Consequently, their utility 
would not be obvious from these materials. Thus, Le Gros – not engaged in 
systematisation – was unlikely to discover this for himself. Further, Le Gros’s lack of 
reference to real and personal rights suggests that these were not terms in common 
parlance among the lawyers of his day. 
 
(8) Other Materials 
As one might expect, the various uses of “real” and“personal” and references to “in 
rem” and “in personam” are also seen in modern legal writing. Concerning use of the 
civilian concepts of real right and personal right, among the more significant are the 
Jersey Law Review’s reprint of Advocate P Le Couteur’s “Hypothecation and 
Guarantee: Lecture Given to an Audience of Bankers on the 6th December 1955”,90 
and the Jersey Law Commission’s Consultation Paper, S curity on Immoveable 
Property.91 
 
The earlier of these – Advocate Le Couteur’s lecture – makes the connection 
between “droit réel”, “jus in re” and “real right”, defining such a right as one which 
“can be enforced against all the world”, and applying the term unequivocally to 
Jersey law in the context of a discussion of the real ight of hypothec.92 While the 
terms “real property” and “personal property” appear many times in the lecture, and 
“real estate” and “realty” are also used,93 Advocate Le Couteur made it clear at the 
time the lecture was published that these were usedonly because they would be more 
familiar than the Jersey terms (“immeubles and meubles”) to the lay audience.94 This 
clear and (historically) relatively recent applicaton of civilian “real right” 
terminology is strongly supportive of the legitimacy of analysing Jersey law in this 
way. 
                                                 
90 (1998) JLRev 14. 
91 JLC CP8. See also: (Jersey) In re Esteem 2002 JLR 53, 139 – 140, per Birt, DB, on real, personal, 
and mixed actions; (Guernsey) Howitt, 172 (paras 1, 2, and n3), 173 (para 4), 174 – 175 (n6), 187 
(para 40), 191 (n67), 195 (para 61), 198 (para 69), 200 (para 72). 
92 Le Couteur. See: ch 3 I(3). 
93 Le Couteur. 
94 Ibid 14, n1. 
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The Jersey Law Commission Consultation Paper Security on Immoveable Property95 
(2006) contains a definition of real rights: 
 
“a hypothec is a droit réel accessoire96 attached to the debt itself. It is a real 
right (jus in re) in that it subsists in the property on which it operates as a 
charge, but it is merely an ‘accessory’ or supporting right, existing for no 
other purpose than to effect the charge. These, says Basnage, are the 
principles to be inferred from the practice of his t me with regard to 
hypothecs: 
“Le premier [de ces principes]97 est que l’hypothèque emporte de soy un droit 
réel & un droit de suite sur le fond hypothéqué, jus reali quod fundum 
sequitur adversus quemcumque possessorum . . . 
“Le second est que l’hypothèque ne peut subsister si la substance de 
l’obligation principale ne demeure & ne subsiste . . .”98 
 
In a footnote to this text, “droit réel” is translated as “real right”.99 Reference is made 
to Basnage and to Pothier. The reference to Pothier lays bare the concept’s civilian 
heritage. 
 
Other writing on Jersey law also uses “real” and “personal” in the civilian sense.100 
 
G. REAL RIGHTS IN JERSEY LAW: LAWS 
 
The Loi (1880) sur la Propriété Foncière makes reference to “droit réel” in articles 2 
and 15. Article 2 defines hypothec as a real right (droit réel), and lists the benefits of 
hypothec, which include preference in insolvency (subject to ranking with other 
hypothecs),101 and the droit de suivre the burdened property into the hands of a third 
party.102 Both are commonly recognised characteristics of real ights.103 Article 15 
describes a judicial hypothec as a real right. Articles 2 and 15 make clear application 
                                                 
95 JLC CP8. 
96 See: ch 3 K. 
97 This insertion appears in the text of the Consultation Paper. 
98 JLC CP8, 9, para 3.6. 
99 In n10. 
100 Pallot, 259 – 260, quoting Nicholas French (2nd edn) on the definition of a patrimony. Langlois 
“Hypothecs” 23 and 27, quoting arts 2 and 15 of the 1880 Law. Falle, 162, para 16. Gretton & Reid 
“Thoughts” 289 – 291, paras 9, 10, 11. See also reference to “rights in rem”: Dicker & Ismail 
“Corporate” 290. 
101 Art 2(1). 
102 Art 2(3). Also called the droit de suite. 
103 See: ch 3 B. 
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of the civilian concept of real right to Jersey law. The Loi (1991) sur la copropriété 
des immeubles bâtis also employs the civilian concept of real right104 and it appears 
that the Trade Marks (Jersey) Law 2000 does so also, albeit that it uses the term 
“rights in rem”.105 
 
Some legislation uses the terms “in rem” and “in personam” in relation to the rules of 
international private law.106 In common with the meanings attributed to these terms 
in English international private law, these terms may not be considered as directly 
related to “real right” and “personal right”. For instance, the result of article 2(2) of 
the Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) (Jersey) Law 1960 is that, inter alia, 
matrimonial matters are in rem. Such matters concern the status of a person, not a 
right in a thing. “In rem” and “in personam” in international private law do not 
correspond to “real right” and “personal right” in private law. 
 
H. REAL RIGHTS IN JERSEY LAW: CASES 
 
Given that “real” and “personal” are used in the civilian sense (as noted above), it is 
only to be expected that this usage is also present in case-law. Mostly, this is done by 
reference to some other source,107 but independent use of the concepts of “real right” 
and “personal right” is made by the Court of Appeal in Haas v Duquemin.108 
 
                                                 
104 Arts 5(6), 12(1). 
105 Schedule (“Provisions of Community Trade Mark Regulation Applied to Jersey”), art 19: “Rights 
in rem (1) A Community trade mark may, independently of the undertaking, be given as security or be 
the subject of rights in rem.” For civilian terminology, see also the preamble to the Judgments 
(Reciprocal Enforcement) (Jersey) Law 1960. 
106 Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) (Jersey) Law 1960, art 6(2)(b). State Immunity (Jersey) 
Order 1985, schedule, State Immunity Act 1978, ss10(2)(a), 10(2)(b), 10(3), 10(4)(a), 10(4)(b), 12(7), 
13(2)(b). Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) (Jersey) Order 1997, schedule 3, Merchant Shipping Act 
1995, s166(2)(b). 
107 Birbeck v Midland Bank Ltd 1981 JLR 121, 125, per Hoffmann JA (on art 2 of the 1880 Law. In re 
Désastre Intersub 1985-86 JLR 202, 206 – 207, per Crill, DB (discussion of maritime lien as an action 
in rem, in which specific instance the latter is synonymous with “real right”). Beghins Shoes Limited 
and Island Gift Shops Limited v Avancement Limited 1994 JLR 15, 22, per Le Marquand, Judicial 
Greffier (quoting Nicholas French 1st edn). Ansbacher (Channel Islands) Limited v HSBC Bank PLC 
2007 JLR 593, 596, para 6, per Vos JA (referring to JLC CP8, 9, para 3.6). Cotillard and others v 
O’Connor [2007] JRC005, para 16, per Birt, DB; La Petite Croatie v Ledo 2009 JLR 116, 121, para 9, 
per Clyde-Smith, Commr (both quoting Haas v Duquemin 2002 JLR 27, 35, para 20, per Hodge, JA). 
See also: Case Summaries (2009) JGLR 367, Land Law, Review of La Petite Croatie. 
108 2002 JLR 27, 35, para 20, and 36, para 27, per Hodge JA. 
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“Real” or “realty” is used in a number of instances to mean “immoveable”, and 
“personal” to mean “moveable”.109 “In rem” and “in personam” are used in a number 
of cases with an international private law aspect.110 
 
I. REAL RIGHTS IN JERSEY LAW LISTED  
 
All civil law systems recognise the following core r al rights: ownership, servitude, 
usufruct, and some form of right in security.111 What are the real rights in Jersey law? 
A brief survey follows. 
 
(1) Ownership 
In all civilian systems, ownership is a real right.112 It may also be described as the 
primary real right, for all other real rights are drived from it.113 Although there is no 
direct Jersey authority that ownership is a real right, there is authority that other 
rights are real.114 Given that ownership is a real right in civilian systems, this is likely 
to be so in Jersey law also. 
 
                                                 
109 Jackson v Jackson (1965) 1 JJ 463, 464, 474, per Le Masurier, Bailiff. Birbeck v Midland Bank Ltd 
1981 JLR 121, 123, 126, 128, 129, 130, per Hoffmann JA. Lane v Lane 1985-86 JLR 48, 53, 62, Crill 
DB. In re Harbours and Airport Committee 1991 JLR 316, 342, per Tomes, DB (referring to Jackson 
v Jackson (1965) 1 JJ 463, 474). 
110 See: ch 3 G, 2nd para. Lane v Lane 1985-86 JLR 48, 62, 71, per Crill, DB. Abdel Rahman v Chase 
Bank 1990 JLR 59, 70, Tomes, DB. In re Illinois Dist Ct 1995 JLR N10b, per Bailhache, DB. In re 
Esteem Settlement 2000 JLR 119, 132, per Birt, DB. In re Batalla-Esquival 2001 JLR 160, 162 – 163, 
para 4, 164, para 8, 165, para 9, 166, paras 13 and 14, per Bailhache, Bailiff. Case summary of re 
Batalla (2001) JLRev 202. In re Batalla-Esquival 2002 JLR 192, 193, para 3, Bailhache, Bailiff. Sinel 
Trust v Rothfield Investments 13 December 2002, unreported, paras 35, 54, 57, 64, per Birt DB. Re 
Garden Trust 2 May 2003, unreported, paras 6, 8, 9, 11, per Hamon, Commissioner. Baroque Trust 
Company v Hindelang 15 April 2004, unreported, para 2, per Birt, DB. Att Gen v Smith 2004 JLR 
346, 354, para 22, per Birt, DB. Jaiswal v Jaiswal 2007 JLR 305, 327, para 67, and 328, para 71, per 
Beloff JA. Brunei Inv v Fidelis 2008 JLR 337, 342 – 343, para 11, 349, para 32, 355, para 48, and 
356, para 49, per Clyde-Smith, Commr. On Brunei Inv v Fidelis 2008 JLR 337, see also: Birt “Trusts 
and Divorce” particularly 15, para 30. See also: Case summary of Brunei Investment Agency v Fidelis 
(2009) JGLR 102, 104. In re Kaplan 2009 JLR 88, 98, para 18, per Bailhache, Bailiff (commenting on 
Batalla-Esquival). AG v Bhojwani 2010 JLR 128, 148, para 57, per Clyde-Smith, Commr. 
111 See also: (France) Pothier T aité du Droit de Domaine de Propriété para 2: ownership, feudal 
superiority, rente foncière, servitudes, usufruct, and hypothec; (France) Larroumet, 25 – 28; 
(Louisiana) Yiannopoulos Property 427 et seq; (Quebec) Lamontagne Biens 65 – 67; (South Africa) 
Badenhorst & Pienaar, 48; (Scotland) Reid Property 10 – 11, para 5.  
112 (France) art 544 CC; (Scotland) Reid Property 10, para 5; van der Merwe Things 98, para 104; 
(Louisiana) art 477 CC; (Quebec) art 911 CC. 
113 (Scotland) Reid Property 10, para 5. See: ch 3 K. 
114 See: ch 3 I(2), (3). 
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The content of ownership is fluid and flexible, depending on the property to which it 
relates. In particular, there is a significant difference between land and other 
property, because – at least notionally – land is still held on feudal tenure, meaning 
that ownership of land is never absolutely in one person.115 Against this feudal 
backdrop, and bearing in mind that historically land was the most important kind of 
property, it is unsurprising that a unitary concept of ownership (that is, ownership 
that is not divided among several persons: tenant, seigneur, and crown) is not central 
to the writing of the authors considered above. Thepresent state of feudalism in 
Jersey is discussed elsewhere,116 where it is concluded that feudal land tenure 
remains, more or less, in name only.117 In view of this, the concept of ownership of 
land has really ceased to be one of fragmentation, and so it should be possible to give 
a single definition of ownership for any type of pro erty. This development having 
come in relatively recent times, it has not impacted greatly on written accounts of 
Jersey property law, and it is necessary to look elsewhere for an account of 
ownership. 
 
Although writing before the abolition of feudal land tenure in France, Pothier gives a 
definition of ownership which formed the substance of the same in the French Civil 
Code.118 This was possible because Pothier thought of dominium utile (the right of 
the vassal) as ownership and dominium directum (the right of the superior) as a 
burden on that ownership.119 Pothier writes: 
 
“Ce droit de propriété, considéré par rapport à ses effets, doit se definer « le 
droit de disposer à son gré d’une chose, sans donner néanmoins atteinte au 
droit d’autrui, ni aux lois: Jus de re libere disponendi, ou Jus utendi et 
abutendi » .”120 
 
This is a form of the standard civilian analysis of ownership, which stretches back at 
least as far as Bartolus.121 From the broad statement of rights to dispose of freely, to 
                                                 
115 See: ch 2. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Art 544. See also: Dawes “Code”, particularly 272 – 73, paras 39 – 42. 
119 Pothier Traité du droit de domaine de propriété para 3. 
120 Ibid para 4. 
121 Schrage, 43. 
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use or to exhaust,122 Pothier elaborates further. Ownership – where unfetter d – gives 
the right to: have all fruits proceeding from the ting whether they are the result of 
the owner’s industry or of the industry of another aving no right; use the thing for 
any purpose; change the nature of the thing, even where detrimental to its value; 
destroy the thing; prevent others from using the thing (except where contrary rights 
have been granted); and alienate the thing.123 An owner may be prevented from 
exercising the full incidents of ownership, either by “quelque imperfection de son 
droit de propriété”, or by “défaut de sa personne”,124 such as minority or insanity.125 
Ownership is “imperfect” if it is burdened by another real right126 and it is from this 
that Pothier expands on the phrase “sans donner néanmoins atteinte au droit 
d’autrui”.127 
 
This civilian conception of ownership starts with an bsolute: an owner has absolute 
power over the thing.128 This absolute power is reduced by the rights of others and by 
laws and regulations. In practice, an owner will never have unfettered power, 
particularly in the case of land. For this reason, the starting point of the definition 
may seem artificial. Van der Merwe provides an alternative definition for South 
African law, based on Roman-Dutch sources: 
 
“Ownership is potentially the most extensive private right which a person can 
have with regard to a corporeal thing. […] In principle, ownership entitles the 
owner to deal with his thing as he pleases within te limits allowed by 
law.”129 
 
In essence, this conveys the same idea as Pothier and article 544 of the French Civil 
Code, but without an absolute starting point. Schrage rgues that, although the 
wording of Bartolus’s and subsequent early definitio s of ownership is in terms of an 
                                                 
122 Often given as “use, enjoy, and dispose”, enjoyment including the right to fruits (see for example: 
(Louisiana) art 477 CC; and, (Quebec) art 947 CC). The DCFR extends this list to include “modify” 
also: VIII – 1:202. 
123 Pothier Traité du droit de domaine de propriété para 5. 
124 Ibid para 6. 
125 Ibid para 7. 
126 Ibid para 8. 
127 Ibid para 13. “Droit d’autrui” is stated to include rights in voisinage (on which see: ch 9). 
128 Schrage, 43. 
129 Van der Merwe Things 98, para 104. 
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absolute right, it is wrong to take too literal a reading, which view he supports by 
reference to the wider social context.130 Nonetheless, the absolutist language 
persisted up to the French Revolution and from there to the present day. 
 
(2) Servitude: General 
Servitudes have been received into modern legal systems from Roman law.131 
Bartolus divided servitudes into three types: real, mixed, and personal.132 The real 
servitude linked two pieces of land, one (the servient tenement) subjugated to another 
(the dominant tenement).133 The mixed servitude subjugated a piece of land to a 
person. The three examples of mixed servitudes wereusufruct, use, and habitation.134 
Personal servitude subjugated one person to another person. This was slavery.135 In 
modern times, only a two-fold distinction is used: real and personal.136 “Personal 
servitudes” is the term applied to what were, for Ba tolus, “mixed servitudes”. 
 
Both real servitudes and personal servitudes (in the modern sense) are real rights, 
specifically rights in land.137 The qualifiers “real” and “personal” describe what is at 
the other end of the right: for the real servitude it is also land; for the personal 
servitude it is a person. Of course, land cannot hold rights, only people can, but, 
concerning a real servitude, the relationship betwen the owner of the dominant 
tenement and the owner of the servient tenement is mediated at both ends through a 
piece of land. With the personal servitude, the relationship is mediated at one end 
only through land. 
                                                 
130 Schrage, 45 – 47. 
131 Justinian Institutes 2.3 – 2.5. 
132 Bartolus Commentaria in Digestum Veteris 183, 183. For early Jersey usage, see: Poingdestre Lois 
217, 221; Poingdestre Rermarques 153 (on art 504). See also: Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 485. 
133 Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 485. 
134 Justinian Institutes 2.4; Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 485. For modern law, see: (France) art 625 CC et 
seq; (Louisiana) arts 630, 639 CC; (Quebec – “use” only) arts 1119, 1172 – 1176 CC; (South Africa) 
Badenhorst & Pienaar, 339 et seq. See also: ch 3 n142. 
135 Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 485. 
136 Matthews & Nicolle, 10, para 1.38; Nicolle Immovable Property 53. Case Summaries (2004) 
JLRev 273, Land Law, Review of Russell & Caine v Gillespie & Ford. Dawes “Code” 273 – 274, 
para 42. (France) not prominent in the Civil Code, but see, for example: Pothier Coutume d’Orléans, 
Introduction au titre des servitudes réelles para 2; (Louisiana) art 533 CC; (Quebec) Lamontagne 
Biens 210; (South Africa) Badenhorst & Pienaar, 322; (Scotland) Cusine & Paisley, 32 – 33, for a 
good summary. 
137 Falle, 162, para 16; (France) Pothier Traité du droit de domaine de propriété para 2, Malaurie & 
Aynès, 249, 338; (Louisiana) art 476 CC; (Quebec) art 1119 CC; (South Africa) Badenhorst & 
Pienaar, 321; (Scotland) Reid Property 10, para 5. 
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“Servitude” unqualified means “real servitude”.138 The term “personal servitude”, it 
seems, did not find favour with the drafters of theFr nch Civil Code, who sought to 
remove terminology redolent of feudalism from the law.139 Presumably, this 
contributed to the decline in popularity of the term. 
 
(a) Real servitude 
As stated above, a real servitude is a real right.140 Servitudes are considered more 
fully elsewhere.141 
 
(b) Personal servitude: usufruct 
Of the personal servitudes, only usufruct appears to have been received into Jersey 
law.142 Usufruct is a real right.143 The name is a composition of usus (use) and 
fructus (fruits), which describes the content of the right: the usufructuary (or 
usufruitier) is entitled to the use and the fruits of the burdened property.144 As this 
makes up most of the content of ownership, what remains is referred to as “bare-
ownership” or “nu-propriété”.145 A usufruct may burden moveable or immoveable 
property, but usufructs of land are the most common, n t least because they can arise 
in the context of succession.146 Indeed, douaire and viduité (usufructs in favour of a 
widow or widower, respectively, and arising by operation of law) are discussed by 
                                                 
138 See, for example: Colesberg Hotel v Alton Hotel 2003 JLR 176. The same is true in Scotland: Reid 
Property 354, para 439. 
139 This is why real servitudes are also described as “services fonciers”. See, for example: Jourdain, 
190, para 137. 
140 See: ch 3 n137. 
141 See: chs 6, 7, 8. 
142 Habitation is recognised in Guernsey law: Dawes Laws 672; 1854 Rapport. 
143 (France) art 578 CC; (Louisiana) arts 535, 550 CC; (Quebec) art 1119 CC; (South Africa) 
Badenhorst & Pienaar, 339; (Scotland, where it is commonly known as “liferent”) Reid Property 10, 
para 5.  
144 See, for example: Matthews & Nicolle, 5 – 6, para 1.22; Nicolle Immovable Property 117 and 129; 
(France) art 578 CC; (Quebec) art 1120 CC. 
145 See, for example: Loi (1919) sur la Location des Biens-Fonds, art 2; Le Gros, 325; Matthews & 
Nicolle, 6, paras 1.23 – 1.25; Nicolle Immovable Property 117; (France) arts 595, 759, 815-5, 815-18, 
819 CC. 
146 Wills and Succession (Jersey) Law 1993, art 5. For an account of the law immediately preceding 
this enactment, see: Matthews & Nicolle, 102 – 104, paras 8.86 – 8.96. Also: 1861 Report, xv; Nicolle 
Immovable Property 17. 
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the writers on Norman customary law, where it is clearly stated that these rights are 
real rights.147  
 
In some jurisdictions, (particular) personal servitudes cannot be transferred.148 
Inalienability of personal servitudes can be explained as an instance of delectus 
personae.149 It is unclear whether usufruct is transferable in Jersey, but most likely it 
is.150 
 
(3) Right in Security 
In the legal systems of the western world, rights in ecurity are rights which support 
the performance of an obligation, such as payment of money. Broadly speaking, once 
the performance falls due, the creditor has the right to enforce the security. Rights in 
security increase the likelihood of eventual payment as they are rights parallel to the 
creditor’s personal right to repayment, either against another person (thus a personal 
right in security, in other words, guarantee),151 or in a thing (thus a real right in 
security). A right to sell the burdened thing and recover the debt from the proceeds is 
commonly associated with a real right in security, and this is the case in Jersey 
law.152 A security in Jersey law is accessory to a debt:153 once the debt is paid off the 
right in security is extinguished.154 
 
                                                 
147 Basnage Oeuvres vol 1, 167; Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 56, 58, 336; Pesnelle, 352, n2.Also: Le Gros, 
147, 437; (Guernsey) 1854 Rapport; Falle, 162, para 16. Generally: 1861 Report Evidence, 318, 
questions 7121 – 7129; Le Gros, 40 – 57 (also: Wills and Succession (Jersey) Law 1993, art 6; 
Bankruptcy (Désastre) (Jersey) Law 1990, art 46). 
148 For example: (France) art 595 CC (usufruct is transferable) 631, 634 (use and habitation are non-
transferable); (Louisiana) arts 567, 643 (usufruct and “right of use” are transferable) 630 CC 
(habitation is non-transferable); (Quebec) Lamontage Biens 340 (usufruct is transferable) art 1173 
CC (limitations on when use can be transferred); (Scotland) SC Styles “Liferent and Fee” in SME vol 
13, 673, para 1646, Stair, 2.6.7; (South Africa) Badenhorst & Pienaar, 322, 338 – 339; (Guernsey) 
1854 Rapport, art 37 (habitation not transferable without express power to do this in the grant). 
149 “The rule that when personal relations are important,  person cannot be compelled to associate 
with another person.” Garner Black’s 459. 
150 Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 336, on art 502: “La vente d’un usufruit esaussi retraiable”. 
151 See Le Gros, 218. 
152 See, for example: Basnage Hipoteques 16; JLC CP8, 16. But note the partial exception in art 26 of 
the 1880 Law (on which see: Le Couteur; JLC CP8, 16, 6.1(b)). 
153 See, for example: Bérault, Godefroy, & d’Aviron Commentaires vol 2, 494 (Godefroy); Basnage 
Hipoteques 47 – 48; Le Couteur, 18; JLC CP8, 9, para 3.6 (quoted in Ansbacher (Channel Islands) 
Limited v HSBC Bank PLC 2007 JLR 593, 596, para 6, per Bailhache, Bailiff). 
154 D.46.3.43. Also: Steven, “Accessoriness”; (Quebec) art 2661 CC; (Louisiana) art 3282 CC. 
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Hypothec is a non-possessory security: the debtor is in possession of the thing.155 In 
Jersey, expressly created hypothecs are governed by the Loi (1880) sur la Propriété 
Foncière and the Loi (1996) sur l’hypothèque des biens-fonds incorporels, and are 
real rights.156 They can be constituted over immoveable property onl .157 However, a 
hypothec over moveable property is possible where the creditor is the debtor’s 
landlord. This security, sometimes known as the “land ord’s hypothec”, came into 
customary law from Roman law.158 The landlord’s hypothec is a tacit security, 
arising by operation of law. It cannot be constituted expressly. It is created in favour 
of a landlord over the corporeal moveable property of the tenant when that property 
is brought on to the leased immoveable.159 The landlord’s hypothec can extend to the 
corporeal moveables of a third party.160 (This was the case in Scotland, but is so no 
longer, and it has been questioned whether such scope is compatible with Article 1, 
Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.)161 Presumably, the 
landlord’s hypothec may be prevented from arising by the express agreement of the 
parties – for the landlord can extinguish it by conse ting to removal of moveables 
                                                 
155 For example: JLC CP8, 7, 9. 
156 1880 Law, arts 2 – 29, particularly arts 2, 15; JLC CP8, 9, para 3.6. Of comparative interest is: 
Hinteregger & Borić Sicherungsrechte. 
157 Terrien, 8.1: “Et est entendue que meubles n’a point de suite par hypotheque”. 1880 Law, arts 3, 4; 
Loi (1996) sur l’hypothèque des biens-fonds incorporels, art 1(1), definition of “bien-fonds 
incorporel”. Also: Matthews & Nicolle, 61 – 62; Nicolle Immovable Property 166. Radio and Allied 
Industries v Gordon Bennett Wholesale (Jersey) Ltd (1959) 252 Ex 43, 46; Re Désastre G Lawrence 
Ltd (1963) 1 JJ 341. But hypothecation of ships is possible: Matthews & Nicolle, 64, para 6.50; 
Nicolle Immovable Property 166; Dessain & Wilkins, 16.  
158 Pothier Traité du Contrat de Louage para 228; D.20.2.7. 
159 Terrien, 7.9: “Et sont les biens du conducteur apportez en la maison louee, tacitement obligez au 
prix du louage, suyuant disposition de droict.” (“taci e hypotheque” is used later); (Guernsey) Le 
Marchant, vol 1, 274 – 276; Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 202 “Tous les meubles des fermiers, aussi bien
que des locataires, sont tacitement hypothéquez”; Le Gros, 343, 346, and 322 “Tous les biens du 
locataires et du fermier qui garnissent l’immeuble sont frappes d’une hypothèque tacite au profit du 
loyer.” Matthews & Nicolle (62) call this right the landlord’s “droit de gage”, after Pothier; Dessain & 
Wilkins, following the terminology of English law, call it the “Landlord’s Right to Distrain” (15). See 
generally: Matthews & Nicolle, 62 – 64. Cases (for example): Henry v Falle, Le Boutillier 
intervenante (1897) 218 Ex 433 (referring to “le gage légale”); Le Boutillier v Falle (1897) 218 Ex 
434; Jersey Agencies v Allenby (unreported, 1999/171) 11 Oct 1999. And: Pothier Traité du Contrat 
de Louage paras 226 – 276. See also: (Scotland) AJM Steven “Rights in Security over Moveables” in 
Reid & Zimmermann, 348 – 349; Steven “Landlord’s” (comparing laws of South Africa, Scotland, 
Louisiana, Quebec, and England); (Scotland) Skea & Steven “Difficulties”; (France) Pothier Traité du 
Contrat de Louage; (France) art 2332 CC; (Louisiana) Yiannopoulos Property 471 – 475, para 234, 
arts 2707, 2709, 2710 CC. 
160 Le Gros, 323. See also: Pothier Traité du Contrat de Louage paras 241 – 243. Clearly, confusion 
prevents a right in security arising in the landlor’s own corporeal moveables.  
161 Steven “Goodbye” 178 – 179; Rook Property 56 – 58, 184 – 191; Human Rights (Jersey) Law 
2000, art 2(1), schedule, art 1, Protocol 1. 
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from the leased premises –162 although it cannot be created by agreement. (For 
example, it cannot be created over moveable property which has never been on the 
leased property during the term of the lease, because n expressly created hypothec 
over moveables is impossible.)163  
 
If moveables are removed from the leased premises, th  landlord must seek their 
return, or exercise a claim against them within forty days.164 Generally speaking, 
however, the hypothec gives a preference over other cr ditors in respect of a 
moveable affected by the hypothec165 and over unsecured creditors in a désastre.166 
In view of this, and the description of “hypothec” which is certainly a real right, it 
seems that the landlord’s hypothec is a real right. 
 
In Jersey, two further rights in security over corporeal moveable property are pledge 
and lien.167 Unlike hypothec, both are possessory securities.168 Pledge169 is an 
express security, created when the debtor delivers some moveable to the creditor on 
the basis that it is in security for the debt.170 There is little commentary on lien, 
although it is referred to in recent laws and cases.171 This suggests a relatively recent 
reception of the concept, most probably from English aw. It appears to arise when 
the creditor has some moveable property of the debtor’s at the time that a debt is 
                                                 
162 Le Gros, 323. Also: Terrien, 7.9. 
163 See: ch 3 n157. 
164 Le Gros, 323, 343; Matthews & Nicolle, 63, para 6.41; Dessain & Wilkins, 15 – 16, para 2.3.2.3, 
(consider also: “Excluded Assets” 105 – 106, para 5.3.2). 
165 Le Gros, 345; Matthews & Nicolle, 63, para 6.41. But compare: Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 203 – 
204. 
166 Bankruptcy (Désastre) (Jersey) Law 1990, art 32(1)(c)(ii); Le Gros, 343; Matthews & Nicolle, 63, 
para 6.41; Dessain & Wilkins, 149. 
167 See: Dessain & Wilkins, 15; Matthews & Nicolle, 60– 61. Also: 1861 Report, lxviii; Loi (1884) 
sur le prêt sur gages (both concerning the regulation of pawnbrokers). For incorporeal moveables: 
Security Interest (Jersey) Law 1983. 
168 Matthews & Nicolle, 60, para 6.30 (paraphrasing Pothier). See also: Steven, 102 – 104 (pledge), 
186 – 188 (lien). 
169 Note that “pleiges”, “plège”, and similar in the Grand Coutumier de Normandie, ch 60, have a 
different meaning: they refer to a personal right in security (Everard, 252 et seq). On this usage, see: 
Steven, 9, para 2-12. 
170 Dessain & Wilkins, 15. See also: Steven, ch 6, particularly 64, para 6-01.  
171 For example: [legislation] Cheques (Jersey) Law 1957, art 2; Security Interests (Jersey) Law 1983, 
art 11; Bankruptcy (Désastre) (Jersey) Law 1990, art 21; Companies (Jersey) Law1991, arts 174, 
180; Financial Services (Jersey) Law 1998, arts 32 – 34; Foundations (Winding Up) (Jersey) 
Regulations 2009; [cases] Bass v Pickersgill & Le Cornu 2000 JLR N3b; In re Belgravia 2010 JLR 
247; Cunningham v Sinels [2011] JRC015, unreported. 
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incurred, and on the basis of some pre-existing relationship, such as when the 
creditor is the debtor’s banker or lawyer, or has repaired the moveable.172 
 
Are these real rights? In the case of pledge, this seems certain. Pledge is the simplest 
form of security, and a descendant of the Roman pig us,173 and is everywhere a real 
right.174 For lien the position is less clear. In English law, lien is a personal right; in 
civilian jurisdictions there are examples of lien as a real right.175 In Jersey, there is 
statutory provision that a lien over certain documents will not prevail in the debtor’s 
insolvency.176 It is a stateable construction of these provisions that they are 
exceptions to the general rule that the holder of a lien is entitled to continue to retain 
the moveables. If that is so, lien too is a real right. However, no view has emerged in 
Jersey law on this point. 
 
(4) Lease 
Lease,177 which applies only to corporeal immoveable property, can be distinguished 
from hire, which applies to corporeal moveable prope ty. Classification of a lease as 
either real or personal is difficult because it appears to have features of both. Thus 
what, if any, protection is afforded to the tenant o  transfer of the property by the 
landlord is a recurring question in European legal science.178 In many jurisdictions 
(and also in classical Roman law)179 leases are merely contracts, meaning that, in 
principle, the tenant has only a right against the person with whom he or she 
contracted (the original landlord), not a right in the land itself.180 However, some 
protection for the tenant should the landlord transfer the property is common in such 
                                                 
172 For example: Cheques (Jersey) Law 1957, art 2 (banker); Cunningham v Sinels [2011] JRC015, 
unreported (lawyer); Le Sueur v Vincent (1870) 9 CR 88 (repairer – the word “lien” is not used). Also: 
Dessain & Wilkins, 15; Steven, chs 9 – 17. 
173 See, for example: Justinian I stitutes 2.8.1, 3.14.4, 4.1.14, 4.6.7. 
174 The consequence of Justinian Institutes 4.1.14. (Louisiana) art 3133 CC, Yiannopoulos Property 
11; (Quebec) arts 2660, 2665 CC; (South Africa) Badenhorst & Pienaar, 393; (Scotland) Steven, 95. 
175 Steven, ch 14, particularly 200 – 201, paras 14-13 – 4-15. 
176 Bankruptcy (Désastre) (Jersey) Law 1990, art 21; Companies (Jersey) Law 1991, arts 174; Dessain 
& Wilkins, 15. 
177 Generally: Terrien, 7.9; Le Gros, 318 et seq; Matthews & Nicolle, 17 – 19, paras 1.68 – 1.78; 
Nicolle Immovable Property 144 et seq. 
178 Schrage, 40. 
179 See: G.3.142 – G.3.147; Zimmermann Obligations 377 – 379. Also (of later historical interest): 
Terrien, 244 – 245. 
180 See: Poingdestre Lois 110. 
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jurisdictions.181 In other jurisdictions, lease is recognised as a re l ight – or as 
capable of being made real.182 For Jersey law, two questions present themselves: 
does a lease bind a successor to the landlord; and, if so, why? Jersey sources on these 
questions are few,183 and detailed consideration is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Some preliminary thoughts follow. Contract leases (l ases for more than nine years 
which must be passed before the Contract Court for validity) are considered first.184 
 
In Basden Hotels v Dormy Hotels,185 a contract lease contained an option to 
purchase, which the court held to be binding on a successor to the original landlord. 
The option was held to be part of the “single agreem nt”186 that was the lease, and as 
the lease was binding, so too was the option.187 Why did the contract lease bind? The 
court’s justification was that: “the defendant company purchased it [the property] in 
full knowledge of the terms of the lease”,188 which is suggestive that it was notice of 
the lease which caused the successor to be bound.189 
 
In what way is notice given? A typical clause in a hereditary contract for the transfer 
of land binds the transferee to all obligations andburdens to which the transferor was 
                                                 
181 Lease as a personal right: (France) art 1743 CC (and see art 1709), but see Troplong vol 2, 17, and 
compare the bail à construction (loi du 16 décembre 1964), which is a real right (art 3); (France) 
Pothier (Traité du contrat de louage para 1) defines lease as “un contrat par lequel l’un des deux 
contractants s’oblige de faire jouir ou user l’autre d’une chose pendant le temps convenu et 
moyennant un certain prix que l’autre, de son côté s’oblige de lui payer” [emphasis added]; 
(Louisiana) Yiannopoulos Property 435 – 442, para 226; (Louisiana) art 2711 CC; (Louisiana, see 
also) Stadnik “Doctrinal” in which 1101 – 1105 are of particular interest for Jersey law re significane 
of nine-year period for leases (on which see also C Hugo & P Simpson “Lease” in Zimmermann & 
Visser Mixed 303 – 304; Le Gros, 318). 
182 Consider: (Scotland) Leases Act 1449, Land Registrat on (Scotland) Act 1979, s3(3), Reid 
Property 10, para 5, (but compare: Webster Tenant and Successor Landlord 8); (Quebec) arts 1851, 
1886; (South Africa) C Hugo & P Simpson, “Lease” in Zimmermann & Visser Mixed 302 – 306; 
(England) Harpum & Bridge, 96, 4–019. 
183 As in Guernsey: Dawes Laws 684 (but see Howitt). Other Jersey laws affecting leases are: Loi 
(1919) sur la location des biens-fonds (which regulates, for leases of all durations, notice to quit 
where nothing has been agreed, and what happens when the lease is of a usufruct and the usufruct 
comes to an end); Loi (1996) sur l’Hypothèque des Biens-Fonds Incorporels (which provides for the 
hypothecation of immoveable (contract) leases). 
184 See: ch 4 H(4); ch 5 A(1), n10. 
185 (1968) 1 JJ 911. 
186 Ibid 918, 920, per Bois, Deputy Bailiff. Options to purchase and options to renew, while not to be 
“part of the relationship of landlord and tenant”, were part of a “single agreement”, thus avoiding the 
possibility that the option was without cause (918). 
187 Ibid 919, per Bois, Deputy Bailiff. Also: Matthews & Nicolle, 17 – 18, para 1.70. 
188 (1968) 1 JJ 911, 919, per Bois, Deputy Bailiff. 
189 Compare: Poingdestre Lois 110 – 111 (consider also 111 – 112). 
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subject, in relation to the land. What if this clause were omitted? Would the 
transferee take free of the lease? The court in Basden held that it would not.190 
Registration of the lease provides notice of it191 – that is, registration means that a 
successor landlord is deemed to have knowledge of the lease – rather than anything 
in the hereditary contract conveying the landlord’s ownership. The lease acquired its 
binding force on successor landlords by virtue of registration. 
 
Is lease a personal right or a real right? If a lease is a real right, it follows that it binds 
successor landlords for the tenant has a right in the land itself. If a lease is a personal 
right, following Basden, its binding force is provided by notice or knowledg  of it 
(registration). Lease as a personal right may present a problem for the dichotomy 
between personal right and real right. Normally, mere knowledge of a personal right 
does not make it binding on third parties: the essence of a personal right is that it is 
binding on the parties to its constitution only. This is also a difficulty presented by 
real obligations.192 
 
Leases for more than nine years (“contract leases”)193 are distinguished from leases 
for nine years and fewer  (“paper leases”).194 Dividing leases by reference to this 
duration is a practice not limited to Jersey.195 Leases for terms in excess of nine years 
have been analysed by Basnage as a form of alienation (and also in French doctrinal 
writing),196 which fits with the requirement in Jersey that a contract lease is passed 
before the court, for this is also required of voluntary conveyances of land inter 
                                                 
190 (1968) 1 JJ 911, 919, per Bois, Deputy Bailiff: “If the contract of purchase had not bound the 
defendant company to allow the plaintiff company to occupy the property in accordance with the 
contract of lease, the lease would nevertheless have eld good.” 
191 Ibid: “the defendant company purchased it in full knowledge of the terms of the lease; the 
defendant company cannot claim otherwise for the lease is entered in the Public Registry”. 
192 See: ch 3 I(5). 
193 See: Matthews & Nicolle, 17, para 1.69; Nicolle Immovable Property 149. The nine-year division 
is also present in art 595 FCC. 
194 1861 Report Evidence, 317, questions 7105, 7106.  
195 For example: (France) art 595 CC; (Louisiana) Stadnik “Doctrinal” 1101 – 1105; (South Africa) C 
Hugo & P Simpson “Lease” in Zimmermann & Visser Mixed 303 – 304. Basnage suggests Canon law 
as the source of the practice: Oeuvres vol 2, 335, on art 502. See also: Troplong, vol 2, 19 – 20, para 
478, vol 1, 62, 105 et seq. 
196 Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 335, on art 502 (quoted, in part, in Le Gros, 321); Larroumet, 285 – 286, 
para 439. 
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vivos.197 This could support the view that a contract lease, once passed and 
registered, constitutes a real right in favour of the enant.198 
 
What of paper leases? In the evidence to the 1861 Report, it is suggested that a paper 
lease may bind a successor if that successor has had notice of the lease in his 
hereditary contract.199 If this is correct, this particular form of notice can make a 
paper lease bind a successor. However, notification of a paper lease in a hereditary 
contract is not the same as the entire lease being available for viewing in the Public 
Registry. How much of the (unregistered) paper lease would bind the successor? 
Arguably, the successor, once informed of the lease, is deemed to have knowledge of 
that whole agreement, because he could have asked to see a copy of it. Thus, a 
successor bound by a paper lease could also be bound by an option to purchase (or to 
renew) in it, following the “single agreement” analysis in Basden.200 It appears that it 
is possible to register a paper lease. Arguably, where this has been done a successor 
to the landlord would be bound by it.201 
 
Alternatively, if a contract lease creates a real right in favour of the lessee, is it 
possible that registration of a paper lease also creates a real right? In principle, this is 
possible. However, on one reading, article 50 of the 1880 Law could be construed as 
against this conclusion. The article concerns the position of a: 
 
“détenteur de bonne foi d’un bien-fonds ou d’une servitude foncière – soit à 
fin d’héritage, soit pour un terme d’années certain excédant 9 années, ou pour 
une ou plusieurs vies, ou pour tout autre terme dont la durée est 
conditionnelle ou éventuelle – en vertu d’un contrat p ssé devant Justice 
[…]” 
 
after a dégrèvement:202 such a person can choose whether to give up his or her ight 
in respect of the property. If a person elects to keep the right, he or she must pay off 
                                                 
197 See: ch 5. 
198 See also: Falle 162, para 16. 
199 1861 Report Evidence, 317, questions 7105 – 7111. 
200 (1968) 1 JJ 911, 918, 920, per Bois, Deputy Bailiff. 
201 These conclusions may be derived from: 1861 Report Evidence, 317, questions 7015 – 7113 
(particularly 7112). 
202 Dégrèvement is the method by which hypothecs are enforced: 1880 Law, art 1. Also mentioned in 
art 50 are liquidation and décret. Liquidation was abolished by the Loi (1904) (Amendement No. 2) 
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all the charges on the property. This article bears the reading that holders of a 
hypothec, real servitude, usufruct, and contract lease all have this choice. This is 
interesting: hypothec, real servitude, and usufruct are all real rights, and contract 
lease has been assimilated to their number. It seem, however, that paper lessees are 
excluded. Thus, it could be that contract leases ar real rights, but paper leases cannot 
be, whether registered or not.  
 
Although it is clear that a contract lease will bind third parties, and so afford some 
protection to the tenant, it is unclear whether a contract lease is a real right. The 
position in relation to the binding (or otherwise) nature of paper leases is more 
uncertain: they may be capable of binding third parties, but do not appear to be real 
rights, even if registered. The position that a paper lease binds a successor if notice of 
it is given is attractive, because it would mean that t e effect of notice is consistent 
across the whole class of leases. 
 
(5) Real Obligation? 
In addition to lease, other rights do not bear easy classification as either real or 
personal. Examples in Jersey law include the rente (“an annual payment charged on 
land”)203 and an obligation – at issue in Jersey Hotels v Inglebert Properties Ltd204 – 
                                                                                                                                
sur la propriété foncière, although this reference to it in the 1880 Law hasnever been removed. 
Décrets are now extremely rare: Matthews & Nicolle, 69, para 7.2, 72, para 7.19; Nicolle Immovable 
Property 164.  
203 Matthews & Nicolle, 2, para 1.6. On rente generally, see: Terrien 7.12 and 7.13; Poingdestre Lois 
75 – 87; Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 171, 192, 314, and vol 2, 60, 74, 484; Pothier Traité du Contrat de 
Constitution de Rente, Traité du Contrat de Bail à Rente; de Gruchy, 36; 1861 Report, xvi – xviii, xxi 
– xxiv; Planiol, Treatise vol 1, part 2, 768 – 772; Le Gros, 201 – 208, 452 – 453; Matthews & Nicolle, 
2 – 3, para 1.6 – 1.14, 55 – 56, paras 6.4 – 6.7; Nicolle Immovable Property 185 et seq; ch 4 H(3). See 
also the similar rights alluded to by van der Merwe, 38, para 45; Swadling, 256, para 4.97. Rentes are 
no longer commercially significant and the Jersey Law Commission has proposed their abolition (JLC 
CP6, H). The right to payment is secured by a hypothec (1861 Report, xxii; 1880 Law, art 2, art 19; 
Matthews & Nicolle, 55, para 6.4. On this analysis, ee:  Basnage, Oeuvres, vol 1, 111), which is a 
real right (see: ch 3 I(3)). 
204 (1980) JJ 23. Jersey Hotels sold a field to Mr HG Evans, under the condition that he was to pay 6% 
of the value of any house built upon that field to Jersey Hotels. Mr Evans sold the field to Inglebert 
Properties who wished to sell it to the States. Thecondition was repeated in the conveyance from Mr 
Evans to Inglebert Properties, but the latter had deliberately omitted it from the draft contract of sale 
to the States. Jersey Hotels sought reinstatement of the condition and “to prevent any sale which does 
not do this” ((1980) JJ 23, 25, per Whitworth, JA ). Oddly, given this demand, it was admitted by 
Jersey Hotel’s advocate that a burden which ran with the land did not need to be recited in every 
hereditary contract of transfer in order to preserve the burden ((1980) JJ 23, 26, per Whitworth, JA). 
The Court of Appeal held that Jersey Hotels had failed to establish a right to insist on full recital of the 
condition. 
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to pay a sum on the occurrence of a particular event, which ran with the land.205 Both 
are affirmative obligations to perform, which obligations are enforceable against a 
single debtor. The corresponding rights cannot be real rights because the obligation 
correlative to a real right is passive, not affirmative.206 Rente and the obligation in 
Jersey Hotels must thus be personal rights.207 However, it is by virtue of ownership 
of a particular piece of land that one becomes debtor. Therefore, the examples 
possess a “real” aspect (essential connection to property), but are not “real” in the 
conventional sense.208 This “real” aspect means that these obligations stand apart 
from other personal rights. 
 
Reflecting this characteristic, such obligations are sometimes classified as “real 
obligations”, “obligations réelles”, or obligations “propter rem”,209 which class is 
recognised in civilian scholarship as lying between r al rights and personal rights. 
The label signals a change in perspective from right (personal or real) to obligation. 
The right correlative to a real obligation is a personal right:210 the “real” aspect 
relates only to the obligation. For present purposes, the principal point is that the 
“right” end of a real obligation is not a real right. 
                                                 
205 Other examples are feudal rights such as to suit of court, and of the visiting sovereign to two 
mallards although it is perhaps unlikely that these will be enforced in the future. See, for example: 
KGC Reid “Real Rights and Real Obligations” in Bartels & Milo Contents 32; ch 2. 
206 Consider the nature of ownership (ch 3 I(1)) servitudes (ch 3 I(2)) and rights in security (ch 3 I(3)). 
See also: Poingdestre Lois 76. 
207 Rente is secured by a hypothec. A hypothec is a real right (ch 3 I(3)) but this does not determine 
the nature of the rente itself, which is the underlying right to payment. 
208 See also: Planiol Treatise vol 1, part 2, 769 – 770. 
209 “Real obligation” is used by the court in Jersey Hotels v Inglebert Properties (1980) JJ 23, 26, per 
Whitworth, JA. See: (France) Aberkane Essai, J Hansenne “De l’obligation réelle accessoire à 
l’obligation réelle principale” in Etudes dédiées à Alex Weill (1983) 325, Scapel Notion, Malaurie & 
Aynès, 103, para 379; (Louisiana) Yiannopoulos Property 388; (Quebec) Lamontagne Biens 68. See 
also: (Scotland) Reid “Real Burden” (compare rente with the type 2 real burden), particularly 10 
(using the term “perpetually personal”); (Scotland, with comparative references) KGC Reid “Real 
Rights and Real Obligations” in Bartels & Milo Contents; (Louisiana) Lovett “Creating”, J Lovett 
“Title Conditions in Restraint of Trade” in Palmer & Reid Mixed; (Quebec) Lamontagne Biens 68; 
(South Africa) van der Merwe “Numerus” (using the term “onera realia”); van Erp & Akkermans 
Towards. Contrast the usage of “real obligation” in art 1763 LaCC. 
210 KGC Reid “Real Rights and Real Obligations” in Bartels & Milo Contents 45. 
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(6) Rights of the Beneficiary and Trustee of a Trus t? 
The number of civil law jurisdictions which recognise some form of trust has 
increased greatly in the last 150 years.211 As part of this general movement, any 
doubt over the existence of trusts in Jersey law212 as removed by the Trusts (Jersey) 
Law 1984 (“TJL”). 213 Unlike in England, there is no separate equitable jurisdiction in 
Jersey: equity – as “fairness” – infuses the law as a whole.214 
 
In fact, many legal systems which have the trust have a civilian property law (either 
because they are fully civilian jurisdictions or are mixed jurisdictions), and do not 
recognise the English-law separation of Law and Equity.215 In this context, other 
doctrinal bases for the trust have developed, which do not follow the English-law 
model of vesting some kind of ownership of the trust property in both the trustee and 
the beneficiary.216 
 
What is the position in Jersey? Matthews and Sowden take the view that the trustee is 
“owner” of the trust property.217 What of the beneficiary? On the basis of the TJL, 
and following a comparative survey, they conclude that the beneficiary has a 
“proprietary interest in the trust property, and not merely a personal right against the 
trustees”.218 Thus, in spite of a broadly civilian property law, and the “mixed” nature 
of Jersey’s legal system, the present position is that “a Jersey trust is essentially the 
same animal as is found in English law, subject to ertain local modifications.”219 
                                                 
211 Summarised in Reid “Conceptualising” 2 – 3. 
212 1861 Report, xxiv – xxvi. On the history of trusts in Jersey see: Matthews & Sowden; Midland 
Bank Trust v Fps 1995 JLR 352, 371 – 372, per Le Quesne, JA. See also: (Guernsey) Robilliard 
“Foundation”. 
213 Art 3: “Subject to this Law, a trust shall be recognized by the law of Jersey as valid and 
enforceable.” But see art 11(2). See also: GTL 2007, art 11(2). 
214 Ex parte Viscount Wimborne (1983) JJ 17, 19 – 22, per Crill DB. 
215 See, for summary: Reid “Conceptualising” 2 – 3. 
216 See, for example: (Scotland) Gretton “Trusts”, Gretton & Steven Property 333 – 335, Reid 
“Trust”; (South Africa) T Honoré “Trust” in Zimmermann & Visser Southern, de Waal “Uniformity”; 
(Quebec) Lamontagne Biens 127 – 130, para 187; Gretton & Reid “Thoughts” 291, para 12; Reid 
“Conceptualising” 2 – 3. Consider also the French fiducie, on which see, for example: Matthews 
“Fiducie”. 
217 Matthews & Sowden, 2, para 1.3, 9, para 1.24. 
218 Ibid 8, para 1.20. 
219 Ibid para 1.21. Consider also, for example: Abdel Rahman v Chase Bank 1991 JLR 103; West v 
Lazard Brothers & Co (Jersey) Limited 1993 JLR 165, 309 – 310, per Hamon, Commissioner; I  e 
Rabaiotti 1989 Settlement 2000 JLR 173; Fiduciary Management Ltd v Sheridan 2002 JLR N11; In re 
Esteem Settlement 2002 JLR 53; In re Fountain Trust 2005 JLR 359. 
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Can the beneficiary’s right be described as a real right? The trustee, subject to the 
terms of the trust, has the power to deal with the trust property as though it were her 
own.220 The beneficiary has no such right. Therefore, the beneficiary’s right does not 
appear to be ownership in the civilian sense. Could it be a subordinate real right? 
Perhaps so, but the nature of such a subordinate right is not clear: the right of a 
beneficiary to a trust does not wholly resemble any of the recognised subordinate real 
rights. It may be that the right is merely a personal one, enforceable against the 




Possession is certainly a fact. Is it also a right n a thing? This is a long-standing 
question in European legal thought,221 exploration of which cannot be made here, but 
it can be noted that the position of jurisdictions i  the French tradition appears to be 
against treating possession as a real right.222  
 
J. NUMERUS CLAUSUS  
 
The list given above may not be exhaustive, and in any case it is open to the 
legislature to add to it. A separate question is whether it is possible for private parties 
to add to the list by contracting between themselves. In a legal system in which this 
is not possible there is said to be a numerus clausus – a fixed list – of real rights. In a 
system which does allow this, there is a numerus apertus – an open list – of real 
rights. Where numerus apertus is advocated, it is tempered by “considerations of 
public policy”,223 such as the requirement for publicity.224 Third parties, acquiring 
                                                 
220 Art 24(1) TJL. 
221 For some history: Schrage, 50 – 55. 
222 (France) Larroumet, 49 – 50 (para 78), Malaurie & Aynès, 137 (para 482), Pothier T aité de la 
possession paras 2, 3; (Louisiana) Yiannopoulos Property 598 et seq, para 301 et seq; (Quebec) 
Lamontagne Biens 438, para 653. But note: (Scotland) Reid Property 10, para 5 (possession is listed 
among the real rights). Generally: R Carabie “Saisine, possession, propriété, dans les coutumiers 
normands” in Semaine de Droit normand (1952). 
223 Yiannopoulos Property 415. 
224 (South Africa) Deeds Registries Act 1937, ss16, 102 (“real right”). See: ch 5 A(2) (discussion of 
publicity principle). 
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burdened property, should not find themselves subject to conditions, the content of 
which they had no means of discovering.225 
 
The traditional civilian position is that the list of real rights is closed: there is a fixed 
list.226 This position has even been advocated for English law, albeit relatively 
recently.227 The existence of, or need for, a numerus clausus of real rights continues 
to stimulate debate.228 The position in Jersey is unclear. Such evidence as there is of 
real rights indicates that the apple has not fallen far from the civilian tree. It seems 
probable that Jersey follows the traditional civilian position, but the question is not 
settled.  
 
K. SUBDIVISION OF THE CLASS OF REAL RIGHTS 
 
The class of real rights may be subdivided. For example, the primary real right 
(ownership) is distinguishable from those which are subordinate to it: the subordinate 
or limited real rights.229 The latter are rights in the thing of another, or jura in re 
aliena. Where there is a subordinate real right, there always exists at least two real 
rights in one thing: ownership and the subordinate real right.  
 
Real rights can also be separated according to whether they are “principal” or 
“accessory”, as in French doctrinal writing.230 Principal real rights relate to the nature 
of the thing itself (ownership, servitude, usufruct) whereas real rights which are 
accessory (to a debt) relate to the pecuniary value of a thing (rights in security).231 
Principal real rights are further divided into ownership and dismemberments of 
ownership.232 “Dismemberment” reflects the notion that those subordinate real rights 
                                                 
225 For example: Smits, 250. 
226 For example: Smits, 249 – 252; Akkermans, 7 – 8, ch 2. 
227 B Rudden “Economic Theory v Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem” in Eekelaar & Bell 
Essays 239. 
228 See: Smits, 252 – 254; Akkermans, generally. And: (France) Malaurie & Aynès, 89 – 93, paras 355 
– 361; (England) Swadling, 223 – 224, paras 4.09 – 4.11; (Louisiana) Yiannopoulos Property 414 – 
417, para 217; (Quebec) Lafond Précis 187 et seq. 
229 For example: Reid Property 11 – 12, para 6. 
230 For example: Larroumet, 22 – 24. 
231 JLC CP8, 9, para 3.6 (quoted in A sbacher (Channel Islands) Limited v HSBC Bank PLC 2007 
JLR 593, 596, para 6, per Bailhache, Bailiff); Le Couteur 18. See: ch 3 I(3). 
232 For example: Jourdain, 189 – 190; Larroumet, 22 – 3. 
 69 
which may be called “principal” (that is, real servitudes, personal servitudes, and – 
sometimes – leases) are parts of ownership which have been broken off and given to 
someone other than the owner.  
 





(jura in re 
aliena) 
Servitudes, 
usufruct, rights in 
security, (lease) 




It is likely that the relative absence of the concepts of real right and personal right in 
the Reformed Custom of Normandy contributed to the same in the works of 
Poingdestre and Le Geyt. The enduring influence of their work, of the work of the 
continental commentators on the Reformed Custom, and of Terrien’s commentary 
helps to explain why reference to real right and personal right continues to be sparse 
in Jersey. The increasing influence of English law thereafter provides another aspect 
to this explanation. 
 
Nonetheless, references to civilian concepts of real right and personal right can be 
found in Jersey sources. These concepts make sense of the behaviour of certain rights 
in certain situations, and operate as tools to analyse uncertainties. Although the 
concepts can be, and have been, criticised, and although real obligations challenge 
their neat dichotomy, it is necessary to provide an account of Jersey law at this 
foundational level. Doing so provides the platform from which – internally – future 
advances in legal thinking are likely to be possible, and – externally – full 
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The substance of the law of property is the relationships between persons and 
objects, in particular where those relationships affect third parties. In this way, the 
law of property can be distinguished from other areas of law, such as the law of 
contract.1 There are many ways of classifying property; for example, as moveable or 
immoveable, corporeal or incorporeal, in commerce or out of commerce, in public 
ownership or in private ownership, fungible or non-fu gible, and consumable or non-
consumable.2 Which of these a legal system adopts or gives prominence to, and how 
                                                 
1 See: ch 3 B. 
2 (France) arts 537 (in commerce/out of commerce) 518 – 529, 531 – 536 (moveable/immoveable and 
corporeal) 526, 529 (incorporeal) 587, 589 (consumable) 1291 CC (fungible). (Louisiana) arts 448 
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that system applies the distinction, all contribute to the shape of the law of property. 
Two of these distinctions (made since at least the tim of Gaius)3 are examined in 
this chapter: the distinction between moveables and immoveables, to which is given 
particular attention in modern expositions of property law, and the distinction 
between corporeals and incorporeals, which is frequently applied in combination 
with the first to generate a fourfold classification:4 
 
Corporeal moveable property 
(such as a horse or a car) 
Corporeal immoveable 
property (such as land or a 
building) 
Incorporeal moveable property 
(such as a (personal) right to 
repayment of a loan) 
Incorporeal immoveable 
property (such as a usufruct of 
land) 
 
Yiannopoulos describes the purpose of classification as “facility of understanding 
and regulation”.5 Understanding and regulation can be cross-border as well as 
internal. For instance, classification of property is important for international private 
law. Also, by using, to some extent, a common languge of classification, legal 
systems may more easily be compared with one another. Classification is also 
important when the applicable rules differ between categories. For example, 
classification as moveable or immoveable determines, i  part, whether transfer must 
                                                                                                                                
(division of things) 449 – 450, 452, 453 (public, common, and private things) 461 
(corporeal/incorporeal), 536, 537 CC (consumable/non-c nsumable); Yiannopoulos Property 49 – 51, 
para 29 (fungible/non-fungible), Yiannopoulos Property 52 – 59, paras 30 – 34 (other classifications). 
(Quebec) arts 899 (corporeal/incorporeal and moveable/immoveable) 916, 919, 2876 CC (out of 
commerce), Lamontagne Biens 22 – 25, paras 30 – 41 (fungible, consumable, and other 
classifications). (South Africa) van der Merwe Things 15 – 30, paras 21 – 37. (Scotland) Reid 
Property 17, para 11 (corporeal/incorporeal, moveable/immoveable). Also: (England) Harpum & 
Bridge, 7 – 8, para 1–013. Poingdestre Lois 115; Le Gros, 20, 195 “res nullius”. 
3 (Corporeal/Incorporeal) G.2.12. For example: Terrien, 5.1. (“Corporeal” and “incorporeal” are used 
in preference to “tangible” and “intangible” because the former pair is better known internationally, 
and is present in the sources of Jersey law.) (Moveable/Immoveable) Implicit in G.2.42. The 
distinction between moveables and immoveables rose later to greater importance: Maine Early 335 – 
338. 
4 For example: (France) Jourdain, titles 2, 3; (Louisiana) Yiannopoulos Property ch 7, 42 – 46, paras 
25 – 27; (Quebec) Lamontagne Biens 28 – 31, paras 46 – 55; (South Africa) van der Merwe Things 
20, para 29, 24 – 28, paras 34 – 36; (Scotland) Reid Property ch 13. See: ch 4 C, D. 
5 Yiannopoulos Property 25, para 18 (also: 241 – 248, paras 106 – 108). Also, for example: 
Zimmermann Obligations 24 – 25; van der Merwe Things 15, para 21. 
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be made before the Royal Court;6 i  is also central to succession, for moveable and 
immoveable property are treated separately.7 The corporeal/incorporeal distinction in 
combination with the moveable/immoveable distinction (as in the table above) is 
further determinative of which rules of transfer apply to a transaction, for incorporeal 
moveable property is transferred by a process known as assignment,8 whereas 
transfers of corporeal moveable property are governed either by the customary law, 
or by the Supply of Goods and Services (Jersey) Law 2009. 
 
B. ARE RIGHTS THINGS?  
 
“Do we own physical things? Or rights? Or both?”9 In his article “Ownership and its 
Objects”,10 Gretton discusses some problems with the Gaian scheme, that is, the 
structure of the objects of property law which is derived from Gaius’s exposition of 




In the same article, Gretton conducts a survey of a number of European jurisdictions 
(including – significantly for Jersey – England and France) and of some outside 
                                                 
6 See: ch 5. 
7 For example: Wills and Succession (Jersey) Law 1993, arts 6, 7. 
8 Matthews & Nicolle, ch 3. Also, for example: Terrien, 7.6; Anderson Assignation.  
9 Gretton “Ownership” 804. 
10 Gretton “Ownership”. 

















Europe, but which are in the European tradition.12 He concludes that each of the 
surveyed systems follows the Gaian scheme (to which he is opposed). It comes as no 
surprise, therefore, that it is applied also in Jersey. “Corporeal” and “incorporeal” are 
not found in the Grand Coutumier, but this terminology is used both by Terrien13 and 
by Poingdestre.14 
 
The prevailing view, for good or for ill, is thus that rights are things (res 
incorporales).15 This is liable to lead to a problem of perpetual regression in respect 
of ownership, if ownership itself is conceived of as (n incorporeal) right. Put 
another way, the first premise is that rights are things. Therefore, all rights found in 
the patrimony of a person are owned. In the same way as a person is said to own a 
car, that person is said to own a right of (for example) usufruct. The second premise 
is that ownership is a right. Consequently, the right of ownership (a thing) is itself 
owned. But that second-level ownership is also a thing; it too must be owned. This 
creates third-level ownership. And so it continues. One solution is to state simply that 
ownership is an exception among incorporeals and canot itself be owned.16 Gretton 
is unhappy with this and other analyses. Nevertheless, the position in Jersey law 
appears to be that rights are (incorporeal) things.17 
 
C. CORPOREAL AND INCORPOREAL 
 
Corporeal property is that which has a physical presence, incorporeal property that 
which does not have such a presence.18 This division admits of some uncertainty (for 
                                                 
12 Including: Austria, France, Italy, Spain, Germany, some mixed jurisdictions, and England. 
13 Terrien, 5.1. 
14 Poingdestre Lois 57, 95, 134. 
15 See also, for example: Bankruptcy (Désastre) (Jersey) Law 1990, art 15(1). 
16 Reid Property 23, para 16. 
17 See, for example: Terrien, 5.1 “Et sont ces choses appelees en droict incorporelles” [emphasis 
added]. Also: Pothier Traité des Personnes et des Choses para 248. 
18 (Louisiana) art 461 CC; (France) The Civil Code contains no definition of corporeal and 
incorporeal, but see arts 518 – 525, 528 (corporeal), arts 526, 529 (incorporeal); (France) Pothier 
Traité des Personnes et des Choses para 232; (Quebec) The Civil Code also contains no definition of 
corporeal and incorporeal, but see arts 899, 906; (Guernsey) Carey, 68; (Guernsey) Le Marchant, vol 
1, 131; (Scotland) Reid Property 18 – 19, paras 12, 13; (South Africa) van der Merwe Things 20 – 21, 
para 29; (England, for example) Blackstone Commentaires 2.1.17. 
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example, what is the status of electricity?),19 but such issues are not discussed in 
Jersey sources, and are not presently under examination. 
 
Division of property as corporeal or incorporeal, present in Gaius’ Institutes20 and in 
Justinian’s Institutes,21 is made by Terrien: 
 
“Et sont ces choses appelees en droict incorporelles, comme qui ne se 
peuuent toucher, à la difference des corporelles, & qui se peuuent toucher.”22 
 
In view of this, it is interesting that the division is not made in the Grand Coutumier 
(mid-thirteenth century),23 which makes no mention of incorporeals. It appears that 
classification of property as either corporeal or incorporeal has come to Jersey law, 
through Terrien (circa 1574), from Roman law. Le Geyt acknowledges Jersey law’s 
acceptance of Terrien’s Romanised exposition of rights as either moveable or 
immoveable, and identifies the link between Roman lw and Terrien as Bartolus 
(1313/1314 – 1357).24 Terrien does not mention Bartolus, but is explicit that his re-
working of the customary law divisions is based on Roman law.25 Classification of 
property as corporeal or incorporeal is present in modern legislation and in 
commentary on Jersey law.26 
 
D. MOVEABLE AND IMMOVEABLE 
 
Identifying property as moveable or immoveable is of primary importance. Such 
classification affects, for example, which rules are to be applied to transfers of 
                                                 
19 For example, in Louisiana, Yiannopoulos has expressed the view that electricity is corporeal, like 
all “energies” (Property 43 – 44, para 26). Art 461 of the Louisiana Civil Code holds to be corporeal 
anything which can be perceived by the senses (“felt or touched”). Electricity may be so perceived. 
The Louisiana court took this view: Sommers v Secretary, Dept of Revenue and Taxation 593 So2d 
689, 692, per Carter, Judge (application for appeal d nied: 594 So2d 877).  
20 G.2.12 – 2.14, but consider: Zimmermann Obligations 25 – 26. 
21 Justinian Institutes 2.2, 2.2.1 – 2.2.2. 
22 Terrien, 5.1. 
23 See: ch 87 GC. On the date, see: Everard “Introduction” xviii – xx. 
24 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 68. Bartolus’s views are discussed in Schrage, 43 – 44. 
25 Terrien, 5.1. 
26 Matthews & Nicolle, 2.3; Loi (1996) sur l’hypothèque des bien-fonds incorporels, art 1 definition of 
“bien-fonds incorporel”; Nicolle Immovable ch 2. Also: JLC CP8, 24, para 7.19. An earlier insta ce: 
Hemery & Dumaresq, 30. 
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property27 (and what is included in that transfer),28 the laws of succession,29 how 
security may be constituted over property,30 and which process a creditor can use to 
pursue his debtor’s property. 
 
Fundamentally, every corporeal thing is capable of m vement: “Les planètes sont-
elles meubles ou immeubles?”31 Perhaps that question is flippant, but it demonstrates 
the problem. Where the line is to be drawn is a matter of perspective. From the 
human perspective the Earth is immoveable. This is the starting point. What is 
attached to the Earth becomes equally immoveable, in the eyes of the law at least. 
Thus, it is generally considered that land and thatwhich is connected to it (such as 
buildings, trees, and plants) is immoveable,32 and all else (such as clothes, animals, 
and furniture) is moveable.33 Nonetheless, the division is not always clear-cut. 
Questions concerning what is moveable and what is immoveable are present in the 
sources, and these are discussed below.34 By way of introduction, the following 
observations can be made. 
 
Of the cases,35 the most significant decision is Moser v Waldon36 because the court 
engages with the sources in its judgment. In addition, a great body of relevant 
material is found in the Grand Coutumier, the Reformed Custom of Normandy, and 
                                                 
27 See: ch 5. 
28 See: ch 4 E. 
29 Wills and Successions (Jersey) Law 1993, arts 5 – 7. 
30 See: ch 3 I(3). 
31 Ledoux Introduction back cover, and 175: “Que sont les astres et les planètes sinon des meubles de 
très grand taille, puisqu’enfin aujourd’hui plus personne ne conteste qu’ils soient en perpétuel 
mouvement?” 
32 Ch 87 GC. This view is affirmed by RP Marett in his Lettre Explicative du Projet de Loi Amendé 
sur la Propriété Foncière (logé au greffe le 23 Janvier 1878), available in (1999) JLRev 41, 43: “[…] 
immeubles; les biens-fonds, c'est-à-dire le sol et ce qui y est adherent […]”. Also: Interpretation 
(Jersey) Law 1954, art 4(1), schedule 1 “‘land’ shall include houses and other buildings”. But note 
that these sources speak of corporeal immoveables only (see: JLC CP8, 13, para 5.2). See also: 
Justinian Institutes 2.1.29; D.41.1.7.10; (Guernsey) 1852 Ordinance, 232 item 6. 
33 Ch 87 GC. See, for example: (Scotland) Reid  Property 17, para 11; SLC CM 26; (France) arts 516, 
518, 528 CC; (Louisiana) arts 448, 462, 463, 470, 41, 73 CC; (Quebec) arts 899, 900, 905, 907 CC; 
(South Africa) van der Merwe Things 24, para 34. (England, for example) Gray & Gray, 31, 1.2.47. 
Also: Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 68. 
34 See: ch 4 E – H. 
35 For example: Succession Poingdestre (1758) 2 CR 124; Succession Le Montais (1782) 118 Ex 50; 
Le Retilley v Richards and de Lisle (1838) (a copy of this judgment has not been located. It is the 
subject of a letter to the editor of the JGLR: D Ogier (2008) JGLR 392); Godfray v Baudains (1889) 
10 CR 416; Arbaugh v Leyland (1967) 1 JJ 745; Moser v Waldon (1971) 1 JJ 1927.  
36 (1971) 1 JJ 1927. 
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the commentaries thereon. The Grand Coutumier suggests an overarching principle 
with which to consider the nature of any piece of pr perty: all is moveable which can 
be taken from one place to another; immoveables cannot be so taken.37 This is the 
basic position. By contrast to the single statement of he Grand Coutumier, the 
multiple articles of the Reformed Custom – articles 504 to 520 – read more like a list 
of individual instances (in keeping with the title o the chapter: “Quelles choses sont 
censées Meubles, quelles choses immeubles”).38 
 
In his Remarques et Animadversions sur la Coustume Reformée de Normandie, 
commenting on article 504, Poingdestre notes that articles 504, 506 to 510, 515, and 
518 of the Reformed Custom are drawn from Terrien’s commentary on the Grand 
Coutumier, which indeed is readily observable. The relevance of the Reformed 
Custom to Jersey law in this area is reinforced by Le Geyt, who remarks upon the 
“penchant que les habitans [de Jersey] ont pour suiv e les nouveautez de la province 
voisine”, which can be seen in relation to a specific provision of which there is no 
trace “ni dans le Vieux Coûtumier, ni dans la Glose, ni dans Terrien”.39 In spite of 
Poingdestre’s systematic commentary on the Reformed Custom, his work is 
overshadowed by that of Le Geyt, which provides a deeper account of the law.40 Le 
Gros adds little to the discussion. 
  
Poingdestre describes the articles under the title “Quelles choses sont censées 
Meubles, quelles choses immeubles” as having the nature of an appendix to the 
Reformed Custom,41 and, given the emphasis on transmission of property on death in 
Norman customary law, it is hardly surprising that the policy underlying the 
Custom’s determination of particular property as either moveable or immoveable is 
at times driven by consideration of who will inherit that property on the death of its 
owner.42 The intertwining of the classification of things and the law of succession is 
                                                 
37 Chs 87, 92. Everard, 354 – 356, 376 – 379. Terrien, 5.1, 8.1. Also (Guernsey): 1852 Ordinance, 231 
– 232, items 3 – 5; Le Marchant, vol 1, 129, 130; Carey, 68, 70. 
38 [Emphasis added] See also: Pesnelle, 497. 
39 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 69. 
40 Ibid 68 et seq; Code Le Geyt 3.6. 
41 Remarques on art 504. 
42 See, for example: Terrien, 5.1, from: “Selon ce que dit est, se faut regler un partage & diuision des 
biens” to “& reputez estre du territoire auquel ils sont trouuez.” 
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also evident in Le Geyt’s work: to some extent in his comments on “Meubles” in his 
Manuscrits,43 and particularly so in his Code 3.6, “Des Meubles & des Partages 
qu’on en Fait”.44 
  
Generally in this area, the influence of the Roman law tradition is palpable. Le Geyt, 
the continental commentators on the Reformed Custom of Normandy, and Pothier 
(whose work on this subject has been referred to by the Royal Court)45 make a 
number of references to Roman law, principally to the Digest.46 Houard states that 
the Reformed Custom title on classification of property as moveable or immoveable 
is taken from Roman law.47 The later development of Roman law has had some 
influence also.48 
 
In Guernsey several ordinances have been passed on the subject.49 The 1852 
Ordinance Des Biens Meubles et Immeubles contains, inter alia, lists of things which 
are moveable, and things which are immoveable, and gives greater detail than any of 
the Jersey sources. The substance of the 1852 Ordinance is suggestive of influences 
in common with Jersey: Terrien50 (unsurprisingly) and, more notably, the Reformed 
Custom. Consequently, the Guernsey sources are of particular comparative interest. 
 
                                                 
43 Vol 1, 68 et seq. 
44 54 – 56. 
45 Moser v Waldon (1971) 1 JJ 1927. 
46 See, for example: Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 70; Pesnelle, 501; Pothier T aité de la Communauté 
paras 48 – 63 (also: Traité des Personnes et des Choses art  232 – 272). Compare the lists of 
corporeals in G.2.13 and in Justinian’s In titutes 2.2 with the list of moveables in ch 87 GC. 
47 Dictionnaire vol 1, xlii. 
48 See: ch 4 C. 
49 See also: 1888 Ordinance, concerning potatoes and tomatoes (which refers to an “Ordonnance 
provisoire relative aux Biens meubles passée le 6 Février 1886 et renouvelée jusqu’aux Chefs-Plaids 
d’après Noël tenus le 16 Janvier 1888”, but neither original nor renewal has been found). On the 
nature of ordinances: Dawes Laws 32, also 168 – 170 on “Meubles and Immeubles”. 
50 For example, the familiar principle of international private law in item 2 of the 1852 Ordinance: 
“Les Meubles suivent la personne, et les Immeubles le territoire.” Terrien’s statement is identical 
(5.1). The maxim is also quoted by commentators on the Reformed Custom. This is unsurprising as 
the existence of many distinct legal systems in pre-Revolution France was apt to generate occasions 
for its application. Also (Guernsey): item 22 of the 1852 Ordinance; Le Marchant, vol 1, 129; Carey, 
68, 69, 70. 
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Also worthy of comment are similarities between particular aspects of the 1852 
Ordinance and the French Civil Code, not only in substance, but also in wording.51 
This is suggestive of influence from the French Civil Code, which geographic and 
temporal proximity renders likely. This is a point of difference with Jersey law, the 
sources of which largely pre-date the Code civil. 
 
E. CHANGE OF CLASSIFICATION: ACCESSION 
 
Accession, or accessio, is a doctrine with its roots in Roman law, by which one thing 
attached to another thing becomes part of that thing. This may result in a change in 
classification, a change in ownership, or both, depending on the circumstances. 
Accession operates in three instances: immoveable to immoveable; moveable to 
immoveable;52 and, moveable to moveable.53  The second of these is of present 
interest, for it is in such cases that a change in classification of property occurs.  
 
(1) Moveable-to-Immoveable Accession 
What is the test employed to determine when accession has taken place? Does the 
intention of the owner of the moveable matter?54 
 
In Arbaugh v Leyland,55 the main issue was whether a negative servitude prohibiting 
further building had been breached by the erection of a shed. If the shed had acceded 
to the land, the servitude would certainly have been breached. The shed rested “on 
                                                 
51 Compare: 1852 Ordinance, item 1, with (France) art 516 CC (although the phrase is also present in 
Carey, 68, the writing of which predates the French Civil Code). Also compare the 1852 Ordinance 
and French Civil Code as follows: item 5, art 518; item 6, art 519; item 7, art 520; item 15, art 524; 
item 16, art 526. 
52 Accession of fruits is an example of this. See: G.2.70, 2.73 – 2.77; Justinian I stitutes 2.1.19, 
2.1.20, 2.1.29 – 2.1.34, 2.1.37; Nicholas Roman 133 – 136. Also: Matthews & Nicolle, 15, para 1.60; 
Bérault, Godefroy, & d’Aviron Commentaires vol 2, 437 – 439 (Godefroy). On this type of accession 
generally: van Vliet “Accession I”; van Vliet “Accession II”.  
53 Logically, there is a fourth category (immoveable to moveable), but this is an empty category as no 
law admits of immoveable property acceding to that which is moveable. 
54 For example, compare: (Scotland) Reid Property 458 – 459, para 572; (England) Harpum & Bridge, 
1069 – 1071, para 23–006 – 23–009; (France) art 525, al 1 CC; (South Africa) Badenhorst & Pienaar, 
147 – 154; (Louisiana) arts 493, 493.1, 494 CC; (Quebec) art 955 CC, Lamontagne Biens 500 – 505, 
para 768 – 773. 
55 (1967) 1 JJ 745. 
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granite blocks, [was] not attached to the soil and [could] be moved in one piece.”56 
After listing, but not discussing, several authorities,57 the court had “no hesitation in 
finding that the structure is a moveable.”58  
 
The court had recourse to a number of the same authorities in Moser v Waldon,59 and 
consideration was given to them in the judgment. In Moser, the parties made an 
agreement “in anticipation of the dissolution of their marriage”.60 Following this 
agreement, ownership of the matrimonial home, which had been in the plaintiff’s 
name, was transferred to the defendant. The plaintiff sought a court order that the 
defendant should allow her to remove two items from the house: a glass-fronted 
bookcase-cum-drinks cabinet, and a washing machine. Th  defendant claimed that 
“ownership was […] transferred to him” with the house.61 The agreement between 
the parties provided that the defendant would get th  house “together with the 
improvements and additions made thereto”.62 It also provided that “all effects of 
household use or ornament situate in the premises above mentioned are the property 
of the wife [the plaintiff]” unless otherwise agreed.63 The agreement did not refer to 
the bookcase or washing machine specifically, nor did the contract passed before the 
court which transferred ownership of the house from the plaintiff to the defendant. 
 
In relation to the bookcase, the defendant relied upon three alternative grounds: that 
it was a fixture (that is, that it had acceded to the house); that there had been an oral 
agreement between the parties for the transfer of the bookcase to him; that the 
plaintiff was estopped from claiming the bookcase.64 Only the first is of interest to 
the present discussion. The following facts were establi hed. The bookcase was 
                                                 
56 Arbaugh v Leyland (1967) 1 JJ 745, 747, per Bois, Deputy Bailiff. 
57 Ibid: “Terrien, Coutume de Normandie, Book V, Chapter I, p. 169, Basnage, Coutume de 
Normandie, 1778 edition, p.412, Art. 515, Pothier, 1831 edition, Tome 15, p.16 (1861 edition, Tome 
I, p.12) and Godfray v. Baudains, Le Galle et au. à la cause (1889) 10 CR 416”. In Godfray v 
Baudains, the court held that a construction in wood is moveable, but the court record provides no 
details of the nature of the constructions in question. 
58 Ibid. For the result, see: ch 7 B(1). 
59 (1971) 1 JJ 1927. 




64 Ibid 1929. 
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composed of parts purchased separately, but designed to fit together by screws to 
form the desired shape. Parts of the skirting board an  architrave over a door were 
removed to accommodate it,65 and the door was refitted to open outwards. Screws 
fastened some of the upper units to the wall.66 
 
The court noted that the “tests to be applied in deciding whether an article is to be 
considered as forming part of the structure have been considered in several Norman, 
Jersey, and English authorities”,67 and commenced examination of a selection of 
these with a quotation from Basnage: 
 
“Utensiles d’hôtel soit aux champs ou à la ville sont réputez meubles: mais 
s’ils tiennent à fer, clou, ou sont scellez à plâtre, et mis pour perpétuelle 
demeure, ou ne peuvent être enlevez sans fraction ou deterioration, sont 
réputez immeubles.”68 
 
The text given is paraphrased by Le Geyt in his Code,69 and is, in fact, article 506 of 
the Reformed Custom. The former point was noted in the judgment; the latter was 
not. Article 506 had been used by the Royal Court in Re Succession Poingdestre, a 
decision of 1758: a clock was sufficiently firmly attached to a house that it was held 
to have been put there “pour perpétuelle demeure” and so to have acceded.70  
 
In Moser, Pothier was also considered. The court’s attention focussed on the first 
three of six rules given by him “for determining whet er an article is deemed to form 
part of a building”.71 The first rule is that things inside a house or other edifice for 
                                                 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid 1930. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 342. The Moser judgment incorrectly gives the date of the third edition as 
1719.  
69 Code Le Geyt 3.6.3. Noted in Moser v Waldon (1971) 1 JJ 1927, 1930, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
See also (Guernsey): 1852 Ordinance, 233, item 14; Le Marchant, vol 1, 129 – 130; Carey, 69 – 70, 
71 – 72. 
70 (1758) 2 CR 124. This may also have been the case in R Succession Le Montais (1782) 118 Ex 50, 
but it is not clear from the court record: “l’Horloge en question est clouée dans l’appartement où elle a 
été placée; La Cour a jugé qu’elle doit tenir nature d’Immeubles”. 
71 Moser v Waldon (1971) 1 JJ 1927, 1930, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. The citation from the judgment 
is “Pothier (Nouvelle Edition––1819), in Tome IX, entitled ‘Communauté––Donations entre mari et 
femme’”. 
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perpetuity are part of it,72 which Pothier identifies as having been taken from Digest 
19.1.17.7.73 Pothier’s second rule, which aids interpretation of the first, is that things 
attached to an edifice from which they cannot easily be removed are deemed to be 
there for perpetuity and so form part of it.74 Again, reference is made to the Digest.75 
The third rule is that things which are easily moved are still part of a house if they 
complete it in some way, but if they are mere ornament or furniture, or tools of the 
trade of the person living there, they are not partof the house.76 Again, he links this 
rule back to the Digest,77 which is also done for rules four and five.78  
 
From Pothier’s text, the influence of Roman law is obvious. Also apparent are 
similarities between Pothier and the Reformed Custom, suggesting a link between 
Norman customary law and the Digest.79 The influence of the Digest can also be seen 
in the commentators on the Reformed Custom.80 
  
The court in Moser also considered an English text – the third edition of Megarry and 
Wade’s The Law of Real Property – where two rules are set out.81 The first relates to 
the degree of annexation. Something resting by its own weight “is prima facie not a 
                                                 
72 Pothier Traité de la Communauté para 48: “Les choses qui sont dans une maison ou autre edifice 
pour perpétuelle demeure, en font partie; secùs si elles n’y sont que pour un temps.” 
73 Watson’s translation is: “Labeo writes that in general things inside structures for permanent use are 
part of the structure, but things there temporarily are not part of the structure. For example, pipes n 
place temporarily are not part of the building, butif they are permanently in place, they are part of the 
building.” Mommsen & Krueger, vol 2, 551. Compare (Guernsey) 1852 Ordinance, item 13. 
74 Pothier Traité de la Communauté para 49: “les choses qui sont tellement attachées à un edifice, 
qu’il ne serait pas facile de les en detacher, sontprésumées y être pour perpétuelle demeure, et fair 
partie de la maison et edifice où elles sont attachées.” 
75 D.19.1.17.  
76 Pothier Traité de la Communauté para 53: “Les choses qui peuvent facilement être déplacées du 
lieu où elles sont, ne laissent pas d’être censées faire partie de la maison, lorsqu’elles y servent à 
compléter la partie de la maison où elles sont placées […] mais, si elles n’y servent que d’ornement et 
d’ameublement, ou pour l’exercice du métier de la personne qui habite la maison […] elles ne sont pas 
censées faire partie de la maison, et sont de simples meubles.” See also: Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 74. 
Compare: (Guernsey) Carey, 70, 72. 
77 D.19.1.13.31; D.19.1.17.3; D.33.7.12.23. 
78 Four (on constructive fixtures): Pothier T aité de la Communauté para 60, D.19.1.7, D.19.1.17.8. 
Five (on destination, on which see: ch 6 C): Pothier Traité de la Communauté para 62, D.19.1.17.10, 
D.19.1.17.5, D.19.1.18.1. Rule six (Traité de la Communauté para 63) is an exception to the normal 
rule for things attached by usufructuaries or tenants. 
79 Compare: Pothier Traité de la Communauté paras 48 – 50, with art 506 CR; Pothier Traité de la 
Communauté para 53, with Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 342 on art 506 CR (“Cet article a beaucoup de 
conformité à la disposition du Droit Civil”).  
80 For example: Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 338 et seq; Pesnelle, 497 et seq. 
81 (1966). Moser v Waldon (1971) 1 JJ 1927, 1931, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. Megarry & Wade, 716. 
Also: Harpum & Bridge, 1068. 
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fixture”,82 but something with a substantial connection to land or a building “is prima 
facie a fixture”.83 The second relates to the purpose of annexation, which (if the 
moveable object is to become a fixture) has to be an intention to effect a permanent 
improvement.84 
 
Finally, two English cases were examined, Norton v Dashwood being the more 
significant.85 From that case, the court in Moser focused on a passage containing 
three “tests” or criteria: the mode and degree of annexation; intention (temporary or 
permanent placement?); and the effect of removal on the immoveable.86  
 
The bookcase was held not to be a fixture, for fivereasons. First, it was essentially 
freestanding as the screws were for safety (thus discarding the physical attachment as 
irrelevant on the facts).87 Second, it was intended to be an item of furniture o  
ornament. Third, the units could be used elsewhere. Fourth, there would be no 
damage caused by its removal, and the adverse effect o  removal (exposing the 
missing skirting board and architrave) was negligibe. Fifth, other improvements and 
additions had been made to the building so the wording of the agreement between the 
parties made sense even if the bookcase was ignored.88 
 
In relation to the washing machine, the defendant hd pled that it “was plumbed into 
the building as a fixed and permanent item”, but at the hearing “withdrew his claim 
that the washing machine passed with the property”89 and that appears to have been 
the end of the court’s consideration of the point. The court “authorise[d] the plaintiff 
to remove it”,90 which suggests that it was thought not to have accded, but there is 
no discussion of the point. 
 
                                                 
82 Megarry & Wade, 716. Also: Harpum & Bridge, 1068. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. A second qualification relates to tenants’ property (717). Also: Harpum & Bridge, 1069 – 
1071. 
85 (1896) 2 Ch 497. The other is Leigh v Taylor (1902) AC 157. See: Moser v Waldon (1971) 1 JJ 
1927, 1932, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
86 Moser, ibid, citing Norton v Dashwood (1896) 2 Ch 497, 500, per Chitty, J. 
87 Moser, ibid 1933. 
88 Ibid 1934. 
89 Ibid 1935. 
90 Ibid 1936. 
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In its judgment, the court does not expressly synthesise the authority it sets out, but 
this can be done. From the parts of sources used in the judgment, four criteria can be 
extracted, all of which informed the decision. These are considered in turn, below. 
 
(a) Attachment 91 
Physical attachment is at the heart of the straightforward case of accession. Land is 
immoveable. What is attached to land, or to a building which is itself part of the land, 
becomes effectively part of the land or building and so is also immoveable. This 
criterion is present universally in the sources, including sources in many other legal 
systems.92  
 
An exception to the requirement of attachment is made for things which are of great 
bulk and weight and cannot be moved without disassembly. This is the substance of 
article 515 of the Reformed Custom,93 which Le Geyt and Poingdestre identify as in 
conformity with Terrien’s commentary, thus giving the article more weight in 
Jersey.94 On a practical level, Le Geyt expresses scepticism about whether there are 
any containers on the island sufficiently large and weighty to be properly called 
immoveable, but notes that “il est certain que dans les derniers jugemens on a 
constamment suivi Terrien et la Nouvelle Coûtume à la lettre.”95 
 
In both his Manuscrits and in his Code, Le Geyt links the subject of large containers 
to that of much smaller things which, because of their intimate connection with 
immoveables, are considered to be immoveable, despite little or no physical 
                                                 
91 Ibid 1933: the first reason for the decision. 
92 Art 506 RC and commentators thereon; Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 71; Code Le Geyt 3.6.3; 
Succession Poingdestre (1758) 2 CR 124; Succession Le Montais (1782) 118 Ex 50; Le Retilley v 
Richards and de Lisle (1838) (see: ch 4 n35); Pothier Traité de la Communauté para 49 (second rule); 
Megarry & Wade, 716; Norton v Dashwood (1896) 2 Ch 497, 500, per Chitty, J. Also: D.19.1.17; 
Terrien, 5.1; (France) art 525 CC; Reid Property 465 – 466, para 580; (Quebec) arts 901, 903 CC; 
(Louisiana) art 482 CC; (South Africa) Badenhorst & Pienaar, 147; (Guernsey) 1852 Ordinance, item 
6, item 14. 
93 “Un Moulin & un pressoir, cuves & tonnes sont réputées immeubles, quand ils ne peuvent être 
enlevez sans desassembler.” Compare (Guernsey) 1852 Ordinance, item 6 (“Les Moulins” and “Les 
Pressoirs”). 
94 Poingdestre Remarques on art 515; Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 73. Also: Terrien, 5.1. Compare 
(Guernsey): Le Marchant, vol 1, 131; Carey, 72. 
95 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 73. 
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connection.96 These are considered below, in relation to the functio  of objects,97 for 
while the great size or weight of tanks, vats, presses, and the like may be considered 
to be equivalent to physical attachment, it is the functional subordination of smaller 
items with no physical attachment that forms the prima y justification for their 
classification as immoveable. 
 
(b) Intention 98 
Although the rules of accession are similar in many legal systems, the criterion of 
intention is not a constant.99 Intention that the moveable be affixed on a permanent 
basis is a requirement in all but one of the sources ited by the court in Moser. 
Curiously, the exception is Le Geyt’s Code, and that may be the reason the court 
elected to quote article 506 of the Reformed Custom fro  Basnage, rather than Le 
Geyt’s paraphrase of it,100 particularly in view of the fact that (presumed) intention 
informs its decision.101 The absence of any allusion to intention in Le Geyt’s Code is 
all the more notable in view of the fact that he dos consider the point – albeit briefly 
– in his Manuscrits: of article 506 of the Reformed Custom, he says that e word 
“perpetual” apparently puts owner and tenant (or usufr ctuary) in opposition; their 
presumed intention differs.102 
 
Possibly, Le Geyt’s omission of reference to perpetuity (and thus to intention) in his 
Code was accidental. In any event, in view of its presence in many of the sources 
relevant to Jersey law in this area, and the decisive role it has played in case-law,103 
intention may fairly be asserted as a criterion to be taken into account when 
considering moveable-to-immoveable accession. Specifically, the presumed intention 
arising from the actions of one who owns the immoveabl  is different from that 
                                                 
96 Ibid; Code Le Geyt 3.6.4. Also: Poingdestre Remarques on art 506. 
97 See: ch 4 E(1)(d). 
98 Moser v Waldon (1971) 1 JJ 1927, 1933 – 1934, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff: the second reason for 
the decision. 
99 For example, it is absent in Scotland, where accession is purely mechanical: Reid Property 458 – 
459, para 572.  
100 Code Le Geyt 3.6.3, 54. 
101 Moser v Waldon (1971) 1 JJ 1927, 1933 – 1934, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
102 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 71. 
103 See: Moser v Waldon (1971) 1 JJ 1927; Re Succession Poingdestre (1758) 2 CR 124 “l’Horloge en 
question, entre les Parties, est tellement clouée & fixée, qu’elle a été destine par le Pete pour 
perpetuele demeure”. 
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arising from the actions of someone for whom possession of the immoveable is likely 
to be temporary. Intention to fix a moveable to theimmoveable in perpetuity is 
presumed in the case of an owner, and not in the cas of a tenant or usufructuary.104 
Thus intention is objective in character: it depends ot on subjective thought or will, 
but on a person’s relationship to the property. As such, “objective intention” is a 
misnomer, for what a person actually intended has nothi g to do with it.105 
 
The reason for the criterion of intention appears to be a desire that someone with a 
temporary right to an immoveable will not lose ownership of moveables that are 
affixed to it. Consequently, the presumptions may need to be interpreted with 
flexibility. For example, a tenant under a one-year l se can hardly be said to be in 
the same position as a tenant under a lease for a term of years in excess of a human 
life-span. As the latter will not see the expiry of that term, his position is closer to 
that of an owner. It seems logical, therefore, thata tenant will be presumed to intend 
to put a thing in place for perpetuity if the lease by virtue of which he or she occupies 
the property is for a great number of years. How long a great number is, is a matter 
of difficulty. In Jersey, a long lease is one for a term in excess of nine years.106 
Perhaps this is the obvious division. Usufructs could follow the same rule. However, 
perhaps the period to be considered is not the number of years for which the lease 
was originally granted, but the number of years it has left to run at the time of the 
fixing. 
 
The sources give little in the way of detail. It is clear that the relevant intention is that 
the object is put in place permanently, or “mis pour perpetuelle demeure”.107 It is not 
clear whose intention is relevant. If the affixer is the owner of the moveable the 
answer is clear, but what if the affixer is not the owner of the moveable? In that 
instance, the owner’s intention alone ought to be taken into account, if, in certain 
                                                 
104 Pothier Traité de la Communauté paras 53, 63. See also: art 518 RC; Basnage O uvres 358 (on art 
518); Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 71; Pesnelle, 500; Le Retilley v Richards and de Lisle (1838) (see: ch 
4 n35). Compare: (Guernsey) 1852 Ordinance, item 15; and (Guernsey) Carey, 70; with Le Geyt, who 
is emphatic that “engrais” are moveable (Manuscrits vol 1, 72). 
105 See also: van Vliet “Accession I” 69. 
106 See: ch 3 I(4). 
107 Art 506 RC. For this conceptualisation of intentio, see also: (England) Deen v Andrews (1986) 52 
P&CR 17, 22, per Hirst, J. 
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cases, it is accepted that the function of the critrion of intention is to prevent loss of 
ownership of the moveable.108 The owner of the moveable would be presumed not to 
have intended it to accede. 
 
Can the presumed intention be varied by consent? Onerous transferees and creditors 
ought to be protected from deception as to the value of the land. Thus, if variation is 
possible, adequate publicity is required. For example, where a tenant under a short 
lease109 affixes a moveable not belonging to the lessor, accession will not operate. 
For a tenant under a long lease, accession will operate. In either case, it could be 
argued that the operation of accession should be capable of variation by contract, 
where there is adequate publicity of that agreement. A lease for more than nine years 
requires to be registered for its validity, which ensures publicity.110 If variation was 
desired under a short lease, a rule that that leaseshould be registered in order for the 
variation to be valid would satisfy publicity requirements. 
 
Although intention is only one factor in judging whet er a moveable has acceded, it 
can be determinative. This is equally true where the affixer is the owner of both 
moveable and immoveable. TB Smith, in his Short Commentary on the Law of 
Scotland, provides the example of seats bolted into the floor.111 If this is done for a 
one-off occasion such as a boxing match, the seats have not acceded. If the same 
seats are bolted to the floor in the same fashion for permanent use in a cinema, they 
have acceded (and so would pass with the building if it were sold). In both cases, the 
degree of attachment and of functional subordinatio, and the effect of removal are 
the same. What differs is that in the first instance it is presumed that the intention is 
not to put the seats in permanently, whereas the opposite is presumed in the second 
instance. 
 
                                                 
108 See: (South Africa) van der Merwe Things 127, para 144. On the intention criterion in South 
African law: van Vliet “Accession II” 205 – 212. 
109 That is, sufficiently short that no presumption of intention arises. 
110 See: ch 3 I(4). 
111 Smith Commentary 504. 
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(c) Effect of removal 112 
The effect of removal is a criterion mentioned in a umber of the sources, most of 
which admit some ambiguity over whether the relevant deleterious effect is one 
suffered by the moveable, or by the immoveable.113 Pesnelle’s commentary is 
suggestive that it is damage to the moveable that mat ers.114 The judgment in Moser 
indicates that damage to the immoveable is relevant, but appears at that point only to 
be repeating the argument of the defendant rather than giving its considered opinion 
on the matter.115 Logically, it seems correct to conclude that damage to either thing is 
relevant. Utter destruction of, or significant damage to, either moveable or 
immoveable upon their separation is proof of a materi l degree of physical 
attachment. 
 
That the effect of removal is an element of the test for accession illustrates one of the 
policy bases underpinning the doctrine: destruction of, or damage to, things is to be 
avoided. Therefore, where this would be the result, the law deems one thing to have 
been subsumed by another, preferring the concomitant consequences for ownership 
and classification over impaired or destroyed utility. Similarly, if removal means loss 
of utility even without physical damage, the law often prefers to deem the things 
united, rather than encourage their separation. For example, if the bookcase in Moser 
had not been composed of separable units but was a solid whole, unlikely to suit any 
space other than that wall in that house, the decision of the court might have been in 
favour of accession. Clearly, this criterion is linked to that of function, discussed 
below.116   
 
The effect of removal was one of several factors used in Moser, but the 
commentators on the Reformed Custom discuss whether it is actually an alternative 
stand-alone test. Article 506 provides: 
 
                                                 
112 Moser v Waldon (1971) 1 JJ 1927, 1934, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff: the fourth reason for the 
decision. 
113 For example: art 506 RC; ode Le Geyt 3.6.3; Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 342. 
114 Pesnelle, 500. 
115 Moser v Waldon (1971) 1 JJ 1927, 1934, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
116 See: ch 4 E(1)(d). 
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“à fer, clou, ou sont scellés à plâtre & mis pour pe petuelle demeure, ou ne 
peuvent être enlevés sans fraction ou deterioration” 
 
The comma after “demeure” together with the word “ou” which follows it appear to 
separate two alternatives: the first is attachment with the intention that it be 
permanent; the second makes no reference to intention but perhaps requires a greater 
level of attachment than the first. Pesnelle assert that, nonetheless, two elements are 
always required for accession under article 506: attachment, and intention to attach 
the thing for perpetuity.117 Basnage does not appear to agree, and analyses article 506 
in the way given above, that is, that the article provides two different possibilities:  
 
“qu’ils tiennent à fer, clou, ou qu’ils soient scellez à plâtre, & mis pour 
perpetuelle demeure, ou qu’ils ne puissent être enlevez sans fraction ou 
deterioration, ou sans les desassembler, comme en l’art. DXV.” 118 
 
It appears, therefore, that although an element of intention can play a part in the 
operation of article 506, this is not a necessary component if the item cannot be 
removed without damage or without being broken. Again, this illustrates the policy 




The fourth criterion is the function of the object. Furniture and ornaments with 
minimal physical attachment120 can be contrasted with items which have equivalent 
physical attachment but in some way complete the immoveable, such as a door, a 
window, or a fireplace.121 This criterion may be described as “functional 
subordination”. A door is useless as a door without a structure around it, such as a 
building. The door is functionally subordinate to the building. A bed functions as a 
bed wherever it is located, even if typical weather conditions make an uncovered 
                                                 
117 Pesnelle, 500. 
118 [emphasis added] Basnage O uvres vol 2, 342. 
119 Moser v Waldon (1971) 1 JJ 1927, 1933 – 1934, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff: the second reason for 
the decision. 
120 Pothier Traité de la Communauté para 53. See also: D.33.7.26 (referred to by Pesnell , 501); 
Bérault, Godefroy, & d’Aviron Commentaires vol 2, 440 (Godefroy). Ornament or furniture will 
accede if there is a sufficient level of physical attachment: Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 73 – 74. 
121 Keenan v Keenan v Timber Tech 1999 JLR N6c. 
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location inadvisable. Extreme examples of functional subordination are seen in 
things – such as keys – which are not physically attached to an immoveable at all, but 
nevertheless are treated as though they have acceded in the normal fashion. Le Geyt 
renders these as “dépendances”;122 they can also be described as “constructive 
fixtures”.123 Some Roman law influence is evident on this point. Overlapping 
examples are given in the Digest,124 and by Le Geyt,125  Poingdestre,126 Basnage,127 
and Pothier,128 of items with little or no physical attachment to an immoveable, but 
which nonetheless accede to it. 
 
The policy underlying accession is also seen in this criterion. Not only does the law 
seek to avoid significant reduction in utility by favouring the status quo for things 
which are decisively joined together, it also seeks the same end in a virtual sense, 
favouring the continued unity of things which are functionally “joined”. 
 
(2) The Test for Accession 
The quadripartite test for accession extracted from Moser, and set out above, is 
workable and coheres well with the earlier sources. If it is to be applied in future 
cases, however, some further points should be noted. 
 
In general, the absence of one criterion does not of itself negate the conclusion that 
accession has taken place. Rather, it is a balancing exercise: the strong presence of 
one criterion will make up for the relative lack of another. The exception is the effect 
of removal. If the effect of removal is total destruction of property, it seems that a 
conclusion of accession is inevitable. Therefore, if a transient occupier wants to take 
something away at the end of his or her occupation, hat person must make sure that 
the thing is not so attached to the immoveable as to result in great damage when it is 
removed. 
                                                 
122 Le Geyt Manuscrits 73. On accession of physically unattached things generally: Bérault, Godefroy, 
& d’Aviron Commentaires vol 2, 440 – 441 (Godefroy). 
123 Reid Property 461 – 462, para 576. On the meaning of “fixture”: Brand’s Trs v Brand’s Trs (1876) 
3 R (HL) 16, 23, per Lord Chelmsford. 
124 D.19.1.17, D.19.1.17.8. 
125 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 73. Also Code Le Geyt 3.6.4. 
126 Remarques on art 504. 
127 Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 342. 
128 Pothier Traité de la Communauté para 60. 
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The elements of the test for accession demonstrate clearly that this is a pragmatic 
doctrine, which seeks to promote overall utility: things ought not to be destroyed or 
significantly damaged; and things ought to remain where they are most useful and 
can best fulfil their purpose (the justification for inclusion of the criterion of intention 
is part of this: someone with a temporary right to an immoveable will not lose 
ownership of moveables that are affixed to it). Although the detail of the tests may 
differ, these policy considerations underpin the doctrine of accession in many 
jurisdictions. With the exercise of appropriate caution, reference may reasonably be 
made to, for example, English law (as in Moser), Scots law,129 and civilian systems, 
for the law of accession is Roman-derived in each. 
 
One potentially undesirable consequence of accession i  that a tenant, for example, 
can force a “benefit” on an owner, by causing a moveable to accede to the leased 
land. Where the “benefit” can be removed with damage only to it, there is less 
difficulty. Where removal occasions damage to the immoveable, an action for breach 
of contract may be available, on the basis of an implied term. Otherwise, tortious 
liability may arise. 
  
(3) Compensation 
If accessory and principal belong to different peopl , the question may arise as to 
whether the owner who has benefited from accession i  obliged to compensate the 
owner who has lost out (the former owner of the moveable). Poingdestre appears to 
endorse the possibility of a claim by stating that a enant who is not entitled to 
remove the trees he has planted at the end of the leas  would be able to claim for the 
improvement made to the land.130 A claim for compensation in respect of loss of 
ownership consequential to accession could be based in unjust(ified) enrichment. 
 
Darryl Ogier has traced the customary law maxim celui qui bâtit sur la terre d’autrui 
perd ses mises, referred to in the Guernsey case Le Retilley v Richards and de Lisle, 
                                                 
129 On the similarity between Scots and English law in accession (with some caveats): Smith 
Commentary 500; Reid Property 464, para 578. 
130 Poingdestre Remarques on art 517. See: ch 4 E(4). 
 92
back to Justinian’s Institutes.131 In turn, it finds expression in modern legal 
systems.132 In cases where compensation is claimed, reference may be made to these 
rules as a starting point for development of a modern law. 
 
(4) Accession of Fruits  
Article 505 of the Reformed Custom provides, reasonbly enough, that wood is 
never considered to be moveable until it has been svered.133 Commenting on article 
505, Godefroy says that “encore que cet article ne res rve que les bois, il y a parité 
de raison pour les pierres & mineraux.”134 This is rather an obvious point: the basic 
rule is that all which is attached to the land – or pa t of it – is immoveable until 
severed from it. The fruit of the land is in the same position as an object which has 
acceded. The same article provides a significant exception (discussed below) in 
relation to the moment of detachment.135 
 
Articles 516136 and 517137 contain provisions supplementary to article 505 for the 
benefit of widows and heirs,138 and of tenants, respectively. Under article 517, 
tenants can take half of the trees with them on expiry of the lease provided that the 
planting was done six years or more before the end of the lease.139 Poingdestre 
approves of this latter provision.140 In his Code, Le Geyt does not reproduce articles 
516 and 517, instead simply stating: 
 
                                                 
131 DM Ogier, Letter to Editor, (2008) JGLR 392.  
132 Justinian Institutes 2.1.29, 2.1.30, 2.1.35. Also: (France) art 555 CC;(Louisiana) arts 493.2 – 498 
CC; (Quebec) arts 956, 958 – 963 CC; (Scotland) Reid Property 462 – 463, para 577. 
133 See also (Guernsey): 1852 Ordinance, item 7, item 12; Carey, 69. 
134 Bérault, Godefroy, & d’Aviron Commentaires vol 2, 438. 
135 See: ch 4 F(1). 
136 Compare (Guernsey) 1852 Ordinance, item 6.  
137 Art 516 RC: “Pepinieres [tree nurseries], chênotieres [oak nurseries], haîtrieres [beech nurseries], 
oulmieres [elm nurseries], & autre jeunes arbres provenus de plant, ou de semence, & tenus en 
reservoir pour être transplantez, suivent le fonds; éanmoins les veuves, usufruitiers, & autres heritiers 
prennent part aux pepinieres comme aux meubles, avenant la dissolution du marriage en l’année 
qu’elles doivent être levées”. Art 517 RC: “Pareillement les fermiers aiant planté lesdites pepinieres, 
chênotieres, oulmieres, & autres nouritures de semblable qualité, les peuvent enlever après leur bail 
expire, en laissant la moitié aux propriétaires, pourvû qu’elles aient été faites du consentement du 
propriétaire, ou six ans avant la fin du bail.” 
138 See: Poingdestre Remarques on art 516. 
139 See also: Houard Dictionnaire vol 3, 467. Compare: (Guernsey) Carey, 70. The tenant’s right 
under art 517 has echoes of the ius tollendi of Roman law, common to many modern systems: van 
Vliet “Accession I”, van Vliet “Accession II”. 
140 See: Poingdestre Remarques on art 517. 
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“[…] les Pepinieres & les autres jeunes Arbres provenant de plantes ou 
semences, & tenus en reservoir pour estre transplantés, suivent le fonds, sauf 
ce qui est propre pour estre transplanté.”141 
 
According to this, the only exception to the rule that trees are immoveable when in 
the ground concerns those which are capable of being transplanted. This rule is 
attractively simple. Le Geyt provides no further commentary on the subject of trees 
in his Manuscrits, which is suggestive that the matter had generated no significant 
litigation. 
 
F. CLASSIFICATION BY ANTICIPATION 
 
Sometimes the law considers it expedient to deem a thing moveable which would 
otherwise be immoveable, and vice versa.142 A functional connection can be made 
between these two situations. In both cases, a thing of one class is deemed by the law 
to be of the other class, in anticipation of an actu l attachment or detachment.  
 
(1) Moveables by Anticipation 143 
Article 505144 of the Reformed Custom states that fruit, grains, a d hay still rooted in 
the ground after the day presumed to be the birthday of John the Baptist (24 June)145 
are considered to be moveable, excepting apples and grapes, which retain their 
immoveable status until 1 September.146 Commenting on article 488 (a shortened 
version of 505), Poingdestre147 notes that this is a new rule, developed and observed 
                                                 
141 Code Le Geyt 3.6.5. 
142 See: ch 4 E(1)(d). Also: Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 68. 
143 On the history of this phrase in French law, see: Carbonnier, vol 2, 1615, para 720. For discussion: 
Josserand Actes 375 – 392, paras 298 – 312. Also: (Louisiana) Yiannopoulos Property 292 – 297, 
paras 126, 128, and art 474 CC; (Quebec) Lamontagne, 53 – 55, paras 88 – 89 (arts 900, 2698 CC); 
Dawes Laws 170. 
144 “Les fruits, grains & foins étans sur la terre aprés le jour de la Nativité S. Jean-Bâtiste, encore 
qu’ils tiennent par les racines, & ne soient coupez n  size, sont néanmoins censez & réputez meubles, 
fors & reserve les pommes & les raisons qui sont réputez immeubles jusques au premier jour de 
Septembre; & quant au bois, il n’est repute meuble s’il n’est coupé.” 
145 This is a Jersey quarterday: 1771 Code, “Maisons”. The others are 25 March, 29 September, and 
25 December. The old English quarterdays fall on the same dates. Compare: (Guernsey) 1852 
Ordinance, item 8. 
146 Compare (Guernsey): 1852 Ordinance, item 9, item 10; Carey, 69. Carey says that the Guernsey 
dates used to be 24 June and 1 September, but the new dates were established when the calendar 
changed from Julian to Gregorian. 
147 Poingdestre Remarques. 
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in practice, which is contrary to Roman law, which considered nothing still in the 
ground to be moveable.148 
 
Are apples and grapes exhaustive of the exceptions, or are other similar fruits, such 
as pears, are to be included? Le Geyt admits pears to fruits immoveable until 1 
September,149 but considers the relevant date for all other fruit to be the feast of John 
the Baptist.150 Le Geyt also observes that, although the Reformed Custom says 
“after” the birthday of John the Baptist but “until” 1 September, the position is that 1 
September must also have passed before apples, grapes, nd pears become 
moveable.151 Therefore, the real operative dates for the rules are 25 June and 2 
September. These rules are designed to render natural commodities moveable once 
they are ripe.152 Pesnelle comments that Norman customary law has eschewed the 
rule of Roman law – that all in the ground is immoveable until cut –153 in favour of a 
rule certain and “indépendante du caprice du cultivateur”.154 The Roman rule has not 
been ousted completely for living things:155 it applies to plant-life such as trees, 
which do not reach a specific, annual window of maturity beyond which they spoil. 
 
Some things made moveable by anticipation may never be severed, such as if a few 
stalks of crop are missed in the harvest. Presumably, these regain their immoveable 
status once they are intermingled with the soil because they have degraded beyond 
the point of use. 
 
(2) Immoveables by Anticipation 
The concept of immoveables by anticipation is described in the sources as 
“destination”. A common example concerns the bricks or stones of a house 
demolished but to be rebuilt: they remain immoveabl even during the period before 
                                                 
148 D.6.1.44.  
149 Also: Pesnelle, 499. Compare: Bérault, Godefroy, & d’Aviron Commentaires vol 2, 439 
(Godefroy). 
150 Code Le Geyt 6.3.2. Also, Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 68 – 69. 
151 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 69. 
152 Ibid 68 – 69. 
153 Pesnelle gives a reference to D.6.1.24, which appers to be an error. D.6.1.44 is more relevant: 
“Fructus pendentes pars fundi uidentur”.  
154 Pesnelle, 499, n1. The third paragraph of that note ( n when diligence can be done against the 
crops) should be read in conjunction with Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 69, final paragraph. 
155 See: ch 4 F(1). 
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their re-employment. Interestingly, this example is found in writing on the laws of 
Normandy,156 Jersey,157 Guernsey,158 and also Scotland.159 Like accession, this 
doctrine can be traced back to the Digest.160  
 
As well as building materials destined for re-employment, Le Geyt appears to favour 
Basnage’s view that materials set aside for use in a particular construction project but 
not yet employed can be immoveable. They must, however, have been prepared in 
some way, such as by polishing.161 Referring to a case from 1596, Le Geyt suggests 
that there is a second criterion: the edifice must be more than half-made.162 This 
seems sensible: bricks or stones waiting to be usedin reconstruction may provide 
publicity of their final destination to some degree if they are in plain view. If they are 
not, while some familiarity with the land (or a conversation with a person so 
familiar), or a planning application advertised in the Jersey Evening Post,163 would 
expose the true position, the requirement for a half-bui t edifice gives greater 
publicity of the change in classification of what is apparently moveable property. 
This is to the benefit of creditors, for it affects the value of hypothecated land, and 
also heirs and legatees, for whom the distinction between moveable and immoveable 
is all-important. In view of the publicity aspect, another criterion is likely to be that 
the materials must be on-site. It may, however, be pr ferable to modify the 
requirement for a half-finished building to a more flexible standard.  
 
                                                 
156 See, for example: Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 343; Bérault, Godefroy, & d’Aviron Commentaires vol 
2, 440 (Bérault) 441 (Godefroy). Examples relating o the classification of money given to a woman at 
the time of her marriage, or to minors, are found i articles 511 and 512 RC, respectively, on which 
see: Terrien, 5.1; Carey, 71. 
157 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 71. 
158 Carey, 70. 
159 Reid Property 21 – 22, para 15 (where, however, things can only be made immoveable by 
destination for the purposes of the law of succession).  
160 D.19.1.17.10. 
161 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 72 (compare (Scotland) Johnstone v Dobie (1783) Mor 5443). On the 
same page, Le Geyt states categorically that heaps of manure, fertiliser or piles of straw are always 
moveable (compare: (Guernsey) 1852 Ordinance, item 15; (France) art 524 CC, re “engrais”; 
(Scotland) Reid’s Executors v Reid (1890) 17 R 519, 522 – 523, per Lord President Inglis). This 
question exercised commentators elsewhere, for example: Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 343. 
162 Le Geyt ibid 72. 
163 States of Jersey Planning and Building Services, Supplementary Planning Guidance, Practice Note 
16, section 3. See also: Planning and Building (Jersey) Law 2002, art 6. The records at the Public 
Registry will, at least, reveal what buildings were on the land the last time it was transferred. 
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Is exercise of the will an essential element in destination? Intention is probably 
required, albeit objectively assessed. In the example of building materials, the mental 
element is that the stones are to be used for rebuilding. If stones are not to be so used, 
an act of the will alone cannot make them immoveabl, for this change can only be 
effected by accession, which occurs by operation of law, not by consent.164 
 
Is there some connection between this doctrine and destination du père de famille?165 
Although there seems to be no authority on the point, it may be that both are linked 
not only by the word “destination”, but also by the id a of the bon père de famille. 
The bon père (ou bonne mère) de famille would have wished that the building 
materials would go to the immoveable heir, should he die whilst (re)construction 
work is still ongoing, just as he would ensure that an heir can use a path or road to 
access the inherited property which was so used during his lifetime.166 
 
Destination, as extracted from the Jersey sources, differs from immeubles par 
destination in the French Civil Code.167 In the latter, the purpose of the thing is the 
reason for its recognition as immoveable. Thus, various things used for economic 
exploitation of the land (for example, agricultural machinery and beasts, pigeons in 
dovecots, rabbits in warrens, presses, stills, vats, and manure) all take the nature of 
an immoveable.168 Unlike the prepared building materials in Jersey law, these things 
are not in a temporary state of mobilisation while th y await transformation into 
immoveables in fact. Immeubles par destination i  modern French law are thus the 
functional equivalent of dépendances (or constructive fixtures)169 in Jersey law, 
although the lists of moveables considered to be immoveable by each of those legal 
fictions are not the same.170 
 
 
                                                 
164 Thus, when accession results in a change of ownership, that is original (not derivative) acquisition. 
See: ch 5 A.  
165 See: ch 6. 
166 Ibid. 
167 See: art 517. 
168 (France) art 524 CC. 
169 See: ch 4 E(1)(d). 
170 Compare, for example: (France) art 524 CC; Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 72.  
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(3) Comparison  
Although a functional comparison is possible between the two types of classification 
by anticipation, the rules applicable in each case r  different. Things become 
moveable by anticipation mechanically, whereas an elem nt of intention is required 
for things to be immoveable by anticipation. The policy reasons also differ. Things 
are made moveable by anticipation in order to render certain the time at which the 
change in classification will occur. This benefits creditors, who can seek to seize 
these moveable assets on a certain date, and while they are at peak value. The policy 
behind making things immoveable by anticipation relat s to the transfer of land, and 
has its origins in a time when most transfers were mortis causa. Generally, 
“destination” seeks to put in place what the deceased would have (or should have) 
done. Inheriting a partially-built edifice, but not the materials to complete it – though 
they are on-site and ready – is onerous and an inefficient distribution of the estate. 
 
G. FISH AND OTHER ANIMALS 
 
In the treatments of the classification of property in the Jersey sources, one matter 
remains which is given particular prominence:171 the status of fish, bees, rabbits, 
pigeons, and suchlike.172 The only animal expressly mentioned in this respect in the 
Reformed Custom is the fish. Under article 520,173 fish in a pond or pool174 are 
immoveable, but when they are in a reservoir they are moveable.175 Poingdestre 
agrees with this article, extending the application  rabbits in a warren, and pigeons 
in a dovecot.176 Le Geyt agrees with Poingdestre.177 Domestic animals are relieved of 
earthy bondage: pets are moveable.178 
                                                 
171 The RC also contains articles on the classification of boats in insolvency (art 519. See: Poingdestre 
Remarques on art 519; Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 74; Re Intersub Ltd 1985-86 JLR 202, 207, per 
Crill, Deputy Bailiff; (Guernsey) Carey, 70), and monetary office (art 514. See: Poingdestre 
Remarques on art 514). 
172 Compare: (France) arts 564, 522 CC. 
173 “Les poissons qui sont en estang ou fosse sont repu ez immeuble: mais quand ils sont en reservoir 
ils sont reputez meuble.” Also: (Guernsey) Carey, 72. 
174 Or a stank (see: (Scotland) Valentine v Kennedy 1985 SCCR 89). 
175 On keeping fish: de Gruchy, 129. 
176 Poingdestre Remarques on art 520. 
177 Code Le Geyt 3.6.5. Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 70 – 71. Also: Pesnelle, 511; Basnage Oeuvres vol 
2, 358. 
178 Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 358. Also: Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 71. 
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Article 520 is not easily explained.179 Pesnelle suggests that the animals deemed 
immoveable have a reciprocal relationship with the land, providing a perpetual 
succession in exchange for nourishment.180 However, could this not be said of all 
animals? Are they not all supported by the land in some respect? One reason for the 
rule may be a concern to maintain numbers of particular species and, related to that, 
the protection of the legitimate expectation of an acquirer that a certain number of, 
for example, fish will remain in the pool when he takes possession.181 
 
Basnage asserts that article 520 is consonant with D.19.1.15, (“But fish which are in 
a pool are not part of a building or farm”)182 saying that piscina (“pool”) signifies a 
place in which fish would be enclosed in order to be sold, or for commodiousness.183 
(He must, therefore, equate piscina with reservoir.) Article 520 is an example of the 
influence of Roman law,184 in light of which it is unsurprising that an explanation of 
the provision is found in Pothier: one does not have ownership of wild animals which 
is distinct from ownership of the land itself.185 Therefore, they are immoveable. 
 
Is this a form of accession? This is likely. In introducing the subject, Le Geyt uses 
the word “incorporation”,186 a word which he also uses in relation to what is clearly 
accession.187 The policy of the French Civil Code is to treat particular animals 
involved in the economic exploitation of land as immoveable, with the explanation 
that they have acceded.188 The same justification could be applied to article 520 of 
the Reformed Custom. 
                                                 
179 There is some overlap with art 520 RC and art 524 FCC, but the travaux préparatoires for the 
latter reveal nothing: Fenet, vol 11, 4, 14 – 15. Of related interest: Maine Early 297; Patault, 98; G 
McLeod “Wild and Tame Animals and Bird in Roman Law” in Birks Perspectives. 
180 Pesnelle, 511. 
181 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 70. 
182 Watson’s translation: Mommsen & Krueger, vol 2, 550. 
183 Basnage Oeuvres vol 2, 358. 
184 Also: (Scotland) Hume Lectures vol 4, 566. 
185 Pothier Traité des Personnes et des Choses para 238. 
186 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 70. 
187 Ibid 71. 
188 See: arts 524, 564. Also: ch 4 F(2).  
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H. CLASSIFICATION OF RIGHTS 
 
Rights can be classified as either moveable or immoveable.189 
  
(1) Real Rights 
Article 508 of the Reformed Custom provides that “L’usufruit des choses 
immeubles, est réputé immeuble.”190 Poingdestre endorses this article, stating that it 
is derived from Terrien and thus “de l’ancienne pratique”.191 Le Geyt is also 
approving.192 From this it may be postulated that real rights assume the nature of the 
physical object to which they relate. A backwards look at Terrien confirms this 
position: “sont [immeubles] tous droicts dependans de fons, comme usufruict 
d’heritage, rentes foncieres,193 & servitudes réelles.”194 Thus, a real right takes its 
nature from its object,195 and a usufruct of moveables, for example, would be 
moveable. 
 
(2) Personal Rights  
Article 504 of the Reformed Custom – the text of which is taken from Terrien – 
provides that obligations made in respect of moveable things are moveable and, 
conversely, obligations made in respect of immoveable things are immoveable.196 
The article mentions only obligations, but for every obligation in private law there is 
a correlative right: a personal right.197 Consequently, article 504 can be applied to 
determine whether a personal right is moveable or immoveable. 
 
                                                 
189 For example: Terrien, 5.1; TJL 1984, art 10(10). 
190 Also: Le Gros, 458; (Guernsey) 1852 Ordinance, item 16; (Guernsey) Carey, 71. 
191 Poingdestre Remarques on art 508. Terrien, 5.1. 
192 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 75: “on ne le peut guère aliéner que devant le Magistrat.” 
193 See also (Guernsey): Le Marchant, vol 1, 131; Carey, 71. 
194 Terrien, 5.1. Compare (Guernsey) 1852 Ordinance, item 16. 
195 Also (Guernsey): Le Marchant, vol 1, 131; Carey, 70. Cave: Carey errs in his distinction between 
corporeals and incorporeals on this page. 
196 “Obligations & cédules faites pour choses mobiliaires, sont réputées meubles; comme en pareil, les 
obligations qui sont faites pour choses immeubles sont réputées immeubles.” See: Terrien, 5.1. 
(“Cédule” may be translated as “schedule” (see: P tit Robert 376), but has been given the specific 
meaning of “promissory note” in Guernsey: Jubilee Scheme 3 Limited Partnership v Capita Symonds 
Ltd Guernsey CA Civil Division, Appeal no 425, 14 & 15 December 2010, judgment given 4 Jan 
2011, 8, para 23, per Birt JA.) See also: Poingdestre Remarques on art 504. 
197 See: ch 3 B. 
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Le Geyt criticises article 504 for its ambiguity,198 observing that it is unclear whether 
the nature of the obligation is fixed by the cause of it, or by its effect.199 He considers 
that it would have been clearer to say “pour parveni  à choses mobiliaires. &c”,200 
which demonstrates that, in his view, classification is to be made by reference to the 
effect of the obligation. Therefore, for example, a personal right to payment is 
moveable because it is a right to moveables (money), and a personal right to transfer 
of an immoveable (such as a house) is immoveable. 
 
(3) Real Obligation: Rente  
A number of the provisions in the Reformed Custom deal with the classification of 
rente as immoveable or moveable.201 The basic position – in Norman customary law 
and in Jersey law – is that rente is immoveable, but that what is due to the creditor is 
moveable, once it has fallen due.202 “A rente is an annual payment charged on 
land”203 which may be created on sale as all or part of the price or by a stand-alone 
transaction.204 The system of rentes functioning as (part-) payment in sales of land, 
once common in Jersey, was also common in pre-Revolutionary France.205 The law 
relating to rentes in Jersey was substantially reformed by the Loi (1880) sur la 
Propriété Foncière.206 One innovation was to make all rentes capable of extinction 
by reimbursement,207 subject to minor exceptions.208 To this end, a price was fixed, if 
none was stipulated in the contract of creation.209 The price determined by the 
legislation was not index-linked (and neither were the prices provided for 
                                                 
198 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 75 – 76. 
199 Ibid 75. 
200 Ibid 76. 
201 Arts 507, 509, 510, 513. 
202 Terrien, 5.1, from: “Quant aux rentes hypotheques & achetees par prix d’argent” to “Car tels 
arrierages & pensions tiennent le lieu de fruicts.” Poingdestre Remarques on arts 507, 509, 510, 513. 
Code Le Geyt 3.6.6. 1880 Law, arts 27, 36. Matthews & Nicolle, 23, para 2.1. On Rentes Publiques: 
Loi (1881) sur la Conversion et l’amortissement de la dette publique, art 9. Also (Guernsey): Le 
Marchant, vol 1, 131; Carey, 71. 
203 Matthews & Nicolle, 2, para 1.6. Also: JLC CP8, 10para 4.2; Nicolle Immovable 185. 
204 See: ch 3 I(5).  
205 Planiol Treatise vol 1, 768 - 772, paras 2996 – 3004. 
206 For background, see: RP Marett, Lettre Explicative du Projet de Loi Amendé sur la Propriété 
Foncière (logé au greffe le 23 Janvier 1878) (available in 3 (1999) JLRev 41); 1861 Report, xvi – 
xviii, xxi – xxiv. 
207 Art 37, 1880 Law (for rentes created before the 1880 Law); arts 30, 31, 1880 Law (for rentes 
created after the 1880 Law). Also: Loi (1915) sur la Propriété Foncière (Guaranties) art 12; Loi 
(1970) touchant le remboursement des rentes anciennes art 1. 
208 Arts 41, 42, 1880 Law. The r nte viagère is also a partial exception: art 32, 1880 Law. 
209 Arts 30, 31, 1880 Law. 
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contractually). In consequence, the commercial significa ce of rentes has been 
greatly diminished by inflation. Additionally, many old rentes have been 
extinguished by reimbursement, and now very few new r ntes are created.210 The 
Jersey Law Commission has proposed the abolition of rentes.211 
 
(4) Leases 
A division is made between “paper leases” (“short leases”) and “contract leases” 
(“bail à longues années” or “long leases”).212 Paper leases, or short leases, are leases 
for nine years or fewer; contract leases, or long leases, are leases for a term in excess 
of nine years.213 As it is unclear whether a contract lease is a real right or personal 
right,214 it is convenient to consider leases separately. 
 
Contract leases are immoveable;215 paper leases are moveable.216 Both types of lease 
pertain to land – an immoveable – so, on one view, both should be immoveable. The 
approach of article 504 appears to have been rejected in this instance. According to 
article 504, a paper lease would be immoveable (as would a contract lease) because 
the right or obligation relates to possession and use of an immoveable. 
 
(5) Deeds 
Commenting on article 504 of the Reformed Custom,217 Poingdestre discusses the 
status of deeds, arguing that a deed relating to an immoveable is itself immoveable, 
and a deed relating to a moveable is moveable.218 It may be questioned whether this 
was the burden of the rule intended to be conveyed in article 504. Poingdestre has 
remarked on the influence of Terrien on these articles of the Reformed Custom. 
                                                 
210 JLC CP6, H, “Rentes”. See also: JLC CP8, 23, para 7.17. 
211 JLC CP6, ibid. 
212 Le Gros, 319. 
213 Code Le Geyt 3.6.15; 1861 Report Evidence, 317, questions 7105, 7106; Matthews & Nicolle, 17, 
para 1.69; Nicolle Immovable 136. The nine-year division is also present in (France) art 595 CC. See: 
ch 3 I(4). 
214 See: ch 3 I(4). 
215 York Street Pharmacy v Rault (1974) 2 JJ 65, 69, per Le Masurier, Bailiff. 
216 Daisy v Clémentine (1888) 212 Ex 482 (“le droit d’un fermier à la terre qu’il exploite en vertu de 
son Bail est un droit mobilier”. The lease in question was for seven years). Compare: (Guernsey) 1852 
Ordinance, 234, item 21; Carey, 71. Also: Code Le Geyt 3.6.15. 
217 “Obligations & cédules faites pour choses mobiliaires, sont réputées meubles; comme en pareil, les 
obligations qui sont faites pour choses immeubles sont réputées immeubles.” 
218 Poingdestre Remarques. 
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When Terrien addresses himself to the like point, it is in relation to (incorporeal) 
rights and obligations, not to the (corporeal) evidnce of them, if there be such. It 





Answering the question of what is moveable and what is immoveable begins with the 
simple proposition that all that can be taken from ne place to another is moveable, 
and all that cannot be so taken is immoveable. This is the starting point for 
classification of corporeal property for all systems in the European tradition.  
 
Corporeal things can change their status; the primary example of this is moveable-to-
immoveable accession. The criteria applied to determine when accession – and thus a 
change in classification – has occurred may differ slightly from one system to the 
next, but the results achieved are, for the most part, the same, for the underlying 
policy of the law is preservation of unity where detachment would result in 
diminution of economic value. Of the matters discused relating to the classification 
of property, moveable-to-immoveable accession gives rise to the most litigation.219 
Nevertheless, the cases are few in number. Moser provides sufficient material for the 
exposition of a quadripartite test, but it also demonstrates the utility of comparative 
reference on this particular point of property law (for which Roman law is a common 
source). The doctrinal proximity of English law on this type of accession (or on 
“fixtures”) makes it a legitimate source of inspiration for future questions. However, 
equally proximate are the laws of other jurisdictions – in particular other mixed 
jurisdictions – and if Jersey law is to remain true to its own sources and development 
to date these ought also to be considered. 
 
Under certain circumstances, the normal rules of classification are bent or modified. 
The extent and instances of this modification may be a point of difference between 
legal systems, but the general practice is not unusual. It is interesting to note that the 
                                                 
219 See, for example: Moser v Waldon (1971) 1 JJ 1927; Keenan and Keenan v Timber Tech 1999 JLR 
N6c. 
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reason for modification of the normal rule appears to be wholly economic. In this 
way, both the rule and the exceptions to it share a common policy.  
 
Taking the position that rights are things and capable of being owned, rights can 
themselves be classified as moveable or immoveable. Following the principle given 
by article 504 of the Reformed Custom of Normandy, this classification of 
incorporeal property is linked to some aspect of the p ysical world. 
 
Consideration of the classification of property as moveable or immoveable has been 
done with matters inter vivos in mind. However, it appears that the law set out is 
equally applicable where these issues must be resolved in the context of succession, 
for there is nothing to indicate to the contrary. Therefore, the law may be said to be 
unitary in this respect. 
 
“Et voila ce qui est de ce titre par lequel on voit que plusieurs choses sont 
reputées meubles ou immeubles non de leur propre nature mais par 
appropriation, destination ou en faveur des mineurs o  des créditeurs ou pour 
autres causes; lesquelles en tous autres regards demeurent comme elles sont 
de leur nature.”220 
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A. THE PROCESS OF TRANSFER  
 
For anyone looking for the first time at the way in which transfer of immoveable 
property is carried out in Jersey, some features ar especially striking. Firstly, in 
general, the court will not order specific performance of an agreement to sell. 
Secondly, contracts regarding immoveable property must be registered, but only after 
they have been read aloud in open court with the parties to them swearing an oath to 
uphold their contract.1 The parties do not sign these contracts. Thirdly, transfers of 
                                                 
1 But see: ch 5 n9. 
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immoveable property must be approved in advance by the Housing Minister,2 a 
system which was set up in response to the rise in population following the end of 
the Occupation, and consequent rise in house prices.3 If a transaction is carried out 
without the consent of the Minister, not only may it be declared to be void by the 
court,4 but it also constitutes an offence, punishable by fine.5 The effect of the 
housing legislation is evident in some of the case-l w, but it is not examined here in 
any detail. 
 
Voluntary transfer followed by registration is not the only way of acquiring 
immoveable property. Transfer can also be involuntary, as for example with 
compulsory purchase, or transfer in the course of insolvency proceedings. Original 
(as opposed to derivative) acquisition6 is also possible, for example, acquisition by 
prescription.7 These matters are not examined in any detail. Nor is the customary law 
exception to the normal requirement that voluntary t ansactions transferring 
immoveable property must be passed before the court and registered. This was 
considered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Nicolle v Wigram.8 
Precisely, the issue was whether a private road could be transferred to a parish by 
acte of the parish assembly, followed by the parish taking possession. Affirming the 
judgment of the Superior Number of the Royal Court, the Judicial Committee held 
that transfer by this method – for this particular type of transaction only – was valid.9 
                                                 
2 Housing Law 1949, Part 4, and Housing (General Provisions) (Jersey) Regulations 1970. Article 10 
of the Housing Law 1949 details the transactions which require consent. The equivalent Guernsey 
provisions: Housing (Control of Occupation) (Guernsy) Law, 1994, as amended. 
3 Population Office information sheet “Dwelling Accommodation in Jersey” (not dated). 
4 Housing (Jersey) Law 1949, art 12(1). 
5 Ibid art 20. 
6 In original acquisition the owner’s title is entirely new, unlike derivative acquisition where the title 
of the previous owner is acquired, together with any defects or burdens. Apart from acquisitive 
prescription, examples of original acquisition (conerning all types of property) are accession, 
commixtion, confusion, occupancy, and specification: (France) arts 546, 573 et seq, 712 CC; 
(Louisiana) arts 482 et seq, 3412 CC; (Quebec) arts 914, 916, 935, 954 et seq CC; (Scotland) Reid 
Property 30, para 22, n1, and 435 – 455, paras 539 – 566; (South Africa) Badenhorst & Pienaar, ch 8. 
Also: (England) Smith Property ch 7. 
7 The prescriptive period for ownership is 40 years: Manning v Parish of St Helier (1982) JJ 215. See 
also: Poingdestre Remarques on art 60; Poingdestre Lois 59 – 63; 1771 Code, “A la Cour du Samedi”; 
Le Gros, 230 et seq. Before the introduction of the register in Jersey, concluded contracts which had 
not been passed en ouïe de paroisse were made good by ten years’ possession: Poingdestre Lois 65 – 
66; Poingdestre Commentaires 3. Le Geyt suggests this applies also in the time of the register, in 
relation to contracts passed before the court, but not registered: Manuscrits vol 4, 142. 
8 [1954] AC 301. 
9 Ibid. See also: Matthews & Nicolle, 7, para 1.26; Nicolle Immovable 98. 
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The area examined here is inter vivos voluntary transfer of immoveable property in 
Jersey, with some reference also to Guernsey. This can arise due to sale, gift, or 
exchange. The emphasis is on sale, as it is the most i portant in practice, but it may 
be noted that the process is substantially the same in all three cases, albeit the cause 
differs. The law now comes principally from legislation and cases, but some 
customary law also remains relevant. 
 
(1) Initial Stages: Before the Contract Court 
In Jersey, all transfers of immoveable property,10 whether that property is corporeal 
or incorporeal (such as a hypothec),11 must be passed before the Royal Court and 
registered.12 In a typical house sale the period between the sell r finding a buyer and 
the parties appearing at the Contract Court is often quite short: around three weeks.13 
Normally there is no legally enforceable agreement between the parties prior to 
appearance at the Contract Court. By contrast, a prior contract (conditions of sale) is 
common in Guernsey.14 The contract that is presented to the court is drawn up by the 
transferor’s legal representative, and approved by that of the transferee. In Guernsey, 
it is usually the transferee’s advocate who drafts the contract.15 The contract, once in 
French, is now written in English; this change occurred in Jersey in 2006,16 and 
rather earlier in Guernsey, in 1969.17 Unless the property has been subdivided or the 
object is a new building, the terms of the contract will be largely identical to those in 
the contract for the previous transfer. Obviously, elements such as the names of the 
parties, the date of possession, and the purchase price (in the case of a sale) will be 
                                                 
10 Leases for a period in excess of nine years are immoveable and so must be passed before the Royal 
Court in order to be effective: Brown v Alexandre (1891) 214 Ex 349, 351; Le Gros, 320. It may be 
that a contractual right to transfer of immoveable property under a (preliminary) agreement of sale is 
incorporeal and immoveable (an immoveable personal right), but – despite being immoveable – is not 
transferred by passing contract and registration. See: art 504 RC; ch 4 H(2). 
11 1880 Law, arts 17, 23. Also: Ahier v Arm (1909) 77 Exs 331, 332. 
12 For example: Nicolle v Starck (1858) 46 H 251; Du Tertre v Hornby (1892) 215 Ex 426, 428 (the 
transfer of rights created by passing contract before the Royal Court can only be effected by passing 
contract). Also: 1861 Report Evidence, 311, question  6973, 6974 (all “real property” passes by 
contract, and delivery of saisine is not required). 
13 Information gathered from anonymous questionnaires completed by Jersey conveyancers. 
14 Dawes Laws 629 – 630. 
15 Ibid 627. The transferor’s agent draws up the conditions f sale (Dawes Laws 630). There are 
exceptions to this (for example, schemes of development: Dawes Laws 637). 
16 See Royal Court Rules 2004, rule 20/9 (2), as amended by the Royal Court (Amendment No 2) 
Rules 2006. 
17 See: Conveyancing (Guernsey) Law, 1969; Conveyancing Order, 1969. 
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different. Between finalising the terms of the contrac  and appearance at the Contract 
Court, the parties are made aware of the contents of the deed by their advocates who 
also ensure these terms are understood. 
 
The contract that is passed before the Contract Court is known as a “hereditary 
contract” or contrat héréditaire.18 The qualification “hereditary” is useful in order to 
distinguish between the agreement that is passed before the court and any other 
contractual agreement, concerned only with personal rights and obligations. 
 
To provide some security against the possibility that e purchaser may fail to turn up 
at the Contract Court, a deposit is occasionally paid in advance of settlement 
(typically around ten per cent of the purchase price).19 The deposit is paid under 
written agreement that it will act as liquidate damages if the transaction fails to 
complete. In such cases, it may be agreed that the purchaser who fails to appear must 
pay in total twenty-five or thirty per cent of the purchase price. The ten per cent 
deposit will be retained in part-satisfaction of the debt under the agreement, and the 
remainder will be sought. This is a high penalty. Conversely, if it is the seller who 
fails to complete, the disappointed purchaser will ish either to fix another date for 
completion, or to have the deposit money returned. The return of the money in these 
circumstances will be provided for in the deposit agreement which normally states 
that the seller is liable to pay a stipulated penalty in addition.20 
 
In Guernsey, the payment of a ten per cent deposit is common and typically provided 
for in the conditions of sale. The money is held by the purchaser’s agent, which 
simplifies its return, should the seller fail to complete. In that case, the seller is often 
bound to pay ten per cent of the purchase price to the purchaser, by way of 
damages.21  
                                                 
18 See, for example: Falle, 156, para 1. 
19 Information gathered from anonymous questionnaires completed by Jersey conveyancers. 
20 For examples of penalties on the seller see: Dolbel v Aubin et uxor (1796) 3 CR 69; Guiton v de 
Gruchy (1870) 9 CR 70, 72; Arthur v Procureur Général des Desreaux (1882) 208 Ex 95, 96. 
21 Dawes Laws 631. 
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(2) The Contract Court  
On the chosen Friday, from 2pm onwards, lawyers, parties, and representatives of 
parties begin to arrive in the Royal Court.22 The Contract Court commences at 
2.30pm.  Anything from a handful to many transactions may be dealt with at the 
weekly sitting. The precise number for one week is not known until all the parties 
wishing to pass contract have congregated in the court. The average number of 
transactions is typically in the thirties or forties.23 All transactions are dealt with that 
day; none is postponed. In recent history, the greatest number for one sitting was 
113, in 2002. The Contract Court takes place within the sitting of the Samedi 
division24 of the Royal Court. 
 
The role of the court is administrative, not judicial: the court makes no finding as to 
the validity of the contracts passed before it.25 Arguably, this is not the view 
expressed in a comment in the evidence pertaining to the Report of the Royal 
Commissioners of 1861: 
 
“7009. (Mr. Jebb to Mr Dupré.) When a contract is passed, it has the effect of 
a judgment of the court?–It has.” 
 
However, the point is not elaborated upon and, as such, is ambiguous. For example: 
has the content of the contract the effect of a judgment of the court, or is it only the 
court’s role in solemnising the agreement between th  parties that has the effect of a 
judgment? It is difficult to construct from Mr Dupré’s answer any credible 
opposition to the orthodox view: passing contracts before the court is an 
administrative procedure. 
 
                                                 
22 For details of the passing process in the mid-nineteenth century: 1861 Report Evidence, 311 – 312, 
questions 6975 – 6982, 312 – 313, questions 7001 – 7009, 314, questions 7022 – 7031. 
23 Average number per week: 49 in 2007; 41 in 2008; 38 in 2009; 34 in 2010, up to mid-July. (Figures 
acquired from the Jersey Judicial Greffe.) The averg  number passed every three weeks in the mid-
nineteenth century was 80 – 90: 1861 Report, 313 – 314, question 7021. 
24 The extraordinary division of the Royal Court, which formerly sat on Saturdays, whence its name: 
Le Quesne, 30. 
25 See, for example: Falle, 158 – 159, para 6. 
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The contract is passed to the Judicial Greffier (who is the clerk of court and also the 
keeper of the register),26 or Greffier-substitute, by an advocate. It is a contravention 
of the Loi (1961) sur l’exercice de la profession de droit à Jersey for a lay-person to 
present a contract to the court.27 Conveyancing without legal representation is thus 
impossible. The Greffier checks the contract to make sure that the “coding” (the 
front-page summary of the transaction) is structurally correct and contains all the 
required information. The contents of the contract re not checked by anyone from 
the Judicial Greffe28 until the following Monday. At 2.30pm, everyone stands and the 
Bailiff (or Deputy Bailiff, Lieutenant-Bailiff, or Commissioner) enters with two 
Jurats. The Greffier reads the coding of the first contract aloud. If, at this point, the 
parties have not yet arrived, the lawyer for one side will shout de côté, and the 
contract will be put to the bottom of the pile and called again at the end of the sitting. 
The whole contract is not read out in court, only the coding, which includes the 
names of the parties and the type of transaction (fr example, “sale of land and 
appurtenances”). Presumably, the rest of the agreement is included by implication. 
The parties to the contract stand. If the parties ar  lay-people, the Bailiff asks: 
 
“Do you know the contents of this deed?” 
  
The parties nod to indicate that they do. The Bailiff then asks the parties to raise their 
right hands, if they have not already done so, and asks: 
 
“Do you swear that you will neither act nor cause anyone to act against this 
contract of [type of contract]29 in perpetuity, on pain of perjury?”30 
 
                                                 
26 The role of Judicial Greffier and of Registrar, once separate (see: Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 4, 137), 
became vested in the same person in 1931, by virtue of the Loi (1931) consituant Le Département du 
Greffe Judiciaire. See also: Departments of the Judiciary and Legislature (Jersey) Law 1965; Hume & 
Lambert Registration; Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 4, 130; Ogier Government 73 – 74; Terrien, 12.4, 14.3, 
14.4, and 15.6. 
27 Art 2(2). 
28 The department of the Judicial Greffier. Its functions were reformed by the Loi (1931) consituant Le 
Département du Greffe Judiciaire (see: ch 5 n26). 
29 For example: “sale of land and appurtenances”. 
30 The formula given 1861 Report Evidence (312, question 7002) was slightly different: “You swear 
that you will neither act nor offer to act against the contents of this deed under pain of perjury?” It is
submitted that the present formula is preferable, for it is broader. See also: 1771 Code, “Serment des 
Contractans”. 
 111 
Again the parties nod to answer in the affirmative. The Bailiff signs or initials the 
contract at the top of the first page31 or at the end, and passes it to the Jurats who do 
the same.32 These three persons alone sign the contract: the contracting parties do 
not. Once all the contracts in the Greffier’s posses ion have been passed before the 
court and signed, the Greffier gathers them together and transports them to the 
Judicial Greffe, which is located in the basement of the court building. 
 
Once the contract has been passed before the court its contents are in the public 
domain.33 Consequently, the Greffier, if asked, will now show the contract to any 
third party, even before he has reached the Judicial Greffe,34 where the details of the 
contract are put on to the register.35 
 
By the Powers of Attorney (Jersey) Law 1995, it is possible for a mandatory to take 
oath on behalf of a contracting party, and a mandatory is involved in the passing of 
approximately half of the contracts passed before the court.36 A power of attorney 
should have been executed37 and registered in the Public Registry before the contract 
is passed in court.38 If registration of the power of attorney post-dates he Contract 
Court at which the mandatory acted, it is possible to pass a deed of rectification at the 
next sitting of the Contract Court. The deed sets out the parties to, and nature of, the 
transaction it seeks to rectify, and the relevant dates (which illustrate the problem 
addressed, because the date of registration of one party’s power of attorney will post-
date the passing of contract). The contract which is the subject of the deed of 
rectification is referred to by date and by the book number and page number where it 
                                                 
31 That is, near the first line of the full contract, not on the coding page. 
32 The Code of 1771 requires only that the Bailiff and Jurats signent, not that they subscribe. Further 
detail is given by rule 18/8 of the Royal Court Rules 2004: “[a]n hereditary contract is duly 
authenticated if signed or initialled on either thefirst or the last page thereof by the persons before 
whom it has been passed.” 
33 True in Jersey and in Guernsey: Jeremie, 132; Carey, 181. 
34 Which may be defined as follows: “The Judicial Greffe provides administrative and secretarial 
support to ensure the effective operation of Jersey’s courts.” 
http://www.gov.je/Government/NonexecLegal/JudicialGreffe/Pages/WhoWeAre.aspx (accessed on 4 
August 2011). See also: Bois, 44, para 5/85.  
35 Compare with Royal Court Rules 2004, rule 18/3(2). For a comparative view see: F Roumy 
“Histoire du noriat et du droit notarial en France” in Schmoeckel & Schubert. 
36 Information obtained from the Jersey Judicial Greffe. 
37 Powers of Attorney (Jersey) Law 1995, arts 3(2), 3(5). 
38 Ibid art 3(4). 
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can be found in the Public Registry. The manner in which the deed is set out 
resembles that of any other contract passed before the court. 
 
The deed of rectification declares itself to have retrospective effect.39 There are 
obvious difficulties with retrospectivity in property law as third parties can be 
affected. For example, what would happen if a hypothec were granted by the 
transferor over the object of transfer (such as a field) during the period between 
passing contract for alienation of the field and passing the deed of rectification? 
Were the deed of rectification to be passed at the very next sitting of the Contract 
Court, there may be no problem (assuming that the deed of rectification takes effect 
before the grant of hypothec).40 
 
Bodies corporate are empowered by the 1995 Law to execute powers of attorney “in 
the manner permitted by […] articles of association or other internal regulations”.41 It 
is not clear whether certain persons may automatically act for a body corporate, such 
as a director in the case of a company. According to the “realist” theory of corporate 
personality,42 the board of directors of a company, when acting to ether, is the 
company (an organ of the company) and not just an agent of it. If this approach 
pertains in Jersey, the board of directors could pass contracts for (or as) the company 
with no need for a mandate. Article 20 of the Companies (Jersey) Law 1991 is about 
contracting on behalf of the company, but the languge used is that of the law of 
agency,43 and so it does not resolve the question. 
 
The Guernsey Contract Court takes place on Tuesday and Thursday mornings from 
9.30am. The procedure differs slightly from that of Jersey.44 The composition of the 
Court is usually a Lieutenant-Bailiff and four Jurats, but, as in Jersey, the contract 
                                                 
39 For example, by virtue of a clause such as this one: “Now today [first party to the original contract] 
and [second party to the original contract] have agreed to ratify and confirm the said contract which 
passed before Court on [date] and furthermore to confirm that the said contract remains valid and in 
full force from the date of its passing before Court on [date], notwithstanding that [relevant party’s] 
power of attorney was not registered on or before that date.” 
40 Compare information on ranking of contracts passed on the same day in Guernsey: Dawes Laws 
640. 
41 Powers of Attorney (Jersey) 1995 Law, arts 2(4), 3(3). 
42 See: FW Maitland “Introduction” in Gierke, particularly xxv, xxvi, xl, but the whole repays reading. 
43 Art 20(1). See also: Dunlop Company. 
44 See further: Dawes Laws 626 – 627. 
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will usually be signed by the Lieutenant-Bailiff and two Jurats. As in Jersey, the 
parties do not sign the contract.  
 
In Guernsey, in addition to the possibility of appointing a mandatory, a party may 
give consent “in advance of completion at an earlier Contract Court”.45 The consent 
is noted by the court. Presumably, this consent is revocable, but having been given in 
a public forum it would seem logical that it should also have to be revoked in that 
same forum. 
 
The process of passing contracts before the court is a public act. In contrast to 
personal rights (droits personnels) which affect only certain, specified persons, real 
rights (droits réels) affect third parties.46 Consequently, the process of creation, 
variation, transfer, or extinction of real rights is attended by some sort of publicity, 
and this is particularly true of immoveable property, which is typically of high 
value.47 The use of publicity to inform third parties, to promote certainty, to facilitate 
proof of rights,48 and to reduce the opportunity for fraud,49 is sometimes known as 
the “publicity principle”.50 The outworking of this principle is in evidence both in the 
requirement that contracts relating to land are passed in open court and in the 
requirement that contracts so passed are registered in a public register.51 In relation to 
the latter, Le Geyt records that the function of the Register of 1602 – which register 
is still in use – was publicity of rights and preservation of deeds; earlier, in 1562, the 
                                                 
45 Ibid 627. 
46 See: ch 3.  
47 C & G Developments Ltd v Duquemin (1965) Guernsey Court of Appeal, October 15, per L 
Masurier, Bailiff of Jersey: “For my part I am quite unable to accept that invitation. It was of the very 
essence of the feudal system that a sale of land should be public and notorious and the faculty given to 
members of a family in the line of succession to reclaim land sold out of the family upon tendering to 
the purchaser the purchase price could have been of little avail had not some machinery been devised 
for making the fact of sale widely known.” 
48 Hume & Lambert Registration para 1. 
49 Ibid para 2. 1861 Report Evidence, 316, questions 7073, 7074. 
50 In Scotland and South Africa by this name, but the principle is clearly discernable elsewhere also: 
SLC DP 121, 1, para 1, 2, paras 1.4 – 1.5. Also: (Scotland) Reid Property 482, para 602; (South 
Africa) van der Merwe Things 38, para 44, Badenhorst & Pienaar 65; (France) Simler & Delebecque, 
613 et seq, Malaurie & Aynès, 29; (Quebec) art 2938 et seq CC, Lamontagne Biens 77 – 78, para 128, 
Lamontagne Publicité; (Louisiana) art 1839 CC, Mazeau “Registration”, Redmann “Recordation”, 
Yiannopoulos Servitudes para 125, (particularly 359 – 360). See also: Vinding Kruse, ch 2 (on 
publicity and – inter alia – a Scandinavian right similar to the retrait lignager).  
51 The publicity function of registration is mentioned in the evidence to the 1861 Report: 164, question 
3753. 
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establishment of a register had been proposed by Royal Commissioners, but that 
project did not have publicity at its heart (the register was to be kept locked) and 
sought only to achieve the preservation of deeds.52 Appearance at the Contract Court 
provides publicity of the act itself, and registration supplies ongoing publicity. The 
formalities involved in transfer of immoveable property also provide a safeguard 
against rash decisions to alienate or burden property. This is sometimes described as 
the cautionary principle: “parties are not to be catched by rash expressions”.53  
 
An essential part of the Jersey system of immoveable transfer is the involvement of 
public officials. In this respect the Jersey system is similar to those of continental 
Europe where a public official – the notary –54 is involved in transfer of immoveable 
property.55 Jersey does not have notaries in the continental sense, but instead has 
recourse to (functionally) the original notary: the court.56 The ceremony of passing 
contract is a public act of transfer. This may be contrasted with a private system of 
transfer, such as in Scotland and England, where there is no equivalent involvement 
of a public official prior to registration. 
 
Going further, Vinding Kruse has identified two forms of publication in relation to 
private transactions in civil law systems. The first s publication “immediately at the 
very moment––or directly after––the legal fact has come into exist nce”; the other he 
describes as permanent publication, which term is used because this is the method of 
making known a “legal fact [which] will continue to exist in relation to third 
persons”.57 Both are seen in Jersey: passing a contract before the court provides 
immediate publication (publicity of the transaction);58 registration provides 
permanent publication (publicity of the right).  
 
                                                 
52 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 4, 139. 
53 Erskine Institute 684, 3.2.2. 
54 A modern study is Schmoeckel & Schubert, in which see: F Roumy “Histoire du notariat et du droit 
notarial en France”; N Ramsay “The History of the Notary in England”; J Finlay “The History of the 
Notary in Scotland”. See also: Brooks & Helmholz. 
55 For example: F Roumy, “Histoire du notariat et du droit notarial en France” in Schmoeckel & 
Schubert, 125, 155 et seq.  
56 A point recognised, in part, by Carey, 181: “un instrument public lorsqu’il est fait par un notaire 
public, ou, en ce pays, lorsqu’il est signé par deux Justiciers.” 
57 Vinding Kruse, 71. 
58 Ibid 118 (also: 117 on reading in court and publicity).  
 115 
(3) The Nature of the Contract Passed Before the Co urt 
A typical hereditary contract for the sale and transfer of land includes the following 
clauses: salutation;59 designation of parties; conveyance, detail of what is conveyed, 
and derivation of neighbouring titles; title conditions, such as servitudes; statement 
that all is in perpetuity; inclusion of any rights not expressly detailed, of any defects, 
and a statement of the parish in which the property is situated; statement that the 
purchaser is subject to all burdens which were on the seller, and derivation of the 
seller’s title; stipulation of the price and when it is payable; warranty that there are no 
rights in security over the property; statement that immediate vacant possession is 
given; apportionment of rates; narration of the oath; nd attestation of due execution 
by the court.60 Modern contracts are typically longer than earlier examples, but this is 
largely due to an increase in the number of servitudes and title conditions; the basic 
structure has persisted for centuries.61 
 
A notable feature of the hereditary contract is that its essential parts as to transfer are 
drafted in the past tense (which is not true of the equivalent Guernsey deed).62 For 
example, the contract states that the parties “appeared”63 in court, the words of 
conveyance are in the past tense (bailla, donna, quitta, céda, transporta, vendit, 
vendirent, sold, gifted, ceded, transferred, given, etc), in the case of transfer by 
reason of sale the contract states that the sale “was made”64 for a stated sum which 
will be paid by a stated date, the contract states that the parties “took oath”65 to 
uphold the contract, and the final clause states that the contract was sealed with the 
Seal of the Royal Court (“we have sealed”).66 (Sealing is no longer done in 
practice.)67 According to the contract, the transfer has already t ken place. This is 
                                                 
59 The opening salutation addressing all who may come to see or hear the document was in common 
use. See, for example: Kaye, 28; Mollet “Interesting” (an Act of the Royal Court granting a divorce in 
1580). 
60 Commentary on the clauses in the hereditary contract is given by Falle: 158 – 171, paras 4 – 45. For 
the equivalent information in relation to Guernsey: Dawes Laws 637, appendix 7. 
61 For example: Le Quesne, 565 – 566, note xxvi; 1861 Report, xviii. Also: Le Gros, 434 – 436; 
Trotter. 
62 Dawes Laws appendix 7. 
63 Or comparurent. 
64 Or [Ladite vente héréditaire] faite. 
65 Or [Et] jurerent [lesdites parties]. 
66 Or nous avons scellé. 
67 See: ch 5 A(4). 
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odd. When the deed is drawn up, it purports to record a future event. Nonetheless, the 
predictable nature of the event makes this possible. 
 
As the document itself records that which has already happened, this suggests that it 
is not constitutive of transfer. This is the view of Advocate Richard Falle, who also 
provides some useful contextual information: 
 
“The earliest surviving written contracts indicate that they were first sworn 
before the Bailiff and Jurats and later read publicly before the congregation à 
l’issue du service divin, literally en ouïe de Paroisse or ‘in the hearing of the 
Parish’. There is some evidence that before transactions were reduced to 
writing the parties to a transfer of title would make a simple and solemn 
verbal declaration en ouïe de paroisse and it was this declaration which 
bound the parties. It may also be for this reason that the whole transaction is 
recorded historically. The written document minutes and announces an event 
which has already occurred.”68 
 
This comports with the view of John Le Patourel, the Channel Islands historian, who 
notes that the Jersey hereditary contract appears to have fulfilled a function 
secondary to the act taking place.69  
 
The hereditary contract is essentially a notarial deed (the executing notary being the 
court). Notarial deeds of this style were once commonplace in immoveable transfer 
in a large part of France70 (and elsewhere),71 but this is no longer so: the present 
notarial function is execution of a deed, rather than the recording of a passed act. 
Although the use of the past tense in Jersey contracts is explicable, it may be that, in 
modern times, it would be appropriate to draft the Jersey contract in the present 




                                                 
68 Falle, 159, para 7. See also: Le Couteur, 16. 
69 Le Patourel, 100. 
70 Brissaud, 392 – 401, paras 312 – 316; Falle 157 – 158, para 3. 
71 For example, on the Scottish instrument of sasine: JW Cairns “Historical Introduction” in Reid & 
Zimmermann, vol 1, 74; GL Gretton “The Feudal System” in Reid Property 86 – 87, para 91 (note 
that the Land Register has since become operational f r the whole of Scotland); Ockrent, 46. 
72 See: ch 5 B(6). 
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(4) Registration of Hereditary Contracts 
On Friday afternoons, the codings of the hereditary contracts passed that day are 
photocopied and put into a ring-binder which is avail ble in the public reading 
room.73 This acts as an index to the contracts until they ar  given a permanent entry 
in the register. Anyone may request to see the full hereditary contract to which one of 
the photocopies pertains. The details of each transaction are entered onto the 
PRIDE74 system: an electronic database which can be accessed by the public without 
charge at the Judicial Greffe or at the Jersey Archive. Many legal firms have remote 
access to the online register. The final destinatio of the physical documents, which 
are vacuum-packed, is the Jersey Archive. The costs associated with immoveable 
transfer are stamp duty,75 a £50 registration fee, and a £20 Jurats’ stamp. 
 
Until 1963, contracts were sealed with green wax. On the obverse was the seal of the 
Bailiwick; on the reverse was the Bailiff’s personal arms or monogram. Sealing was 
done twice a year “on a day appointed by the Bailiff” which was, in practice, “the 
same day as the exposition des contrats, held each term on the Wednesday before the 
last day on which summonses could be served for the Assise d’Héritage.” In this 
way, “all contracts passed in the preceding six months could be inspected without 
charge by the public” should anyone wish to raise an action in the Cour d’Héritage 
on the basis of a contract thus inspected.76 
 
Royal Court rules of 1963 abolished the exposition des contrats and amended how 
sealing was done. Instead of wax, a press seal on a paper wafer was introduced. “At 
that stage, the seal used was still that of the Bailiwick”. Royal Court Rules of 1968 
introduced a seal for use on, i ter alia, contracts passed before the Royal Court, 
which change carried the practical advantage that law firms no longer needed to take 
                                                 
73 Registration practice has changed over the years since 1602. This may be seen by comparing the 
terms of the 1602 Act, or the relevant provisions of the Code of 1771, with modern practice. Some 
insight into the practice of the mid-nineteenth century can be obtained from the 1861 Report, 
“Registration” xxvi, and 1861 Report Evidence, 328, question 7343 et seq. See also: Le Geyt 
Manuscrits vol 4, 140 – 142; Le Quesne, 186 (summary of early registration practice). 
74 Public Registry Index and Document Enrolment. 
75 Stamp Duties and Fees (Jersey) Law 1998, art 2(1),schedule, part 1, item 13. 
76 Information gathered from correspondence with Mr Peter Bisson (with thanks), October 2010. 
Quotations in this paragraph are from that correspondence. 
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contracts to the Bailiff’s office for the purpose of sealing.77 According to Royal 
Court Rules 2004, rule 20/10(3), sealing of contracts is still required, “but it is no 
longer done because [the contracts] are no longer rel ased back to the law firms”. 
Instead, as detailed above, contracts are sent by the Judicial Greffe to the Archive, 
for storage.78 
 
The Jersey Public Registry was set up by an Act of the States of 1602.79 The 1602 
Act established that “registration must be made of all hereditary contracts which are 
passed before justice in time to come”.80 As an incentive to use the new register, if 
the parties failed to have their rights registered within three months (presumably 
three months of the appearance before the court), the rights were rendered null.81 
(Present practice means that the court delivers the contract up for registration 
immediately after it has been passed.)82 Today, in addition to hereditary contracts 
(including transfers of ownership, hypothecs, contract leases,83 servitudes, and 
usufructs), some other deeds are also registered.84 
 
The register is a register of deeds (RoD), not a regist r of title (RoT): title flows from 
the deed, or contract, and not from the register its lf.85 Not all RoD systems are alike, 
and this is equally true of RoT systems.86 Broadly, a register of deeds: 
 
“is evidence that a particular transaction took place, but is in principle not 
itself proof of the legal rights of the involved parties and, consequently, it is 
                                                 
77 Royal Court Rules 1968 (R&O 5107), rule 15. 
78 See also: Royal Court (General) (Jersey) Rules 1963 (R&O 4450), rules 31, 32.  
79 It is not clear whether the 1602 Act was ever the subject of an Order in Council. The Jersey Archive 
only holds Orders in Council going back to 1603, and the Privy Council registers for the period 1 
January 1602 to 1 May 1613 were destroyed by fire in 1619. 
80 “un enregistrement soit faict de tous contrats heritaux qui se passeront en temps d’avenir par devant 
justice” 1602 Act. 
81 “Et en cas que aucun seroit refusant et que par sa faute déliberée ses droits ne seroient enregistrés 
dedans Trois mois au susdits livres tels droits recelés seront tenus de nul effet ni valeur.” 1602 Act.
82 Royal Court Rules 2004, rule 18/3(2). 
83 A lease for more than nine years: see ch 5 n10. 
84 For example: partages (dividing up the estate of a deceased person between the heirs), wills of 
immoveables, powers of attorney, tutelles, curatelles, deeds poll relating persons who already have a 
register entry, and electricity, waterworks, and drainage notices. It was not possible to make a will of 
immoveable property until 1851 (Loi (1851) sur les Testaments d’Immeubles). Testation was not 
completely free until 1926 (Loi (1926) sur les héritages propres). 
85 See, for example: SLC DP 125, 1 – 4, paras 1.5 – 1.12. 
86 This point is demonstrated for RoT systems by O’Connor: “Deferred”. See also: Mapp, 3, para 1.7.  
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not evidence of its quality. Thus before any dealing can be safely effected, the 
ostensible owner must trace his ownership back to a g od root of title”,87 
 
while a register of title is a register of: 
 
“the legal consequence of [the] transaction […]. So the right itself together 
with the name of the rightful claimant and the object of that right with its 
restrictions and charges [is] registered. With thisregistration the title or right 
is created.”88 
 
Thus, where land is being transferred in Jersey, it is necessary to trace title back at 
least forty years, after which time any problems with title may have been “cured” by 
the operation of acquisitive prescription.89 Of course, prescription does not operate 
through passage of time alone: it is necessary to show the requisite possession also.  
 
The register is composed of verbatim copies of deeds, the manner of recording of 
which has kept pace with technological advance. Today, eeds are scanned into an 
electronic register, whereas they were previously photocopied (from the early 
1960s), and before that scribes made copies by hand. The electronic register contains 
deeds from 1753 onwards; earlier deeds – which have not been scanned – are 
available in books. The entire register is indexed by name but not by property. The 
difficulties associated with extracting information from a register indexed in this way 
are complained of in the evidence given the Royal Commissioners which led to the 
Report of 1861.90 However, some remedial steps have been taken. Indexing by 
address began for all new registrations in 1984 and, following the introduction of 
conveyancing in English on 1 November 2006, it has been the practice to include a 
reference to the Jersey Digital Map within the body f the hereditary contract, where 
applicable, and to attach a copy of part of the map as an appendix to the contract, 
indicating the location of the property.91 The Digital Map has no effect on title; it is 
for illustrative purposes only. If the Map contains a mistake, this has no effect on the 
                                                 
87 Stoter, 17. Also: Hogg, 1 – 2. 
88 Stoter, 17.  
89 See: ch 5 n7. 
90 1861 Report Evidence, 329, question 7369 et seq, 331, question 7399. 
91 See Practice Direction RC06/01 “Use of English in co tracts passed before the Royal Court and in 
other documents registered in the Public Registry”, schedule B, n15. 
 120
rights to which it relates. Property is defined by a written description of the 
boundaries in the body of the hereditary contract. This can be problematic. 
Descriptions are sometimes vague. Modern deeds typically refer to a Unique 
Property Reference Number (UPRN), which relates to the Digital Map and at least 
assists in locating the object of transfer in the island,92 even if the Map itself carries 
no authority. 
 
In Guernsey, registration is made at the Greffe and also – where ownership, usufruct, 
or droit d’habitation is transferred – at the Cadastre.93 (There is no Cadastre in 
Jersey.) The effect of registration at the Greffe is considered below.94 Registration 
must be made at the Cadastre within twenty-eight days of registration at the Greffe;95 
failure to do so is punishable by fine,96 but has no effect on property rights. The 
Cadastre contains details of all “real property in the Islands”, including a property 
reference and the applicable rate of tax, the owner’s name and address, and the 
dimensions of the property “plan area”.97 The cadastral register is public.98 Changes 
or additions to a plan area which may affect its taxa ion must be notified to the 
Cadastre by 30 September immediately following the c ange; failure to do so is 
punishable by fine.99 There are also penalties for submission of false information to 
the Cadastre.100 The purpose of the Guernsey Cadastre is to facilitte rating and the 
levying of taxes. However, as the Cadastre can be searched by property (rather than 
                                                 
92 See Practice Direction RC 06/01 (pursuant to rule 20/9 of the Royal Court Rules 2004), schedule B, 
n15. 
93 See: Taxation of Real Property (Enabling Provision) (Guernsey and Alderney) Law, 2005; 
Taxation of Real Property (Guernsey and Alderney) Ordinance, 2007, ss12, 16, 54. 
94 See: ch 5 B(2). 
95 Taxation of Real Property (Guernsey and Alderney) Ordinance, 2007, s16(1)(a). Also: Dawes Laws 
627 – 628, 641. In view of the conclusions drawn below about when ownership is transferred, art 
16(1) is ambiguous: the twenty-eight days could be calculated from either registration at the Greffe, or 
when contract is passed before the court (if registrat on follows within two months). It is suggested 
that art 16(1)(b) was intended to apply to acquisition by prescription and other forms of original 
acquisition. 
96 The owner is fined: Taxation of Real Property (Guerns y and Alderney) Ordinance, 2007, s16(5). 
97 Ibid arts 12(3)(a), 12(3)(b), 12(3)(c), 12(3)(e) 12(5). 
98 Ibid art 12(4). 
99 Ibid art 15(1), 15(4). 
100 Ibid art 50. 
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the name of the owner) and has an associated map,101 it assists with location of the 
information in the register at the Greffe.102 
 
As with the Jersey register, the register at the Guernsey Greffe is a register of 
deeds.103 The Greffe makes copies of deeds and these copies make up the register.104 
The information at the Cadastre is not determinative of title; it is the information on 
the register at the Greffe which is important for this purpose.  
 
B. WHEN DOES TRANSFER OCCUR? 
 
In Jersey, transfer does not take place before the parties appear at the Contract 
Court.105 There are two distinct phases after that. The first is the passing process 
itself; the second is registration of the deed passed before the court. At which of 
these points does transfer occur? 
 
There are at least two main models of transfer found in legal systems. In what may 
be called the “constitutive” model, registration achieves the actual transfer. That is 
the case in both England and Scotland.106 In the “defeasibility” model, transfer 
occurs by other means, before registration, but the owner is vulnerable to subsequent 
grants by the transferor, and also to claims of the transferor’s creditors, until 
registration is made. The acquirer thus has ownership, but not priority in a question 
with third parties. Voluntary transfer of immoveable property in France operates on 
the defeasibility model.107 Can the Jersey system of transfer be described in ither of 
these ways? 
                                                 
101 Ibid art 13. 
102 Dawes Laws 628, 634; information gathered from the Cadastre. 
103 Ibid 627. 
104 Original deeds are returned by the Greffe. The exception is bonds, where the Greffe retains the 
original: Ibid 640. 
105 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 119; Poingdestre Remarques on art 527. Also (Guernsey): Carey, 181–
182; C & G Developments Ltd v Duquemin (1965) Guernsey Court of Appeal, October 15, per L 
Masurier, Bailiff of Jersey. 
106 (England) Land Registration Act 2002, s58(1) (for c mmentary see Cooke, ch 4); (Scotland) Land 
Registration (Scotland) Act 1979, s3(1)(a), Burnett’s Trustee v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19, 46–47, 
para 88, per Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (for example), but note that the feudal system has now been 
abolished (Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc (Scotland) Act, s1). See also Germany: § 873(1) BGB. 
107 See: art 1138 (also 1583) CC, Décret no 55-22 of 4 January 1955, arts 28(1), 30(1). Quebec, for 
example, has a similar system: Lamontagne Publicité 31 et seq. 
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(1) Before 1602 
From at least as early as the fourteenth century,108 transfers were solemnised by 
public announcement of the details of the transaction “within the hearing of the 
Parish”, en ouye de Paroisse.109 An identical, or closely analogous, procedure was 
also used for some time in Normandy and some other parts of France.110 A shift in 
the formalities for transfer of land from taking place on the land itself to taking place 
in a public forum such as a churchyard, assembly, or court, is observable in the 
histories of many jurisdictions.111 In Jersey, rights were probably transferred when 
publicity of the act was made, that is, the declaring of the transaction to the parish, 
for without such declaration the contract was void.112 Such a system made sense in a 
largely illiterate society. Clearly, however, the collective memory of the parish was 
unreliable and capable of corruption. 
 
The practice developed of declaring the transfer to the Royal Court in order that the 
details of the transaction would be entered on to the Rolls of Court, providing some 
written record of the parties’ rights. Like declaration to the parish, appearance before 
the court for this purpose was not unique to Jersey.113 In 1562, Royal Commissioners 
instructed that a register should be set up in Jersey. Initially the project did not thrive, 
and it seems that many transactions were not registered.114 On 24 July 1602, the 
States passed the Act which formed the basis of the present register. The process of 
passing a contract before the court, with the addition of registration, was the chosen 
                                                 
108 See further the short history in Le Couteur. For a modern study of eleventh century transfers, see: 
Tabuteau. 
109 Poingdestre Commentaires 3 (8 for further comment); Le Quesne, 185 – 187; 1861 Report, 312, 
question 6984; 314 – 315, questions 7034 – 7040; Messervys “Notes”; Rybot “Deeds”; Mollet 
“Ouye”; Mollet “Contrats”; Le Gros, 434 – 435. Also: Vinding Kruse, 83–84, on the transition to 
involvement of written deeds in transfer in France generally. 
110 Art 455 RC: “La lecture se doit faire publiquement & à haute voix, à jour de Dimanche, issue de la 
Messe Paroissiale du lieu où les héritages sont assis en la presence de quatre témoins pour le moins, 
qui seront à ce appellez, & signeront l’acte de la publication sur le dos du contrat, dont le Curé ou 
Vicaire, Sergent ou Tabellion du lieu qui aura faitl dite lecture est tenu faire registre: & n’est receu 
aucun à faire prevue de ladite lecture par témoins. Pourront néantmoins les contractans leur seureté 
faire enregistrer ladite lecture au Greffe de la Jurisdiction ordinaire.” The witnesses did not sign in 
Jersey, except perhaps between 1562 and 1602: Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 4, 137 (also: Poingdestre 
Remarques on art 455). See also: Denisart, vol 3, 389, “Nantissement”; Le Conte, 218 – 219. 
111 Vinding Kruse, 76, 77. 
112 Poingdestre Lois 30, para 5.  
113 Vinding Kruse, 83–86, 89–90, on England, Northern F ance, and Germany. Of related interest: 
Brissaud, 381 – 392, para 304 – 311. 
114 Falle, 157 –158, paras 2, 3; Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 4, 137. Also: Le Quesne, 122 – 123, 184 – 
186. 
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model,115 replacing public declaration to the parish.116 Compulsory registration 
provided ongoing publicity, which task was previously vested in the imperfect 
collective memory of the parish.117 
 
The Jersey register applies to the whole island. Even in 1602, this achievement was 
not novel. Some of the Hanseatic city-states had registers dating from the fourteenth 
century.118 Neither England nor France had, however, created a comparable system. 
Broadly speaking, registers of rights in land in Europe seem first to have flourished 
in the Germanic countries and in Scotland. In France, there was an unsuccessful 
attempt to establish a comprehensive register of rights in 1553,119 which itself was 
preceded by the successful establishment of a register of donations in 1539.120 In 
England too an unsuccessful attempt was made to establish a register of immoveable 
property,121 by the statute For Inrollments of Bargains and Sales in 1536.122 The 
establishment of the General Register of Sasines in Scotland was broadly 
contemporaneous with the Jersey project; its foundation l statute, an Act of 1617, 
bears some similarity to the Jersey 1602 Act.123 In Scotland, as in Jersey, attempts 
                                                 
115 Falle, 157, para 3. See also Falle “Poem” 226 – 227.
116 Poingdestre Lois 30, para 5. See also L i (1842) sur les Publications dans les Eglises.  
117 See, for example: Hume & Lambert, para 2. 
118 Ockrent, 8. 
119 4 May (Henry II), available in Rebuffi, vol 2, 18 – 22. The scope of the Edict was to cover 
contracts of “vendition, eschange, donations, cession , & transportz, constitutions de rentes, garenties, 
contrelettres licites, & declarations, & toute autre obligation excedant pour une fois, la somme de 
cinquante livres tournoys, & generalement toute autre disposition, soit entre vifz ou derniere volonté 
[…]” art 1, 19. Also: Cooper, part 1, 23 and 31; Brissaud, 401 “theEdict of May 3, 1553, decided that 
neither ownership nor rights in land could be acquired without registration of the sale and of the deed 
relating to it; but this edict was not carried out”; Ordonnance de Villiers-Cotterets of 1539. 
120 Ordonnance sur le fait de la Justice which “is generally cited as the earliest [French] ordinance on 
the subject of Registration”, and “was confirmed by the Ordonnance de Moulins […] February, 1566; 
and by D’Aguesseau’s Ordinance of 1731”: Cooper, pat 1, 20. (On D’Aguesseau’s Ordinance, see 
Regnault, vol 1 “Les Donations et l’ordonnance de 1731”.) See also: Terrien, 7.15; Ockrent, 13.
121 “Manors, Lands, Tenements or other Hereditaments, shall pass, alter or change from one to 
another, whereby any Estate of Inheritance or Freehold shall be made or take Effect in any Person or 
Persons, or any Use thereof to be made, by reason only of any Bargain and Sale thereof, except the 
same Bargain and Sale be made by Writing indented sealed, and inrolled” 27 Henry VIII c 16. 
122 (1535) 27 Henry VIII c 16 (available in Statutes At Large vol 2, 234 – 235). This statute required 
sealed writing, and registration within six months. See also: Vinding Kruse, 86; Cooke, 17 – 18. 
123 For example, both enforce the compulsory nature of r gistration by making it a requirement for the 
continuing effectiveness of the deed against third parties: 1602 Act “Et en cas que aucun seroit 
refusant et que par sa faute déliberée ses droits ne seroient enregistrés dedans Trois mois au susdits 
livres tels droits recelés seront tenus de nul effet ni valeur”; 1617 Act “And if it shall happen any of
the saids Writs, which are appointed to be Registrated, as said is, not to be duely Registrated within 
the said space of three-score dayes: then, and in that case, his Majesty, with advice and consent 
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had been made in the mid- to late-sixteenth century o set up a register.124 The 
register kept by the Guernsey Greffe is first mentioned in an Ordinance of the 
Guernsey Royal Court in 1563 (4 October),125 but was not established until around 
three years later.126 (The register is “extant though fragmentarily in its early pages, 
from 1567.”)127 Precisely what influence, if any, these projects had on one another is 
not examined here, but it may be seen that the Jersy register (and that of Guernsey) 
was established at a time when the northwest corner of Europe was very much 
concerned with such endeavours.128 
  
Has the point at which transfer takes place changed between 1602 and the present 
day? If transfer still takes place when the contract is passed before open court, at 
what point in the passing process does transfer occur? And what is the role of 
registration? 
 
(2) 1602 Act  
The starting point for the modern law is the Act of the States of 24 July 1602, which 
set up the register of contracts.129 On priority against subsequent grants of the 
transferor, the Act states that: 
 
“Auquel enregistrement seront sujettes les obligations reconnues en justice, 
les engaiges et hypothèques, sur peine d’être reputé s privées et ne porter 
aucun pied en date, au devant des autres.” 
 
Thus registration is necessary for priority. 
 
                                                                                                                                
foresaid, decernes the same to make no faith in Judgement by way of action or exception in prejudice 
of a third party, who hath acquired a perfect and lawful Right to the saids Lands and Heritages”.  
124 Ockrent, 65 – 72. See: ch 5 n114; 1861 Report Evidence, 314 – 315, question 7039. 
125 Available in R MacCulloch (ed) Recueil d’Ordonnances de la Cour Royale de l’isle de Guernesey 
(1852) vol 1 (covering 1533–1800) 17. 
126 1566 (20 Jan) (available in R MacCulloch (ed) ibid 20). Further ordinances were made in 1570 
(ibid 27), 1581 (ibid 44), and 1631 (ibid 163). 
127 Ogier Government 55, n14. 
128 See: Vinding Kruse, 95, on similar sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century developments in 
Denmark and Norway. 
129 “Il a été trouvé expedient par Monsieur Le Gouveneur bailly Justice et États que un enregistrement 
soit faict de tous contrats heritaux qui se passeront en temps d’avenir par devant justice”. For an 
account of the different sections of the Act: Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 4, 137 – 139. 
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In the previous section it was concluded that, prior to 1602, ownership transferred on 
the passing of contract. There is no suggestion in the 1602 Act that the point at which 
ownership transferred was changed. Falle notes that the provisions of the 1602 Act 
were, at least in some matters, regulatory only,130 that is, they did not change the 
existing practice. It seems likely that the 1602 Act was regulatory only in this respect 
also. If that is the correct view, ownership passed when the contract was passed 
before the court.131 The final provision of the 1602 Act may support this conclusion 
because it states that “rights” must be registered within three months of passing 
contract. However, it is not clear whether by “rights” are meant personal rights, real 
rights, or perhaps the physical document itself. The final provision is also notable 
because it declares to be null any contract not registered within the stipulated time. 
Thus, the ownership acquired by passing contract may be described as precarious.132 
 
On this view, therefore, ownership transfers between th  parties when the contract is 
passed before the court, while priority against subsequent acts of the granter is 
acquired on registration. If registration is not made within three months of passing 
contract, not only is priority not acquired, but the entire contract is stripped of any 
effect, ownership reverts to the transferor. 
 
Is another reading possible? Article 58 of the French Ordonnance de Moulins of 
1566 provided that, if a donation was registered within the stipulated period (four 
months), it took effect from the date of the deed.133 Therefore, not only was 
                                                 
130 Falle, 157, para 3. 
131 Poingdestre Remarques on art 527: “Un contrat heredital ne seroit valable en nos isles n’étant passé 
devant justice”. 
132 “Et en cas que aucun seroit refusant et que par sa faute déliberée ses droits ne seroient enregistrés 
dedans Trois mois au susdits livres tells droits recelés seront tenus de nul effet ni valeur.” 
133 “Et pour oster à l’avenir toutes occasions de frauds & de doutes qui pourroient estre mûës entre nos 
sujets pour l’insinuation des donations qui seront ci-après faites, avons ordonné que d’oresnavant 
toutes donations faites entre-vifs, mutuelles, réciproques, onereuses, en faveur de marriage & autres, 
de quelque forme & qualité qu’elles soient faites entr -vifs, comme dit est, seront insinuées ès Greffe 
de nos sieges ordinaries de l’assiette des choses données & de la demeurance des parties dans quatre 
mois, à compter du jour & date d’icelles donations, pour le regard des biens & personnes, & dans six 
mois, pour ceux qui seront hors de nostre Royaume. Autrement & à faute de ladite insinuation, seront 
& demeuront lesdites donations nulles & de nul effet & valeur, tant en faveur du créancier, que de 
l’heritier du donnant. Et si dedans ledit temps ledit donnant ou donataire decedoit, pourra néanmoins 
ladite insinuation estre faite dans ledit temps, à compter du jour dudit contrat comme dessus, sans que 
cette présente Ordonnance fasse aucun prejudice aux donations ci-devant faites, & droits acquis à nos 
sujets à cause d’icelles, ni aux instances mûës & à mouvoir pour ce regard.” Available in Recueil 
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ownership transferred on the date of the deed (provided registration followed), but a 
precarious priority was acquired at that same time. Could this be the effect of the 
1602 Act? It would seem not. The contract is brought into existence when it is passed 
before the court (except, according to Poingdestre, hypothecs, which are valid 
between the parties even without being passed before the court).134 The contract 
ceases to have any legal existence if it is not regist red within three months. The 
priority provision envisages the possibility of a period where the contract has no 
priority against subsequent grants of the transferor (“sur peine d’être reputées 
privées”). The only time at which a contract (other than a hypothec) could exist and 
carry no priority must be within those three months. Registration is the only event 
given which will affect priority within the three-month period. Therefore, in order to 
meet the description of events given in the Act, registration must be constitutive of 
priority, and is not merely a means of preserving it. 
 
The device employed by the 1602 Act – a punitive sanction for failure to register 
within a certain period – was used in other legislation of the same period,135 notably, 
the Guernsey Ordinance of 1631 on registration (superseded by an Ordinance of 
1724):136 
 
“[…] faits enregistrer au Greffe de la Cour dans deux mois après le 
passement d’iceux, à peine de perdre la preference qu’aultrement ils pouroent 
avoir eu sur les acquisiteurs et creantiers posterieurs qui se seroent faits 
enregistrer”137 
 
                                                                                                                                
d’Edits et d’Ordonnances Royaux sur le fait de la justice, et autres matieres (1720) vol 1, 477. See 
also: Cooper, part 1, 20; Argou, vol 1, 266 – 269. 
134 Poingdestre Remarques on art 527. 
135 Scottish Act of 1617 setting up the General Registr of Sasines (see: ch 5 n123, for text). 
136 “à l’avenir toutes obligations et transactions ne pr ndront date de priorité que du jour qu’ils seront 
mis au Greffe.” Available in R MacCulloch (ed) Recueil d’Ordonnances de la Cour Royale de l’isle 
de Guernesey (1852) vol 1 (covering 1533–1800) 248. Of related interest: Howitt; Jubilee Scheme 3 
Limited Partnership v Capita Symonds Ltd Guernsey Court of Appeal, Civil Division, Appeal no 425, 
14 & 15 December 2010, judgment given 4 January 2011. 
137 Available in R MacCulloch (ed) ibid 163. Also: Carey, 183. 
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This provision appears to say that a precarious priority is acquired when the contract 
is passed because priority is “lost” (rather than never acquired) if registration is not 
made within the stipulated period.138 
 
It is noteworthy that the 1631 Guernsey Ordinance did not provide for the eventual 
invalidity of the deed itself. Priority (or alternatively the opportunity to acquire it) 
was removed by failure to register within two months, but ownership remained with 
the transferee. There is nothing to suggest that a subsequent registration could not 
have been made in Guernsey, although, presumably, the deed would only have 
ranked according to the date of registration, rather t an the date on which it had been 
passed before the court. Therefore, what was lost following failure to register within 
two months of passing contract was priority from the date of the contract. Ownership 
was transferred when the contract was passed before the court.139 
 
Thus, when registration came to be introduced in Jersey (and in Guernsey) the model 
of transfer was the defeasibility model. Registration was not constitutive of transfer, 
which occurred when the contract was passed before the court. Rather, registration 
removed the transferee’s vulnerability to subsequent grants by the transferor and to 
the transferor’s creditors. If the transferor is honest and registration is made within 
the stipulated period, the main practical difference between the defeasibility model 
and the constitutive model is the transferee’s period of vulnerability to the claims of 
the transferor’s creditors. 
 
(3) Subsequent Legislation 
The Code of 1771 (a compilation of laws, rather than a systematised codification) 
contains a section on the law of the register, which amounts broadly to a restatement 
of the 1602 Act. The Code of 1771 can be taken as super eding the 1602 Act on 
                                                 
138 An alternative reading is that it is the opportuniy to acquire priority (by the act of registration) 
which is lost, and not priority itself. The result of either reading is the same in that, as long as 
registration is made within two months of passing contract, priority takes effect from the date that the
contract was passed. The difference is that priority is conferred contemporaneously with ownership 
(when the contract is passed) on the first reading, whereas on the second reading priority is conferred 
on registration although backdated to the date on which the contract was passed. 
139 See also: Dawes Laws 640. 
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those matters covered by both.140 Notably absent from the Code of 1771 is the final 
paragraph of the 1602 Act, which states that contracts not registered within three 
months have no effect.141 
 
It is not clear why this provision was omitted from the 1771 restatement. Both the 
1602 Act and the 1771 Code mention that the contract, once passed, will be “dans 
deux ou trois jours après”142 delivered up for registration (a provision which has now 
been repealed).143 This provision seems to give guidance only, for there is nothing to 
suggest that failure to meet its terms carries any consequences. However, it appears 
to demonstrate that in 1771 the practice was still to hand the passed contracts back to 
the parties, who thus bore the responsibility of taking them to be registered. The only 
sanction for failure to register is the three-month rule of the 1602 Act. Why was the 
rule omitted? Possible explanations are that registrat on always took place on time 
(and so the rule was superfluous), or that registrat on never took place on time and so 
the rule ceased to be operative (la coutume abat le droit).144 
 
Le Geyt (writing broadly equidistant from 1602 and 1771) provides some guidance 
to the practice of his day.145 He describes the provision of the 1602 Act containing 
the three-month rule as “nothing but menacing”,146 and considers that it no longer 
renders a contract completely without effect. Rather, “La non-insertion dans le temps 
requis rend le contrat un fait privé.”147 On this view, failure to register in time has 
consequences only for priority: passing contract transfers ownership, even if 
registration is not made. Le Geyt appears to report tha  registration within three 
                                                 
140 That registration must be made of all hereditary contracts passed before the court composed of the 
Bailiff, or his Lieutenant, and two Jurats; that the contract is to be formal in nature and signed by the 
Bailiff and Jurats; various stipulations regarding how registration is to be made by the official in 
charge of the register; that engages (or engaiges) and hypothecs are to be registered; and, that the 
register is to be public. Engages appear to be alienations of land or rights by the Crown, with the 
facility to repurchase what was sold at any time: Houard Dictionnaire vol 2, 132 – 133, 
“Engagement”, “Engagistes”; de Ferriere Dictionnaire vol 1, 578 – 579, “Engagement”, “Engagistes”. 
141 “Et en cas que aucun seroit refusant et que par sa faute déliberée ses droits ne seroient enregistrés 
dedans Trois mois au susdits livres tells droits recelés seront tenus de nul effet ni valeur.” 1602 Act.
142 1771 Code “Regîtres”. The formula in the 1602 Act is identical, save that “dans” is rendered 
“dedans”. 
143 Loi(1840) sur le registre public des contrats, art 6. 
144 Le Gros, 456, citing 1861 Report Evidence, 278 – 279, questions 6286, 6287. 
145 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 4, 137, et seq. 
146 “cette clause n’est que comminatoire” ibid 139. 
147 Ibid 142. 
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months of passing contract meant that priority was acquired from the date of the 
deed.148 Thus registration within three months preserved priority, rather than 
constituted it. Furthermore, later registration was possible, although a contract 
registered more than three months after the date tht it was passed before the court 
took priority from the date of registration.149 
 
Against this position, Le Geyt refers obliquely to “quelques sentences” in which 
contracts not registered within three months were nonetheless ranked by the date on 
which they were passed before the court.150 He recognises that these decisions are 
“directly contrary” to the 1602 Act.151 Perhaps in order to sideline these decisions, he 
provides no dates or other references for them (contrary to his usual practice). This 
suggests that they are to be considered as aberrations, rather than representative of 
the law. 
 
The omission of the final provision of the 1602 Act from the Code of 1771, taken 
together with Le Geyt’s description of the practice of his day, indicate that the law 
was in the course of development. Subsequent enactments do not appear to have 
modified the moment of transfer, or the moment at which priority is acquired. It may 
be seen, therefore, that the position in Jersey today is similar to the position in 
Guernsey under the Ordinance of 1631.152 
 
Legislative reform of the law on registration was made in 1840153 and again in 
1862.154 The 1840 law introduced registration of the division of immoveable 
property of a deceased person by the heirs.155 Article 6 (since repealed)156 is of 
                                                 
148 Ibid 139. This passage is not easy to interpret. Some assist nce may be obtained from: JLC CP8, 
10 et seq; Kelleher “Effect”; Poingdestre Lois 101 – 104, generally. The 1880 Law (arts 44 – 46) has 
modified the law since Le Geyt’s day. 
149 Interestingly, a similar fate seems to have befalln art 58 of the French Ordonnance de Moulins: 
Argou, vol 1, 267 – 269. 
150 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 4, 139. 
151 Ibid. 
152 No longer in force: ch 5 n136. 
153 Loi (1840) sur le registre public des contrats. 
154 Loi (1862) sur le tenue du Registre Public, now known as the Loi (1862) sur le registre public des 
contrats (see: Statute Law Revision (No 3) (Jersey) 1966, art 2, schedule 2). The four articles of the 
1862 Law made administrative changes to facilitate searches, in pursuance of the aim that the register 
should be “aussi parfait que possible” (preamble to the Law). 
155 Art 2. 
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interest: all contracts passed before the court are o main in the hands of the Chief 
Magistrate, who will deliver them for registration within three days.157 It is unclear 
whether this altered the practice of the day, or whether it stated in legislative form 
what was already taking place. Either way, since at le st 1840 it has been almost 
impossible to conceive of circumstances in which the t ree-month rule of the 1602 
Act could be applied. Even in the unlikely event that a contract was lost for a period 
in excess of three months following it being passed in court, this would not fall foul 
of the three-month rule, which requires that the failure to register is due to the refusal 
and deliberate fault of a contracting party.158 Thus, although the three-month rule 
may remain in force, in practice it lies dormant. (This is not so in Guernsey, where 
the parties take their contracts away and have responsibility for registering them, and 
priority is only acquired on registration.)159 
 
Part 18 of the Royal Court Rules 2004 contains provisi ns on “Registration of Title, 
Hypothecs etc […]”. Rule 18/3, “Registration of instruments relating to the title of 
immoveable property”, states: 
 
“(1) No instrument relating to the title of immoveable property is valid unless 
registered in the Public Registry. 
“(2) Any such instrument shall be deemed to be so registered if it is in the 
custody of the Greffier for the purposes of registration, and its effective date 
shall be deemed to be, if a contract, the date on which it was passed before 
Court or, if another instrument, the date on which its registration in the Public 
Registry was ordered by the Court.”160 
 
“Instrument” is not defined by the Royal Court Rules. Given the terms of 18/3(2), it 
clearly includes hereditary contracts, but is intended to be broader than these alone. 
  
According to rule 18/3(1), registration is required for a contract to have any validity 
at all. This suggests that the point at which transfer occurs is on registration, which, 
                                                                                                                                
156 By the Statute Law Revision (No 3) (Jersey) Law 1996, art 1, schedule 1. 
157 “Tout contrat après sa passation devant Justice rest ra entres les mains du Chef-Magistrat, qui le 
remettra dans trois jours à l’Enregistreur.” 
158 “Et en cas que aucun seroit refusant et que par sa faute déliberée ses droits ne seroient enregistrés 
dedans Trois mois […]” 1602 Act. 
159 See: ch 5 n136. 
160 An earlier incarnation of this rule is rule 14/3 of the Royal Court Rules 1968 (R&O 5107). 
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according to rule 18/3(2), takes place when the herditary contract is passed to the 
Greffier. The Royal Court Rules 2004 are, however, s condary legislation, deriving 
their authority from article 13(1) of the Royal Court (Jersey) Law 1948. The power 
conferred by article 13(1) is for the creation of administrative regulations only. 
Therefore, if previously transfer occurred when thecontract was passed before the 
court, this has not changed. 
 
(4) Analysis: Passing Contract 
Assuming transfer of ownership to occur at the time that the contract is passed before 
the court, when is the crucial moment before which the transferee has no right and 
after which the transferor is divested of his or her right? 
 
The Bailiff (or Lieutenant-Bailiff) and two Jurats are the only persons to sign161 a 
hereditary contract. In doing so, they are not assenting to the contract on behalf of the 
parties, for the parties themselves have just assented by taking the oath before all 
present. The signatories are no more than witnesses.162 
 
Normally, when a witness signs, the juridical act has already been performed (as 
with, for example, witnesses to a paper lease, or a will). The hereditary contract was 
historically a record of an act – the juridical actof transfer – that had already taken 
place.163 Thus, the Bailiff and the Jurats’ role as witnesses uggests that transfer takes 
place when the parties take the oath. Yet that would be to overlook the particular 
identity of these witnesses: the Bailiff and Jurats are public officials, and it is in their 
capacity as public officials that they act in the Contract Court. Further, the juridical 
act is not taking place privately (as it would with a paper lease or a will), but 
publicly, in the court. The signatures of the Bailiff and Jurats are, in effect, a 
notarisation of the contract (the court being the original notary). Unlike ordinary 
                                                 
161 “An hereditary contract is duly authenticated if signed or initialled on either the first or the last 
page thereof by the persons before whom it has beenpassed.” Royal Court Rules 2004, rule 18/8. For 
historical interest, see Royal Court Rules 1968 (R&O 5107), rule 14/6. 
162 The final clause of the contract: “In witness whereof we have sealed these present letters with the 
Seal of the Royal Court; present hereto” or “En temoin de quoi nous avons Scellé ces Lettres du Sceau 
de la Court Royale. Présents à ce”. These words are followed by the names of the two Jurats present. 
The name of the Bailiff is given in the first, salutational, clause of the contract. If another is sitting in 
the place of the Bailiff, his name is recorded next to this clause, at the top of the contract. 
163 See: ch 5 A(3). 
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witnessing, the signing by the three public officials is an inherent part of the passing 
process. That process, therefore, is not complete until the second Jurat has signed, at 
which point transfer is effected. Thus, there are two distinct phases to the juridical 
act of transfer of immoveable property: the parties swearing the oath, and the 
contract being signed (or notarised). Transfer of ownership occurs, wholly and 
instantaneously, at the moment at which both phases have been completed:164 
validity and (precarious) priority is conferred upon the transaction at this point. 
 
(5) Analysis: Registration 
Registration has the effect of conserving, or making permanent, the priority and 
validity acquired when a contract is passed.165 Registration also provides publicity. 
Furthermore, Matthews and Nicolle consider, under reference to Le Gros and Le 
Geyt, that “there is […] undoubtedly a principle that instruments once enrolled in the 
public records acquire a prima facie validity only displaced by a judicial decision or 
inter partes agreement”.166 The passage from Le Gros is: 
 
“De la nullité ab initio des contrats héréditaires. 
“Pour qu’une partie puisse invoquer la nullité, il faut qu’elle y ait intérêt. En 
principe, ce qui est nul ne produit aucun effet lega . Mais, à Jersey, cette règle 
ne reçoit pas son application en matière des contrats p ssés en forme 
authentique sous le sceau du bailliage. Le Registre Public fait foi des contrats 
y enregistrés, et tout contrat nul ab initio qui n’a pas été annulé par acte 
judiciaire ou par contrat entre partie et partie subsiste en toute sa force et 
vigeur.”167 
 
It is unremarkable to say that a party should have interest before he or she may bring 
an action in court, and it is logical that a nullity should be without legal effect. Le 
                                                 
164 Consistent with C & G Developments Ltd v Duquemin Guernsey Court of Appeal (1965) October 
15 and 16, per Le Masurier, Bailiff of Jersey: “Counsel for both parties were agreed, but for reasons 
unexplained, that by the law of Guernsey, land could be lawfully conveyed in only one way. The 
conveyance does not depend on the act or consent of the parties themselves, but the sanction of the 
Royal Court is required to substantiate the transfer.” The final sentence is unfortunately worded: of 
course, transfer requires the consent of the parties as much as any prior agreement to transfer does. 
Perhaps the purpose of the sentence was to distinguish the Guernsey (and Jersey) process of 
immoveable transfer from those jurisdictions where transfer is made by consent of the parties alone. 
See also: Carey, 181, 183; Dawes Laws 640. 
165 See also: Vinding Kruse, 109, 116. 
166 Matthews & Nicolle, 8, para 1.33. Also: Nicolle Immovable 113 and Deacon v Bower (1978) JJ 39 
at 49 et seq, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
167 Le Gros, 430. 
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Gros’ next assertion is interesting. Presumably, the “règle” (note the singular) to 
which he refers is that a nullity has no legal effect. So, a contract passed before the 
court (and registered) constitutes an exception to the general principle that that which 
is null has no legal effect. What Le Gros tells us is that the register “makes faith”168 
in relation to the contracts registered therein, and this he expands upon, stating that 
any contract which is actually a nullity but has not been formally annulled “subsists 
with all its force and vigour”. That is its legal effect. Presumably, this means that the 
contract has the effect it would have had, were it not for its vice. Le Gros does not 
say that the vitiated contract is unassailable. Thus, on his view, on registration, a void 
contract would be made good but challengeable by regist ation. This seems a 
stronger statement of the effect of registration than that made by Matthews and 
Nicolle. On one reading, a hereditary contract which was completely ineffective is 
given effect to by registration, whereas Matthews and Nicolle seem to say merely 
that registration confers a presumption of validity. 
 
Le Gros’ passage proceeds to discuss what he describ  as a statutory exception to 
the exception169 that he has just given: article 42 of the Loi (1880) sur la Propriété 
Foncière.170 He concludes with a reference to Le Geyt,171 which, however, is silent 
on the effect of registration apart from making the related observation that hereditary 
contracts only become valid when certain formalities are performed.172  
 
In addition to the reference to Le Gros, Matthews and Nicolle also cite the following 
article in Le Geyt’s Code: 
 
                                                 
168 Curiously, the Scottish Registration Act of 1617 uses the same language: “mak faith”, and later 
“mak no faithe”. 
169 The rule is that a nullity has no legal effect. The exception to this (according to Le Gros) is that a 
registered contract which is void ab initio does have effect until it is annulled. The exception to this 
exception is found in art 42 of the 1880 Law. 
170 “La femme alliée de mari, qui n’est point séparée de lui quant aux biens, ne pourra être contrainte 
d’accepter le remboursement d’une rente ancienne, ou d’une rente ou autre hypothèque 
conventionnelle nouvelle, à elle appartenant ; et le remboursement desdites rentes et hypothèques fait 
au mari sans le consentement libre et exprès de la f mme, exprimé au moyen d’un contrat passé 
devant Justice, sera nul ab initio, sans qu’il soit nécessaire pour la femme d’en faire prononcer la 
nullité après le décès du mari.” 
171 It is assumed that Le Gros’s reference is to Le Geyt’s Manuscrits. The passage referred to concerns 
validity of contracts and court judgments: vol 1, 18 et seq. 
172 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 119. 
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“Les Escritures publiques sont de la main de personnes autorisées pour cela 
par des charge qu’elles portent dans l’Estat, & ces Escritures ne peuvent 
guere estre contredites sans la formalité d’une inscription en faux.”173 
 
This is found in the context of formalities under the heading “Des Escritures”. 
“Escritures publiques” appear to be writings made by a public official in his or her 
capacity as such.174 Consequently, hereditary contracts may be described as 
“Escritures publiques”.175 The inscription de faux is an action in French private law 
by which a notarised document may be challenged.176 Notarial deeds are probative as 
to all the matters which it is possible for the notary to know, such as the identity of 
the parties, and the date on which the deed was signed.177 It seems that Le Geyt, in 
the quotation above, refers to a similar action in Jersey law.178 Le Gros too states that 
hereditary contracts must be challenged by formal process:179 just as creation of a 
hereditary contract can only be done by formal process, so too is there a formal 
process for attacking the contract. 
 
Is Le Geyt to be read as saying that registration cfers a right where there would 
otherwise be none (at least until a successful inscription de faux is made)? The article 
from his Code is consistent with both Le Gros and Matthews and Nicolle, but there is 
nothing to suggest that his view goes as far as Le Gros’s. If Le Gros is put aside for a 
moment, Le Geyt’s article (and article 42 of the 1880 law) could mean merely that 
registration shifts the burden of proof.180 This is a more convincing reading, for it 
does not lead to the result that a fraudster’s contract, once registered, would acquire a 
validity which it surely does not deserve. Further, Le Geyt’s article on “Escritures 
publiques” is found in a section of his Code concerned with the different ways in 
which proof can be established, not the way in which rights are constituted. In 
                                                 
173 Code Le Geyt 2.7.7. 
174 See: Houard Dictionnaire vol 2, 87 “Ecritures”. 
175 See also Le Nouveau Petit Robert (1995 edn) 716, “Écrivain public”: “personne qui rédige des 
lettres, des actes, pour ceux qui ne savant pas écrire ou qui maîtrisent mal l’écrit”. 
176 Code de procédure civile, arts 306, 314. The related Crime de faux is mentioned in Poingdestre 
Lois 254. 
177 Art 1319 CC. See: Herzog, 327. 
178 See also: Carey, 230; Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 4, 131; Houard, Dictionnaire, vol 3, 42 – 44; 
Hemery & Dumaresq, 25; Pipon & Durell, 28. 
179 Le Gros, 430. 
180 For moveables, where the burden of proof lies in relation to ownership is dependent on possession. 
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modern French law “fait foi” may be translated as “probative”,181 if that word is 
taken to mean a presumption that some aspect, or aspects, concerning the deed is 
valid. Thus, on the basis of Le Geyt and Matthews and Nicolle, it is suggested that 
the effect of registration is to render the contract probative.182 
 
Of what does this probativity consist? As already seen, one approach is to separate 
the matters which can be known by the notarising body from those which cannot be 
so known. For example, the probativity conferred by registration could extend to the 
date on which the contract was passed before the court, the identity of the parties 
(imputing the advocates’ knowledge of the parties to the court), the date of 
registration (given that this effectively now takes place in the court room),183 and that 
the formalities required to be performed by the court have been validly executed. 
Were the presumption of validity to go beyond the matters within the immediate 
knowledge of the court, probativity could also extend to the content of the contract: 
for example, that the immoveable transferred was owned by the putative transferor 
immediately prior to the transfer. Perhaps it was thi hat Le Gros had in mind when 
he penned his passage. It seems certain that the first type of probativity applies to 
registered deeds (that is, probativity as to those matters within the immediate, and 
usual, knowledge of the court). Although probativity as to the contents of the deed is 
not at odds with the sources, it seems unlikely that i  extends so far, in the absence of 
express authority to that effect. 
 
Returning to the Royal Court Rules in light of the above discussion, rule 18/3(1) 
could be read to mean that no contract can be used a  evidence unless it has been 
registered, because rule 18/3(1) does not say that registration is constitutive of 
validity, but that registration is a necessary, even if not a sufficient, condition for 
validity:184 
 
                                                 
181 Compare, for example, the French and English texts of art 1319(1) CC on www.legifrance.gouv.fr. 
See also: Le Nouveau Petit Robert (1995 edn) 939 “FOI […] FAIRE FOI: démontrer la véracité, 
porter témoignage, donner force probante.” 
182 See also: Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 4, 141, 131. 
183 Royal Court Rules 2004, r18/3(2). 
184 This is true of instruments of sasine in Scotland. 
 136
“(1) No instrument relating to the title of immoveable property is valid unless 
registered in the Public Registry.” 
 
On this view, “valid” ought to be preceded by “presumed to be”, or followed by 
“proof”, if the rule were to be unambiguous. 
 
When taken as a whole, what has been written, legislatively or otherwise, about the 
effect of registration does not provide clear guidance. One possibility is that 
apparently suggested by Le Gros: registration turns an invalid deed into a valid one, 
at least for a time. This is not at odds with rule 18/3(1), Matthews and Nicolle, or 
article 42 of the 1880 Law. However, this interpretation does not seem wholly to fit 
with Le Geyt’s view. There is a specific procedure for challenging registered deeds, 
but this does not mean that those deeds are valid until shown to be otherwise. Neither 
– significantly – does Le Gros’s interpretation fit with the function of registration as 
reducing the opportunity for fraud for, as already observed, a fraudster’s void 
contract would acquire undeserved validity on registration.  
 
The other possibility considered is that registration confers a presumption of, inter 
alia, valid execution upon a deed. This view is consistent with the article from Le 
Geyt’s Code, article 42 of the 1880 Law, and Matthews and Nicolle. As suggested 
above, rule 18/3(1) can be read to fit with this poiti n. Clearly, Le Gros is at odds 
with this conclusion. It may be that he is simply wrong. This seems likely: none of 
the sources on registration since 1602 suggests that registration confers validity on a 
nullity. 
 
In practice, the window between the hereditary contract being passed before the court 
and its registration is now very small, for, under rule 18/3(2) of the Royal Court 
Rules 2004, registration of a contract affecting title to land is deemed to have taken 
place once the contract is “in the custody of the Greffier for the purposes of 
registration”. The contract is in the hands of Greffier for this purpose when it is given 




(6) The Nature of the Hereditary Contract 
Through the development of the process of immoveable transfer, a new role for the 
hereditary contract has crystallised. The contract is s ill a record of a transaction that 
has already taken place, and this aspect of its chara ter facilitates the important 
business of registration for posterity and publicity. But the contract is itself an 
inherent and indispensable part of the transaction of which it is a record. Therefore, it 
would be wholly appropriate to formulate hereditary contracts in the present tense. 
 
C. REQUIREMENTS OF FORM 
 
(1) Agreements Concluded Prior to the Contract Cour t 
Sometimes there is a preliminary agreement between th  parties, created prior to 
passing contract and distinct from the hereditary contract. For example, parties to a 
transaction for the sale and transfer of high-value property may decide that a deposit 
will be paid by the purchaser to the vendor, to be forfeited if, through the fault of the 
purchaser, the transaction does not complete. 
 
(a) Does the agreement need to be in writing?  
In Guernsey, a preliminary agreement must be in writing and signed.185 In Jersey, the 
position is less clear.186 Le Geyt states in his Code that, in order to constitute proof of 
the arrangement, a private agreement must be in written form, signed by the 
obligated party and two witnesses.187 However, this relates to proof and not to 
validity, on which the article is silent. 
  
In Guiton v de Gruchy in 1870 the full court refused to make an award of amages 
for failure to pass a hereditary contract to transfer land because there was no prior 
written agreement between the parties containing a stipulated penalty clause.188 That 
decision was later considered in the 1968 case of Basden Hotels v Dormy Hotels, 
which referred to Le Geyt’s Code, 2.9.5: 
                                                 
185 Conveyancing (Guernsey) Law, 1996, ss1(1), 1(3), respectively. Previously, writing was not 
required: Gauson v Harris (1995) 20.GLJ.42. 
186 See, for example: JLC CP6, D. 
187 2.7.1. 
188 (1870) 9 CR 68, 72. 
 138
 
“Le Titre d’un heritage ne se peut prouver par Tesmoins de vive voix, tous 
Contracts hereditaux devant estre passez par Serment devant le Magistrat, & 
n’est celuy qui se retracte d’un accord heredital non passé dans cette forme 
sujet qu’à payer le dedit, s’il y en a, & les despens & dommages encourus par 
sa faute. On tolere que des assignations de rente & des eschanges qui, 
d’accord de partie, se presentent & se lisent publiq ement en Cour, passent 
sans Serment & soient insinuez sur les Rolles des Cours Ordinaires pour 
valoir à perpetuité.” 
 
In this passage, Le Geyt presents the requirement for writing as a rule of evidence 
only.  
 
Based on this passage, the court in Basden concluded that, although Guiton could be 
read as requiring both a written agreement and a stipula ed penalty clause before any 
remedy can be given, it is only a written agreement tha  is actually necessary.189 It 
should be noted, however, that Le Geyt does not say whether the broken “accord 
hérédital” must be in writing. On the basis of Le Gyt alone, it seems that is possible 
to conclude an agreement without the intervention of writing, but this was not the 
approach taken by the courts in Guiton and in Basden. Although these cases 
concerned the availability of a remedy, it is unsatisf ctory to say that it is possible to 
have a right but no remedy. Assuming the court not to have intended such a result, 
two things may be observed: first, that writing was considered by the courts to be a 
requirement for the validity (as opposed to proof) of a contract relating to the transfer 
of land; second, that this represents a divergence from Le Geyt’s Code. A transition 
has been made from the requirement of writing as a rule of evidence, to the 
requirement of writing for validity.190  
 
The view of the court in Basden (that a written agreement is required before the court 
will award a remedy, but a stipulated penalty is not) was upheld in the 1974 case of 
York Street Pharmacy v Rault,191 and also in 1977 in Romeril v Davis.192 Although in 
                                                 
189 (1968) 1 JJ 911, 915, per Bois, Deputy Bailiff (also: 916 “The situation therefore is that the courts 
of this Island can penalise a faithless promisor ‘à héritage’ where he has given his promise in writing. 
Where there is nothing in writing, he can shield himself behind the maxim ‘promesse à héritage ne 
vaut’.”). 
190 Also: Symes v Couch (1978) JJ 119, 147, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
191 (1974) 2 JJ 65, 69, per Le Masurier, Bailiff. 
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Romeril the court determined that concluded intention to contract was absent, there is 
some discussion of the requirements for an “accord hérédital”,193 including the 
assertion (not made in other cases) that both parties must sign a single written 
agreement.194 
 
The following year, in 1978, the decision in Symes v Couch195 seemed to step back 
from a rigid requirement for writing. There was an oral agreement that the defendant 
company would transfer a house to the plaintiff once Housing Committee consent 
had been obtained. Consent had not been granted, but when the defendant company 
instructed the third-party tenant to pay rent to it, instead of to the plaintiff who had 
been collecting the rent until that time, the plaintiff sought clarification of the 
position from the court. The defendant company argued that the lack of writing and 
lack of a penalty clause made the agreement unenforceable.196 The court held that 
there was an oral agreement between the parties,197 and that, in principle,198 the 
plaintiff could have a remedy in damages based on that oral agreement.199 The 
reasons for this decision merit some examination. 
 
Having determined that there was “an oral agreement, evidenced in writing” (that is, 
by an exchange of correspondence) between the parties, the court considered the 
remedies available to the plaintiff. Was writing necessary in order to obtain a remedy 
for non-performance? It was observed that specific performance of an “accord 
hérédital” (whether written or not) has been consistently rejected by the court.200 The 
court summarised the previous case-law thus: 
 
                                                                                                                                
192 (1977) JJ 135. 
193 Ibid 138 – 140, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
194 Ibid 139. 
195 (1978) JJ 119. 
196 Ibid 122, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
197 Ibid 140, 148. 
198 Should the plaintiff obtain housing consent and the defendant company refuse to transfer the house 
to him, the plaintiff would be able to obtain damages: ibid 149. 
199 Ibid 149 (see: 121 – 122 for details of the Order of Justice). 
200 Ibid 140 – 149. 
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“[…] it appears from most of the cases that what was sought to be enforced 
was a simple promise, sometimes oral, occasionally without the mention of a 
penalty in default, and unsupported by any act by the party relying on it.”201 
 
Of these characteristics, weight was placed particularly on the element of reliance (or 
its absence). 
 
The court proceeded to consider the position in England where “the Statute of 
Frauds,[202] now replaced by Section 40[203] of the Law of Property Act, 1925, 
produced almost the same effect as the customary law of Jersey”: an agreement for 
the transfer of land must be in written, executed form. However, in England, where 
writing was absent but there had been some performance of the agreement, specific 
performance could be obtained by bringing a suit in equity.204 Could a parallel result 
be achieved in Jersey? There seems to have been some doubt over whether specific 
performance was available as a remedy at all in Jersey law, but the court pointed to 
its earlier judgment in York Street Pharmacy v Rault205 where it was concluded that, 
generally, the remedy does exist in the jurisdiction.206 
 
Reference was made to the English case of Steadman v Steadman (which in turn 
refers to Fry’s Specific Performance)207 and the criteria set out therein to be satisfied 
in order to demonstrate part performance.208 The court was clear that without either 
writing or part performance, it would be unable to pr vide any remedy because this 
would be directly contrary to an established line of Jersey case-law.209 Although 
                                                 
201 Ibid 140. 
202 Of 1677. 
203 Section 40(1). 
204 Symes v Couch (1978) JJ 119, 140 – 141, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
205 (1974) 2 JJ 65, 69, per Le Masurier, Bailiff. 
206 Symes v Couch (1978) JJ 119, 141 – 142, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff.  
207 This is reached by a circuitous route: “In ‘Steadmn v. Steadman’, at page 991, letter e., Lord 
Dilhorne cited a passage from ‘Chapronière v. Lambert’ in which Warrington L.J. referred to Fry on 
Specific Performance.” Ibid 142. 
208 “(1) the acts of part performance must be such as not only to be referable to a contract such as 
alleged but to be referable to no other title: (2) they must be such as to render it a fraud in the 
defendant to take advantage of the contract not being in writing: (3) the contract to which they refer 
must be such as in its own nature is enforceable by the Court; and (4) there must be proper parol 
evidence of the contract which is let in by the acts of part performance.” Ibid 142. 
209 Ibid 144. 
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there could be doubt as to whether all of the St adman criteria were satisfied,210 the 
court was clearly leaning towards finding some remedy for the plaintiff; it declared 
that a refusal to pass contract (were the Housing Committee to consent) would be 
fraudulent “by taking advantage of the lack of a written memorandum”.211 Specific 
performance was rejected because the court considered it had “no power” to grant 
it.212 Instead, damages were awarded, for “to leave the plaintiff without a remedy 
would be to set at naught the equitable jurisdiction of the Royal Court.”213 
 
It has been suggested that the effect of Symes v Couch is to relax the requirement for 
a written agreement only where the agreement is evidenced in writing (as it was in 
Symes).214 This seems doubtful. As the judgment of the court develops, it is made 
clear that the reason for the relaxation is that there had been some performance of the 
agreement between the parties.215 In broad terms, it seems that the plaintiff in Symes 
relied upon an assertion made on behalf of the defen ant company, to the company’s 
knowledge, and to the plaintiff’s detriment. Therefor , the basis of the decision 
appears to be based on the English Equitable doctrine of part performance.216 
Consequently, the decision in Symes does not affect the rule established in the earlier 
cases (that preliminary contracts relating to the transfer of immoveables must be in 
writing), but it does illustrate a way around it in certain circumstances. 
 
In summary, the position now seems to be that writing is a requirement for the 
constitution of contracts relating to the transfer of land (what may be called an 
“agreement of sale”). This does not appear to be tru of deposit agreements, but, 
following Le Geyt,217 witnessed writing would constitute proof of the arrangement. 
In any case, it is clearly best practice to reduce a d posit agreement to writing. Given 
the requirement of writing for agreements of sale, it may be observed that, where 
                                                 
210 The doubt was over the third: ibid 143. 
211 Ibid 143. 
212 Ibid 148. 
213 Ibid 149. 
214 Matthews & Nicolle, 8, para 1.32. 
215 Noted also in: Nicolle Immovable 102.  
216 Abolished by the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, s2(8). 
217 Code Le Geyt 2.7.1. 
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there is no such agreement, there are no legally binding obligations between the 
parties prior to appearance at the Contract Court. 
 
(b) Requirement of a stipulated penalty clause in order to be able to claim 
damages?  
If there is a concluded agreement prior to the parties’ appearance at the Contract 
Court and that agreement is broken, the court may award damages for the breach. In 
the case of Guiton v de Gruchy,218 the court appears to take the view that damages 
could not be awarded in the absence of a stipulated penalty for breach contained 
within the contract.219 It is hard to see why, but in any event Le Geyt’s view220 
contradicts this and more recent judgments have expressly rejected that aspect of the 
1870 decision.221 It is submitted that this latter position is the correct one. Thus, 
damages may be awarded whether or not there is a stpulated pecuniary penalty for 
non-performance. Additionally, it was held by the court in Basden Hotels v Dormy 
Hotels (referring to Le Geyt’s Code and to Pothier) that where a penalty clause is 
included in the agreement the court has the power to reduce it.222 
 
(c) Reform 
The Jersey Law Commission is unhappy with the uncertainty of the law in this area 
and has recommended legislating for a rule that all agreements relating to 
transactions “in immovable property […] should contai  prescribed essential terms 
in writing […] and be signed by both parties in the presence of independent 
witnesses”.223 Symes would be overruled. The Commission believes that constructive 
trusts, estoppel, and rectification – all of which exist in Jersey law – would provide 
                                                 
218 (1870) 9 CR 68. 
219 Ibid 72. 
220 Code Le Geyt 2.9.5. 
221 Basden Hotels Limited v Dormy Hotels Limited (1968) 1 JJ 911, 915, per Bois, Deputy Bailiff; 
Symes v Couch (1978) JJ 119, 147, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff (referring to Basden). Cf: JLC CP6, D, 
2.1. 
222 (1968) 1 JJ 911, 915, per Bois, Deputy Bailiff. See also: Arthur v Procr Gen de Desreaux (1882) 
208 Ex 95, 101. 
223 JLC CP6, D, 1.5.  
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the flexibility in the new rule that justice may require.224 As the Commission notes, 
this “would not be radically different from existing Jersey law”.225 
 
(2) The Hereditary Contract 
Hereditary contracts in both Jersey and Guernsey must be in writing.226 A 
requirement of writing is usual in other countries too,227 and facilitates ongoing 
publicity by providing something which can form the basis of a land register entry. 
The hereditary contract is, however, unusual in that t e parties to it do not sign it. 
 
The Royal Commissioners in their report on the laws of Jersey in 1861 suggested 
that hereditary contracts should be signed by the parties.228 There is some discussion 
of the point in the evidence appended to the report; the opinion in favour of signing 
was not unanimous.229 In spite of the Commissioners’ suggestion, signing of 
hereditary contracts was never introduced. One of the objections given in the 
evidence was on grounds of the additional cost because the Greffier would need to 
retain the original contracts, which was not the practice at the time.230 This particular 
objection no longer pertains. Mr Godfray (a Jersey advocate) saw no pressing need 
for signing because the system had worked well for many years and, while signing 
may have made a difference in a case referred to (but not named) in the evidence, it 
would not eliminate fraud.231 Even if signing were to be introduced, it was not 
suggested that it should replace passing contract.232 
 
                                                 
224 Ibid 1.4. 
225 Ibid 1.5. 
226 Jersey: “tous passements qui seront fait par devant le Bailly ou son lieutenant et deux ou trois de 
Justice, seront écrits en une lettre formelle” 1602 Act; “Tous Contrats ou Passemens qui seront faits 
par devant le Bailly ou son Lieutenant, et deux Jurés-Justiciers, seront écrits en Lettres formelles” 
1771 Code. Guernsey: Conveyancing (Guernsey) Law, 1996, ss1(1), 1(6). 
227 For example, in Scotland, the common law requirement (see Stair: 335 – 338, 2.3.11, 2.3.13, 
2.3.14) was made statutory by the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s1(2)(b). See also: 
s16 of the Deeds Registries Act 1937 (South Africa).  
228 1861 Report, xviii.  
229 Ibid Evidence, 312 – 314. Passing reference is also made at 215, question 5056. 
230 Ibid 313, question 7017. 
231 Ibid questions 7013, 7014. 
232 Ibid questions 7016, 7017. Signing the register instead of the deed is also suggested: 314, question 
7025. 
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In 2002, the Jersey Law Commission proposed that the passing process be abolished 
in favour of a system where all the parties sign the contract before a Jersey advocate 
or solicitor acting as witness. The witness would bear the responsibility of delivering 
the contract for registration.233 In the same Consultation Paper, the Commission also 
proposed that hereditary contracts should be drafted in English. To date, the latter 
proposal has been implemented,234 but the former has not. 
 
It may be noted that, in practical terms, signing has already been introduced as an 
alternative to a party appearing in court in order to pass contract. Under the Powers 
of Attorney (Jersey) Law 1995, article 3(2), it is possible for a party to appoint 
another to pass contract in his or her stead. Of course, this does not avoid the 
necessity for someone to pass contract, but it remov s the need for a particular 
person to appear in court and so serves to limit the inconvenience to the parties, if 




(1) Enforcement of an Agreement Concluded Prior to the Contract Court 
In many cases, there is no agreement prior to that made in the Contract Court and 
thus nothing to enforce. Where there is a preliminary agreement, in what way will 
this be enforced by the court? 
 
(a) No specific performance: nulle promesse à héritage ne vaut 
It is a rule of some antiquity that contracts relating to land that have not been passed 
in due form before the Contract Court cannot be enforced by specific performance. 
This rule has become connected with the formula n lle promesse à héritage ne vaut, 
which was included by Le Gros in his collection of maxims.235 Although the rule is 
given by Le Geyt in his Code (so was presumably well established by the time Le 
Geyt was writing), the actual maxim nulle promesse à héritage ne vaut – or any of its 
                                                 
233 JLC CP6, B. 
234 Royal Court Rules 2004, r20/9(2). 
235 Le Gros, 459 (“Promesse à Héritage ne vaut”). See also discussion: Matthews & Nicolle, 8, para 
1.30; Nicolle Immovable 100. 
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variations –236 does not appear until the twentieth century. It isfound, for example, in 
the court record for the case Neame, veuve Palmer et au v Sinatt (1925),237 and is 
also recorded by Le Gros238 (with no supporting references). Nonetheless, the rul  
itself is clearly long-established: specific performance is in principle unavailable 
where the contract relates to land. 
 
It is important to note that the maxim is of applicat on only in those cases where 
there is some contractual agreement prior to the failure to pass contract in the 
Contract Court. It seems that such an agreement is common only in Guernsey.239 In 
Jersey, the number of cases where the rule applies must be few in number (albeit that 
the scope of the rule is, obviously, wider than merely transfer of ownership).240 
 
In Basden Hotels v Dormy Hotels the court states that the reason for its inability to 
compel someone to pass contract is that “the obligation is one ‘quae non est in 
dando, sed in faciendo’ (see Pothier, Traité du Contrat de Vente, Partie VI, Chap. I, 
Nos. 480 et seq.).”241 In fact, Pothier sets out both the proposition made, and an 
opposing view,242 before concluding that the law of France has followed the latter. 
The following part of the passage bears reproduction: 
 
“D’un autre côté on dira que la règle, Nemo potest cogi ad factum, et celle 
que les obligations quæ in faciendo consistunt, se résolvent nécessairement en 
dommages et interest, ne reçoivent d’application qu’à l’égard des obligations 
de faits extérieurs et corporels, telle qu’est l’obligations de celui qui se seroit 
oblige de copier mes cahiers, lesquels faits ne peuvent se suppléer que par 
une condemnation de dommages et interest. Mais le fait qui est l’objet d’une 
promesse de vendre n’est pas un fait extérieur et corporel de la personne du 
débiteur: il peut le suppléer par un jugement, comme nous l’avons rapporté, 
qui ordonnera que, faute par le débiteur de vouloir passer un contrat de vente, 
le jugement vaudra pour contrat. Cette opinion paroît suivie dans la pratique, 
                                                 
236 For example: Promesse à héritage ne vaut (rien), or À héritage (nulle) promesse ne vaut. 
237 233 Ex 479, 484. 
238 Le Gros, 459. 
239 Although an “Agreement of Sale” is referred to in Romeril v Davis (1977) JJ 135, 137, per Crill, 
Deputy Bailiff.  
240 For example, leases, which are moveable if for a term of nine years or fewer and immoveable (and 
therefore must be passed before the court) if for al nger period: Code Le Geyt 1.1.17. 
241 Basden Hotels v Dormy Hotels (1968) 1 JJ 911, 914, per Bois, Deputy Bailiff. 
242 Pothier Traité du contrat de vente para 479. 
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comme étant la plus conforme à la fidélité qui doit régner entre les hommes 
pour l’accomplissement de leurs promesses.” 
 
Although Pothier sets the two views out as alternatives, rather than definitively 
concluding that there is some fatal logical flaw with the one which was rejected by 
practice, the passage as a whole has the effect of an argument against the proposition 
that the court in Basden seems to assert it supports.  
 
In England, the primary remedy for breach of contract is damages.243 Many 
jurisdictions do not adopt this approach, but neither do they recognise an absolute 
right to specific performance.244 For example, if an order of specific performance 
will be unduly burdensome on the defaulting party the courts will decline to grant it. 
Specific performance as the primary remedy for breach of non-monetary obligations 
is the model adopted by the Draft Common Frame of Reference,245 subject to a 
handful of exceptions.246 The Jersey law on remedies in the general contractual 
sphere is not wholly clear.247 
 
(b) The reason for the rule: first justification 
In Jersey, two justifications for the rule have been advanced: the principle of 
conservation du bien dans la famille, and that a man cannot be compelled to take an 
oath against his will. Their nature differs. Conservation du bien dans la famille 
expresses a policy preference which underlies more than one legal rule. The inability 
to compel a person to take an oath is a statement of fact and thus expresses a 
practical problem rather than a legal principle. This can be seen from the order the 
                                                 
243 Beale Chitty 1719, para 27-005. 
244 For example, in Scotland, where specific implement (performance) is the primary remedy, 
although it is discretionary: McBryde, para 23.10 – 23.27; Walker Remedies 276. In sales of land, 
there is a special variant for implement of the sale obligation, “adjudication in implement”: Rules of 
the Court of Session, Form 13.2-B(21); Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1907, s5A. The position in 
French law is well summarised in von Bar & Clive DCFR (Full) vol 1, 834 – 835. For South Africa: 
G Lubbe “Contractual Derogation and the Discretion  Refuse an Order for Specific Performance in 
South African Law” in Smits Specific. See also: H Dondorp “Precise Cogi: Enforcing Specific 
Performance in Medieval Legal Scholarship” in Hallebe k & Dondorp, 32 – 41. 
245 Von Bar & Clive DCFR (Full). 
246 III. 3:302. The exceptions, in III. 3:302(3), are that performance is (a) “unlawful or impossible” (b)
“unreasonably burdensome or expensive” (c) “of such a personal character that it would be 
unreasonable to enforce it”. 
247 Related to this, see: Supply of Goods and Services (Jer ey) Law 2009, arts 86, 87. 
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court makes when it is asked to enforce a transfer: th  recalcitrant party is to pass the 
contract or pay damages.248 
 
The first of these justifications – the feudal principle conservation du bien dans la 
famille – has been progressively eroded by an increased statutory loosening of the 
rules on succession to immoveables.249 The Loi (1851) sur les testaments 
d’immeubles made it possible to make a will of certain immoveabl  property. 
Thereafter, the Loi (1926) sur les héritages propres enabled a person to leave 
immoveable property to whomever he wished. Finally, the Loi (1960) modifiant le 
droit coutumier abolished the rights of an heir to have contracts or testaments set 
aside on certain grounds.250 A surviving relative no longer has the right to challenge 
a will of immoveable property simply by virtue of being related to the deceased. The 
court in Basden commented: 
 
“We come therefore to the conclusion that the effect of the Law of 1926 is 
virtually to set at naught the fundamental principle of Jersey law “de la 
conservation du bien dans la famille” so far as immoveables are concerned, 
and consequently that where the only reason why an obligation entered into 
by and enforceable against a person in relation to immoveables should not be 
enforceable against his successor in title is that t e successor is an heir, the 
heir no longer has the right to avoid the obligation.”251 
 
If the conservation principle were the only root of the rule preventing specific 
performance, the rule has become detached from the idea which gave it life. That 
aside, it is doubtful whether conservation du bien dans la famille can actually be a 
foundation for the rule, for the rule neither prevents transfer nor the creation of 
limited real rights.  
                                                 
248 See: Symes v Couch (1978) JJ 119, 141, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
249 Le Gros “Préface” IV. 
250 Art 1. 
251 Basden Hotels Limited v Dormy Hotels Limited (1968) 1 JJ 911, 917, per Bois, Deputy Bailiff. 
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(c) The reason for the rule: second justification 
Another reason for the rule is given by Mr Dupré252 in his answers to the Royal 
Commission in 1859:253 a man cannot be compelled to take an oath against h s 
will. 254 Nevertheless, the law departs from this position in three instances. 
 
Article 36 of the Matrimonial Causes (Jersey) Law 1949 provides that a person 
nominated by the court can convey property on behalf of a recalcitrant party, at that 
party’s cost, to give effect to an order of the court pursuant to the 1949 Law. Ritson v 
Slous from 1973255 and Lane v Lane from 1985256 apply this model to other 
circumstances. 
 
In Ritson, a bungalow and land were left by will to seven children in equal shares.257 
The Ritsons bought six of these shares. The Slouses held the remaining one seventh 
share. Under Jersey law, as in Roman law,258 co-owners are not normally required to 
remain in co-ownership and may raise a court action to bring the co-ownership to an 
end.259 The reason for this rule is that co-ownership is an unstable relationship, from 
which one should always be able to escape.260 The Slouses refused to sell their share 
to the Ritsons, but when the latter threatened to raise a court action the Slouses 
agreed to a sale by auction.261 The Ritsons’ £21,500 bid was the highest at auction.262 
However, housing law and regulations meant that the w ole property could be sold 
for a maximum of £3,388 only,263 because the land was intended for development.264 
                                                 
252 The then Attorney General. 
253 1861 Report Evidence, 527, question 10,801. See also: Gallichan v Gallichan (1954) 1 JJ 57, 60, 
65, per Le Quesne, Lieutenant Bailiff; Symes v Couch (1978) JJ 119, 140, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
254 The Jersey Law Commission describes this as the “reason most often stated for non-availability of 
specific performance in relation to immovables.” JLC CP6, D, 2.1. 
255 1 JJ 2341. 
256 1985-86 JLR 48. 
257 Ritson v Slous (1973) 1 JJ 2341, 2342, per Le Masurier, Bailiff. 
258 The actio communi dividundo. See: Justinian Codex 3.37.5 (In communionem vel societatem nemo 
compellitur invitus detineri); D.10.3; Justinian Institutes 4.6.20, 4.17.5. 
259 (1973) 1 JJ 2341, 2346, per Le Masurier, Bailiff. It is a maxim of customary law that nul n’est tenu 
de rester dans l’indivision. But see also comments against this being an absolute right: Haas v 
Duquemin 2002 JLR 27, 39, para 39, per Hodge, JA. 
260 See: D Kleyn & S Wortley “Co-ownership” in Zimmermann & Visser Mixed 703, 713: “It has 
often been noted that communio est mater rixarum––co-ownership is the mother of disputes.” 
261 (1973) 1 JJ 2341, 2342, per Le Masurier, Bailiff. 
262 Ibid 2342. 
263 This was done under the Housing (Extension of Powers) (Jersey) Law 1969, art 10, and the 
Housing (General Provisions) (Jersey) Regulations 1970, regulation 4(a). Imposing a maximum price 
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On account of the low price, the Slouses refused to pass contract. An action of 
licitation was raised and the court granted an order to sell. Nonetheless, the Slouses 
continued to refuse to pass contract and the Ritsons returned to the court, seeking 
relief.265 The Slouses were ordered to convey the property within six weeks or the 
Deputy Viscount266 was empowered to convey the property in their stead.267 The 
court was: 
 
“satisfied that it is the incontestable right of the owner of an undivided share 
of any real estate to enforce the sale of such real est te, and we know of no 
rule of law which prevents this Court from divesting a person of his property 
when the justice of a case dictates that that be don .”268 
 
The judgment refers neither to the maxim nulle promesse à héritage ne vaut nor to 
the rule it is said to express. The court record is equally silent.269 Given this, the 
judgment could be seen to be p r incuriam, not formally affecting the authority of 
the line of cases applying the rule. 
 
Nevertheless, something can be said regarding the interaction of the rule and 
common ownership. Common ownership is a special regim  with features that differ 
from the normal rules of ownership, such as the capa ity of one co-owner to bring 
the co-ownership to an end, which forces the other co-owner(s) to enter into a sale or 
alienation. The court in Ritson is protective of this capacity (“the incontestable right 
[…] to enforce the sale”)270 and this protectiveness (understandably, if it is to count 
for anything) also extends to the transfer by reason of sale. Although some aspects of 
the approach taken by the court are suggestive of an in ppropriate application of 
English law,271 the result is eminently sound: if a co-owner has the right to force a 
                                                                                                                                
at which land can be sold (or leased) is still within the power of the Housing Minister (Housing 
(Jersey) Law 1949, art 14(3)(c)), but can only be done if regulations provide how the price will be 
determined. It appears that there are currently no such regulations. 
264 (1973) 1 JJ 2341, 2343 – 2344, per Le Masurier, Bailiff.  
265 Ibid 2344 – 2345. 
266 “The Viscount is the Chief executive officer of the Courts and the States. He also acts as Coroner.” 
Bois, 5, para 2/4. 
267 (1973) 1 JJ 2341, 2346 – 2347, per Le Masurier, Bailiff.  
268 [emphasis added] Ibid 2346.  
269 (1973) 260 Ex 447. 
270 (1973) 1 JJ 2341, 2346, per Le Masurier, Bailiff.  
271 Ibid 2345. 
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sale of the co-owned property, the ability to force transfer must also exist. Therefore, 
the rule expressed by the nulle promesse maxim ought not to be applied to cases 
where a co-owner seeks exit from common ownership. 
 
Twelve years later, in Lane v Lane,272 a similar result was handed down by the Royal 
Court. The defendant was divorced from her husband in the English High Court. An 
agreement between the parties regarding various properties was made the subject of a 
court order. The ex-spouses jointly owned a house in Jersey, and the defendant had 
agreed to transfer her share of that house to her ex-husband. To this end, she signed a 
power of attorney allowing a Jersey advocate to pass the necessary contract on her 
behalf. The ex-husband died in an accident. Following this, and on learning that the 
transfer had not yet been made, the defendant travelled to Jersey, revoked the power 
of attorney, and moved into the house, of which she was now the sole owner.273 
 
The plaintiff was an heir of the deceased. Further proceedings in England concluded 
that the order remained valid even after the death of t e ex-husband, and could be 
enforced by the plaintiff.274 The plaintiff sought transfer or damages. If an order to 
transfer were granted, the plaintiff also requested that the Viscount be given the 
power to do this if the plaintiff did not do so within a certain period.275 The court 
recognised the comity “between the courts of the United Kingdom and Jersey”276 and 
held that the defendant had consented to transfer “all her interest”277 in the house, 
which was construed broadly to include “interests both present and contingent”.278 
The house was to be valued and either transferred to the plaintiff or its value paid to 
the plaintiff by the defendant. It is not unusual for the court to make such an order: 
transfer or the payment of damages. What is remarkable is that if neither were done 
within six weeks, the Viscount was “authorised to pass the contract on behalf of the 
defendant and thereafter to put the plaintiff into possession.”279 Thus, the court was 
                                                 
272 1985-86 JLR 48. 
273 Ibid 52, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
274 Ibid 54. (See also: Re Lane (Deceased) [1986] 1 FLR 283, [1986] Fam Law 74.) 
275 Ibid 53. 
276 Ibid 57. 
277 Ibid 60. 
278 Ibid 61. 
279 Ibid 63. 
 151 
willing to put the mechanism of the Viscount as substitute for the recalcitrant party 
into practice once again (albeit that the defendant could avoid this by paying the 
value promptly).280 
 
Although the maxim nulle promesse is not mentioned, there is some discussion of the 
court’s ability to grant specific performance.281 The defendant is likened to a 
“faithless promisor under an agreement of sale”, and reference is made to the earlier 
case of Symes v Couch282 in which specific performance of transfer of land was 
requested, but denied.283 It may thus be argued that, like Ritson, this case too is per 
incuriam regarding the rule under consideration. Additionally, the effect of Lane on 
the court’s power to enforce transfer of immoveable property was considered to be 
limited in a subsequent case, on the grounds of the cross-jurisdictional element 
involved.284 Nevertheless, Lane, like Ritson, demonstrates that inability to force a 
person to take an oath does not remove the court’s power to force transfer. Given that 
a route around this problem has been found it is difficult to justify refusal to 
implement the same procedure on this ground in other cases. 
 
In conclusion, conservation du bien dans la famille no longer justifies the rule, if it 
ever did. Neither does the inability to force a person to take an oath. Of course, the 
court cannot force someone to take an oath, but no doubt this is true of any juridical 
act, in any jurisdiction. There is no logical impediment to the court granting specific 
performance of the transfer of land more widely, where it appears that it would best 
serve the ends of justice to do so. Although there is a legal impediment, in the form 
of judicial precedent, both of the justifications tha  have been advanced for the rule 
can be demonstrated to be either obsolete or not good. The Jersey Law Commission 
has recommended the introduction of legislation enabli g the court to grant specific 
performance in immoveable property transactions generally.285 
 
                                                 
280 Consider also the court’s ability to appoint a factor or curateur loco absentis to pass contract on 
behalf of an absent: Falle, 160 – 161, para 11. 
281 1985-86 JLR 48, 62, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
282 (1978) JJ 119. 
283 1985-86 JLR 48, 62, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
284 Pirouet v Pirouet 1985-86 JLR 151, 162, per Dorey, Commissioner. 
285 CP6, J.  
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(2) Acquisition of Possession 
Transfer of ownership does not automatically entail tr nsfer of possession. However, 
assuming the vendor or other possessor has no real right in the immoveable, the 
matter is straightforward: the owner may apply to the court for removal of the 
unwanted person from his or her premises. As real rights, the right of usufruct or the 
right of a tenant to possess under a contract leasewould be unaffected by the transfer 




Writing is required for what may be called an “agreement of sale” in Guernsey and in 
Jersey. However, there is some indication that the court in Jersey will provide a 
remedy in respect of an oral agreement if there has been part performance. 
 
Where an agreement of sale is in writing, the absence of a stipulated penalty clause 
for breach will not preclude a court award of damages. Where a penalty is stipulated, 
the court may reduce it if it is considered to be too great, notwithstanding the normal 
rule that la convention fait la loi des parties. In general, the court has set its face 
against granting specific performance of an obligation to transfer land. In 
justification of this at least two reasons have been advanced, but neither seems 
sufficient to continue to support the refusal. 
 
The hereditary contract must be in writing. While th  Guernsey hereditary contract 
has been modernised to some extent, the Jersey contra t has changed little for 
centuries. However, while it was once but a written r cord of a transaction which had 
already taken place, the legislation on registration has attributed to it an essential and 
central role in the transfer process: transfer cannot be made without a hereditary 
contract. 
 
Transfer of ownership is effected by passing contract before the Royal Court. The 
continuance of the practice of concluding immoveabl transfers in public may seem 
somewhat quaint, but provides the benefit of signalling the gravity or importance of 
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the transaction in which the parties are engaged.286 This process is complete when 
the last person to sign the contract has done so. It seems that in Jersey a precarious 
priority is also conferred at this point. Registration must follow within three months 
in order for the contract to rank from the date on which it was passed before the 
court. Later registration is possible, but priority in that case is taken from the date of 
registration. Current practice means that registraton follows almost immediately on 
passing contract. In Guernsey, following the Ordinance of 1724, priority is conferred 
on registration; deeds rank according to the date of r gistration. 
 
The registers in both Jersey and Guernsey are registers of deeds, which have no 
effect on the validity or otherwise of the deeds of which they are composed. 
Registration in Jersey renders a contract probative, but it is suggested that this 
extends only to the matters that may be known by the court, for example that the 
formalities of execution were validly performed, and that the contract was passed on 
a particular date. As to other matters, the burden of proof is on anyone seeking to 
rely on the deed. 
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A real servitude is a limited real right.1 Creation, exercise, and extinction of 
servitudes created by agreement (conventional servitudes), by destination du père de 
famille, and by carrying out particular activity for a specifi d time (acquisitive 
prescription) are examined in this and the following two chapters. For reasons of 




                                                 
1 See: ch 3 I(2), K. 
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(1) Reception of Servitudes 
Servitudes2 have been received from Roman law into many legal systems.3 It appears 
that Jersey is no exception. Servitudes are found neither in the Très-Ancien 
Coutumier nor in the Grand Coutumier, only in the Reformed Custom,4 suggesting 
that servitudes were received into Norman law betwen the mid-thirteenth century 
and sometime before 1583. 
 
The section on servitudes in the Reformed Custom was not a complete picture of the 
law. For example, rustic servitudes are not mentioned at all, save for one article, 
which addresses only the size of servitudes of way.5 In view of such gaps, and of the 
provenance of the law of servitudes, it is unsurprising that commentators on the 
Reformed Custom, Poingdestre and Le Geyt, commonly t ok cognisance of the civil 




The French Civil Code provides a definition of a servitude which can be equally well 
applied in Jersey. A servitude is a burden “imposed on one piece of land for the use 
and utility of a piece of land which belongs to another”.7 It is passive in respect of 
the person whose land is burdened: the servient propriet r.8 It gives the person whose 
land benefits from the servitude – the dominant proprietor – a property right in the 
land of the servient proprietor.  
 
                                                 
2 Known in English law as easements and profits à prendre. 
3 A short comment on the Roman law ancestry of the Scots servitude and the English easement can be 
found in: Mackintosh Roman 141 – 144. See also: (Roman Law) Buckland, 259 – 268; Watson 
Roman 49 – 50; Schulz Classical 381 – 386, 392 – 397; (Scotland) Reid Property para 440; (France) 
Larroumet, 475 et seq; (Louisiana) Yiannopoulos Servitudes para 9; (Quebec) Lamontagne Biens 367 
et seq; (South Africa) Badenhorst & Pienaar, ch 14. 
4 Poingdestre notes this in his Remarques: “Les servitudes tant urbanes que prediales ont été omises 
par le coutumier et la Glose ni le style de proceder ni même Terrien qui les a suivis de bien loin n’en 
ont presque rien dit.” 
5 Art 622. 
6 See: Basnage Servitudes; Bérault, Godefroy & d’Aviron Commentaires vol 2, 711 – 739 (Godefroy 
& d’Aviron); Poingdestre Lois 193 – 198, 302 – 304; Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 193 et seq. 
7 Art 637. Also: Basnage Servitudes 558. 
8 Matthews & Nicolle, 10, para 1.38; Nicolle Immovable 56. 
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Servitudes may be exercised by another in place of the dominant proprietor. 
However, generally, for brevity, reference is made throughout to the dominant 
proprietor alone. 
 
(b) Positive (or affirmative), and negative (or passive) 
The dominant proprietor in a positive servitude hasthe right to take something from, 
or perform some action on, the servient tenement. The dominant proprietor in a 
negative servitude has the right to prevent some action taking place on the servient 
tenement.9 
 
(c) Real (or praedial), mixed, and personal 
Servitudes have sometimes been divided servitudes into real (praedial), mixed, and 
personal.10 A real servitude subordinated one piece of land to an ther. This chapter is 
concerned with this class of servitudes. A mixed servitude subordinated a piece of 
land to a person (for example usufruct). A personal servitude subordinated a person 
to a person: slavery. It is now common to speak only f real and personal servitudes, 
with personal in the modern context assuming the meaning originally ascribed to 
mixed. 
 
(4) Rustic (rural), or urban 
In Roman law, rustic servitudes were res mancipi;11 urban servitudes were r s nec 
mancipi.12 The former were conveyed by mancipatio; the latter were not.13 
Mancipatio is not part of Jersey law,14 and this classification “has been suppressed in 
all modern civil codes.”15 Therefore, it appears that these terms have no significance 
in Jersey law.  
 
 
                                                 
9 Ibid. Also: Poingdestre Lois 57. 
10 Bartolus Commentaria in Digestum Veteris 183, 183; Basnage Servitudes 558. Also: (Scotland) 




14 Matthews & Nicolle, 10 – 11 para 1.40; Nicolle Immovable 57 – 58. Also: Yiannopoulos Servitudes 
para 15. 
15 Yiannopoulos Code 169, comments on art 698, para (d). 
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(3) Balancing Rights 
As noted by the court in Le Feuvre v Mathew, “every servitude is a burden on the 
servient tenement.”16 Where there is a servitude, there are two conflicting property 
rights in one piece of land: ownership and a servitude.17 The right of the owner to the 
enjoyment of the land must be balanced against the right of the servitude-holder, 
without rendering either sterile. Therefore, the law of servitudes seeks a balance 
between these competing rights.18 
 
(4) Publicity Principle 
Real rights, or property rights, are enforceable against the whole world.19 The 
publicity principle is the idea that property rights must be subject to some form of 
publicity before they are constituted: just like contractual rights, their creation, 
transfer, variation, or extinction must be intimated to those who will be affected. 
Obviously, in practice it is not possible to intimate these events to the whole world, 
so some attenuated form is deemed sufficient, such as registration.  
 
B. EXPRESS CREATION 
 
Servitudes are commonly created by express agreement between the parties, either 
within a hereditary contract for the transfer of land, or in a separate document. The 
hereditary contract must be passed before the Royal Court, to be constitutive of a real 
right.20 Thus, in Nicolle v Starck,21 the plaintiff sought to register a deed, constitutive 
of a servitude in his favour, on the court roll. It was held that this was insufficient to 
create a servitude, which could only be done by the passing of a contract before the 
Royal Court. 
 
A large number of servitudes arise expressly, either cr ated by the would-be servient 
owner over his land (express grant), or by the would-be dominant owner over land 
                                                 
16 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1974) 2 JJ 49, 63, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
17 Carbonnier, vol 2, para 795. 
18 See, for example: Cusine & Paisley, 387, para 12.02. 
19 See: ch 3 B. 
20 See: ch 5. 
21 (1858) 46 H 251. Also: Felard Invs v Trustees of Church of Our Lady (1978) JJ 1, 8 – 10, per 
Ereaut, Bailiff. 
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which he is in the process of transferring to another (express reservation). Express 
creation is probably the most common in practice.  
 
C. DESTINATION DU PERE DE FAMILLE   22 
 
Destination du père de famille (“destination”) is the doctrine that in certain 
circumstances a servitude can be created other than expressly when land is divided. 
If an owner has been making use of land which would constitute a servitude were the 
land divided, a servitude is created upon division. O ly certain servitudes can be 
created in this way, and the scope of the doctrine is discussed below. This basic idea 
is found in many legal systems,23 which suggests it is a desirable component. 
Certainly, it assists where an express grant or reservation of a desirable servitude has, 
for whatever reason, been omitted upon division. This flexibility is perhaps even 
more desirable within a system like Jersey which, at le st generally,24 does not allow 
acquisition of servitudes by prescription. 
 
(1) History 
Godefroy25 gives Bartolus’26 commentary on D.32.89.127 as the origin of this 
doctrine. However, it appears that Bartolus’ ideas were influenced by Accursius28 
and Oldradus.29 Either way, the doctrine was part of the ius commune development 
of Roman law.30 Destination appeared, inter alia, in the Customs of Normandy, 
                                                 
22 The comparable doctrine in Louisiana is known as “destination of the owner” (art 741 CC), and as 
“destination of proprietor” in Quebec (art 1181 CC). This is commensurate with the modern day 
situation where there is often no père and no famille. 
23 For example: (France) destination du père de famille, art 692 CC; (England) Gray & Gray, 654 – 
659 (the rule in Wheeldon v Burrows), 679 – 681 (implied reservation); (Louisiana) destination of the 
owner, art 741 CC; (Scotland) implied grant and impl ed reservation of servitudes, Cusine & Paisley, 
chs 7 – 9. It does not appear in South African law: Badenhorst & Pienaar, 332 – 334. In Quebec, 
“destination of the proprietor” requires, inter alia, writing, and so is essentially unilateral express 
creation: art 1183 CC, Lamontagne Biens 406 – 408. 
24 See: ch 6 D. 
25 Godefroy Coutume 458. Also: Ourliac & Gazzaniga Histoire 229. 
26 Bartolus of Saxoferrato, or Bartolo de Sassoferrato (1313 – 1357). 
27 D.32.91.1 in some versions. 
28 Or Francisco Accorso (c 1182 – c 1260). 
29 Referred to by Bartolus, with approval: Bartolus Infortiati on D.32.1.89 (“Ita dicit Old. & bene.”). 
30 See: ch 3 C (second para). 
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Paris, and Orléans. Paris and Orléans differed fromN rmandy in requiring writing of 
some form before destination could apply.31  
 
(2) Jersey Sources 
The starting point for Jersey law is article 609 of the Reformed Custom: 
 
“En faisant partage & division entre coheritiers oupersonniers de chose 
commune dont l’une partie sert à l’autre, les veuës & esgouts demeurent 
comme ils sont lors du partage, si par lots & partages il n’est expressément dit 
du contraire.”32 
 
This is accepted by Poingdestre as representative of J rsey law.33 The doctrine of 
destination is expounded at greater length by Le Geyt, in his Code: 
 
“Quand aucun met hors de ses Mains partie de sa Maison, ou une Maison, qui 
a veües & esgouts ou autres Servitudes permanents sur une autre Maison 
qu’il retient, ou quand la Maison retenuë a de telles Servitudes sur celle qu’on 
alienne, les choses doivent demeurer en l’estat qu’elles sont lors qu’on 
contracte, mais, quant aux Servitudes discontinuës, elles demeurent esteintes 
de part & d’autre s’il n’en est rien dit du contraire. Il en est ainsi des partages 
d’heritages entre coheritiers ou autres consorts.”34 
 
This article goes further than article 609 of the Reformed Custom. The latter seems 
only to envisage division of the land and transfer of all the pieces, while Le Geyt 
describes a situation where only a part of the land is alienated. Thus destination in 
Jersey law appears to have developed by Le Geyt’s time.
  
The only Jersey case to consider destination fully is Le Feuvre v Mathew.35 It gave 
rise to two Royal Court judgments (the court was convened for a second time to 
allow counsel to research the questions raised by the first sitting). The facts 
concerned an L-shaped plot of land which was divided into three approximately 
                                                 
31 Coutume d’Orléans art 228. Coutume de Paris art 216 (1580) (cf: art 91 (1510)). Precisely what the 
requirement of writing meant is not clear. 
32 Also, for example: Basnage Servitudes 560. 
33 “Cet article est pour les servitudes et Batiments tant urbanes que praediales Et n’a point de difficulté 
car il est de droit commun confirmé par la pratique.” Remarques art 609.  
34 Code Le Geyt 3.11.8. 
35 (1973) 1 JJ 2461; (1974) 2 JJ 49. 
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square-shaped pieces. One of the outer thirds (the wall d garden) had a servitude of 
way over a private road located on the middle section (Lynton). This servitude was 
extinguished by confusion when both sections came to be owned by the same person. 
Upon that owner’s death the two plots were again separated by testamentary 
disposition. A servitude of way, as had existed before, was not expressly re-created. 
 
At the first hearing the court concluded that “the laws of England and of Jersey on 
this matter are basically similar”.36 The court was satisfied that destination, or 
creation of a servitude “by implication”,37 was part of Jersey law and set out “defined 
circumstances”38 in which the doctrine would operate. These were int nded as 
“demonstrative and not exhaustive”.39 Firstly, one person must have held the putative 
dominant and servient tenements immediately prior to division for the question of 
destination to arise.40 This is self-evident. Secondly, immediately prior t  division 
“the properties must have been used in such a way, or have been in such a physical 
state” as could have constituted a servitude had they been separate.41 Thirdly, the 
putative servitude must be continuous, apparent, and permanent.42 Fourthly, “If the 
division is effected by the instrument of the forme sole owner, there must be no 
expression of intention which is expressly contrary to the implied continuance of the 
position existing at the time of division.”43  
 
In the second judgment it was concluded that a right of way which is visibly manifest 
can be created by destination.44 Despite the judicial comment on the similarity of 
Jersey and English law in this area, it was determined that the doctrine of destination 
                                                 
36 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1973) 1 JJ 2461, 2478, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. This is broadly true where, 
as in Le Feuvre, neither subdivided plot is retained by the transferor (Gray & Gray, 655). This 
statement is qualified because it is unclear whether  state of knowledge of each transferee is 
relevant (see: Aldridge v Wright [1929] 2 KB 117, 130, per Greer, LJ). 
37 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1973) 1 JJ 2461, 2478, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1974) 2 JJ 49, 54, Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
40 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1973) 1 JJ 2461, 2478, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid 2478 – 2479. It is also stated that the servitude need not be one of necessity. Indeed, if it were, 
it would not be created by destination at all, but would be a legal servitude. 
43 Ibid. A fifth and final point concerns matters of evidenc . 
44 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1974) 2 JJ 49, 53 – 54, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
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(not servitudes by implication) exists in Jersey law, nd that it had operated to create 
a servitude in this case. 
 
There is nothing to suggest that the use has to continue after division. Obviously, if 
the right is not exercised within forty years of its creation, it will be extinguished by 
prescription.45 The essential requirement for its creation is that there was some 
relationship between the putative dominant and servient tenements which would (or 
could) have been a servitude right up to the time of division. Severance completes 
the process. “Permanent” is a condition mentioned by Le Geyt,46 and adopted by the 
court in Le Feuvre,47 which presumably means use that is well-established and not of 
a temporary nature. This fits with the nature of a servitude as a real right. 
 
In Le Feuvre, the properties in question were simultaneously devolv d mortis causa, 
and the court expressly declined to decide whether destination would operate were 
the division to be effected in a way other than “testamentary disposition” or 
“partage”.48 However, it did say that: 
 
“It would seem clear from the reference in Le Geyt, […] that the principle 
equally applies to such a case [division by another m ans], but we leave open 
the question whether it might be subject to qualification.”49 
 
The “reference in Le Geyt” is from his Code, in which examples where only part of 
the land is transferred are given. The retained lanis either the dominant tenement 
(as in express reservation), or the servient tenemet (as in express grant). In both 
cases, where the servitude would be continuous, it is created. Discontinuous 
servitudes cannot be created in this way.50 
 
Two questions arise: what might be the “qualification” adverted to by the court in Le 
Feuvre, and to which servitudes can destination apply? 
                                                 
45 See: ch 8 F. 
46 See: Code Le Geyt 3.11.8. 
47 See: Le Feuvre v Mathew (1973) 1 JJ 2461, 2479, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
48 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1974) 2 JJ 49, 54, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Code Le Geyt 3.11.8. The text is above: ch 6 C(2). 
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(3) A Qualification to the Application of Destinati on?  
No indication of what the “qualification” alluded to by the court in Le Feuvre51 
might refer to is given. It is possible that the court had in mind whether or not a 
distinction should be made between retention of the dominant tenement and retention 
of the servient tenement. In English law (and in Scots law) it is more difficult to 
acquire an implied servitude when the putative dominant tenement is retained 
because “a grantor [should] not derogate from him grant.”52 Arguably, no distinction 
should be made because the problem is the same either way: some established use is 
lost. No distinction is made in France, or Louisiana.53 
 
Le Geyt’s Code mentions no qualification. Given that he lays out the circumstance of 
a servitude being created over the retained land, this absence is notable. Were the 
question to arise, the better view appears to be that Jersey law follows the French 
position in making no distinction between grant or reservation of a servitude by 
destination. 
 
(4) Which Servitudes are Capable of Creation by Des tination? 
It is clear that not all servitudes fall into the ambit of destination. Certain limitations 
have been suggested. In addition to “permanent” (discussed above)54 the servitude 
must be “continuous”55 and “apparent”.56 “Urban” may also be a condition.57 
 
(a) Continuous  
Le Geyt discusses definitions of “continuous” and “discontinuous” servitudes in his 
Manuscrits. He identifies two views. The Canonists, he says, considered continuous 
servitudes to be those capable of being used at any ime, such as a right of access 
open at all times. Gathering acorns is given as an example of a discontinuous 
servitude: owing to the seasons, it cannot be exercised all year round. The Civilians 
                                                 
51 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1974) 2 JJ 49, 54, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
52 (England) Gray & Gray, 679 – 681, Wheeldon v Burrows (1879) 12 ChD 31, 49, per Thesiger, LJ; 
(Scotland) Cusine & Paisley, 297. 
53 (France) Larroumet, 524 – 528; (Louisiana) Yiannopoulos Servitudes 404 – 409. (Or Quebec: 
Lamontagne Biens 404 – 408. But see: ch 6 n23).  
54 Ch 6 C(2). 
55 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1973) 1 JJ 2461, 2478 – 2479, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Poingdestre Remarques on art 610. 
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made the distinction according to whether the servitude is exercised by a person or 
not. Thus aqueduct and support are given as examples of continuous servitudes. Also 
view and stillicide58 are ranked among the continuous because evidence of their 
existence is visible. A discontinuous servitude is such because it cannot be exercised 
continuously (such as access).59 Although these definitions appear in a section on the 
prescription of servitudes, Le Geyt indicates that these are general terms of 
classification.60 Although he does not explicitly endorse either the Canonist or the 
Civilian position, in a later passage he employs the Civilian approach.61 However, Le 
Geyt’s failure to choose clearly between the two approaches is typical of the early 
sources generally. Indeed, the choice was only definit ly made in France when the 
Civilian approach was adopted for the Civil Code.62 
 
While considering whether it is possible to possess a ervitude,63 Poingdestre states 
clearly that access is a discontinuous servitude whreas aqueduct is continuous.64 
This is the Civilian approach. Less clear, however, is the following: 
 
“les autres qui ont cause continüe, comme chemin gardé ouvert 
continuellement, un conduict ou Aqueduct par la terre d’autruy, &c”65 
 
Does this mean that access can be a continuous servitud  if it is exercised over a 
route which is always open? If so, this conflicts with Poingdestre’s otherwise 
Civilian approach. Consistency would be achieved by reading “chemin gardé ouvert 
continuellement” as a reference to a ditch, or similar, used for a servitude of 
aqueduct, although this would be an unusual use of “chemin”.  
 
In pre-codification French law it appears that there was some emphasis on whether 
the servitude could be seen. For example, both Lalaure66 and Pesnelle conflate 
                                                 
58 Eavesdrip or eavesdrop. 
59 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 193. An account of the Civil law position is also given by Basnage: 
Servitudes 558 – 559. 
60 Manuscrits vol 1, 193. 
61 Ibid 195. 
62 Art 688. 
63 It is not: Lois 196. 
64 Lois 197. 
65 Ibid. 
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continuous with visible, and discontinuous with latent.67 This apparent tendency 
offers an explanation for Poingdestre’s otherwise unclear sentence: it seems that he 
too has conflated continuous and visible. The continually open path giving access 
over the servient tenement is a constant advertisement of the existence of the 
servitude. The court in Le Feuvre read Poingdestre in this way, concluding that “a 
servitude ‘continue’ is one which is clearly visible and permanent”.68 The same view 
was read into the passage from Le Geyt.69 While Le Geyt is not necessarily 
inconsistent with this position, it cannot be positively justified from the relevant text. 
 
France and Louisiana have abandoned the “continuous” requirement: the servitude 
must be “apparent”.70 Arguably, if limits are placed on the type of servitudes 
susceptible to creation by destination, the main cocern should be whether the 
servitude is visible as it is this aspect which will give warning to others who might be 
affected by it. Given the tendency in the sources to conflate “continuous” with 
“visible”, “continuous” in either the Civilian or Canonist sense seems already to have 
been abandoned as a condition. If that is so, the servitude of view must no longer be 
susceptible to creation by destination, for while it is continuous (in the Civilian 
sense) it is not visible. 
 
(b) Apparent 
According to the court in Le Feuvre, the prospective servitude must be “apparent”71 
(visible). “Apparent” is a condition common in jurisdictions with destination or a 
similar doctrine,72 but it is not given by Le Geyt,73 Poingdestre,74 or article 609 of the 
                                                                                                                                
66 One writer describes his work as “the leading treatis  in France before the Code civil”: White 
“Acquisitive” 778, n8. 
67 Lalaure Servitudes 8: “On divise encore les Servitudes par rapport à leur effet & leur exercice, en 
visibles ou continues ; en latentes ou discontinues”. Pesnelle, 621, n1: “les servitudes discontinues & 
latentes”. Merlin notes a problem with conflating continuous and visible: negative servitudes are 
continuous and invisible (Repertoire vol 12, 522). 
68 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1974) 2 JJ 49, 51, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
69 Ibid. 
70 (France) art 694 CC applies destination to discontinuous servitudes; (Louisiana) art 741 CC, 
Yiannopoulos Servitudes 405, para 142. Both had employed the Civilian meaning of “continuous” and 
“discontinuous”. The requirements in Quebec are different: art 1183 CC (compare art 551 CC of 
Lower Canada). See: ch 6 C(4)(b). 
71 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1973) 1 JJ 2461, 2479, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
72 (France) arts 692, 694 CC; (England) Gray & Gray, 657, Simpson “Wheeldon”; (Louisiana) arts 767 
– 769 of the 1870 CC. (Art 741 of the present LaCC provides that apparent and non-apparent 
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Reformed Custom.75 However, Poingdestre evidences conflation of the “continuous” 
nature of a servitude with its visibility.76 When this is taken together with 
“continuous” as a condition for destination in Le Gyt’s Code, some argument for 
“apparent” as a condition can be drawn from these Jrsey sources. As apparent seems 
to have supplanted continuous only in the modern codes, it is possible that it had not 
fully emerged as a condition in the legal milieu of Poingdestre and Le Geyt, and so 
does not find full expression in their work. 
 
The court in Le Feuvre supports “apparent” as a condition for destination in the first 
judgment.77 In the second judgment, counsel for the plaintiff argued in favour of 
“apparent” (or visible) as a condition for destinaton, essentially on the basis of the 
publicity principle.78 The “apparent” condition meets the requirement of publicity for 
creation of real rights better than the “continuous” condition. 
 
(c) Conclusion on continuous and apparent 
From the above, it can be concluded that servitudes which are capable of creation by 
destination are those which are “apparent”, that is, which present some manifest sign. 
Access over a cut or marked road or path, view, and stillicide, are all examples of 
such servitudes. If “continuous” were to be added as a requirement, this would make 
the scope of destination unjustifiably narrow, for there is no real policy reason for it. 
As noted above, other jurisdictions have dropped th requirement of continuousness. 
“Apparent” can be justified on the basis that it provides publicity of the right. 
Nevertheless, even restricting the operation of destination to visible servitudes may 
be too much. For example, if a property is divided and no servitudes are created in 
respect of underground pipes and services, such rights cannot be constituted by 
destination because of failure to meet the “apparent” quirement.  
                                                                                                                                
servitudes can be created by “destination”, but for the latter a document must first be filed at the 
registry which is analogous to unilateral express creation. For implied creation, therefore, “apparent” 
is still a condition.) In Scotland, the test is based around the notion of “necessity”: Cusine & Paisley, 
ch 8. 
73 Code Le Geyt 3.11.8. 
74 Remarques on art 609. 
75 Art 609 does not refer to “continuous” or “discontinuous” servitudes either. 
76 See: ch 6 C(4)(a). 
77 See: ch 6 n71. 




One option would be to construe “apparent” broadly. It could be considered that 
pipes and wires carrying services ought to be expected to exist where, for example, a 
piece of land has a building on it. Consequently, the circumstances themselves give 
adequate notice of the servitude-like use already being exercised.79  
 
Alternatively, the test could be styled as “continuous” or “apparent” (which is 
consistent with Poingdestre). In this way, access (one of the most important 
servitudes in practice) would be included, to the extent that it is exercised over a 
clear path or road, because it would be “apparent”. Pipes and services would also be 
included because, while perhaps not apparent, they would be “continuous”. The law 
in this area is not entirely settled, and is thus open to further judicial development. 
 
(d) Urban 
The article on destination in the Reformed Custom na es two servitudes: view and 
stillicide.80 Both are urban servitudes.81 According to Bérault and Godefroy, article 
609 applies only to the two types of servitude to which it directly refers.82 Pesnelle 
favours another reading: the two servitudes mentioned in article 609 are merely 
examples of the servitudes which are “plus ordinaries & plus connues”.83 Le Geyt is 
silent on this, and the article in his Code gives no such restriction. Poingdestre’s view 
is obscure. He states that article 609 applies to servitudes “tant urbanes que 
praediales”.84 If “praediales” is supposed to be synonymous with “rustic” (which 
would be unusual), he is with Pesnelle. Alternatively “praediales” may signify that 
the article applies to real servitudes, not personal servitudes.85 In the latter case, 
                                                 
79 See: Basnage Servitudes 490 – 491 “Si toutefois les deux heritages de haut & de bas avoient 
apartenu à une même personne, & que depuis il eût ali né le fonds superieur, cet aquereur ne pourroit 
pas le priver de l’usage de l’eau pour le fonds qu’il auroit retenu, quoi qu’il ne se fût pas réservé ce 
droit, parce qu’il n’est pas vrai-semblable qu’il ait vendu sans cette condition, ce qui est conforme à la 
loi binas à dex. de servit. Urb. Præd. & il faut résoudre en ce cas la même chose que la Coûtume a fait 
en l’art. DCIX. qu’en faisant partage entre coheriti s & personniers, les vûës & les égouts demeurent 
comme ils sont lors du partage: ce qu’il faut pareillement observer pour les eaux qu’un coheritier ou 
un associé seroit tenu de laisser au même état qu’ils étoient lors du partage.” 
80 Art 609. See: ch 6 C(2). 
81 Justinian Institutes 2.3.1. 
82 Bérault Coustume 694; Godefroy Coutume 458. 
83 Pesnelle, 621. 
84 Poingdestre Remarques. 
85 On which see: ch 3 I(2). 
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Poingdestre’s view is closer to that of Bérault and Godefroy, but less restrictive, as 
he would apply the article to all urban servitudes. 
 
Generally, the distinction between rustic and urban servitudes is of no application to 
Jersey law.86 Destination is no exception. The court in Le Feuvre clearly did not 
consider “urban” to be a requirement (access is a rustic servitude)87 and also – in 
keeping with Le Geyt – showed no preference for limiting the servitudes capable of 
creation by destination to the two given in article 609 of the Reformed Custom.  
 
(5) Basis of destination 
According to the court in Le Feuvre v Mathew, “the principle we are considering is 
based on the presumed intention of the parties”.88 Immediately following this 
comment is a quotation giving the basis for destinatio  as the intention of the seller 
alone.89 The name of the doctrine itself also refers to oneperson only: the owner of 
the single piece of land before division. It is true that both the intention of the seller 
alone and the intention of buyer and seller are requi d, albeit at different stages. The 
actions of the owner before division demonstrate his intention “that one plot serve 
the other”, and it is at that stage that the intention of the seller alone is required.90 
Common intention of both parties is required (or may be imputed) when the land is 
divided, for there can be nothing to negate the creation of the servitude in the 
hereditary contract. Failure by both parties to exercis  a power of veto could be 
described as a “convention tacite”. 
 
Nevertheless, the essence of destination is a state of ffairs, set in place by the owner 
of a piece of land, which would amount to a servitude were the land divided91 (and 
which is still ongoing at the time of division). The intention of the “père de famille” 
dates from the time when the servitude-type use is commenced. The will of any other 
party who will become owner of part of the land only bears on the matter at the time 
                                                 
86 See: ch 6 A(2)(d). 
87 Justinian Institutes 2.3. 
88 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1973) 1 JJ 2461, 2478, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
89 Dalloz Nouveau Répertoire de Droit (1950) (see: ibid 2477). 
90 KGC Reid “Praedial Servitudes” in Palmer & Reid Mixed 19. 
91 Subject to some limits. See: ch 6 C(3), (4). 
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of conveyance to that party, whose only input is the capacity to prevent a servitude 
being created, by demanding provision in the deed to that effect. Arguably, therefore, 
the true genesis of a servitude created by destination is the action of the owner before 
division, together with his intention (whether actual or implied from the 
circumstances) to make one part serve another.92 
 
D. AQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION 
 
(1) No Acquisitive Prescription  
In pre-Revolution France, rules varied regarding the possibility of creating servitudes 
prescriptively. In the pays de droit écrit, which followed Roman law, acquisitive 
prescription was largely allowed in the presence of certain factors.93 In the pays du 
droit coutumier, the trend was against acquisitive prescription of servitudes.94 Le 
Geyt records that the prohibition on acquisitive prscription in respect of servitudes 
first appeared in Jersey law in 1625,95 noting that this follows the position of article 
607 of the Reformed Custom.96 In a decision of 28 April 1625, the court held that 
long use alone was no longer sufficient to create a s rvitude without title.97 
 
It was not the practice in Jersey to adopt all the innovations of the Reformed Custom. 
However, this rule may have seemed particularly attractive following the successful 
establishment of a land register for the whole island in 1602. A register will be 
incomplete if rights can be acquired prescriptively, so the rule supports the publicity 
aim of the register.98 Of course, not all rights do appear on the register (for example, 
ownership can be acquired prescriptively)99 and in that sense the policy regarding 
                                                 
92 Consider also: KGC Reid “Praedial Servitudes” in Palmer & Reid Mixed 19 – 20 (on Louisiana). 
93 Merlin Répertoire vol 12, 552. 
94 See: Lalaure Servitudes 181 et seq. 
95 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 194. 
96 “Droiture de servitude de vûës, égoûts de maisons & autres choses semblables, par la Coûtume 
générale de Normandie, ne peut être acquise par possession & jouissance, fût-elle de cent ans, sans 
titre; mais la liberté se peut raquerir par la posses ion de quarante ans continuels, contre le Titre de 
Servitude.” 
97 Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 194. Unregistered servitudes created by prescription prior to 1625 are 
valid until extinguished. There is some suggestion that this is true of servitudes created before 1771 in 
Baudains v Simon. See: ch 8; ch 6 D(4), respectively. 
98 See: ch 5 A(2). A similar argument was advanced by counsel for the plaintiff in Le Feuvre v 
Mathew (1974) 2 JJ 49, 53, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
99 See: ch 5 n7. 
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acquisitive prescription seems inconsistent, but the new register may have been one 
factor which led to the adoption of the rule. 
 
The writers of the French Civil Code tended towards the prevailing position in the 
pays de droit écrit: acquisitive prescription of servitudes is thus posible in France, 
but it is restricted to servitudes which are “continuous” and “apparent”.100 Many 
other countries allow acquisitive prescription of servitudes.101 Jersey, Guernsey, and 
Quebec – in the minority – retain the prohibition.102 
 
(2) Nulle Servitude Sans Titre  
The general rule that the acquisitive prescription of servitudes is not possible is often 
expressed as nulle servitude sans titre.103 Titre, or “title”, is a troublesome word, 
which has different meanings in different contexts. In some contexts, “title” means 
ownership, as in “having title” to a particular piece of land. It is clear that this is not 
the meaning to be ascribed to the word here, for, while it is true that there must be 
ownership before there can be a servitude, this is true of all types of servitude and so 
would not specifically exclude acquisitive prescription. “Title” may mean a 
document, but again this meaning would not exclude acquisitive prescription, which 
could proceed on the basis of a “grant” from a non-owner.104 Therefore, this meaning 
seems unlikely. “Title” could also mean a juridical ct (that is, a voluntary act 
                                                 
100 Art 690 CC. 
101 (Louisiana) art 740 CC, “Apparent servitudes may be acquired by title, by destination of the owner, 
or by acquisitive prescription”; (Scotland) only positive, or affirmative, servitudes can be created by 
prescription (Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, ss3(1), 3(2)); (England) acquisitive 
prescription is possible by common law, the doctrine of lost modern grant, or the Prescription Act 
1832; (South Africa) Badenhorst & Pienaar, 303. 
102 Dawes Laws 678 – 679; (Quebec) art 1181 CC. 
103 See, for example: Sarre v Barette (1914) 228 Ex 508, 511; Searley v Dawson (1971) 1 JJ 1687; Le 
Feuvre v Mathew (1973) 1 JJ 2461; Felard Investments v Church of Our Lady (1978) JJ 1, (1979) JJ 
19; Colesberg Hotel v Alton Hotel 2003 JLR 47, 2003 JLR 176; Matthews & Nicolle, para 1.42 et seq; 
Nicolle Conveyancing 22; Nicolle Immovable 59. (Guernsey) Kingsway v Bell (1987) 6.GLJ.141; 
Singleton v Le Noury (1990) 9.GLJ.48; Dawes Laws 679. Also: Houard Dictionnaire vol 4, 201; 
Basnage Servitudes 561. (Quebec) Lamontagne Biens 386, para 565. 
104 As is the case for acquisitive prescription of land i  Scotland (Prescription and Limitation 
(Scotland) Act 1973, s1) and in Germany (Servitudes (Grunddienstbarkeiten, § 1018 BGB) can be 
constituted by prescription, which functions in the same way as the acquisitive prescription of 
ownership of land (§§ 1065, 1227, 985, 1004 BGB). Such prescription must be based on an entry in 
the Land Register). 
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intended to have, and having, legal consequences).105 This is the meaning favoured in 
modern commentary,106 and can reasonably be imposed on earlier sources. For 
example, Le Geyt: 
 
“Mais c’est à present l’usage, il faut un titre pour une servitude, comme 
donation, vente, échange ou partage entre les propriétaires des deux fonds, le 
servant et le dominant.”107 
 
Of course, all of these juridical acts must be carried out before the Royal Court in 
Jersey, and so will of necessity involve a document. In general, commentators’ use of 
“title” is ambiguous as to whether “document” or “juridical act” is meant.108 Possibly 
the two were conflated, for a document may be constitutive, or at least evidence, of a 
juridical act. 
 
If the maxim means that without a document evidencing (or constituting) a juridical 
act there can be no servitude, this would not only exclude prescriptive servitudes but 
be problematic for legal and natural servitudes. Legal servitudes (such as the way of 
necessity in favour of landlocked land)109 and natural servitudes (such as natural 
drain of rainwater from higher to lower land)110 arise by operation of law. By 
definition, therefore, they will have no associated documentation. Le Gros states 
baldly that they are excluded from the maxim.111 The reason may be historical. 
Discussion of the maxim appears to pre-date discussion of legal and natural 
servitudes in the Jersey (and Norman) sources.112 Therefore, the maxim is first 
                                                 
105 For example, a contract. A useful definition is given in von Bar & Clive DCFR (Full) vol 1, 125: 
“A juridical act is any statement or agreement, whether express or implied from conduct, which is 
intended to have legal effect as such. It may be universal. It may be unilateral, bilateral, or 
multilateral.” (II 1:101(2)). 
106 In Quebec, the “titre” of the maxim means an agreem nt: Lamontagne Biens 386, para 566. Also: 
(France) Larroumet, 521 (“titre” means “acte juridique”); (Louisiana) Yiannopoulos Servitudes para 
112. 
107 Manuscrits vol 1, 195. 
108 For example: Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 194; Bérault, Godefroy & d’Aviron Commentaires vol 2, 
712 (Bérault), 715 (Godefroy) (compare 472 (Bérault)). 
109 For example: Hawkins v Turner (1971) 1 JJ 1813. 
110 For example: Gibaut v Le Rossignol (1900) 11 CR 188; Le Gros, 199. 
111 17. 
112 For example, Poingdestre discusses the way of necessity, but never describes it as a legal servitude, 
instead discussing whether an owner of land next to landlocked land can be compelled to sell a 
passage: Lois 194 – 195. See also: Yiannopoulos Servitudes para 12. 
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discussed when the only kind of servitude for which there would be no documentary 
evidence was one acquired by prescription. 
 
In fact, the prohibition on acquisitive prescription f servitudes is given in the Code 
of 1771 without reference to “title”.113 Therefore, questions concerning the meaning 
of “title” and the meaning of the maxim can often be ignored. The exception is when 
considering older sources, of which an example is Le Geyt’s suggestion that 
prescription without “title” is still possible in certain circumstances. 
 
(3) Le Geyt on Acquisitive Prescription 
Le Geyt was unhappy with the judgment of 1625 which followed article 607 of the 
Reformed Custom in denying creation of servitudes by prescription. He described the 
judgment as a “grand erreur”,114 noted in some detail that the practice since the 1625 
decision had not been constant, and doubted, in consequence, that custom had 
changed.115 This unhappiness is reflected in his Code, where he sets out that a 
servitude can prescribe without title following forty years’ possession: 
 
“La Servitude peut neanmoins se prescrire sans titre s’il paroist qu’elle ait 
esté 40 ans possedée, non seulement n c vi nec clam nec precario, mais par 
une voye d’execution de son droit, & par des Actes qui, au veu & au sceu de 
la partie, ne se puissant faire autrement que par titre, & qu’on ne peut 
presumer n’avoir esté soufferts que par une pure humanité.”116 
 
If “au veu & au sceu” is rendered “au vu & au su”, Le Geyt states prescription 
operates when exercise of the putative servitude is made as if of right, in the sight 
and with the knowledge of the putative servient owner. The same idea is presented in 
his Manuscrits.117 However, in the same title in his Manuscrits, Le Geyt strongly 
conveys the impression that he is swimming against the tide in arguing (in a way 
                                                 
113 “servitude, laquelle ne peut s’acquérir par la presc iption, fût-elle Centenaire” À la Cour de 
Samedi. 
114 Vol 1, 200. 
115 Ibid.  
116 3.10.6. 
117 Vol 1, 200. 
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which is not easy to follow) that acquisitive prescription of servitudes is still 
permissible.118 At times it seems that even he is not convinced of his stated position. 
 
Elsewhere in his Code, Le Geyt says that aqueduct can be acquired by fort -years’ 
possession.119 He also discusses this in his Manuscrits, stating that “La servitude 
d’aqueduct est la seule qui se prescript incontestablement par quarante ans.”120 This 
is taken directly from Roman law.121 Only two servitudes were expressly mentioned 
in article 607 of the Reformed Custom (view and stillicide). Bérault refers to debate 
over whether article 607 applied to all servitudes, or to urban servitudes only.122 Le 
Geyt’s argument in favour of prescriptive acquisition of aqueduct also draws on this 
debate, and on the Digest.123 However, given that Le Geyt rejects application of 
article 607 in Jersey law, it seems odd apparently to argue on the basis that it does 
apply. 
 
Poingdestre accepts article 607 as Jersey law without demur, and applies it to all 
servitudes.124 Whatever the position in the time of Poingdestre and Le Geyt, the Code 
of 1771 is unequivocal in its exclusion of any form of acquisitive prescription.  
 
(4) Quasi-Prescription: Baudains v Simon  
Baudains v Simon125 could be seen as supporting the existence of, or introducing, 
acquisitive prescription of servitudes, contrary to other sources of Jersey law. For 
this reason, the case merits close examination. 
 
The facts were as follows. Simon raised an action to confirm her right to use a short 
stretch of road, which the defendants kept obstructing and (allegedly) trespassing 
upon. The defendants claimed that the plaintiff could show no title to the road. For 
                                                 
118 Ibid 193 et seq. 
119 3.11.13. 
120 Vol 1, 199. 
121 Ibid 199 – 200. D.8.5.10. (See also: Bérault, Godefroy & d’Aviron Commentaires vol 2, 712 
(Bérault), 715 (Godefroy).) 
122 Bérault, Godefroy & d’Aviron Commentaires vol 2, 712. 
123 Vol 1, 199 – 200; D.8.5.10. 
124 Remarques. 
125 Simon v Baudains (1970) 1 JJ 1405 (Royal Court); Baudains v Simon (1971) 1 JJ 1949 (Court of 
Appeal). 
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ease of reference, the court divided the road into two sections: the first road and the 
second road. At first instance, the court was satisfied that the plaintiff owned the first 
road, but not the second.126 The second defendant argued that there could be no 
servitude in respect of that road because the plaintiff could show no title and there is 
nulle servitude sans titre.127 The court did not address that point expressly. It held 
that the second road must be a chemin de voisiné, without making it clear whether it 
considered that to be a form of ownership, or a servitude.128 Additionally, 
Poingdestre’s definition of chemin de voisiné was quoted and later paraphrased, but 
Poingdestre and the court conflict over whether one e d must meet a public road or 
not.129 Having lost at first instance, the defendants appeled. 
 
The Court of Appeal upheld the Royal Court judgment.130 Regarding the second 
road, its reasons are remarkable. The Court considered that the facts were suggestive 
of a servitude because evidence had been given that the second road had been used 
for access to the plaintiff’s property “throughout living memory”, and that the 
boundaries of the first road established by an 1876 contrat de transaction would be 
bizarre in their inutility unless there was a right to use the second road.131 The 
President suggested two possible reasons for the lack of documentary evidence. 
Either the servitude had been created by acquisitive prescription when that was still 
possible (1771 at the latest),132 or it was created when the land was subinfeudated.133 
 
It seems that subinfeudation ceased to be practised from around the seventeenth 
century.134 Further, if the grant of land was after 1602, it would have been 
registered.135 Therefore, any express grant in a subinfeudation wuld have to be 
                                                 
126 Simon v Baudains (1970) 1 JJ 1405, 1423, 1420, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
127 Ibid 1423. 
128 Ibid 1423 – 1424. 
129 Ibid 1422 – 1423, and 1424. The court held the second ra to be a chemin de voisiné. Compare 
definitions: ibid 1424; Poingdestre Lois 194 (citing D.43.8.2.22, and commentary thereon. D.43.8.2.23 
is more pertinent). 
130 Baudains v Simon (1971) 1 JJ 1949, 1952, and (for example) 1955, per Settle, JA. 
131 Ibid 1953, 1954. 
132 The President variously took (the Code of) 1771 (ibid 1953) and the year 1625 (ibid 1954) as the 
point at which acquisitive prescription became impossible. 
133 Baudains v Simon (1971) 1 JJ 1949, 1953–1954, per Settle, JA. See: ch 2 B. 
134 1861 Report, viii. See: ch 2 B. 
135 See: ch 5. 
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before 1602.136 Consequently, if a servitude was created by either of the means 
suggested by the President this must have occurred before 1771. However, the Court, 
having concluded that there was a servitude with a “legal origin”,137 decided that it 
was not incumbent upon it to pronounce the exact nature of that genesis. 
 
Le Quesne, JA, agreed with the President, and thought it sufficient to establish title to 
the servitude that its use “for well over a century” had been demonstrated, together 
with “the other circumstances to which the President […] adverted”.138 The “other 
circumstances” appear to be the inutility of the first road – as established by the 
contrat de transaction – if there is no right over the second. Le Quesne ref r ed to Le 
Geyt’s discussion of acquisitive prescription of servitudes in the Manuscrits, as 
authority that prescription was still possible after 1625 where long usage was 
“accompanied by other appropriate circumstances”.139 At best, however, this admits 
the possibility of acquisitive prescription only upto 1771. According to Le Quesne, 
use was proved “for well over a century”,140 but 1771 was a full two centuries before 
the case came before the Court of Appeal. The decision was, however, that for 
recognition of a “pre-prohibition” right, it was nec ssary to show use for only one 
hundred years or so. 
 
This result is unproblematic for a servitude with some legitimate origin, but the 
difficulty is identifying when this state of affairs has arisen. Following Baudains, 
where this cannot be known (but is not negated) the court will favour the party 
claiming the servitude, contrary to the principle that land is presumed free from 
burdens.141 This approach resembles acquisition by use for time i memorial,142 but 
is also strikingly similar to the English doctrine of lost modern grant.143 Perhaps 
                                                 
136 Alternatively, a servitude may have been created by a form of destination in the hypothetical 
subinfeudation, but would have been pre-1700. 
137 Baudains v Simon (1971) 1 JJ 1949, 1955, per Settle, JA.
138 Ibid 1955 – 1956, per Le Quesne, JA. 
139 Ibid 1955. Thus, as with Le Geyt himself, Le Quesne is not specific about what these 
“circumstances” may be. 
140 Ibid. 
141 See, for example: Poingdestre R marques art 607; Basnage Servitudes 485, 499; Haas v Duquemin 
2002 JLR 27, 35, para 20, per Hodge, JA; Colesberg Hotel v Alton Hotel 2003 JLR 176, 180, para 3, 
per Southwell, JA. Also: (Scotland) Cusine & Paisley, 285 – 286. See: ch 7 n57.  
142 Poingdestre, 54 – 59. Also: Le Geyt Manuscrits vol 1, 195.  
143 Gray & Gray, 676. Also: Matthews & Nicolle, 11, para 1.43. 
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English law influenced the court’s reasoning (originat ng with counsel’s 
submissions). 
 
(5) Conclusion  
Before Baudains v Simon, the prohibition on acquisitive prescription of servitudes 
was clear. However, Baudains indicates that some of the results of this prohibition 
are so unjust that a way around the prohibition must sometimes be found. 
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The holder of a servitude, the “dominant owner”, has the right to perform or prevent 
some kind of action on the servient tenement. Under a positive servitude,1 the 
dominant owner can possess part of the land. This pos ession is in competition with 
the servient owner’s possession, and the two must co-exist. The servitude creates a 
situation loosely analogous to that of common ownership: the needs of the servient 
owner must be balanced against those of the dominant ow er. This balancing is 
                                                 
1 See: ch 6 A(2)(b). 
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evident in the cases and rules regarding the use that can be made, or the extent, of the 
servitude.2 
 
Unlike a positive servitude, a negative servitude gives the dominant owner no right 
to possess part of the servient tenement, only a right to prevent some kind of action 
on it. Therefore, there are no competing rights of p ssession to be balanced. 
However, doubt may surround the extent of a negative servitude, requiring 
interpretation of the constitutive hereditary contrac . 
 
The law regarding the exercise of servitudes is found primarily in Le Gros, Basnage, 
and cases. When considering the parameters within which a servitude can be 
exercised, it is of first importance to determine th extent of the right. Any activity 
beyond that extent is not justified by the servitude and is, therefore, unlawful.3 The 
way in which the extent of a servitude is ascertained depends to some degree on its 
mode of creation, so aspects of the subject are considered in that way. Thereafter, 
some common matters are considered. 
 
B. SERVITUDES CREATED EXPRESSLY 
 
When a servitude has been created expressly, regard should first be paid to the deed 
in order to ascertain the limits of the right.4 Where the deed gives limits, these must 
be adhered to.5 If the words are insufficient or ambiguous, some method is needed of 
ascertaining the limits. The following seven cases involve interpretation of 
servitudes. 
 
(1) Arbaugh v Leyland  6 
The court sought to determine two issues. First, had t e construction of a wooden hut 
breached a servitude which limited building, even though it had not acceded to the 
                                                 
2 For example: (Scotland) Cusine & Paisley, 387, para 12.02. 
3 Unless justified by another right. 
4 For example: Matthews & Nicolle, 12, para 1.46; Nicolle Immovable 57; Colesberg v Alton 2003 
JLR 47, 60, para 29, per Bailhache, Bailiff. 
5 For example: Carey, 215. 
6 (1967) 1 JJ 745. 
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land?7 The court referred to Pothier’s first and third rules of contractual interpretation 
(follow the common intention of the parties over adhering to the letter of the 
agreement,8 and when a term is capable of two readings use whichever is closer to 
the nature of the contract)9 and an English case, Shaw v Morley,10 in which a 
temporary wooden structure on a racecourse was held to be an “office” in terms of 
betting legislation.11 The court held that the wooden hut, though moveable, could 
constitute a breach of a servitude, and, applying Pothier’s rules, that “the common 
intention of the parties [was] that there should be no detached buildings on the 
property.”12 Second, a mitoyen boundary wall had been extended. Did this breach a 
negative servitude in respect of the wall?13 The court held that the servitude applied 
“solely to the walls extant at the time of the sale of the property by the plaintiff”14 
(when the servitude was created), so horizontal extension of the wall (as in this case) 
was not a breach of the servitude: the extension was not in existence when the 
servitude was created, so the servitude was held not to apply to it.15 Thus, the court’s 
general approach was to seek the probable intention of the parties to the original 
grant, and construe any restrictions narrowly. 
 
(2) Blackburn v Kempson 16 
A negative servitude prevented the building of more than one house.17 The defendant 
wished to build an extension to her house, which would constitute a separate, self- 
contained household, where the defendant’s daughter and her family would live. 
Both parties sought clarification from the court on whether this would breach the 
servitude. Ambiguity centred on the meaning of “une seule maison”. As the term was 
unclear, taking its ordinary meaning would not assist matters. Consequently, the 
                                                 
7 Ibid 746, per Bois, Deputy Bailiff. 
8 “On doit, dans les conventions, rechercher quelle a été la commune intention des parties 
contractantes, plus que le sens grammatical des termes” Pothier Traité des Obligations para 91. 
9 “Lorsque dans un contrat des termes sont susceptibl s de deux sens, on doit les entendre dans le sens 
qui convient le plus à la nature du contrat” ibid para 93. 
10 (1867–68) LR 3 Ex 137. 
11 Betting Act 1853 (see: Arbaugh v Leyland (1967) 1 JJ 745, 748, per Bois, Deputy Bailiff). 
12 Arbaugh, ibid 748, per Bois, Deputy Bailiff. 
13 Ibid 746. 
14 Ibid 750. 
15 Ibid. 
16 (1971) 1 JJ 1747. 
17 There was also a servitude restricting the materials that could be used for construction: ibid 1748, 
per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
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court looked at the “context in which the expression [was] used”18 and sought to 
“give effect to that interpretation of the expression which appear[ed] to be most 
consistent with the intention of the author of the clause and hence to the intention of 
those who are parties to it.”19 The court decided that the intention of the author was 
“to preserve a ratio between buildings and open space consistent with a high-class 
residential area, and generally to create and encourage a pleasing neighbourhood”,20 
and that “une seule maison” meant “a building for human habitation so designed and 
constructed as to be capable of occupation by one household.”21 Therefore, 
construction of the extension would constitute a breach of the servitude. 
 
The court provided a summary of the rules for interpr tation of documents: 
 
“The object of all interpretation of a written instrument is to discover the 
intention of the author. That intention must be gathered from the instrument 
itself; the function of the Court, therefore, is to declare the meaning of what is 
written in the instrument, and not of what was intend d to have been written. 
Prima facie, words must be taken in their ordinary sense, but where words are 
susceptible to more than one meaning, assistance may be obtained from the 
context in which they appear, and courts will give effect to that interpretation 
which appears to be most consistent with the intention of the parties to the 
instrument.”22 
 
Pothier is not mentioned in the judgment. However, this passage is consistent with 
his first and third rules of contractual interpretation (relied upon by the court in 
Arbaugh).23 In general, the court’s approach was to look for the probable intention of 
the parties to the original grant, considering clauses in the context of the whole 
document if necessary. 
 
The rendering of the court is the “intention of theauthor”,24 but in a judicial context 
there is little difference between “intention”25 and “probable intention”.26 Similarly, 
                                                 
18 Ibid 1756. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid 1757. 
21 Ibid 1758. 
22 Ibid 1756. 
23 See: ch 7 B(1). 
24 (1971) 1 JJ 1747, 1756, Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
25 Ibid. 
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there is little between “intention of the parties” and “intention of the author”27 for it 
is the task of the author to represent the intention of the parties in written form, and 
both parties ratify this written form in open court when the contract is passed. 
Therefore, “parties” and “author” can be taken to be synonymous. 
 
(3) Representation Blampied  28 
A house had been constructed in the garden of another. T e issue was whether the 
part of the garden that the house was built upon was subject to a negative servitude, 
prohibiting building. A number of properties were subject to similar, but not 
identical, negative servitudes. Blampied sought recification of the contracts of sale 
to make it clear that the house had not been built in breach of a servitude. The court 
was reluctant to rectify, but, on request, did interpr t the clauses, and decided that the 
servitude had not been breached. 
 
Reference was made by the court to Pothier’s first29 and sixth (interpret a clause by 
reference to the other clauses)30 rules of contractual interpretation. Following these, 
the court’s decision was based upon determination of the intention of the parties. 
This process was facilitated by construing the contract as a whole, that is, by 
reference to other terms which were not constitutive of the servitude. As in 
Blackburn, the court’s approach was to look for the probable int ntion of the parties 
to the original grant, considering clauses in the context of the whole document where 
necessary. 
 
(4) Haas v Duquemin    31 
The interaction between servitudes and common ownership of a yard was at issue. 
Inter alia, the correct approach to interpretation of contracts relating to property 
rights was considered. The Court of Appeal stated that a grant of a servitude, which 
is effective against third parties, should not necessarily be interpreted in the same 
                                                                                                                                
26 Basnage Servitudes 486. 
27 (1971) 1 JJ 1747, 1756, Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
28 4 November 1998, unreported. 
29 See: ch 7 n8. 
30 “on doit interpréter une clause par les autres clauses contenues dans l’acte, soit qu’elles precedent, 
ou qu’elles suivent” Pothier Traité des Obligations para 96. 
31 2002 JLR 27. 
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way as a simple contract.32  A contract is concerned with personal rights, andis only 
binding on the parties to it, thus “the intentions of the contracting parties are the 
prime consideration.”33 This is not true of deeds constitutive of real rights, “which 
affect others than the initial parties to the deed”.34 In other words, it should be 
possible to look at the register and see the nature and extent of property rights 
affecting any piece of land without reference to the factual matrix. This is the 
publicity principle of property law.35 
 
In essence, the Court of Appeal in Haas restated, using different language, the 
general approach of the courts to interpretation of hereditary contracts constitutive of 
servitudes. This is most clearly seen in Blackburn v Kempson, in which the court 
restricted itself to the wording of the hereditary contract, without reference to the 
underlying factual matrix (which would have been necessary if the true intentions of 
the parties had been sought).36 In Arbaugh v Leyland,37 the court was assisted by 
reference to English law, but did not seek to ascertain the actual intentions of the 
original parties to the servitude. Similarly, in Representation Blampied,38 the court 
also sought the probable, rather than actual, intention of the parties, by reference 
solely to the hereditary contract. 
 
The Court of Appeal in Haas also referred, inter alia, to a passage in Domat saying 
that, when in doubt, servitudes are to be interpreted in favour of the servient 
tenement.39  
 
(5) Colesberg Hotel v Alton Hotel   40 
The dominant owner wanted to change the use of the dominant tenement from a 
small hotel car park to the site of some residential property, and also parking for flats 
which were to be built on adjoining land, also owned by the dominant proprietor but 
                                                 
32 Ibid 35, para 20, per Hodge JA. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 See: ch 5 A(2). 
36 (1971) 1 JJ 1747, 1756, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
37 (1967) 1 JJ 745. 
38 4 November 1998, unreported. 
39 Haas v Duquemin 2002 JLR 27, 40 – 41, para 44, per Hodge JA. 
40 2003 JLR 47 (Royal Court); 2003 JLR 176 (Court of Appeal). 
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not part of the dominant tenement of the servitude. The servient owner contended 
that this would be an aggravation of the servitude as it would result in increased 
use.41 Both determination of the purpose of the servitude and of the extent to which 
the servitude could be used rested on interpretation of the deed.  
 
The conveyancing phrase “toutes fois et quantes et à tous usages”, used in the grant 
of the servitude, was held by the Royal Court to be th  widest grant possible.42 
Consequently, the development would not breach the servitude.43 The Court of 
Appeal – although stating that the Royal Court should not have determined the 
meaning of the conveyancing phrase without hearing evidence on the matter – 
upheld the result reached by the Royal Court,44 albeit for different reasons. Based on 
“what must have been in the contemplation of the parties”45 to the original deed (that 
is, the probable intention of those parties) the court held that use of the dominant 
tenement for parking would have been contemplated.46 Therefore, this purpose for 
the servitude was within the grant of it. Regarding the increased use of the servitude, 
Southwell, JA, rejected a test – suggested by Colesberg’s counsel – of what was 
“contemplated by the parties to the [constitutive] deed”,47 preferring “the test 
adumbrated by Basnage […] that the user must not be such as to render the burden 
on the servient tenement more inconvenient and more onerous”.48 The latter he 
equated with the civiliter principle, referred to by the Bailiff at first instance.49 
 
The Royal Court referred, inter alia, to Basnage, Pothier, and Haas v Duquemin in 
discussing how to interpret the relevant deeds. In the Court of Appeal, Southwell, JA, 
emphasised the differences and distance between “Jersey land law” and Roman law, 
the laws of France pre- and post-codification, and E glish law.50 Nevertheless, he 
                                                 
41 2003 JLR 47, 52, para 6, per Bailhache, Bailiff. 
42 Ibid 57, para 20, per Bailhache, Bailiff. (This view is supported by Basnage: Servitudes 491.)  
43 Ibid 58, para 24. 
44 2003 JLR 176, 186, para 34, and 187, para 40, per Southwell, JA. 
45 Ibid para 33. 
46 Ibid para 34. 
47 Ibid 187, paras 39. 
48 Ibid para 39, per Southwell, JA. 
49 Ibid; 2003 JLR 47, 58, para 25, per Bailhache, Bailiff. Also, see: ch 7 I. 
50 2003 JLR 176, 179, para 2, per Southwell, JA. 
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referred approvingly to Basnage,51 whose commentary demonstrates the close links 
between Roman law and the law of servitudes in Normandy (and thus Jersey law 
also). Indeed, Basnage’s words quoted by Southwell, JA, are followed by citation of 
the Digest.52  
 
(6) Cotillard v O’Connor       53 
A servitude prohibited construction of commercial buildings and restricted 
residential construction to buildings of good quality.54 Mrs Cotillard sought a 
declaration from the court that laying a road and the demolition and construction of 
boundary walls on the servient land would not breach the servitude.55 The court held 
that there would be no breach, with essentially a two-fold justification: firstly, the 
work was not for a commercial end; and secondly, constructing anything other than 
good-quality dwellings was prohibited. However, nothing was said of, for example, 
walls and roads associated with dwellings, and so it c uld be taken that there was no 
restriction on these.56 This reasoning is consistent with the presumption hat land is 
free from burdens.57 On interpreting the servitude, the court considere Pothier’s 
first, third, sixth, and seventh rules on interpretation of agreements,58 Blackburn v 
Kempson, Haas v Duquemin, and Colesberg.  
 
(7) La Petite Croatie v Ledo    59 
The defendants (servient owners) began work on a derelict cottage on the servient 
land, including an extension of the cottage and establi hing a hardcore and rubble 
track to it. The plaintiff (dominant owner) sought a permanent injunction, claiming 
the works to be in contravention of its servitude (r ferred to in the judgment using 
                                                 
51 Ibid 187, para 39, per Southwell, JA. 
52 Basnage Servitudes 488. D.8.2.20.4. 
53 [2007] JRC005; 2007 JLR N12. 
54 [2007] JRC005, para 5, per Birt, Deputy Bailiff. 
55 Ibid paras 10, 11. 
56 Ibid para 26. 
57 See, for example: Basnage S rvitudes 486; Haas v Duquemin 2002 JLR 27, 35, para 20, per Hodge, 
JA; Colesberg v Alton 2003 JLR 176, 180, para 3, per Southwell, JA. 
58 See: ch 7 nn8, 9, 30. Pothier’s seventh rule (Traité des Obligations para 97): “Dans le doubte, une 
clause doit s’interpréter contre celui qui a stipule quelque chose, et à la décharge de celui qui a 
contracté l’obligation.” 
59 2009 JLR 116. 
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the English law terminology of “restrictive covenant”) prohibiting building.60 
Difficulty attended identification of the boundaries of the servient tenement. 
Consequently, there was doubt over whether the cottage was subject to the burden.61 
The court concluded it was not, but that another ara was,62 arriving at the latter 
conclusion based on evidence extrinsic to the regist r. 
 
Extensive reference was made to English law materials63 nd to a Jersey case on 
trusts (which in turn referred to English cases),64 as well as some reference to 
Pothier’s rules on contractual interpretation.65 As in previous cases, the approach of 
applying principles of (non-hereditary) contractual interpretation to servitudes risks 
conflict with the general principle favouring freedom from burdens in cases of 
uncertainty.66 Previous cases avoided such conflict. This case did not. 
 
Where property rights are not concerned, the aim of interpretation can be to strive to 
give effect to the agreement between the parties, for it is only the parties to the 
contract who will be affected.67 This cannot be so for hereditary contracts. Property 
rights affect third parties; those third parties must be able to ascertain the precise 
nature of the right.68 This is achieved by publicity.69 The servitude was created 
expressly by registered deed. Therefore, the extent of the servitude must be apparent 
from the face of the register. If this is not so, hw can a party know what binds him? 
This point is particularly strong where, as in this case, the servitude is negative, for 
there will be no sign of it on the land. 
 
The presumption that land is free from burdens supports the reliability of the register, 
by reducing the likelihood that off-register burdens will be recognised.70 The 
                                                 
60 Ibid 119, per Clyde-Smith, Commissioner. 
61 Ibid 131, para 38, and 135, para 47. 
62 Ibid 139 – 140, paras 67 – 71. 
63 Ibid 131, para 39 et seq, and 137, para 57 et seq. 
64 Ibid 121 – 123, para 10. 
65 Ibid 120 – 121, para 8. 
66 See: ch 7 n57. 
67 This point is made in Haas v Duquemin 2002 JLR 27, 35, para 20, per Hodge, JA. 
68 Ibid.  
69 See: ch 5 A(2) (publicity principle). 
70 Such as by destination or based on the decision in Baudains v Simon (1971) 1 JJ 1949. See: ch 6 C, 
D(4). 
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presumption also dictates that ambiguity will be construed in favour of the servient 
tenement. That is, however, not dependent on the existence of a register, but is a 
societal choice: the selection of a starting point. If third parties must be able to 
determine from the register the nature and extent of rights which may bind them, it is 
obvious that those elements must be clearly delineated. Where this is not done, the 
presumption that the land is free from burdens means that the servitude will be 
construed narrowly. 
 
This was not the approach of the Royal Court in La Petite Croatie. Although it noted 
the warning of Hodge, JA, in Haas v Duquemin that particular considerations apply 
to the interpretation of deeds constitutive of property rights,71 and the “powerful 
submissions”72 of counsel for the plaintiff on Haas and the “sanctity of the 
Registry”,73 these concerns were set aside in favour of following English law.74 
Extrinsic evidence was used to determine the extent of the servient tenement.75 
Specifically, a latent ambiguity, together with evidence “of probative value”, meant 
that correspondence relating to the drafting of theservitude was held to be 
admissible.76 
 
The court does not make its reasons for departing from established principles of 
Jersey law clear. In general, it may be noted that t e presumption that land is free 
from burdens is weaker concerning the extent of a right, in comparison to 
consideration of whether a right has been created at all. Concerning the extent of a 
servitude, it is a question of balancing the rights of the two parties. Both have a real 
right in the same piece of land and there will always be tension between them. The 
court cannot treat the dominant owner’s right as less important than that of the 
servient owner (nor is the opposite true), but must try o give effect to the rights of 
both parties. If a strict application of the presumption of freedom will result in an 
unworkable servitude for the dominant tenement (for example, a seasonal or 
                                                 
71 2009 JLR 116, 121, para 9, and 137 (where “real right” is erroneously equated with “immovable 
property” (see further: ch 3 D)), paras 55 and 56, per Clyde-Smith, Commissioner. 
72 Ibid 137, para 56. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid para 57 et seq. 
75 Ibid para 53 et seq. 
76 Ibid 139, para 63, per Clyde-Smith, Commissioner. 
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nocturnal servitude of access to landlocked land), the principle should not be strictly 
applied. In this way, the decision could be justified, although it may be questioned 
whether these facts warranted departure from the usual principles: the servitude 
would not have been unworkable, but absent. 
 
(8) Interpretation of Servitudes Created Expressly 
From the cases emerges a clear method for the interpre ation of servitudes. First, and 
obviously, the hereditary contract constitutive of the servitude should be examined. 
Where there is ambiguity, the probable intention of the parties to the contract 
constitutive of the servitude is sought.77 To this end, it may be necessary to look at 
the relevant clause in the context of the whole document, or even other hereditary 
contracts pertaining to neighbouring plots.78 If there is still ambiguity, the hereditary 
contract must be construed in favour of the servient la d (in keeping with the 
presumption that land is free from burdens)79 ubject to exception in cases where this 
would result in great hardship on the dominant tenement.80 
 
This method is also set out by Basnage (to whose work the court in Colesberg 
refers)81 in relation to ascertaining the manner of use and extent of a servitude of way 
which has been created by deed.82 Additionally, aspects of it are present in other 
legal systems. For example, the same test is found in article 780 of the Louisiana 
Civil Code of 1870, which applied to servitudes of passage. That article was the basis 
                                                 
77 Applied in: Arbaugh v Leyland (1967) 1 JJ 745; Blackburn v Kempson (1971) 1 JJ 1747; 
Representation Blampied 4 November 1998, unreported; Colesberg v Alton 2003 JLR 176; La Petite 
Croatie v Ledo 2009 JLR 116. 
78 Applied in: Blackburn v Kempson, ibid; Representation Blampied, ibid; La Petite Croatie v Ledo, 
ibid. 
79 Applied in: Arbaugh v Leyland (1967) 1 JJ 745; Cotillard v O’Connor [2007] JRC005. See also 
Blackburn v Kempson, ibid 1756, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff: “the function of the Court, therefore, is 
to declare the meaning of what is written in the instrument, and not of what was intended to have been
written.” 
80 See: ch 7 B(7) (last para). 
81 Colesberg v Alton 2003 JLR 47, 55, para 15, and 57, para 19, per Bailhache, Bailiff; Colesberg v 
Alton 2003 JLR 176, 187, para 39, per Bailhache, Bailiff. 
82 “Que s’il n’est point fait mention de la largeur du passage, ni de la maniere que l’on s’en pourra 
servir, l’on doit examiner quelle a été l’intention vraisemblable des contractans, & la fin pour laquelle 
le chemin a été stipule & promis; que si ces circonsta ces ne donnent point assés de lumiere, il faut en 
cette obscurité favoriser le fonds servant” Basnage Servitudes 486. 
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for article 749 in the 1996 revision,83 which is of broader application (it applies to all 
servitudes), but has lost the provision that the final resort is to interpret the servitude 
in favour of the servient tenement. Yiannopoulos, however, is of the opinion that this 
provision is implicit in article 749.84 
 
C. SERVITUDES CREATED BY DESTINATION 
 
In Le Feuvre v Mathew,85 a servitude of access was held to have been created by 
destination.86 One of the issues before the court was whether the limits of the 
servitude had been breached by a change in purpose when the dominant owner 
(defendant) changed the dominant tenement from a market garden to a dwelling 
house. The court held that the purpose of the servitude was fixed to the purpose of 
the usage at the time of subdivision. Consequently, the court held that the limits of 
the servitude had been breached.87 The plaintiff was granted a permanent injunction 
preventing the exercise of the servitude, and damages in respect of trespass. 
 
A servitude is created by destination if particular se vitude-like use has been made of 
the prospective servient tenement up to the point when that land ceases to be owned 
by the same person as the dominant tenement.88 Therefore, it is logical that its 
content is determined by the use that is being made at the time of subdivision,89 at 
which point it “crystallises” into a servitude, and whereas the probable intention of 
the parties is relevant to interpretation of servitudes created expressly, the will of the 
grantor alone is relevant for servitudes created by estination. A comparison can be 
made with the rule (in other jurisdictions) governing the extent of servitude acquired 
by prescription: tantum praescriptum quantum possessum.90 
                                                 
83 “[…] If the title is silent as to the extent and manner of use of the servitude, the intention of the 
parties is to be determined in the light of its purpose.”  
84 Yiannopoulos Servitudes 418 – 419, para 149, n4. 
85 (1973) 1 JJ 2461 (first sitting); (1974) 2 JJ 49 (second sitting). 
86 See: ch 6 C. 
87 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1974) 2 JJ 49, 63, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
88 See: ch 6 C. 
89 Matthews & Nicolle, 12, para 1.46; Nicolle Immovable 61; ch 6 C(5). Also, for example: (France) 
Planiol Treatise vol 1, part 2, 750, para 2964; (Louisiana) Yiannopoulos Servitudes 420, para 149. 
90 For example: (Scotland) Reid Property 374, para 460, Kerr v Brown 1939 SC 140, 147, per Lord 
Justice-Clerk Aitchison, cited therein (although the strictness with which the maxim is applied is 
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D. SERVITUDES CREATED BY PRESCRIPTION 
 
Creation of a servitude by acquisitive prescription s not now possible in Jersey 
law.91 However, it is possible that there are servitudes still in existence which were 
created by acquisitive prescription before its prohibition. This possibility was raised 
in Baudains v Simon.92 
 
As acquisitive prescription of servitudes has not been possible in Jersey since 1771 at 
the latest,93 the discussion here is limited. It is most likely that there will be no 
deed.94 Therefore, the best evidence available will be the ex rcise that was carried 
out over the prescriptive period: tantum praescriptum quantum possessum. This is 
the rule applied in a number of jurisdictions which recognise acquisitive prescription 
of servitudes.95 However, as Gordon notes, there is a question over “whether ‘use’ 
means use only of the particular kind established during the period of prescription, or 
use as a genus of which the particular kind established is a species.”96 This 
demonstrates that the tantum praescriptum maxim is rather vague, which vagueness 




The purpose of a servitude can be either general or limited. In the context of a right 
of way, a servitude with a general purpose can be used to access the dominant land, 
no matter to what use that land is put, whereas “a right of way [which] is granted 
[…] for a particular97 purpose […] cannot be exercised for a radically different 
                                                                                                                                
variable: see Carstairs v Spence 1924 SC 380, 387 per Lord President Clyde; (Louisiana) 
Yiannopoulos Servitudes 419, para 149. See also: ch 7 D. 
91 See: ch 6 D. 
92 (1971) 1 JJ 1949, 1954 per Settle, JA. This case is discussed above, see: ch 6 D(4). 
93 See: ch 6 D(4). 
94 It is possible, even if unlikely, that the exercise of the servitude was initially based on a contract 
which had not passed before the Royal Court or been th  subject of a ouïe de paroisse. Were this still 
extant, it could also be used as evidence of the extent of the servitude. 
95 For example: (France) Jourdain Les biens (1995) 215, 158, Aubry & Rau, vol 3, 132; (Scotland) 
Reid Property 245 – 246, para 325; (Louisiana) Yiannopoulos Servitudes 419, para 149. See also: ch 7 
n90. 
96 Gordon Land 751, para 24–61. 
97 Or limited. 
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purpose.”98 The important question here is to determine what te default rule is in 
relation to the purpose of a servitude, in the case wh re no purpose is specified. Is a 
limitation of purpose implied, or can the servitude be used for any purpose? 
 
(1) Le Feuvre v Mathew  
In Le Feuvre,99 the court held, on the facts, that the servitude was limited as to its 
purpose.100 It appears that the court based its decision on English case law.101 A 
passage in Le Gros was referred to, but this neither supports nor contradicts the 
court’s conclusion.102 The part of Le Gros cited is supportive of the principle that “a 
servitude […] created for a particular purpose […] may only be exercised for that 
purpose”.103 However, it does not follow from this that all servitudes are of limited 
purpose, merely that those which are cannot be exercised for another purpose. Thus, 
on one view, the conclusion of the court in Le Feuvre104 is based entirely on English 
law, where the default rule seems to have been that easements were limited as to 
purpose.105 Since Le Feuvre was decided, however, there has been an important new 
decision in England in this area: McAdams Homes Ltd v Robinson.106 
 
In McAdams Homes,107 a cottage and a bakery were built on one piece of land. 
Subsequently, they came to be in separate ownership. T e bakery was demolished 
and two houses built in its stead. The owners of the cottage obstructed the drain 
through which the bakery land’s sewage system accessed the public sewer. The 
owners of the bakery land sued for the cost of constructing a new link to the public 
sewer. The court held, inter alia, that the bakery had a valid easement, created by 
                                                 
98 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1974) 2 JJ 49, 59, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. See also: Colesberg v Alton 
2003 JLR 47, 56, para 16, per Bailhache, Bailiff. 
99 (1974) 2 JJ 49. 
100 Ibid 61, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
101 Ibid 60. 
102 “Elle (la servitude) ne peut être exercée que dans l  limite des besoins pour lesquels elle a été 
constituée.” Ibid 59. 
103 Ibid. 
104 (1974) 2 JJ 49. 
105 SG Maurice Gale on Easements (15th edn, 1986) 289 et seq (also: 297 et seq) (the most recent 
edition is the 18th, 2008). Also: Carstairs v Spence 1924 SC 380, 387, per Clyde, LP (commenting on 
English law). 
106 [2005] 1 P&CR 30, para 50, per Neuberger, LJ. McAdams appears to apply to easements by 
prescription as well: Gray & Gray, 628, para 5.1.70. 
107 [2005] 1 P&CR 30. 
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implication, and that change in the use of the dominant tenement alone (absent 
increase in the burden on the servient tenement) would not prevent the easement 
from being exercised. 
 
Neuberger, LJ, after a review of the case law, proposed its rationalisation. Whether 
there is breach of an easement, created by prescription or by implication, depends 
upon fulfilment of two criteria: 
 
“i) whether the development of the dominant land […] represented a ‘radical 
change in the character’ or a ‘change in the identity’ of the site […] as 
opposed to a mere change or intensification in the use of the site […]; 
“ii) whether the use of the site as redeveloped would result in a substantial 
increase or alteration in the burden on the servient land”.108 
 
In spite of this test, it is possible that an increas  in the use of the easement alone will 
breach the easement, under the doctrine of “excessive user”,109 giving rise to an 
action in tort. It is not suggested that this structure is emulated in Jersey law, despite 
a convergence between English and Jersey tort law.110 An unacceptable increase in 
use of a servitude in Jersey law gives rise to remedies in property law. Nonetheless, it 
can be seen that the result of McAdams Homes is to demonstrate that while some 
increase in the burden on the servient tenement gives rise to an action, mere change 
in use of the dominant tenement will not. Thus, easements created by implication or 
prescription in English law are all general as to purpose.111 
 
This leaves Jersey law in a curious position. If Le Feuvre were to be decided by 
reference to English law today, the result would not be the same. The increased use 
of the servitude, when it was used for the transportati n of building materials, may 
still be held to have been unlawful. If this were th  case, it could be the subject of an 
                                                 
108 Ibid para 50, per Neuberger, LJ. 
109 Ibid para 27. 
110 Nicolle Origin 65 – 67, 15.23 – 15.25.5. 
111 According to Gray and Gray, an easement created expressly “may not be used subsequently for a 
purpose wholly different from that originally envisaged”, which would distinguish easements created 
by express grant from those created by implication or prescription: 627, para 5.1.69. However, as 
creation by implication and prescription in English law both “derive from deemed grants” (Gray & 
Gray, 628, para 5.1.70), the effect of Neuberger LJ’s judgment ought to apply to easements by express 
grant also. It would not be logical for different conditions to attach to a “deemed” grants as against 
actual grants.  
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injunction. However, it appears that at the point when the action was raised, the 
building work had been completed. If the exercise of the servitude had reverted to 
use by foot and with trolley, there would be no continuing unlawful action, and the 
single fact of the dominant tenement having changed to a residential property would 
not render the servitude unexercisable. 
 
It is surprising that the Jersey court chose to follow the English law position in 
determining the scope of the servitude in Le Feuvre,112 perhaps all the more so as the 
decision drew out a convergence between Jersey law and French law in relation to 
the doctrine of destination i  the same case. Nonetheless, as the decision was based 
on the particular facts, and as there was no discussion of a default rule as to purpose, 
it is open to the court to decide differently in the future. 
 
(2) Default Rule 
In Jersey, with one exception, there is no authority n whether the default purpose of 
a servitude is general or limited. A default rule cannot be satisfactorily extrapolated 
from Le Feuvre v Mathew, the single case which touches on this issue.113 On the 
whole, a default rule that servitudes are general as to purpose is preferable, as it 
avoids interpretative difficulties.114 If the default rule were limited purpose, there 
would be greater doubt over what the precise purpose is. In litigation, this doubt will 
have to be resolved by the courts, frequently on the basis of the presumed intention 
of parties who are long dead, and factual circumstances of equal age, which can be 
difficult to ascertain. 
                                                 
112 (1974) 2 JJ 49. 
113 See: ch 7 E(1). 
114 French law appears to operate on the basis of a general purpose servitude as the default rule: Aubry 
& Rau, vol 3, 130, para 253; Planiol & Ripert, vol 3, 964, para 983. This is not a point which has 
occupied much attention in more modern French doctrinal writing (for example: Carbonnier, vol 2, 
1758, para 808 et seq; Larroumet, vol 2, 475, para 798 et seq. Although see: Jourdain, 218, para 160), 
which may suggest that it is settled, and not seen as problematic. See also: (Scotland) Carstairs v 
Spence 1924 SC 380, 386, per Clyde, LP (general, with a sm ll number of exceptions); (Louisiana) 
Yiannopoulos Servitudes 429 – 431, para 155. 
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F. MANNER OF EXERCISE OF SERVITUDES OF ACCESS 
 
Roman law sets out three ways in which access can be exercised: on foot, with beasts 
of burden, or with a vehicle.115 The greater is deemed to include the lesser,116 so a 
right to pass with vehicle includes the right to pass with animals, and on foot. Given 
the Roman law origins of the Jersey law of servitudes, it is suggested that these 
categories may be used in Jersey. They provide referenc  points which help to avoid 
uncertainty relating to the type of use allowed by a servitude. Changes in land use, 
and technological advances, lead to development of he factual content of the 
categories. For instance, the right to pass with some form of vehicle must now 
include a motor vehicle. Of course, it is open to the grantor to be highly specific 
about the type of use allowed. In that case, it may be considered that any use 
mentioned in the deed was not intended to be represntative of a broader category. It 
may also be noted that, in practice, the category of the right to pass with beast of 
burden may have all but fallen away. 
 
G. USE ONLY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE DOMINANT TENEMEN T 
 
A servitude must be exercised for the benefit of the dominant tenement alone,117 for 
“it is inconsistent with the nature of a servitude that the dominant proprietor should 
have power to communicate its benefit to any third party.”118 For example, if the 
dominant proprietor has land nearby which does not form part of the dominant 
tenement, it is unlawful for the servitude to be usd for the benefit of that other land. 
Equally, if land adjoining the dominant tenement is subsequently purchased by the 
dominant proprietor, the servitude cannot be exercis d in favour of the new 
acquisition. 
 
Taken to its extreme, where land other than the dominant tenement, but owned by the 
dominant owner, gains some incidental benefit from a servitude, the dominant owner 
                                                 
115 This corresponds to iter, actus, and via: see D.8.3.1. See also: (Scotland) Erskine Institute 2.9.12. 
116 D.8.3.1. See, for example: (Scotland) Malcolm v Lloyd (1886) 13 R 512. 
117 Colesberg v Alton 2003 JLR 176, 179, para 1, per Southwell, JA. 
118 Reid Property 378, para 464. See also: Basnage Servitudes 492; Benest “Aggravation” 73, para 2 
(Jersey law and Scots law are compared). 
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could be prohibited from exercising the servitude. However, to interpret the 
requirement in this way runs contrary to the principle of balancing the respective real 
rights of each party with the other.119 Alternatively put, this rule should not be 
applied so rigidly as to strip the servitude of its u ility. The Court of Appeal adopted 
this attitude in Colesberg,120 where two pieces of land were dominant tenements to 
the same servient tenement, in respect of the same type of servitude. The use of one 
of the dominant tenements as a car park for the othr dominant tenement was held 
not to breach the servitude.121 Use of the servitude to access a car park was seen as 
sufficient of an end in itself, regardless of the direct benefit conferred on land which 
was not the dominant tenement. 
 
H. IMPLIED CONTENT 
 
A servitude may also bring with it implied content. For example, a servitude of 
drawing water from a well has as ancillary to it a right of way in order that the well 
might be reached, even when this is not expressly stated.122 Implied content may also 
consist of a right to install a structure – such as pipes or a channel for a servitude of 
aqueduct – and a right to maintain that structure, which would allow access on to the 
servient tenement for that purpose.123 
 
(1) General 
Le Gros recognises implied content in the Jersey law of servitudes:  
 
“La servitude […] peut être rendue plus commode comme l’élargissement du 
chemin débiteur de la servitude.”124 
 
                                                 
119 See: ch 7 A.  
120 2003 JLR 176, 183 and 186, paras 23, 36, per Southwell, JA. 
121 Ibid 187, para 38 (also: 186, para 37, where the argument that each dominant tenement can make 
use of both servitudes is rejected). 
122 See also: Matthews and Nicolle, 12, para 1.46. 
123 Just as the right that the dominant proprietor has can be exercised by a tenant, the right of entry fo  
maintenance could be exercised by those engaged for the performance of that task. 
124 Le Gros, 21. 
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His comment is a specific example, but is intended to represent a principle of wider 
application:125 that which facilitates the exercise of a servitude (such as a road) may 
be made more commodious (such as by making it wider). 
 
At first, it seems that Le Gros allows improvements over and above what is strictly 
necessary for exercise of the servitude, but the context is important. This comment 
has on either side of it statements that it is not permissible to go outside the limits of 
the servitude. The extent of a servitude is determined and fixed at its creation, 
including implied content. If the right to make improvements is too broadly 
construed, the effect would be to rob of meaning the idea that the extent of the 
servitude is fixed.126 From Le Gros’ double emphasis on the fixedness of a servitude 
this could not have been his intention. 
 
At its most basic, implied content enables the servitude to be exercised. In 
determining implied content, French law, Quebec law, nd Louisiana law indicate 
that necessity is a key concept. All three state that rights which are necessary for the 
use of a servitude127 are obtained at the time of its constitution. The problem lies in 
knowing which rights are to be considered necessary. Although improvements that 
are wholly unnecessary for the exercise of the servitude may be insupportable, Le 
Gros’ comment suggests that the standard to be applied is not to be ascetic. The test 
could be characterised as one of “reasonable necessity”, which was the conclusion 
reached by the House of Lords in the landmark case of Moncrieff v Jamieson.128 
Although a Scottish appeal, it was approached, by the English judges at least, on the 
basis that English and Scots law on this topic was the same. 
 
(2) Illustration of a Test: Moncrieff v Jamieson  
In Moncrieff, the pursuers had an express servitude of access over the defenders’ 
land. Such was the topography129 that it was impossible to take a vehicle on to the 
                                                 
125 Indicated by “comme”. 
126 Cf: “fixité” in French law (see: ch 7 J). 
127 (France) arts 696, 697 CC; (Louisiana) art 743 CC; (Quebec) art 1177 CC. For Scotland and 
England, see: ch 7 H(2). The position in South Africa is unclear. 
128 2008 SC (HL) 1. 
129 The pursuers’ house was at the bottom of a small cliff: ibid, 3, para 3, per Lord Hope of Craighead. 
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dominant tenement. An implied right to load, unload, and turn a vehicle was 
accepted.130 The dispute centred on whether a right to park could be implied as 
ancillary to the servitude of access.131 The House held unanimously that it could.132 
 
Lords Hope, Scott, Rodger and Neuberger all considered what the test should be for 
the inclusion of ancillary rights. Lords Hope and Scott thought the right should be 
“necessary for the comfortable use and enjoyment of the servitude”,133 and 
“reasonably necessary”,134 respectively. They also thought that the parties to creation 
of the servitude needed to have contemplated the ancillary right.135 Lord Rodger’s – 
more restrictive – view was that that which was ancillary should be “essential to 
make the servitude […] effective or to carry out the purpose for which the servitude 
was granted”.136 Lord Neuberger opined that the implied right must be “reasonably 
necessary”,137 to which he added: 
 
“Without the necessity, there would be the danger of imposing an 
uncovenanted burden on the servient owner, based on little more than 
sympathy for the dominant owner; without the reasonbleness, there would 
be a danger of imposing an unrealistically high hurdle for the dominant 
owner.”138 
 
Lord Hope made a similar, but less full, justificatory statement.139 These accounts 
reflect the search for equilibrium between the respective rights of the dominant 
proprietor and the servient proprietor in this area.140 
 
It is noteworthy that all the judges reached the same final decision, despite semantic 
variations, and the additional “contemplation” element given by Lords Hope and 
                                                 
130 Ibid 12, para 32; 2008 SC (HL) 1, 19, para 52, per Lord Scott of Foscote. 
131 Which was previously unclear. See: Cusine & Paisley, 182 - 188, paras 3.48 – 3.52. Parking is a 
recognised servitude in Jersey law: Haas v Duquemin 2002 JLR 27.  
132 Although Lord Rodger expressed some reservations: 2008 SC (HL) 1, 24 – 34, paras 65 – 99. 
133 Ibid 11, para 29, per Lord Hope. 
134 Ibid 19, para 52, per Lord Scott. 
135 (Hope) ibid 11, para 30; (Scott) ibid 19, para 52. 
136 Ibid 29, para 82. 
137 Ibid 36, para 112. 
138 Ibid 36, para 112. 
139 “The use of the words ‘necessary’ and ‘comfortable’ strikes the right balance between the interests 
of the servient and the dominant proprietors”: 2008 SC (HL) 1, 11, para 29. 
140 See: ch 7 A. 
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Scott. The significance of the contemplation requirement seems minimal. If the 
presence or absence of such contemplation is assessed objectively, by reference to 
the “reasonable party”, any ancillary right necessary for the exercise of the servitude 
would always have been in the party’s contemplation. 
 
Lord Neuberger’s test is attractive because it is succinct and lacks the (perhaps) 
meaningless requirement of the “contemplation of the parties”. His justification of 
the inclusion of both “reasonably” and “necessary” accords with the spirit of the law: 
seeking an appropriate balance between ownership and a servitude. Inclusion of both 
“reasonably” and “necessary” may help to ensure that t e rights of both parties are 
considered adequately. 
 
For Jersey, Le Gros’ comment offers comparatively little to go on. However, on the 
basis that similitude may be claimed between servitudes in Jersey law and in other 
mixed jurisdictions (at least),141 the decision in Moncrieff provides some assistance. 
In any event, in order to be compatible with established principles of the Jersey law 
of servitudes,142 Le Gros’ statement needs to be construed conservatively. 
 
I. CIVILITER PRINCIPLE 
 
An obligation on a dominant owner to exercise a servitude in a reasonable manner – 
or civiliter – is implied. The civiliter rule is representative of the balance that the law 
makes between the dominant proprietor’s servitude, and the servient proprietor’s 
ownership.143 It can be traced back to Justinian’s Digest,144 and, therefore, it is 
unsurprising that the obligation is found in many jurisdictions.145 
 
                                                 
141 The greatest divergence is found in the area of creation, where acquisitive prescription is largely 
prohibited. But Quebec also applies this general rule. See: ch 6 D.  
142 Such the freedom of land from burdens and fixedness. 
143 See: ch 7 A. Also: Cusine & Paisley 387, para 12.02. 
144 D.8.1.9. See: Basnage Servitudes 486, 491. 
145 (England) Gray & Gray, 5.1.21; (Scotland) Erskine I stitute 2.9.34; (South Africa) Voet, vol 2, 
472. In France, it appears that the obligation is found, at least in part, in the doctrine of l’abus des 
droits, (on which: Josserand Esprit). Also: (Louisiana) the term is not used, but see Yiannopoulos 
Servitudes para 152; (Quebec) the term is not used, but see Lamontagne Biens 414 – 415, para 619. 
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The civiliter obligation is alluded to by Le Geyt (“l’on ne doit user d’aucune 
Servitude à heure induë”),146 noted explicitly by Basnage,147 and also alluded to by 
Le Gros (“La servitude doit être exercée de manière qu  celui qui en est le débiteur 
soit incommodé le moins possible”).148 Basnage’s exposition is fullest, and seems to 
be framed as a general proposition, as opposed to Le Geyt’s comment, which is 
confined to one aspect of exercise. It is this general obligation that is found in 
modern case law,149 in which the civiliter obligation is presented as exercise “in a 
way which minimizes inconvenience”150 to the servient tenement, a formulation 
which is consistent with the older materials. Thus, the obligation is one to minimise 
inconvenience, not to cause the minimum inconvenience possible.151 The dominant 
owner is bound to exercise the right reasonably, not to act in the best interests of the 
servient owner. 
 
The civiliter rule must be distinguished from the extent of the servitude, discussed 
above.152 Logically, determination of the latter is prior to consideration of the 
former.153 For example, a servitude giving a right of way by foot only may not be 
exercised with a vehicle, because that is outside the extent of the right. But if it is 
being exercised by foot only, that exercise, which is lawful in one respect, may be 
unlawful in another if it breaches the civiliter obligation. Thus, running backwards 
and forwards along a track to gain nothing but its erosion would be unlawful.154 
Similarly, using the right of way at night while making a great deal of noise may also 
be unlawful, depending upon whether or not the servient owner is within earshot. In 
                                                 
146 Code Le Geyt 3.11.9. 
147 Basnage Servitudes 486, 491. Also: Houard Dictionnaire vol 4, 204. 
148 121. 
149 Haas v Duquemin 2002 JLR 27, 40, para 44, per Hodge, JA; Colesberg v Alton 2003 JLR 47, 58, 
para 25, per Bailhache, Bailiff, and 2003 JLR 176, 187, para 39, per Southwell, JA. 
150 2002 JLR 27, 40, para 44, per Hodge JA; and, 2003 JLR 47, 58, para 25, per Bailhache, Bailiff 
(quoted, with approval, in the Court of Appeal: 2003 JLR 176, 187, para 39, per Southwell JA). 
151 Cusine & Paisley, 512 – 514, para 12.181.  
152 See: ch 7 E, F, G. 
153 “that requirement [the civiliter obligation] is concerned with the manner of the exercise of a 
servitude right, not with the prior question of the true extent of it.” Moncrieff v Jamieson 2005 SC 
281, 301, per Lord Hamilton. In the House of Lords, Lord Rodger rephrases this: “the crucial point is 
that the civiliter doctrine does not itself determine the extent of the servitude right; it only comes into 
play in order to regulate how that right is to be ex rcised.” 2008 SC (HL) 1, 33, para 95. 
154 This is akin to the French doctrine of abus de droit because the main aim seems to be a nuisance to 
one’s neighbour, with an absence, or insufficient presence, of pursuance of one’s own legitimate 
interests. 
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Colesberg v Alton,155 Southwell, JA, remarked that using the vehicular right of way 





Typically, allegations of “aggravation” arise when there is dispute between the 
dominant and the servient owners over what can be done within the limits of the 
servitude. The term is used by Le Gros, but whether he intended it to have technical 
significance is a moot point. His familiarity with t e French Civil Code – within 
which “aggravation” is a concept in the law of servitudes – may be of import. Indeed, 
perhaps Le Gros “transplanted” the term from French law into Jersey (or was 
complicit in that happening). Either way, aggravation s today a useful concept, with 
a certain pedigree in Jersey law. 
 
(1) Nature of aggravation 
“Aggravation” is a term used in Jersey, France, Louisiana, and Quebec.159 In Jersey, 
it was considered in Le Feuvre v Mathew and Colesberg v Alton.160 The starting point 
in both cases is a short passage from Le Gros where he states that “La servitude ne 
peut être aggravée”,161 but this is not a definition. At its most basic, it means some 
action by the dominant owner, which the law deems to be unacceptable. 
 
Le Gros makes further mention of “aggravation” while discussing natural 
servitudes.162 Of natural drain of rainwater from higher to lower ground, he writes 
that the owner of the higher ground “ne peut rien faire qui aggrave cette servitude”, 
                                                 
155 2003 JLR 176. 
156 Ibid 188, para 41. 
157 Ibid. 
158 See: ch 7 J. 
159 (France) art 702 CC; (Louisiana) Yiannopoulos Servitudes 431-433, para 156, and 426, para 152. 
Art 778 of the 1870 CC deals with aggravation (the English version does not use the word), but this 
article is neither repeated nor included in modifie form in the 1996 version; (Quebec) Lamontagne 
Biens 416, para 621, art 1186 CC. 
160 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1974) 2 JJ 49; Colesberg v Alton 2003 JLR 47, and 2003 JLR 176. 
161 Le Gros, 21. 
162 A natural servitude is one which arises from the relative position of the tenements. See, for 
example: Matthews & Nicolle, 11, para 1.41; Nicolle Immovable 48. 
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giving the example of polluting the water.163 He also recites part of a case on the 
same subject,164 where the court pronounces that the dominant owner is f ee to 
channel the water as he or she wishes on the dominant tenement, as long as the effect 
is not “d’aggraver artificiellement la servitude naturelle résultant de l’état des lieux 
ou d’incommoder indûment le voisin.”165 
 
It is possible that neither Le Gros nor the court intended the verb “aggraver” to have 
a specific legal meaning, but the cases appear to use “aggravation” as a term of art.166 
Therefore, it is important to be clear about what is being aggravated. A servitude is a 
burden on ownership. Its limits are fixed at the time of its creation. It is, therefore, 
impossible for the servitude itself to be made a greater weight, for it is a right with 
fixed boundaries. This has been described as the fixité of a servitude.167 When an 
aggravation occurs, it is the factual burden on the servient tenement that is increased. 
The French Civil Code expresses this clearly and accur tely, as aggravation of the 
condition of the servient tenement.168 
 
From the discussion in Le Feuvre169 and Colesberg,170 “aggravation” in Jersey law 
appears to have the following attributes: it is impermissible;171 it may occur when the 
factual burden on the servient tenement is increased or altered172 (the prohibition on 
such increase or alteration is also given by Basnage);173 if the purpose for which the 
servitude is used changes, aggravation results if the servitude is limited as to 
                                                 
163 Le Gros, 196. 
164 Gibaut v Le Rossignol (1900) 11 CR 188.  
165 Le Gros, 199. 
166 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1974) 2 JJ 49, 59, 62 – 63, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff; Colesberg v Alton 
2003 JLR 47, 52 – 58, per Bailhache, Bailiff; Colesberg v Alton 2003 JLR 176, 183 – 184, 186 – 188, 
per Southwell, JA. 
167 (France) art 702 CC, Carbonnier, vol 2, 1770, para 816; (Louisiana) fixité is not referred to, but the 
same principle that the dominant proprietor must remain within limits pertains also (consider: 
Yiannopoulos Servitudes 423 – 424, para 152); (Quebec) Lamontagne Biens 416, para 621. Atias 
suggests that a more realistic basis for this area of the law would be the mutability, or, perhaps, 
instability, of expressly granted servitudes: Atias “Mutabilité”. 
168 Art 702 CC. Also: Yiannopoulos Servitudes 431, para 156. 
169 See: ch 7 n166. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1974) 2 JJ 49, 59, Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff.  
172 Ibid 59, 61 – 62, 63. 
173 Servitudes 488 (although Basnage is discussing a specific servitude, the obligation must apply to 
all servitudes. Universal application is adverted to by the marginal heading, where the obligation is 
said to relate generally to “une servitude”). 
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purpose,174 but not if the servitude is general as to purpose;175 action which is beyond 
the scope of the servitude is characterised as aggravation;176 breach of the civiliter 
obligation is also characterised as aggravation.177 
 
The fundamental element in aggravation is that the limits of the servitude have been 
breached: the weight on the servient tenement has been increased without the 
justification of a servitude, that is, its condition has been aggravated. Aggravation is 
a convenient umbrella term for any kind of breach of a servitude. Whether there is 
aggravation may be determined by reference to the factual circumstances, the 
position of the tenements, interpretation of titles, or even the needs of the dominant 
tenement, and the prejudice to the servient tenement.178 
 
In practice, it may be that, in almost all instances where a remedy is given, prejudice 
has been suffered by the servient proprietor. The necessary presence of prejudice to 
the servient proprietor is recognised by Matthews and Nicolle.179 Where there is no 
prejudice, it may be held that the d minimis exception applies. 
 
(2) Effect of aggravation 
In Colesberg, it is stated – without discussion – that the result of aggravation is 
extinction of the servitude.180 This cannot be correct. The paragraph in Le Gros 
which mentions aggravation is followed immediately by a paragraph on the ways in 
which a servitude can be extinguished, but Le Gros’ account of the latter is 
suggestive of an exhaustive list, and aggravation is ot included.181 In Le Feuvre it 
was not said that aggravation of a servitude entailed ts extinction, even though 
aggravation was held to have occurred in that case.182 Instead, it was held that a 
                                                 
174 Colesberg v Alton 2003 JLR 47, 56 – 57, per Bailhache, Bailiff. 
175 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1974) 2 JJ 49, 63, Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
176 Colesberg v Alton 2003 JLR 176, 186, para 37, per Southwell, JA. 
177 Ibid 187-188, para 41. 
178 See: (France) Planiol & Ripert, vol 3, 965, para 984; (France) Jourdain, 217, para 160; (Louisiana) 
Yiannopoulos Servitudes 431, para 156; (Quebec) Lamontagne Bi ns 417, para 621. 
179 12, para 1.47. 
180 Colesberg v Alton 2003: JLR 47, 52, para 6, and 53, para 9, per Bailhache, Bailiff, and JLR 176, 
183, para 20, per Southwell, JA. 
181 Le Gros, 21. 
182 See: ch 7 E, for greater discussion. The conclusion that there was aggravation in that case may 
have been wrong. 
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change of purpose of a limited-purpose servitude rendered it no longer able to be 
exercised.183 Therefore, were the dominant proprietor to restore th  dominant 
tenement to its original use, the servitude could be exercised again (assuming it had 
not been extinguished by prescription).184 The origin of the idea in Colesberg that 
aggravation extinguished the servitude is not clear.185 However, on the basis of Le 
Gros and Le Feuvre v Mathew,186 it would appear to be erroneous. 
 
On the facts in Colesberg, were aggravation to lead to extinction, the result would be 
absurd. For example, a dominant proprietor in a car could be half way across the 
servient tenement and sound the horn. Supposing this noise to be a breach of the 
civiliter obligation, there is aggravation, the servitude is extinguished, and the 
dominant proprietor is a trespasser for the remainder of the journey. It may be 
possible for a resolutive condition to be included in the servitude grant which would 
have the effect of extinguishing the right upon aggr vation. However, even if a grant 
did contain such a condition, the extinction would be the result of agreement between 
the parties.187 Aggravation without prior agreement regarding its effect does not 
extinguish the right. 
 
K. RESIDUAL RIGHTS OF THE SERVIENT OWNER 
 
(1) No positive obligation  
It is common to all servitudes that no positive obligation is placed on the servient 
owner. This is the passive nature of servitudes.188 
 
(2) Negative obligation not to diminish the servitu de 
The servient owner has the right to use his property, xcept insofar as this is limited 
by the servitude.  Accordingly, the owner cannot do anything which results in 
                                                 
183 Le Feuvre v Mathew (1974) 2 JJ 49, 63, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
184 See: ch 8 F. 
185 Colesberg v Alton 2003 JLR 47, 52, para 6, and 53, para 9, per Bailhache, Bailiff (Royal Court). 
The wording of the Court of Appeal judgment is less conclusive (“the right of way was or should be 
extinguished”) Colesberg v Alton 2003 JLR 176, 183, para 20, per Southwell, JA. 
186 (1974) 2 JJ 49. 
187 See: Le Gros, 21. 
188 See: ch 6 A(2)(a). 
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diminution of the servitude right.189 This is a straightforward consequence of the 
grant of servitude; a grant must not be derogated from.190 
 
The obligation not to diminish a servitude was enforced in Turner v Société Tyler.191 
The defendant company carried out works, including some excavation, with the 
effect that the plaintiff’s servitudes of passage and of drawing water became all but 
incapable of exercise. The court ordered the company to restore the land to the state 
it had been in before the works began. 
 
                                                 
189 Le Gros, 36. 
190 Mercer v Bowers (1973) 1 JJ 2453. 
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Of the Jersey sources on the extinction of servitudes, the most comprehensive 
account is given by Le Gros.1 By contrast, the commentaries on the Reformed 
Custom do not generally purport to give an exhaustive list of methods of extinction, 
but focus on article 607, which provides for extinction by prescription. The five 
causes of extinction given by Le Gros are: agreement, confusion, renunciation by 
virtue of dégrèvement, expropriation, and non-use for forty years.2 The court in 
Felard Investments Ltd v The Trustees of “The Churc of Our Lady, Queen of the 
Universe”,3 recites this list, adding extinction “by destruction”.4 With the exception 
of renunciation by virtue of dégrèvement, which is specific to Jersey, these methods 





                                                 
1 Le Gros, 21. 
2 Ibid. 
3 (1978) JJ 1. 
4 Ibid 9, per Ereaut, Bailiff. 
5 For example: (France) arts 705, 706 CC; (England) Gray & Gray, 681 – 685; (Louisiana) arts 751, 
753, 765 CC; (Quebec) art 1191 CC, Loi sur l’expropriation LRQ, c E-24, art 55.2 et seq; (Scotland) 




As a real right in land, a servitude can be extinguished by passing a contract to that 
effect before the Royal Court.6 Le Gros gives this method as “Par la convention”,7 
and “convention” may be translated as “agreement”. If he servient owner wishes to 
extinguish the servitude, agreement of the dominant owner is necessary. However, 
there is nothing to suggest that the dominant owner cannot extinguish the servitude 




Le Gros says that confusion operates to extinguish a servitude “lorsque le fonds 
dominant et le fonds servant sont réunis dans la même main”.8 Basnage makes the 
important point that not only must the dominant and servient tenements come into 
the same ownership, but they must do so in their enti ety.9 If one part is missing from 
this unity, the servitude still exists. He also observes that extinction by confusion was 
possible in Roman law (as was extinction by prescription).10  
 
Lalaure, an eighteenth-century commentator on l’a cien droit, highlights another 
question: what type of title must a person hold in the dominant and servient 
tenement? If the owner of the dominant tenement acquires a right of usufruct in the 
servient tenement, or vice versa, the servitude is not lost by confusion11 because 
usufruct, like a praedial servitude, is a burden on the property, as opposed to 
ownership of it.12 The same is true of all the subordinate real rights.13 However, if 
ownership of one tenement and bare ownership of the o r are brought together, 
confusion will result. Both are ownership: bare ownership is simply ownership 
burdened by a particular subordinate real right (usufr ct).  
                                                 
6 For example: Felard v Church of Our Lady (1978) JJ 1, 9, 10, per Ereaut, Bailiff. See: ch 5. 
7 21. 
8 21 (cited with approval in Felard v Church of Our Lady (1978) JJ 1, 9, per Ereaut, Bailiff). See also: 
Carey, 215. 
9 Basnage Servitudes 494. For example: Johnson v Summers (1971) 1 JJ 1889. 
10 Basnage ibid. 
11 Lalaure Servitudes 64.  
12 See: ch 3 K. 
13 Ibid. 
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Regarding common property, Lalaure argues that if A and B have separate pieces of 
land, which are both dominant tenements in relation o C’s land, and A and B then 
become common owners of C’s land, these servitudes ar  not extinguished by 
confusion.14 If, however, A and B held the dominant tenement(s) in common 
ownership as well, the servitude would be extinguished. The type of ownership in 
dominant and servient tenement must be identical. 
 
The orthodox view of the effect of confusion is that it extinguishes, rather than 
merely suspends, a servitude.15  On the basis of Le Feuvre v Mathew,16 this appears 
to be the position in Jersey. Had the servitude subsi ted, unextinguished, during the 
time that dominant tenement and servient tenement wre held by the same person, 





Le Gros’s third method of extinction is “Par la renonciation en vertu de la procédure 
du Dégrèvement”.17 Dégrèvement is a procedure which enables the holder of a 
hypothec to enforce the security. Le Gros refers to the 1880 Law generally (which 
introduced the procedure) but not to any specific article. Article 50 appears most 
relevant, under which “le détenteur [therefore, the dominant owner] de bonne foi” of 
a servitude can elect to renounce it during a dégrèvement. (The reference to good 
faith appears to relate to the exception that persons with a voidable title do not have 
the option to keep their right in a dégrèvement.) The procedure is described by 
Nicolle: 
 
“If the servient tenement becomes subject to dégrèvement under the 
provisions of the Loi (1880) sur la propriété foncière, and the servitude was 
created by a contract passed before the Court subseq ent to the acquisition of 
the servient tenement by the person whose property is en dégrèvement, he 
contract creating the servitude will be listed in the dégrèvement, and the 
                                                 
14 Lalaure Servitudes 64. 
15 For example: ibid 65.  
16 (1973) 1 JJ 2461; (1974) 2 JJ 49. 
17 21. 
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owner of the dominant tenement will be called on to accept tenure of the 
property en dégrèvement or to renounce his contract. If he renounces his 
contract, the servitude ceases to exist.”18 
 
The principal insolvency proceeding in Jersey is now désastre.19 The Bankruptcy 




Le Gros’s fourth way of extinguishing a servitude is “Par l’expropriation pour cause 
d’utilité publique”.20 Several Laws confer on a minister the power to extinguish a 
servitude, the most important being the Compulsory Purchase of Land (Procedure) 
Law 1961.21 Compulsory purchase, including compulsory extinction of a servitude, 
is competent only in pursuance of a “Law confirmed by Order of Her Majesty in 
Council”.22 
 
Other Laws which expressly confer the power to extingu sh a servitude include: the 
Housing (Jersey) Law 1949, article 4(2)(b);23 the Postal Services (Jersey) Law 2004, 
article 44(4)(b); the Planning and Building (Jersey) Law 2002, article 119(3)(b); the 
Education (Jersey) Law 1999, article 63(2)(b); the Telecommunications (Jersey) Law 
2002, article 30(4)(b); and the Drainage (Jersey) Law 2005, article 33(4)(b). 
                                                 
18 Immovable 85 – 86. 
19 Matthews & Nicolle, 78, para 7.53. 
20 21. 
21 Arts 2(2)(b), 5. 
22 Compulsory Purchase of Land (Procedure) Law 1961, art 2(1). 
23 According to the Housing (Jersey) Law 1949, art 4(1), and the Postal Services (Jersey) Law 2004, 
art 44(1), compulsory purchase must be done in accordance with the provisions of the Compulsory 
Purchase of Land (Procedure) (Jersey) Law 1961. This means that the power of compulsory purchase 
can only be exercised in pursuance of a “Law confirmed by Order of Her Majesty in Council”: art 
2(1), Compulsory Purchase of Land (Procedure) (Jersey) Law 1961. 
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F. EXTINCTIVE PRESCRIPTION 
 
Le Gros’s fifth method of extinction is “Par suite du non-usage pendant quarante 
ans”.24 The reason he gives for this is that the servitude is presumed to have been 
renounced if it has not been asserted for such a length of time.25 This method of 
extinction is also given in the Code of 1771, in a passage similar to article 607 of the 
Reformed Custom.26 
 
The conditions for extinctive prescription are not the same for all servitudes. Some 
begin to prescribe when the dominant proprietor ceases to exercise the right (positive 
servitudes), while others require an act contrary to the servitude before prescription 
will start to run (negative servitudes). Basnage, Godefroy, and Lalaure identified the 
former group as (generally) rustic servitudes and the latter as (generally) urban 
servitudes.27 However, while there may be some loose correlation between when 
prescription operates and the categories of rustic and urban, this is incidental. 
Clearly, the conditions for the commencement of extinctive prescription depend upon 
whether the servitude is positive or negative.28 
 
Basnage states that extinctive prescription will not start to run unless the dominant 
proprietor is negligent or at fault.29 Thus, it will not run in the case of force majeure, 
because “on ne lui pourroit imputer de l’avoir abando né”.30 In such a case of 
impossibility of exercise, it may be best to think of the servitude as suspended. It is 
of comparative interest that this is no longer the case in Quebec: the law was changed 
in the interest of “stabilité des titres immobiliers”.31 
 
Basnage offers a final quirk: if B has a right of way over two properties, both of 
which are owned by A, extinctive prescription is interrupted by exercising the right 
                                                 
24 21. 
25 Ibid. 
26 “A la Cour du Samedi”. See also: Poingdestre Remarques on art 607. 
27 Basnage Servitudes 494, 495; Godefroy Coustume 456; Lalaure Servitudes 69. 
28 Houard Dictionnaire vol 4, 204. 
29 Basnage Servitudes 494. 
30 Ibid. Also: Lalaure, 72. 
31 Lafond Précis 915. 
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over one of the properties alone.32 At the least, this is a statement that should not be 
made without qualification. If the two servient tenements formed part of a path, it is 
easier to see why exercise of one of the servitudes may also preserve the other from 
extinction by prescription. In this example, the servitudes are both of the same type, 
and there is a strong connection between them, as they form part of the same path. 
These are exceptional circumstances, and likely to be rare in practice. Were the 
servitudes not so connected, it is hard to see any justification for holding that use of 
one alone preserves the other also. 
 
For negative servitudes, it seems that raising an action in respect of the breach should 
interrupt prescription because that is an assertion of the right. Whether the 
justification for extinctive prescription is taken to be the negligence,33 presumed 
abandonment,34 or presumed renunciation35 of the dominant proprietor, instigating 
court proceedings counters each of these allegations. For positive servitudes, one 
single instance of exercise during that period will ha t the running of prescription, 
which must then recommence from the beginning again. The servitude does not need 
to be exercised to its full extent for this to happen. Partial exercise is sufficient.36  
 
A thirty or forty year period used to be typical for extinctive prescription. However, 
this has been shortened in many jurisdictions. In France, the periods under the Ancien 
Régime differed: for example, in Normandy it was forty years, but thirty in Orléans.37 
Now, under article 706 of the French Civil Code a thirty-year period applies. South 
Africa also applies a thirty-year period.38 A ten-year period applies in Quebec and 
Louisiana.39 In Scotland, a middle ground of twenty years has been applied since 
1973.40 The forty-year period applicable to Jersey is the longest among these 
                                                 
32 Basnage Servitudes 494. 
33 Ibid. Of the three, it is this justification which rings most true if prescription cannot run following, 
for example, an act of God, but see: Johnston Prescription 16 – 17, paras 1.58 – 1.63. 
34 Basnage Servitudes 494. 
35 Le Gros, 21. 
36 Basnage Servitudes 494. Pesnelle, 618, n2. 
37 Pothier Coutume d’Orléans, Des Servitudes réelles art 226. 
38 Prescription Act 68 of 1969, s7. 
39 (Quebec) art 1191 CC; (Louisiana) art 753 CC. 
40 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, s7(1). 40 years had applied previously. 
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jurisdictions. Shortening the period, as has been do e in Guernsey,41 may now be 
appropriate. 
 
G. PARTIAL PRESCRIPTION 
 
Given that is it possible for a servitude to be lost by non-use, is it possible to lose 
only part of a servitude in the same way? For example, if part of a piece of land 
burdened by a servitude of way or by a servitude prohibiting building is built upon, 
can prescription operate to reduce the scope of the servitude to the extent of the land 
not developed? Alternatively, if a servitude of access is only exercised on foot for 
forty years, is the right to pass over the servient t ement by vehicle lost? These 
questions are not discussed by Poingdestre, Le Geyt, or Le Gros. 
  
Basnage considers prescription of the modes in which a servitude of access can be 
exercised. He suggests that the determinative factor is whether the rights are in 
“separate titles”: 
 
“Si celui qui a droit de chemin à pied, à cheval, à charrue & charrette, y passé 
seulement à pied durant le temps prefix pour la prescription de la liberté, 
sera-t-il censé avoir conservé le droit d’y passer à cheval & avec charrette? 
L’on fait cette distinction, que si ces droits ont été donnés par titres séparés, 
le droit de l’un ne se conserve point par la possession de l’autre; mais s’ils 
sont compris sous un même titre, il suffit d’y avoir passé à pied, pour 
conserver le droit d’y passer à cheval & avec charrette”.42 
 
The word “titre” is ambiguous,43  which renders the meaning of the passage obscure. 
It is common for two or more servitudes to be contained in one conveyance. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that “titre” refers to a physical document because it is clear 
that individual servitudes within a single conveyance are capable of independent 
extinctive prescription. “Titre” could mean clearly individual servitudes (that is, in 
separate clauses) whether in one document or not. A third possibility is that it refers 
to the level of detail given in the deed. If the right is simply stated as “servitude of 
                                                 
41 20 years: 1909 Law, s1. See also: “Review of Legislation, 1909” 11 (1910 – 1911) 2 Journal of the 
Society of Comparative Legislation 340, 351. 
42 Basnage Servitudes 494. 
43 Also true in other areas. See: ch 6 D. 
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access” (or equivalent), exercise on foot preserves th  right to pass by vehicle from 
extinctive prescription; if each of the modes of exercise is given, use on foot will not 
preserve the others, use with a vehicle. However, even if this is the correct reading of 
Basnage, it seems likely that use with a vehicle will always preserve use on foot, 
because the greater includes the lesser.44  
 
The second and third possibilities are similar: have the modes been set out 
separately, in such a way that they may be “crossed off”? Basnage does not use the 
term “partial prescription”, so it seems that he considered prescription of modes to be 
prescription proper, and thus each stipulated mode t  b , in effect, a separate grant. 
 
In Colesberg v Alton,45 although a servitude of access had been exercised only on 
foot for a number of years, partial prescription of the right to pass with a vehicle was 
rejected.46 The servitude had been created by an express grant, which was general as 
to mode of exercise.47 The decision is consistent with Basnage. However, the 
Bailiff’s reason for rejecting prescription seems to exclude partial prescription 
completely: 
 
“in relation to a consensual servitude, it is necessary to look at the title and 
the intention of the parties is to be drawn from the terms of the deed.”48 
 
If the extent of a servitude is always drawn from the deed, subsequent (non-)usage is 
irrelevant. In fact, this approach would exclude any extinctive prescription, partial or 
otherwise. This cannot be what the Bailiff intended. On that assumption, Colesberg 
indicates that partial prescription of a mode of exercise cannot take place where the 
grant is non-specific as to the ways in which the servitude can be exercised. 
 
Prescription affecting only part of the area burdened by a servitude does not appear 
to be discussed in the Jersey sources. However, it is recognised in some other 
                                                 
44 See: ch 8 F. 
45 2003 JLR 47 (Royal Court).  
46 Ibid 57, para 21, per Bailhache, Bailiff. 
47 The servitude is recited ibid 51, para 3. 
48 Ibid 57, para 21. 
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jurisdictions.49 A strong argument in favour of its recognition can be made. For 
example, if building has taken place in contravention of a negative servitude or over 
land burdened by a positive servitude, it is reasonble to afford security to the owner 
of that building upon the expiry of the prescriptive period, if no challenge has been 
raised. The building itself provides adequate publicity of the reduction of the right, to 
any interested party. The law could also respond to the breach by holding the 
servitude to be wholly extinguished, but that would favour the servient owner over 
the dominant owner, where it is not necessary to do so.50 
 
There are circumstances in which recognition of partial prescription would be 
undesirable. For example, it would be inconvenient f a servitude of égouts,51 created 
during a year of particular high rainfall, were partially to prescribe following (albeit 
perhaps improbably) forty years of very low rainfall. Subsequent high rainfall would 
lead to aggravation of the servitude. Égouts is a continuous servitude: it is not 
exercised by human intervention.52 It seems improbable, however, that the class of 
continuous servitudes could be considered incapable of partial prescription. A 
servitude prohibiting building is also continuous and is surely capable of partial 
prescription, otherwise an unlawful building which covered the burdened land 
entirely would become lawful after forty years, whereas one which only partially 
covered the burdened land would not. It may be, therefore, that a continuous 
servitude can partially prescribe when the relevant act is of human origin (such as 
building, and unlike rainfall). 
 
It may be noted that partial prescription consisting only of the loss of an accessory 
servitude is impossible. If the accessory servitude has not been used for forty years, 
neither will the primary servitude have been used, so both will be extinguished 
                                                 
49 For example: (France) art 708 CC, Planiol & Ripert, vol 3, 978, para 995 (and case law therein), 
Larroumet, 545, para 882; (Quebec) Lamontagne Biens 430 – 431, para 646. In Louisiana there is no 
partial prescription (art 759 CC) but see earlier (1870) position, described by Yiannopoulos Servitudes 
455 – 457, para 167. 
50 See: ch 6 A(3). 
51 Eavesdrop or eavesdrip. 
52 The Civilian sense: ch 6 C(4)(a). 
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together. Also, Basnage notes that exercise of an accessory servitude alone does not 




Destruction was recognised by the court in Felard54 as a way in which a servitude 
could be extinguished. It seems that destruction of either the dominant or the servient 
tenement will extinguish the servitude if, for example, “the structure was demolished 
with no intention to rebuild or is permanently converted to an entirely different 
facility.” 55 Generally speaking, as a servitude burdens the land, not what is built upon 
it, a building on the servient tenement that is destroyed or demolished will still be 
subject to the servitude if it is rebuilt. Destruction, or loss, of a piece of land is 
unusual. In Jersey it may occur if, for example, reclaimed land is retaken by, or given 
back to, the sea. 
 
I. END OF FIXED TERM 
 
A servitude created “à fin d’héritage” is perpetual. Logically, however, it is possible 
to create a servitude for a fixed term.56 At the expiry of this term, the servitude is 
extinguished. 
  
J. FULFILMENT OF RESOLUTIVE CONDITION 
 
There appears to be no impediment to creating a servitude subject to a resolutive 
condition. The servitude would be extinguished upon fulfillment of the condition.57 
 
                                                 
53 Servitudes 494. 
54 (1978) JJ 1, 9, per Ereaut, Bailiff. 
55 Cusine & Paisley, 692. 
56 Discussed in: (Scotland) Cusine & Paisley, 701 – 702, para 17.32; (Louisiana) Yiannopoulos 
Servitudes 467 – 477, para 172; (Quebec) Lamontagne Bi ns 426, para 639; (South Africa) 
Badenhorst & Pienaar, 338. 
57 See: (France) Larroumet, 537, para 873; (Louisiana) Yiannopoulos Servitudes 467 – 477, para 172; 
(Scotland) Cusine & Paisley, 701 – 702, para 17.32; (South Africa) van der Merwe & de Waal 
Servitudes 503 – 504, para 617. 
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K. AVOIDANCE OF TITLE TO LAND 
 
It is unclear whether avoidance of title to land is retroactive in Jersey law. If it is, and 
one of the parties to the constitution of a servitude subsequently has his title reduced, 
any servitudes would be extinguished.58 The use of “extinguished” is a loose one, 
because if reduction is retroactive, the servitude was never validly constituted as one 
of the parties to its creation was not an owner, and so incapable of the act he or she 
purported to perform. 
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This chapter is concerned with an aspect of the relationship between the law of 
property and the law of tort. What is the law applicable when one neighbour, through 
use of his or her land, interferes with the land of another neighbour? This may take 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as “Voisinage and Nuisance” (2009) JGLR 274. The 
consent of the editor for reproduction here has been obtained. 
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the form of physical damage to, or interference with enjoyment of, immovable 
property. “Interference with property” is used to refer to these collectively. 
 
In Jersey case law, the court has often granted remedies in respect of interferences 
with property with reference either to “nuisance” or the doctrine of “voisinage”. 
Recent litigation has raised questions concerning the place and nature of these legal 
concepts in Jersey law. Are they functional equivalents? Under what circumstances 
does each apply? Is it even the case that they are both part of Jersey law? Gale & 
Clarke v Rockhampton Apartments2 concerned damage to a building resulting from 
activity on neighbouring land. In the Royal Court, it was held that the appropriate 
basis for the action was the law of voisinage.3 The Court of Appeal, upholding these 
findings, further suggested that voisinage might be restricted to cases where there 
was damage to buildings.4 In the subsequent case of Yates v Reg’s Skips,5 noise 
generated on one property adversely affected the enjoyment of another.6 In the Royal 
Court, both parties agreed that the doctrine of voisinage was applicable.7 The Royal 
Court granted the injunction sought by the plaintiffs.8 On appeal the decision was 
upheld, but the court was unsure about the basis of the action.9 The law now appears 
uncertain. 
 
In Roman law, a Digest text records that discharging smoke into the building above 
was impermissible.10 However, Roman sources also present the apparently 
conflicting rule that the inevitable escape of smoke into neighbouring premises, 
                                                 
2 Gale v Rockhampton 2007 JLR 27 (Royal Court); Rockhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 332 (Court of 
Appeal). 
3 Gale v Rockhampton 2007 JLR 27, 41 – 42, paras 30 – 31, per Bailhache, Bailiff. 
4 Rockhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 332, 384, paras 151 and 154, and 387, para 164, per McNeill, JA. 
5 Yates v Reg’s Skips 2007 JRC 237, unreported (Royal Court) (also: 2007 JLR N65); Reg’s Skips v 
Yates 2008 JLR 191 (Court of Appeal).  On this case see: Voisinage and Customary Law: Review, 
lodged at the Greffe on 5 January 2009 by Senator BE Shenton; and the response, Voisinage and 
Customary Law: Review (P.1/2009) – Comments presented to the States on 6 March 2009 by the 
Council of Ministers. A Jersey Law Commission Consultation Paper on voisinage has been drafted, 
but this has not been published on the Commission’s website (http://www.lawcomm.gov.je). 
6 Yates v Reg’s Skips 2007 JRC 237, unreported, para 4, per Bailhache, Bailiff. 
7 Ibid para 8. 
8 Ibid para 34. 
9 Reg’s Skips v Yates 2008 JLR 191, 200 – 201, para 30, and 202, para 34, per Jones, JA. 
10 D.8.5.8.5. See, for example: Gordley “Nuisance”. 
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concomitant to lighting a fire in a hearth, was permissible.11 Thus, causing 
inconvenience to one’s neighbour was on some occasions lawful, but on others it was 
not. The reconciliation of these rules is an enduring legal problem. Though the 
factual and legal contexts vary, the underlying issue is the same, namely, balancing 
the competing rights of the parties. This is true of b th Common Law and Civilian 
jurisdictions, but also in the mixed jurisdictions, of which Jersey is one. The debate 
in Jersey over the respective places of nuisance and the doctrine of voisinage has 
been cast in terms of whether a Common Law or Civilian approach prevails in this 
area of the law.12 For Jersey, this could be stated more specifically: does the 
influence of English law or the influence of French law prevail? For this reason, the 
approaches of these two jurisdictions will be reviewed briefly. Some of the mixed 
jurisdictions are considered also – including Guerns y – in order to locate Jersey law 
within that class. These mixed jurisdictions exhibit variations on the English and 
French themes. Following this, the Jersey materials are examined. 
 
(1) English Law and Nuisance  
In England, physical damage to, or interference with enjoyment of, the immoveable 
property of a neighbour can constitute a private nuisance.13 This is a tort, for which 
the victim may obtain an injunction or damages. Theactivity need not be unlawful in 
itself;14 it is the resulting effect which generates the wrong. A characteristic doctrine 
of English law, and of the Common Law world more generally, nuisance is unknown 
in the Civil Law world. 
 
                                                 
11 D.8.5.8.6. 
12 Hanson “Tort”. 
13 Distinguished from a public nuisance, which is a criminal offence and “affects the reasonable 
comfort and convenience of a class of Her Majesty’s subjects who come within the sphere or 
neighbourhood of its [the nuisance’s] operation”: Dugdale & Jones Clerk & Lindsell 20–03. 
Interference with easement and profits, and some typ s of encroachment also fall within the scope of 
private nuisance: Dugdale & Jones Clerk & Lindsell 20–06. 
14 Also, that planning permission has been granted does not in itself render an owner immune from 
liability for interference with property: see ch 9 B(5), and comments to a similar effect in the 
Guernsey case of Fruit Export Company Ltd v Guernsey Gas Light Company 3 May 1994 (Guernsey 
Royal Court) 20, per de Vic Graham Carey, Deputy Bailiff. 
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Balancing the parties’ rights against one another is the principal exercise involved in 
establishing whether there is liability.15 This is expressed through the principle of 
unreasonable user (or the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas), which applies 
to all (private) nuisances.16 A distinction is made between instances of physical 
damage to property and instances of interference with enjoyment of it,17 but this 
division should not be overstated.18 Whether user was unreasonable is determined by 
reference to the level of harm where damage is physical, while a number of other 
factors, including the character of the neighbourhood19 and the duration of the 
nuisance,20 are considered where interference with enjoyment is the subject of the 
complaint. 
 
The role of fault in establishing liability for nuisance is a troubled question.21 In the 
leading case of Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather,22 Lord Goff stated that 
although the principle of reasonable user lies at the heart of the tort of nuisance, this 
does not mean that the “defendant should be held liable for damage of a type which 
he could not reasonably foresee.”23 This illustrates the general position of the law, 
which is that liability is not now strict.24 
 
In addition to the law of nuisance, the rule in Rylands v Fletcher25 also provides 
redress in some circumstances. Originally, the rule imposed strict liability where the 
harm complained of was the consequence of a non-natural use of land. Non-natural 
use is constituted by bringing something “not naturlly there” on to the land,26 
although that action must bring with it “increased danger to others”.27 The potentially 
                                                 
15 Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880, 903, per Lord Wright; Dugdale & Jones Clerk & 
Lindsell 20–01. 
16 Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966, 980, per Lord Denning, MR. 
17 St Helens Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) 11 HLC 642, 650, per Lord Westbury, LC. 
18 See: Deakin Tort 511 – 512. 
19 Sturges v Bridgman (1879) LR 11 Ch D 852, 865, per Thesiger, LJ. 
20 Dugdale & Jones Clerk & Lindsell 20–16. 
21 See: Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645, 657, per Lord Wilberforce; Deakin Tort 526 – 528.  
22 [1994] 2 AC 264. 
23 Ibid 300, noting the influence of the law of negligence. 
24 Dugdale & Jones Clerk & Lindsell 20–37, 20–38. Also: Deakin Tort 528. 
25 (1868) LR 3 HL 330. 
26 Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330, 340, per Lord Cairns. 
27 Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263, 280, per Lord Moulton. Also: British Celanese v AH Hunt 
(Capacitors) Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 959. 
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wide ambit of the rule has been restricted by subsequent case-law,28 and the strict 
liability of the rule has also been eroded by the introduction of a requirement of 
foreseeability as a component of Rylands liability.29 
 
English law in this area has influenced some mixed jurisdictions, including 
Guernsey, Scotland and South Africa. 
 
(2) Some Mixed Jurisdictions 
Several Guernsey cases apply a law of nuisance, but the context in which that law 
sits is not clear. For example, does Guernsey have a law of tort, or a law of torts? 
That is, is there a list of nominate torts or is tort a general category of (civil) 
“wrongness”? The extent of the presence or influence of English law is also unclear. 
Case-law suggests that there are at least similarities between the law of nuisance in 
Guernsey and that of English law.30 
 
In Scotland, the law of nuisance was subject to a number of early influences, but, 
sometime after 1750,31 English law became dominant among these.32 Although there 
are similarities between Scots and English law in this area,33 there are also 
differences. For example, the Scots law of nuisance is narrower in scope and the rule 
in Rylands v Fletcher34 does not apply.35 Additionally, the doctrine of aemulatio 
vicini, a limited form of liability for abuse of right, is present in Scots law.36 
 
                                                 
28 For example: Read v Lyons [1947] AC 156. 
29 Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather [1994] 2 AC 264, 306, per Lord Goff of Chieveley. 
30 See: Dadd v Guernsey Rifle Club 10 May 1993 (Guernsey Royal Court), 3 August 1994 (Guernsey 
Court of Appeal). Fruit Export Company Ltd v Guernsey Gas Light Company Ltd 3 May 1994 
(Guernsey Royal Court), 2 October 1995 (Guernsey Court f Appeal); Morton v Paint 9 February 
1996 (Guernsey Court of Appeal) 5, per Southwell, JA. See generally: Dawes Laws 691 – 701. 
31 Whitty Nuisance para 16. 
32 Ibid paras 7, 16. 
33 For example: ibid paras 32 (law will not provide redress in all instances), 39, 41; Watt v Jamieson 
1954 SC 56, 58, per Cooper, LP (test of objective intolerability); RHM Bakeries v Strathclyde 
Regional Council 1985 SC (HL) 17 (liability is not strict, and fault required to be proved before 
damage will be awarded).  
34 (1868) LR 3 HL 330. 
35 RHM Bakeries v Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 SC (HL) 17, 42, per Lord Fraser of 
Tullybelton. Generally: Whitty Nuisance paras 18–25. 
36 Whitty Nuisance paras 33–36. Reid “Abuse” particularly 153 – 155. 
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South African law has undergone a partial reception of English law in this area.37 
However, private nuisance is restricted to interfernce with enjoyment of property, as 
the actio legis Aquiliae covers physical damage.38 Also, the South African law of 
nuisance is generally thought to be a strict-liabilty doctrine, although it has been 
argued (in the context of a comparison with Scots law) that this divergence is largely 
one of “form rather than substance”.39 
 
(3) French Law: Troubles Anormaux ou Excessifs de Voisinage  
The French law of civil liability (responsabilité civile) is based on articles 1382 to 
1386 of the Civil Code, supplemented by special regim s, or rules created post-
codification dealing with specific factual situations, such as road traffic accidents. 
All contribute to form the law applicable when one neighbour, through the use of his 
or her land, causes physical damage to, or interference with enjoyment of, the land of 
another neighbour. 
 
Where the damage complained of has been caused by the fault, negligence, or 
recklessness of the wrongdoer, liability attaches by virtue of articles 1382 and 1383 
of the Civil Code. In addition, article 1384-140 makes a person strictly liable for the 
damage caused by things under his guardianship, ands “things” includes 
immovable property, liability under article 1384-1 may be invoked in some 
circumstances where there is interference with property. Similarly, article 1386, 
(liability for damage caused by a ruined building which is, in effect, strict),41 will be 
applicable in some instances. 
 
                                                 
37 Church & Church Nuisance para 167. D Van Der Merwe, “Neighbour Law” in Zimmermann & 
Visser Southern 759. 
38 Church & Church Nuisance para 169. 
39 F Du Bois & E Reid “Nuisance” in Zimmermann & Visser Mixed 589 – 590.  
40 This part of the article was originally intended as an introduction only; its interpretation as a source 
of liability began in 1896 (l’arrêt Teffaine 18 Juin 1896: D.1897.1.433, conclusions Sarrut, note 
Saleilles). Also: Borghetti “Responsabilité”. 
41 There is an irrebuttable presumption that the owner of the building was at fault: Roubier “1386” 
para 1, I. 
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The judge-made doctrine of troubles de voisinage42 (or “neighbourhood 
disturbances”) protects “the peace of private individuals” where the “normal 
inconveniences of life in a neighbourhood” have been xceeded.43 Elements of this 
type of liability are found in the work of pre-codification jurists, but the origin of the 
modern doctrine is a case from 1844, in which the noise from a factory was declared 
to have exceeded the level a neighbour is obliged to tolerate.44 Thereafter, the rule 
developed that the problem must be in some way “abnormal” and the damage 
“excessive” before liability arises.45 Anything below this threshold must be tolerated, 
but the wrongdoer is strictly liable46 for anything above the threshold. A variety of 
activities have been held to constitute troubles, for example: noise from a flat,47 
dust,48 smoke,49 deprivation of view,50 and construction works resulting in cracks and 
fissures in neighbouring property.51 Additionally, trouble may also be constituted by 
the risk of damage occurring, for instance, through of proximity to a golf course.52 
 
In respect of troubles de voisinage, it is possible to obtain an injunction, damages or 
both. What is awarded is the sole province of the judge. As with responsabilité civile 
under articles 1382 to 1386, there must be a fait générateur (juridical fact53 
triggering legal consequences), damage, and a causal link between the two.54 The 
abnormal use of property constitutes the fait générateur.55 Much juristic ink has been 
expended in seeking the basis for the doctrine.56 The search ended with a definitive 
                                                 
42 See, for example: Dalloz’ note to article 544, “Responsabilité pour troubles anormaux de 
voisinage”. The doctrine of troubles de voisinage has caused conceptual problems because it is not 
found in the exhaustive list of limitations on ownership in art 544. 
43 G Viney “Tort Liability” in Bermann & Picard Introduction 254. 
44 Civ 27 nov 1844, S. 1844.1.811. 
45 Viney & Jourdain Conditions 1199 – 1200, para 939. 
46 In cases where the problem occurs more than once, however, Reid and du Bois’s argument could be 
applied (see: ch 9 A(2) final para). 
47 Such as vacuuming and footfall: Civ 2e, 3 janv 1969: D. 1969. 323. 
48 Civ 2e, 22 oct 1964: D. 1965. 344. 
49 Civ 1er, 1er mars 1977: Bull. civ. I, nº 112. 
50 26 janv 1993 (Nº de pourvoi: 91-15352). 
51 Civ 3e, 25 oct 1972: Bull. civ. III, nº 560 (Nº de pourvoi: 71-12434). 
52 Civ 2e, 10 juin 2004 (Nº de pourvoi: 03-10434), which can be compared with the English case 
Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966. 
53 On this concept: ch 9 D(2). 
54 Viney & Jourdain Conditions 1218, para 953. 
55 Ibid. 
56 For a brief summary: ibid 1202 – 1205. Also: Yocas Troubles; Leyat Responsabilité. 
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statement by the Cour de cassation that it was a form of no-fault liability,57 
distinguishing the doctrine from responsabilité civile generally, and from the 
doctrine of abuse of rights (abus des droits).58 Where the juges du fonds 59 determine 
that a particular damage falls under liability for troubles de voisinage, liability under 
articles 1384-1, and 1386 can no longer be applied.60 
 
The French are currently considering codal revisions. The property law reforms 
suggested by the Association Hénri Capitant in its Avant-projet de réforme du droit 
des biens include codification of the French doctrine of troubles de voisinage.61 The 
comparable laws in Quebec and Louisiana are codified and are similar to the French 
law, having been influenced by it. 
 
Article 976 of the Quebec Civil Code provides that “[n]eighbours shall suffer the 
normal neighbourhood annoyances that are not beyond the limit of tolerance they 
owe each other, according to the nature or location of their land or local custom.” 
The concept expressed by this article carries the same name as its French law 
counterpart: troubles de voisinage. As with French law, Quebec law makes a 
distinction between normal and abnormal inconveniences.62 Damages, injunction or 
both are available as remedies.63 Fault is not a necessary component of liability.64 
Liability can also arise under the general delictual provisions in the Code.65 In 
contrast to article 1384-1 of the French Civil Code, article 1465 of the Quebec Civil 
Code does not create strict liability in respect of damage caused by things under the 
wrongdoer’s control, but only a presumption of fault. Article 1467 of the Quebec 
Code (relating to ruinous buildings or those with a defect of construction, and 
                                                 
57 Responsabilité sans faute: Civ 2e, 24 avr 1989, 87-16696. 
58 On which, see: Josserand Esprit. 
59 Judges of both fact and law. This excludes the Cour de cassation. 
60 Civ 2e, 18 juill 1984: Bull. civ. II, nº 136. 
61 Arts 629, 630 (see: http://www.henricapitant.org/node/70, accessed on 12 August 2011). Reform of 
the law of obligations is the first priority. 
62 For example: Katz c Reitz [1973] CA 230; Dumas Transport Inc c Cliche [1971] CA 160 (this 
decision is doubtful on other grounds. See: Lafond Précis 411). 
63 Arts 1601, 1607 QCC. Lamontagne Biens 179, para 238. 
64 Gourdeau c Letellier de St-Just 2002 CanLII 41118 (QC CA) para 44, per Thibault, JCA; Popovici 
“Poule”. 
65 Art 1457 QCC is equivalent to art 1382 FCC; Art 1467, para 1 QCC is equivalent to art 1386 FCC. 
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equivalent to article 1386 of the French Code) imposes strict liability. Under article 
1457, fault-based liability can arise for negligenc and carelessness. 
 
In the Louisiana Civil Code, articles 667 to 669 apply specifically to relations 
between neighbours. These articles are located in the property law section of the 
Code. They are said to create legal servitudes66 (which may be described as 
limitations on ownership arising ex lege),67 but this classification has been criticised, 
particularly in relation to article 669, because of the absence of distinct dominant and 
servient estates.68 Articles 667 and 669 impose restrictions on the right of 
ownership.69 The former states that a proprietor shall not do anything on his or her 
own land “which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or 
which may be the cause of any damage to him”. Liability for damages under this 
article is not strict, except where the activity complained of is pile-driving or blasting 
with explosives. Under article 669 neighbours can incur liability for “different 
inconveniences” that they cause to one another.70 Yiannopoulos argues that the 
threshold for liability under article 669 is determined by reference to use which is 
“abnormal” or “exceptional” and “causes damage or excessive inconvenience to 
neighbors” (which is similar to the French law terminology of abnormal or excessive 
neighbourhood disturbances and the English law principle of unreasonable user).71 In 
the application of article 669, the courts have someti es had regard to elements of 
Common Law “nuisance”, but this has been criticised as incompatible with 
Louisiana law.72 
 
                                                 
66 See: Parish of East Feliciana v Guidry 923 So2d 45 (La App 1 Cir 2005) 52, per McClendon, J. 
67 For example: Yokum v 615 Bourbon Street, LLC 977 So2d 859 (La 2008) 872, per Kimball, J. For 
Jersey, see also: ch 6 D(2). 
68 See: Robichaux v Huppenbauer 245 So2d 385 (La 1971) 392, per Barham, J. 
69 Yiannopoulos Servitudes 98, para 34. 
70 A note to this article says: “The English text of CC 1808 is a more complete and preferable 
translation of the French text than the present English text.” The 1808 equivalent is art 17: “The works 
or other thing which every one may make or have in his own grounds, and which send into the 
apartments of others who dwell in the same house, or int  the neighboring houses, a smoke or smells 
that are offensive, such as the works of tanners and diers, and the other different inconveniencies 
[inconveniences] which one neighbor may cause to another, ought to be borne with, if the service of 
them is established, or if there be no service settled, he inconvenience shall either be borne with or 
hindred [hindered], according as the rules of the police or usage may have provided in said matter.” 
71 Yiannopoulos Servitudes 119, para 42. 
72 Ibid 157 – 158, para 53. 
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Under article 668, some inconvenience must be tolerated. Accordingly, the negative 
side of ownership is restricted,73 that is, the capacity to prevent others from acting in 
a way which infringes one’s ownership. Breach of the obligations under these articles 
can give rise to damages, an injunctive remedy or both.74 Liability under articles 668 
and 669 is strict.  
 
Liability may also arise under the general delictual provisions75 of the Code, which 
include liability without reference to negligence for “ultrahazardous activities” (other 
than those covered by article 667).76 Liability can attach to a person for abuse of 
right, either under article 2315 or article 667.77  
 
(4) Similarities and Differences 
Each jurisdiction so far considered employs either a distinction between normal and 
abnormal inconveniences or a test of what is objectiv ly reasonable78 in order to 
locate the threshold for liability. It is submitted that there is no significant difference 
between the two and that, therefore, there is no difference on this point between the 
Civilian approach (normal and abnormal inconveniences), as adopted in France, 
Quebec, and Louisiana, and the Common Law approach (objectively reasonable) of 
England, Scotland, and South Africa. This is perhaps unsurprising: it is a common-
sense approach to a thoroughly practical problem. Gordley’s view is that the 
Common Law maxim sic utere tuo ut neminem laedas,79 first found in Blackstone’s 
Commentaries,80 is a restatement of Odofredus’s commentary on Digest 8.5.8.5: 
                                                 
73 Yiannopoulos Servitudes 98, para 34. 
74 Ibid 139, para 50, and 176, para 61. 
75 Art 2315 – 2324 LaCC. 
76 Yiannopoulos Servitudes 107, para 38. Langlois v Allied Chemical Corp 249 So2d 133, 139 – 140 
(1971) per Barham, J. 
77 For example: Higgins Oil & Fuel Company v Guaranty Oil Company 145 La 223, 82 So 206 
(1919); Yiannopoulos Servitudes 146, para 51. 
78 On “reasonableness” in this context, see also: Gale v Rockhampton 2007 JLR 27, 37, para 18, per 
Bailhache, Bailiff. 
79 Alternatively given as ic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas [so use your own property as not to injure 
that of another] (see, for example: Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880, 903, per Lord 
Wright). See: Searley v Dawson (1971) 1 JJ 1687, 1699, per Le Masurier, Bailiff; Yiannopoulos 
Servitudes para 32 “the common reservoir of the civilian tradition”, and 156, para 53. 
80 Blackstone Commentaries 3.217. 
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unusquisque debet facere in suo quod non officiat alieno.81 If that is correct, the law 
in this area finds its origins in the Digest for both the Common Law and the Civilian 
systems. The primary principle in all of the systems considered, therefore, is that the 
respective rights of the parties should be balanced against one another, however that 
may be expressed. 
 
A second similarity is that, in each system, more than one set of rules is potentially 
applicable. Thus, while there are specific rules concerning, for example, nuisance or 
troubles de voisinage, the general law of negligence may also be applicable. 
 
Although there is some convergence between the laws of the jurisdictions 
considered, they also diverge, for example, in relation to whether liability is strict, 
fault-based, or a mixture of both.82 Thus, the precise circumstances in which a 
remedy will be granted also differ. Further, the types of inconvenience deemed to be 
unacceptable are also not identical, and the systems considered show variation in 
where the balance between the parties’ rights is deemed to lie. The structure of the 
law is not uniform. In South Africa, an important distinction is made between 
interference with enjoyment (which is covered by nuisance) and physical damage 
(which is covered by the general law of negligence). Another divergence of potential 
significance is that the relevant rules are not always found in the law of tort, but are 
sometimes located in the law of property, such as in the case of Louisiana. 
 
It may be helpful to measure these different system against the English law of 
nuisance. Scots law (and probably also Guernsey law) h s a law of nuisance which is 
substantially similar to that of English law. In South Africa, this is partially true (the 
law of nuisance only applying where there is interference with enjoyment). The 
equivalent Louisianan law, found in articles 667 to 669 of the Civil Code, is directly 
comparable to the English law of nuisance. The equivalent law in France and 
                                                 
81 Gordley Method 83, citing “Odofredus, Lectura super digesto veteri at D 8.5.8.5 (1550)” (Opera 
iuridica rariora vol 2).  
82 Strict, for example: (France) troubles de voisinage, and art 1384-1 liability; (South Africa) liability 
for nuisance in South Africa (at least nominally); (Louisiana) liability under arts 668, 669 CC; 
(Quebec) liability under art 976 CC. Arts 667 – 669 of the Louisiana CC demonstrate a mixture of 
strict liability and fault-based liability. In English law, and in Scots law, liability is fault-based. 
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Quebec, however, is more fragmented, being spread across the doctrine of troubles 
de voisinage, articles on acts of things under one’s guardianship, and articles on 
liability for ruinous buildings or those suffering from a defect of construction. Of 
these, the primary functional comparator is the doctrine of troubles de voisinage, the 
other articles providing for specific instances of liability. Troubles de voisinage 
creates liability for excessive inconvenience within the framework of a 
neighbourhood, giving it the necessary generality and geographical dimension to 
make it most analogous to nuisance. 
 
Jersey law in this area is uncertain. The foregoing comparative survey presents some 
specific questions which can be asked of Jersey law in order to achieve clarification. 
For example: is the applicable Jersey law property law, tort law, or both? How many 
doctrines make up the law which is functionally comparable to the English law of 
nuisance? Is liability strict or not? What is the treshold for liability? What are the 
available remedies? With these in mind, the Jersey sources are now considered. 
 
B. VOISINAGE AND NUISANCE IN JERSEY  
 
(1) Early Cases and Materials 
What may be the earliest mention of this area of the law in the Jersey sources appears 
in Hemery and Dumaresq’s Statement of the Mode of Proceeding and of Going to 
Trial in the Royal Court of Jersey of 1789.83 (A more definitive statement cannot be 
made without further historical research, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.)84 
Regarding the jurisdiction of the Saturday’s (Samedi) Court, Hemery and Dumaresq 
write that this concerns “principally actions of waste, nuisance, trespass, disturbance, 
and such like injuries, committed to the prejudice of houses, woods, or lands.”85 The 
context suggests that “nuisance” already had a specific technical meaning in Jersey. 
Nonetheless, it cannot be assumed that this passage refers to the English law of 
nuisance. Although Hemery and Dumaresq wrote in English (for an English 
                                                 
83 See: ch 1 n61. 
84 The “querela novae dissaisinae” is found in the Très-Ancien Coutumier, but this is a forerunner to, 
rather than an early example of, the modern regime in this area. See further: the final paragraph of this 
section.  
85 Hemery & Dumaresq, 30. 
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audience), French was the legal language of the jurisdiction. It is, therefore, possible 
that the English legal term was used only because it most closely fitted the existing 
Jersey legal concept.86 
 
Le Geyt does not consider “nuisance”, or an equivalent. Poingdestre uses the word 
“voisinage” in his commentary on servitudes in the Reformed Custom of 
Normandy,87 but it seems unlikely that it is used as a term of art, for it appears as part 
of a list of otherwise loosely synonymous words, and therefore the best translation is 
probably “neighbourliness” or similar.88 Le Gros uses the word “voisinage” twice. 
The first use seems to mean “neighbourliness”.89 The second use is as part of the 
statement that “le droit de voisinage oblige les voisins à souffrir quelque 
incommodité les uns pour les autres”, but it occurs within a quotation of Basnage,90 
with which passage Le Gros goes on to disagree.91 L  Gros repeats the principle at 
the beginning of another section,92 but provides no information on how it is to be 
enforced: by an action in voisinage, or (as in English law) by an action in tort? For 
this, cases must be examined. 
 
A number of unreported Jersey cases would be analysed today as instances of private 
nuisance, troubles de voisinage or some equivalent. Nine such cases are here 
considered, dating from 1889 to 1962. In Curry v Horman (1889),93 manure piled on 
one property resulted in a nauseating stench on neighbouring land. The defendant, 
having worked the offending matter into the ground a  so eliminated the problem, 
was condemned only to pay the costs of the action. Damages were awarded in Arm v 
                                                 
86 Also: Rockhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 332, 375, para 127, per McNeill, JA. 
87 “amité voisinage familiarité courtoisie ou semblables causes” Remarques “Servitudes”, introductory 
passage. 
88 Gale v Rockhampton 2007 JLR 27, 33-34, para 9; Rockhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 332, 348, para 32, 
per McNeill, JA. 
89 36 – 37. 
90 119. See: Basnage Servitudes 499. His words are resonated in Pothier. 
91 On the ownership of fruits falling on neighbouring land, and on which Le Gros is probably wrong. 
(See: Code Le Geyt 3.11.10; Matthews & Nicolle, 15, paras 1.59 – 1.60; Nicolle Immovable 45 – 46. 
The law appears to be that the fruit is divided betwe n the owner of the tree and the owner of land on 
which it fell. Following the normal rule for accession of fruits (see: ch 4 E(4)) the owner of the tree 
would alone be entitled to the fruit. That is Le Gros’ view, although he cites only English law to 
support it.) 
92 222: “Le propriétaire d’un héritage doit jouir et user de sa propriété de manière qu’il n’incommode 
pas indûment son voisin.” 
93 (1889) 213 Ex 511. 
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De La Mare (1899)94 because of smoke and cinders coming from a chimney o  the 
defendant’s property, connected to his printing business. Dutton v Constable of St 
Helier (1901)95 concerned noise, smell and fine dust connected with the operation of 
a parish incinerator, which affected enjoyment of the plaintiff’s property and resulted 
in some damage to his vegetation. Both damages and an injunction were granted. 
Noise, smell and soot gave rise to an injunctive remedy in Chisholm v Glendewar 
(1924).96 Noise and vibrations from the defendant’s industrial saws and damp from 
his defective plumbing were the cause of complaint in Keough v Farley (1937).97 As 
the defendant had taken steps to remedy the problem n ither damages nor an 
injunction were granted. In Herivel v Harman (1947),98 the plaintiff complained of 
numerous types of noise emanating from an adjacent house, which was used as a 
school. He was granted injunctive relief in respect of some of his complaints.99 No 
decision is recorded in Penseney v Philip Le Sueur & Sons Ltd(1951),100 where the 
problems complained of were dust, noise and strain on a party wall as a result of 
movement and storage of coal on the defendant company’s land. In Coutanche v 
Lefebvre (1955),101 property damage was caused by dust, which resulted in the death 
of some trees, and damages were awarded. Finally, in Lysaght v Channel Islands 
Property Holdings (1961 and 1962),102 damages were awarded for inconvenience 
caused by building work. 
 
“Voisinage” is mentioned in Arm v De La Mare103 and in Chisholm v Glendewar.104 
In both cases the context suggests that “neighbourho d” is the most appropriate 
translation. The word “trouble” is used in Lysaght v Channel Islands Property 
                                                 
94 (1899) 220 Ex 28. 
95 (1901) 221 Ex 120. 
96 (1924) 233 Ex 31. 
97 (1937) 12 CR 373. 
98 (1947) 243 Ex 200; (1947) 243 Ex 222. 
99 (1947) 243 Ex 222, 223. 
100 (1951) 247 Ex 117. 
101 (1955) 249 Ex 390. 
102 (1961) 253 Ex 204; (1962) 254 Ex 10. 
103 (1899) 220 Ex 28, 29: “qui est non seulement une nuisance mais un danger au voisinage”. 
104 (1924) 233 Ex 31, 33: “de ne plus en incommoder le voisinage”. 
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Holdings,105 but not in conjunction with “voisinage”. Overall, it seems that no legal 
significance was attached to the words in these instances. 
 
The word “nuisance” appears in a number of the unreport d cases.106 “Tort” also 
appears frequently.107 However, “nuisance” and “tort” are never found in 
combination, such as “tort de nuisance”, or similar. The frequency with which “tort” 
is used and the context in which it is found at least bear the argument that the word 
has some legal significance. (“Tort” has the natural meaning of “wrong” in the 
French language.) The same could also be said of “nuisa ce”, but, looking at the 
records alone, the argument that nuisance carried no technical meaning is tenable. It 
is interesting to note, however, that the noun “nuisance” had fallen into desuetude in 
France by the seventeenth century,108 and did not reappear until just after the middle 
of the twentieth (via the English language).109 Thus, of the court records considered, 
the first seven cases (from 1889 to 1951) were decided when the word “nuisance” 
was all but unknown in the continental French language.110 Nevertheless, there are 
differences between French as used in France and French as used in Jersey, and the 
disappearance of “nuisance” from the French language cannot lead to a certain 
                                                 
105 (1961) 253 Ex 204: “le locateur doit garantir le locataire de tout trouble qui pourrait être apporté à 
sa jouissance”. 
106 Curry v Horman (1889) 213 Ex 511, 513 “la nuisance dont s’agit”; Arm v De La Mare (1899) 220 
Ex 28, 29 “qui est non seulement une nuisance”, and 30 “le défendeur a refusé de faire cesser la 
nuisance dont se plaint ledit acteur”; Dutton v Constable of St Helier (1901) 221 Ex 120, 121 “la 
nuisance intolérable”, “à ladite nuisance”, “autres désagréments et nuisances”, “afin que les 
nuisances”, “les dites nuisances”; Chisholm v Glendewar (1924) 233 Ex 31, 32 “nuisance intolérable”, 
“ladite nuisance causée”, “ladite nuisance”, and 33 “ladite nuisance”; Keough v Farley (1937) 12 CR 
373, 375 “qu’ils fasse cesser les nuisances”, and 376 “jusqu’au jour qu’il aura fait cesser lesdites 
nuisances”, and 379 “a porté remede à cette nuisance; que pendant que ladite nuisance existait”; 
Lysaght v Channel Islands Property Holdings (1962) 254 Ex 10, 11 “legal nuisance”. 
107 Curry v Horman (1889) 213 Ex 511, 512 “tant pour le tort causé”; Arm v De La Mare (1899) 220 
Ex 28, 29 “Sieur De la Mare a causé un tort sérieux a  Remontrant”, and 30 “pour le tort subi”; 
Herivel v Harman (1947) 243 Ex 200, 201 “les conditions […] causent u  tort et un préjudice tout 
particulier”; Penseney v Philip Le Sueur & Sons Ltd (1951) 247 Ex 117, 118 “de mettre fin à ces 
torts”, and 119 “la société défenderesse lui fait tort”; Coutanche v Lefebvre (1955) 249 Ex 390, 391 “à 
l’égard des torts qu’ils subissent”, “pour mettre fin à ces torts”, “le tort causé”. 
108 Caballero Essai 1 – 2. According to Caballero (2, n4) “nuisance” is in none of the editions of the 
Dictionnaire de l’Academie française from 1798 to 1951. The word is certainly absent from the 8th 
edition (1932 – 1935). It is also absent from Beschrelle Dictionnaire (1880) but not from Hatzfeld & 
Darmesteter Dictionnaire (1926) vol 2, 1606, although it is described as “vieilli ”.  
109 Le Petit Robert (1977) 1288 states that “nuisance” first entered the French language in 1120 and 
entered it again around 1960 from the English languge. 
110 Curry v Horman (1889) 213 Ex 511; Arm v De la Mare (1899) 220 Ex 28; Dutton v Constable of 
St Helier (1901) 221 Ex 120; Chisholm v Glendewar (1924) 233 Ex 31; Keough v Farley (1937) 12 
CR 373; Herivel v Harman (1947) 243 Ex 200, (1947) 243 Ex 222; Penseney v Le Sueur (1951) 247 
Ex 117. 
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conclusion that the word had a legal meaning where it appears in the court records. It 
does, however, render such a conclusion more likely. 
 
While reference to “nuisance” is made consistently from Curry v Horman (1889) to 
Keough v Farley (1937), the word is not used in the next three case records.111 This 
inconsistency could be seen to support the argument that the court had no clear 
concept of nuisance in mind. It is of potential significance, therefore, that in the 
(English-language) reasons for the court’s decision in Lysaght v Channel Islands 
Property Holdings (1962), the defendant’s actions are described as amounting to a 
“legal nuisance”.112 This phrase seems clearly to indicate application of a specific 
legal concept called “nuisance”. Of course, this does not mean that this Jersey 
nuisance and English nuisance were identical, but tha here was some likeness 
between the two seems to have been the view of the Bailiff in Lysaght, who made an 
unqualified reference to an English case in relation o damages.113 In summary, it is 
quite possible that a Jersey concept of nuisance was in the mind of the court in cases 
of interference with enjoyment of, or physical damage to, property, from Curry 
(1889) to Lysaght (1962). 
  
Regarding the provenance of, and influences on, this Jersey concept, two 
speculations may be made. The English tort of nuisace developed from the assize of 
novel disseisin114 (itself influenced by the Canonical ctio spolii),115 which “provided 
for the trial of the question whether A has disseised or dispossessed B of his 
freehold”.116 Therefore, a similar connection between the Jersey br f de nouvelle 
dessaisine and this area of law is possible.117 Alternatively, it may be that, rather than 
English law and Jersey law developing in parallel, the legal development in England 
was subsequently followed in Jersey, giving rise to or modifying the Jersey concept. 
Without further study, nothing can be concluded about the exact historical 
                                                 
111 Herivel v Harman (1947) 243 Ex 200, (1947) 243 Ex 222; Penseney v Le Sueur (1951) 247 Ex 
117; Coutanche v Lefebvre (1955) 249 Ex 390. 
112 A term used in English case-law (see: R ad v Lyons [1947] AC 156, 183, per Lord Simonds). 
113 Grosvenor Hotel v Hamilton [1894] 2 QB 836, 840, per Lindley, LJ. 
114 Simpson History 107; Fifoot History ch 1, particularly 5, 9 – 11. Loengard “Assize”. 
115 Pollock & Maitland History 47. 
116 Holdsworth History vol 1, 275. 
117 On the bref de nouvelle dessaisine, see: Terrien 8.3; Poingdestre Commentaires 45 – 46, 47; Le 
Gros, 173 – 174. 
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development of this area of the law, but, on the basis of Hemery and Dumaresq’s 
Report, some form of the concept seems certain to pre-dat 1789. 
 
(2) Key v Regal and Searley v Dawson  
The first Jersey Judgments case is Key v Regal in 1962,118 which preceded the 
decision in Lysaght by a few months.119 This case is important: the court’s analysis 
of the law has been founded upon in subsequent decisions.120 Physical damage and 
interference with enjoyment121 were argued to be consequences of construction work 
on the defendant’s land. The action failed in respect of the alleged physical damage 
because causation was not proved,122 and on the other matters because the court held 
that the “limit which any normal person could be exp cted to have to bear” had not 
been exceeded.123 Neither nuisance nor voisinage was mentioned in the judgment, 
but the following principles were expressed: 
 
“(1) The occupier of land is entitled to the quiet and unimpeded enjoyment of 
that land. 
“(2) The owner of land is entitled to do as he pleases with that land.”124 
 
These principles encapsulate the issue.125 People living close to one another may 
cause each other harm as a result of their proximity, because one party doing as he 
pleases may infringe the right to quiet and unimpeded enjoyment of land of the other. 
The rights of each must always be balanced. 
 
Nine years later, the same judge (Le Masurier, now Bailiff) decided the next case: 
Searley v Dawson.126 This decision marks the beginning of a divergence between 
cases concerning damage to property (where Searley is applied)127 and cases 
                                                 
118 (1962) 1 JJ 189, Le Masurier, Deputy Bailiff. 
119 Key v Regal (10 February 1962, 2 March 1962); Lysaght v Channel Islands Property Holdings (26 
June 1962). 
120 Notably: du Feu v Granite Products (1973) 1 JJ 2441. 
121 Noise, dust, vibration and litter. Damage to the plaintiff’s health was also alleged ((1962) 1 JJ 189, 
191 – 192, per Le Masurier, Deputy Bailiff). 
122 Ibid 193. 
123 Ibid 194. 
124 Ibid 192. 
125 See: ch 9 A.  
126 (1971) 1 JJ 1687, Le Masurier, Bailiff.  
127 Browne v Premier Builders (1980) JJ 95; Rockhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 332. 
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concerning interference with enjoyment (where Searley is not applied),128 and is the 
origin of the (modern) doctrine of voisinage in Jersey law. The plaintiff’s house 
suffered structural damage due to excavation on the def ndant’s land, which was 
found to have been carried out negligently.129 The court held the defendant liable on 
the basis of a passage in Pothier, which identified an obligation on neighbours to use 
their property in such a way as not to occasion harm to that of others: 
 
“Chacun des voisins peut faire ce que bon lui sembl sur son héritage, de 
manière néanmoins qu’il n’endommage pas l’héritage voisin.”130 
 
This strongly resembles the court’s analysis in Key. Indeed the underlying principle 
is the same:131 the rights of owners must be balanced against one another. However, 
Pothier goes further than Key, asserting what in his view is the basis of the law. Of 
neighbourhood obligations in general, he states: 
 
“Le voisinage est un quasi-contrat qui forme des obligations réciproques 
entre les voisins, c’est-à-dire, entre les propriétaires ou possesseurs 
d’héritages contigus les uns aux autres.”132 
 
Later, in the same appendix, he restates the princile operating in this area of the law: 
 
“Le voisinage oblige les voisins à user chacun de son héritage, de manière 
qu’il ne nuise pas à son voisin.”133 
 
Thus, Pothier identifies what he asserts to be the basis of the law: quasi-contract. It is 
neighbourhood law that obliges neighbours to behave in this manner, and 
neighbourhood law is a quasi-contract. The court had also cited a passage from 
                                                 
128 Du Feu v Granite Products (1973) 1 JJ 2441; Magyar v Jersey Strawberry Nurseries (1982) JJ 
147; Cornick v Le Gac 2003 JLR N43. 
129 Searley v Dawson (1971) 1 JJ 1687, 1689, 1698, per Le Masurier, Bailiff. 
130 Ibid 1701. Pothier also gives an example of an interfernce for which the law will not provide 
redress: “Je puis faire sur mon héritage quelque chose qui prive mon voisin de la commodité qu’il en 
retiroit, par exemple, des jours qu’il en retiroit.” Pothier Coutume d’Orléans, Introduction au titre des 
servitudes réelles para 24, 2e règle. Whitty makes a similar point in relation to Scots law (Nuisance 
para 32). See also: art 668 LaCC. 
131 Searley v Dawson (1971) 1 JJ 1687, 1699, 1701, per Le Masurier, Bailiff. 
132 Pothier Traité du contrat de société 2nd appendix, para 230. 
133 Ibid para 235. Yiannopoulos Servitudes para 32, translates “Le voisinage” as “vicinage”. 
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Domat’s Loix civiles,134 expressing the general principle that an owner cannot make 
use of his land in a way which either causes damage to, or interferes with enjoyment 
of, a neighbour’s land. The passage in Domat is located in a title on the law of 
servitudes and does not describe the relationship between neighbours as quasi-
contractual. Pothier’s analysis was adopted by the court in Searley: “Each 
[neighbour] is under an obligation to the other arising quasi ex-contractu not so to 
use his property as to cause damage to the property of the other”.135 
  
Two apparent oddities of the Searley decision can be observed. Firstly, the plaintiff 
claimed that the defendant was liable for negligence.136 Having determined that 
“there was negligence in this case”,137 the court turned to consider “whether Mr. 
Dawson, as the owner of ‘Oldholme’ owed a duty of care to Mr. Searley”.138 
Nonetheless, references to “negligence” and “duty of care” are absent in the court’s 
own summary of its decision.139 It appears that the consideration of negligence did 
not affect the court’s decision. Liability in neglience was rejected by the court for 
want of a duty of care.140 A typical approach of English law was considered: had an 
easement of support between the buildings been acquired by prescription?141 This 
was not possible in Jersey law because of the prohibition on acquisitive prescription 
of servitudes.142 The court also questioned whether the maxim sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas could be applied. Translating this as “So use your own property 
as not to injure the rights of another”,143 the court held that this approach was not 
open to Jersey law because the right at issue was the right of support building-to-
building, which did not exist.144 The possibility that the right infringed might be 
                                                 
134 (1756 edn) 1.12.2.8, 119: “Quoiqu’un propriétaire puisse faire dans son fonds ce que bon lui 
semble, il ne peut y faire d’ouvrage qui ôte à son v isin la liberté de jouir du sien, ou qui lui cause 
quelque dommage.” 
135 Searley v Dawson (1971) 1 JJ 1687, 1702, per Le Masurier, Bailiff. 
136 Ibid 1697, 1698. 
137 [emphasis added] Ibid 1698. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid 1702. 
140 McNeill, JA, suggests a reason for this: Rockhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 332, 353, para 50. 
141 Dalton v Angus (1881) 6 AC 740. 
142 Searley v Dawson (1971) 1 JJ 1687, 1699, per Le Masurier, Bailiff. See also: ch 6 D. 
143 Rejecting the translation “Enjoy your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of 
another person”: ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
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ownership itself (rather than a right of support) was not considered. Nor, it seems, 
was the possibility of liability in negligence investigated further. 
 
In 1962, the judge in Searley145 had delivered the judgment of the court in Key 
(where two guiding principles were enunciated) and in Lysaght (where reference was 
made to the law of nuisance).  Therefore, the second oddity is that, while seeking a 
basis for liability in Searley, he did not seek to employ the principles set out in either 
of the earlier cases.146 This may have been because the primary problem in the 
previous cases was interference with enjoyment and Searley concerned physical 
damage (though an allegation of physical damage formed part of the complaint in 
Key). Alternatively, the reason may be that the defendant in Searley did not carry out 
the operations that were the cause of the damage himself; they were the work of a 
contractor.  
 
(3) After Searley  
Du Feu v Granite Products 147 (dust) is the first decision in which unambiguous 
reference is made to a “tort of nuisance”.148 In addition to a number of English law 
materials,149 the court considered the principles in Key.150 
 
In Browne v Premier Builders (Jersey) Ltd151 (physical damage), Searley was used as 
authority for the decision that the defendant owed the plaintiff a “duty of care”.152 
Concluding that the obligation in Searley was “akin to the duty imposed in tort”,153 
                                                 
145 Le Masurier, Bailiff. 
146 Damage to property was one of the issues complained of in Key v Regal: (1962) 1 JJ 189, 192, per 
Le Masurier, Deputy Bailiff. 
147 (1973) 1 JJ 2441, Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
148 Ibid 2447. 
149 Ibid 2444, 2447, 2448, 2449. 
150 Ibid 2447. See: ch 9 B(2). 
151 (1980) JJ 95, Crill, Deputy Bailiff. Mercer v Bower (1973) 1 JJ 2453 and Dale v Dunell’s Ltd 
(1976) 2 JJ 291 were decided between du Feu v Granite Products (1973) and Browne v Premier 
Builders (1980). Interference with enjoyment was the issue in Mercer, but the case was decided on the 
basis of a contract between the parties. The judgment in Dale suggests that the case concerns private 
nuisance. On the facts, it seems closer to public nuisa ce (as that term is understood in English law). 
Therefore, neither of these cases contributes to the present discussion.  
152 (1980) JJ 95, 104, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
153 Ibid 105. 
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the court then made reference to English decisions on negligence.154 This decision is 
apt to mislead. The court in Searley does not refer to a duty of care in its own 
summary of its judgment, nor does it draw any comparison between Pothier’s 
obligation (on which the decision was founded) and the law of tort. Recent case law 
has not adopted the terminology used in Browne.155 
 
The court in Magyar v Jersey Strawberry Nurseries Ltd156 (noise) relies on du Feu 
and Key: the former as a case in which Jersey nuisance law had been “thoroughly 
canvassed”,157 the latter as authority for an objective standard to be applied in 
assessing the gravity of the problem complained of.158 
 
Jersey sources are less in evidence in M tchell v Dido Investments Ltd159 (damp), 
where the court was “satisfied that, in respect of nuisance, the law of Jersey follows 
the law of England”.160 Searley is referred to, but it is described as “founded in 
negligence”.161 This goes one step further than Browne, where the court analysed 
Searley as having established a duty “akin to the duty imposed in tort”,162 rather than 
a tortious duty tout court. The judgment in Mitchell appears to be confused.163 
 
Between Mitchell and the next case, Matthews and Nicolle’s The Jersey Law of 
Property was published,164 in which voisinage is described as imposing “on the 
owners of adjoining properties certain reciprocal rights and duties, which do not 
constitute servitudes, nor indeed do they require any titre to establish their 
                                                 
154 Ibid. 
155 Gale v Rockhampton 2007 JLR 27, 34, para 12. See also: R ckhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 332, 373, 
para 121; Yates v Reg’s Skips 2007 JRC 237, unreported, paras 32 – 34, per Bailhache, Bailiff; Reg’s 
Skips v Yates 2007 JLR 191, 197 paras 14 and 15, 198, para 17, 203, para 37 – 39, 203 – 204, para 41, 
205 – 206, para 48, 207, paras 53 and 54, 210, para 67, 212 – 213, para 75, 213, para 76, and 220, 
para 104. 
156 (1982) JJ 147. 
157 Ibid 149, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
158 Ibid 153 et seq. 
159 1987-88 JLR 293. 
160 Ibid 304, para 30, per Tomes, Deputy Bailiff, citing Dale v Dunell’s Ltd (see: ch 9 n151) in support 
of this proposition.  
161 Ibid 310, para 35. 
162 Browne v Premier Builders (1980) JJ 95, 105, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
163 Mitchell v Dido Investments 1987-88 JLR 293, 312, para 30, per Tomes, Deputy Bailiff. Mitchell 
was not followed in Rockhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 332, 378 – 380, paras 135 – 141, per McNeill, JA. 
164 (1991).  
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existence.”165 The authors note that, unlike the English law of nuisance which is part 
of the law of torts, the Jersey law of voisinage is part of the law of property.166 
 
Du Feu was again cited in Cornick v Le Gac (noise),167 in support of applying an 
objective test in order to assess the gravity of the problem. Again on the basis of du 
Feu, it was held that anyone who causes unreasonable inconvenience to his 
neighbour will “be guilty of nuisance”.168 
 
These cases illustrate that, following Searley, the law appears to have bifurcated. 
Where physical damage is at issue, the Searley approach is taken. Key is applied 
where there is interference with enjoyment. 
  
(4) Rockhampton Litigation 
The third case of particular importance in this area (after Key and Searley) is Gale 
and Clarke v Rockhampton Apartments.169 The first defendant owned a block of 
flats. The second defendant was the developer of those flats, and the third defendant 
was the main contractor in respect of their construction. The construction work was 
alleged to have caused subsidence and significant dmage to the plaintiff’s 
property.170 The factual similarity between this case and Searley is immediately 
apparent.171 The plaintiffs initially argued that the defendants were liable in 
negligence. They also argued for the defendants’ liability on the basis of the 
obligation arising from neighbourhood law, which informed the decision in 
Searley.172 The negligence action having been found to have prescribed, the Royal 
Court had to determine the appropriate period of extinctive prescription for the 
alternative claim.173 The plaintiffs argued that this was ten years. The defendants 
                                                 
165 Ibid 13, para 1.50; Nicolle Immovable 31. 
166 Matthews & Nicolle, ibid. 
167 2003 JLR N43. 
168 Ibid, per Le Cras, Commissioner. 
169 2007 JLR 27 (Royal Court); 2007 JLR 332 (Court of Appeal). 
170 Gale v Rockhampton 2007 JLR 27, 30, para 2, per Bailhache, Bailiff. 
171 Noted by the Bailiff: ibid 30, para 4. 
172 Ibid 29 – 30, para 1. 
173 Ibid. Torts are subject to a three year prescriptive period: Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
(Jersey) Law 1960, art 2(1). 
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argued that the doctrine of voisinage was not part of Jersey law at all.174 The court 
disagreed, holding that the tort of nuisance was not part of Jersey law, that an action 
in voisinage (a quasi-contract) was appropriate,175 and that that action was subject to 
a ten-year prescriptive period.176 The defendants appealed. 
 
On appeal it was again argued that the doctrine of voisinage was not part of Jersey 
law.177 Nuisance was the appropriate action, and the three-year prescriptive period 
should apply.178 Further, the concept of quasi-contract was “out-moded”, and 
anything which was said to be based on it should now more properly be considered 
to be based in tort.179 In reply, the respondents argued that voisinage and nuisance 
were both present in Jersey law, but that they were “ ntirely separate concepts”.180 
The choice between them depended on whether the properties were contiguous (a 
necessary condition before voisinage could apply), which they were in this case.181 A 
number of additional authorities were put before thCourt of Appeal. Having 
thoroughly reviewed this material, the Court decided in favour of the respondents: 
voisinage is part of Jersey law and applicable to the present facts,182 it is based on 
quasi-contract,183 and the ten-year extinctive prescription applies.184  
 
Although the facts in Rockhampton resembled those in Searley, the broader legal 
context had changed. Several cases in the intervening period had expressly applied a 
tort of nuisance, with reference to English law. Although these cases concerned 
interference with enjoyment, reference to English law (where nuisance covers all 
types of interference with property) probably contributed to the defendant’s 
assumption that this tort applied to physical damage. In the event, the applicability of 
the tort to physical damage was rejected by the Royal Court and the Court of Appeal 
                                                 
174 Ibid 30, para 3.  
175 Ibid 38, para 23. 
176 Ibid 43, para 39. 
177 Rockhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 332, 338, para 5, and 351, para 44, per McNeill, JA. 
178 Ibid 338, para 5. 
179 Ibid 338, para 5, and 385, paras 156 and 159. 
180 Ibid 338, para 6. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid 389, para 171. 
183 Ibid 386, paras 160 and 387, para 165. 
184 Ibid 392, para 182. 
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alike. The Court of Appeal took the view that the sources supported two doctrines:185 
the obligation arising in voisinage, which applies to physical damage where 
properties are contiguous, and a tort of nuisance. This view does not conflict with the 
Royal Court decision if that is taken to mean “that Jersey had not adopted the English 
law tort of nuisance”,186 a reading supported by comments of the same Bailiff in 
Jersey Financial Services Commission v AP Black (Jersey) Ltd.187 
 
(5) After Rockhampton  
In Yates v Reg’s Skips,188 the defendant was a tenant on farmland which shared  
boundary with the plaintiffs’ land.189 The plaintiffs sought an injunction and damages 
in respect of the noise generated by the defendant’s skip business.190 Both parties 
agreed that this was an action in voisinage.191 The Royal Court held that the “duty of 
voisinage […] owed to the plaintiffs” had been breached,192 and granted the 
injunction sought.193 The defendant appealed. 
 
The appellants argued that voisinage was inapplicable here because this case did not 
concern damage to property, but interference with enjoyment of it.194 Surprisingly, 
the court considered it unnecessary to decide this point because it was not contested 
that a right of action existed, whatever its jurispudential basis: 
 
“we do not think it necessary to decide whether or n t this case falls within 
the law of voisinage, it may do so and, accordingly, we determine that ground 
upon the hypothesis that it does.”195 
 
Furthermore, “the essential facts which the respondents had to establish in order to 
succeed were the same” whether the action was one in voisinage or not.196 
                                                 
185 Ibid 384, paras 151 and 154, 387, para 164, and 392, para 182. 
186 [emphasis added] Ibid 374, para 124. 
187 2002 JLR 294, 308 – 309. 
188 [2007] JRC 237. 
189 Ibid paras 1 and 2, per Bailhache, Bailiff. 
190 Ibid para 7. 
191 Ibid para 8. 
192 Ibid para 32. 
193 Ibid para 34. 
194 Ibid para 28 et seq. 
195 Ibid para 34 (also para 30). 
196 Ibid para 31. 
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A second argument for the appellants was that only a landowner, and not a tenant, 
can be liable in voisinage.197 This was rejected. Making reference to Pothier, the 
court held that the “duty of voisinage is an obligation incumbent on neighbours”, and 
considered this to include both occupiers and owners.198 
 
Thirdly, it was argued that the Royal Court had erred in not applying an objective 
test to the level of noise to be tolerated.199 This failed. The Court of Appeal held that 
an objective “average person” test had been applied by the Royal Court.200 
 
A final argument was that the Royal Court had erred in finding against the defendant 
because the noise generated by the skip business was “lawful” on account of the 
planning permission granted for that use of the land.201 This also failed: the planning 
permission did not legalise the problem.202 Although planning permission may alter 
the character of a neighbourhood (meaning that a previously unacceptable use of 
land is now no longer so), this had not happened in this case.203 
 
The court’s express refusal to determine the basis of the action –204 and thus to 
follow its own decision in Rockhampton – both illustrates and contributes to the 
uncertainty of the law. Are there two doctrines operating in this area? If so, what are 
they, and how do they differ? If there is only one, what is it? 
 
C. HOW MANY DOCTRINES? 
 
Arguably, the case law has divided into two strands. One is based on Key, and Key’s 
application in du Feu (nuisance); the other, starting with Searley, is ultimately based 
on Pothier (voisinage). 
 
                                                 
197 Ibid para 35. 
198 Ibid para 54.  
199 Ibid para 55. 
200 Ibid para 64. 
201 Ibid paras 65, 66. 
202 Ibid para 67. 
203 Ibid para 87. 
204 Ibid para 34. 
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 Nuisance strand Voisinage  strand 
1962 Key (unclear) 
1962 (Lysaght)  
1971  Searley 
1973 Du Feu  
1980  Browne 
1982 Magyar  
1987 Mitchell   
2003 Cornick  
2007  Rockhampton 
2007 Yates (unclear)205 
 
 
 From this, five hypotheses seem to be worth considering:  
 
1. Only nuisance exists, covering all interference with property. 
2. Only voisinage exists, covering all interference with property. 
 
Nuisance and voisinage both exist and – 
3. the spheres of application are identical. 
4. the spheres of application overlap. 
5. the spheres of application are entirely different. 
 
(1) Nuisance Only 
Arguably, nuisance has a long history in Jersey law: from before 1789 to the present 
day. If this is the only doctrine in this area of the law, the decision in Searley must 
either be wrong, or form part of the law of nuisance. The courts have rejected the 
suggestion that Searley was wrongly decided.206 In the face of this, it cannot be said 
that only nuisance exists unless voisinage forms part of nuisance. The Court of 
                                                 
205 Reg’s Skips v Yates 2008 JLR 191, 202, para 34, per Jones, JA. 
206 Gale v Rockhampton 2007 JLR 27, 38, para 23, per Bailhache, Bailiff; Rockhampton v Gale 2007 
JLR 332, 389, para 171, per McNeill, JA. Also: Matthews & Nicolle, 13 – 14, paras 1.50 – 1.53; Law 
of Immoveable Property and Conveyancing Syllabus (Revised 2006), part 3; Nicolle Immovable 35. 
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Appeal in Yates held that the essential facts to be established in a claim in voisinage 
and a claim under nuisance are the same. If this is true, it may be that there is only 
one doctrine, covering the whole of this area. However, it seems unlikely that this 
single doctrine could be nuisance: the obligation in Searley is stated to be quasi-
contractual in nature; while there has never been any such statement in relation to 
nuisance, and cases since K y indicate that tort is the basis of the action. Therefore, 
this hypothesis is unsatisfactory.  
 
(2) Voisinage  Only 
As the sources are clear that there are two doctrines this hypothesis also falls to be 
rejected. 
 
(3) Two Doctrines with Identical Spheres of Applica tion 
Is this third hypothesis the same as saying that there is only one doctrine? This would 
be true if there were two doctrines, with the same doctrinal basis, which produced the 
same result when applied to the same set of facts. O herwise, there is simply 
concurrency of liability.  
 
On the basis of Key and of Yates in the Royal Court, this hypothesis is tenable. In 
Key, physical damage to property appears to have been considered without demur. 
Therefore, it is possible that the nuisance strand covers both types of interference. 
However, the subsequent application of Key, and the decision in Searley and its 
application to cases of physical damage, suggest that this is no longer the case. Yates 
concerned interference with enjoyment. In the Royal Court, both parties agreed that 
voisinage was the appropriate basis for the claim.207 However, when this agreement 
was retracted at appeal,208 the Court of Appeal was sufficiently uncertain that a claim 
in voisinage could be made in respect of interference with enjoyment that it declined 
to make a definitive statement on the point.209 Firmly holding that a claim in 
voisinage could be made in respect of interference with enjoyment would have 
                                                 
207 Narrated in Reg’s Skips v Yates 2008 JLR 191, 196 – 197, para 13, per Jones, JA. 
208 Ibid 198, para 18. 
209 Ibid 200 – 201, para 30. 
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contradicted the division in the case-law since S arley.210 This division was 
impliedly affirmed by the same court in Rockhampton, which held that claims in 
voisinage are applicable where “there is substantial damage to land or buildings”.211 
That the scope of voisinage is restricted to claims in respect of physical damage is 
supported by a narrow reading of the decision in Searley that there is an obligation 
“not so to use [one’s] property as to cause damage to the property of the other”.212 
Therefore, the sources suggest that voisinage does not apply to interference with 
enjoyment, nuisance does not apply to physical damage, nd consequently that the 
third hypothesis does not reflect the law. 
 
(4) Two Doctrines with Overlapping Spheres of Appli cation 
Nuisance seems indubitably to cover interference with enjoyment; voisinage seems 
indubitably to cover physical damage. If they have overlapping spheres of 
application (not identical: that has been considere above), one doctrine must cover 
its own ground as well as that of the other, or each (or either) doctrine must cover its 
own ground as well as part of the ground of the other. The discussion above,213 in 
particular the cases to which each doctrine has been applied by the courts, suggests 
that this hypothesis too is improbable. 
 
(5) Two Doctrines with Distinct Spheres of Applicat ion 
As already stated, the case-law since Key has divided into two strands: nuisance and 
voisinage. Thus the sources bear the reading that these doctrines do not overlap. 
 
Although a trend may be noted in the cases from Searley to Rockhampton, the 
sources as a whole are not clear and none of the above hypotheses is fully compatible 
with them. Nonetheless, it is asserted that, in the modern law, there are two doctrines 
operating in Jersey law. These are not functional equivalents because voisinage 
applies to cases of physical damage (between contiguous properties), whereas 
nuisance applies to cases of interference with enjoyment. Consequently, the 
                                                 
210 See the table above. 
211 See: ch 9 B(4), above; Rockhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 332, 384, para 154, per McNeill, JA. 
212 [emphasis added] Searley v Dawson (1971) 1 JJ 1687, 1702, per Le Masurier, Bailiff. 
213 Ch 9 C(3). 
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influences of English and French law214 appear to be balanced. Perhaps fortunately, 
as was seen earlier, both these laws have much in common, and the underlying 
principle in both is the same: the respective rights of the parties must be balanced. 
This principle is also seen in both voisinage and nuisance in Jersey law. 
Reassuringly, Jersey is not the only jurisdiction t apply different doctrines to 
interference with enjoyment and physical damage: in South Africa, the law is 
structurally comparable. Thus, although the division in the Jersey law (voisinage and 
nuisance) may be viewed as undesirable, the South African experience demonstrates 
that such a solution can work. 
 
D. DOCTRINAL BASES  
 
Nuisance has been stated to be tortious,215 voisinage to be quasi-contractual.216 An 
examination of these attributes follows.  
 
(1) Nuisance 
In the materials from 1789 to 1962, the conceptual basis of this area of law is 
unclear.217 The court in Key talks of liability “in law”.218 This could suggest that the 
action followed the alleged breach of an obligation arising ex lege, or this may 
simply indicate that the basis of liability was not c nsidered at all. 
 
Whatever the nature of the Jersey concept had originally been, it came to be regarded 
as a tort in the case law on interference with enjoyment (nuisance). The first of these 
cases was du Feu, which applies Key, but also refers to English materials on the tort 
of nuisance. Express reference is made to tort as the basis of liability.219 Subsequent 
cases in this line also refer to tort.220 Judicial opinion is that, despite reference to 
                                                 
214 Meaning both pre- and post-codification law. It would be wrong to characterise this as “civilian” 
because other civilian systems have different approaches to that taken in France. See: Tunc 
Encyclopedia. 
215 For example: du Feu v Granite Products (1973) 1 JJ 2441, 2447, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
216 For example: Searley v Dawson (1971) 1 JJ 1687, 1702, per Le Masurier, Bailiff. 
217 See: ch 9 B(1). 
218 Key v Regal (1962) 1 JJ 189, 195, per Le Masurier, Deputy Bailiff. 
219 Du Feu v Granite Products (1973) 1 JJ 2441, 2447, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
220 Magyar v Jersey Strawberry Nurseries (1982) JJ 147, 149, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. Cornick v Le 
Gac 2003 JLR N43, per Le Cras, Commissioner. 
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English law, the English tort of nuisance has not been received into Jersey law.221 
One view, therefore, is that this is a Jersey tort of nuisance.222 It is submitted that the 
sources bear such a reading. Consequently, it seems that the basis of Jersey nuisance 
is tortious. 
 
(2) Voisinage  
Based on Pothier,223 the court in Searley attributed the doctrine of voisinage to quasi-
contract.224 This was restated in Browne,225 Rockhampton,226 and Yates (in the Royal 
Court).227 Pothier’s approach is understandable, at least in he context of the 
eighteenth century. Certain obligations exist betwen neighbours that do not arise by 
agreement between the parties. Therefore, they are not contractual. To classify these 
obligations in the law of tort would not reflect the pre-existing relationship between 
the parties. (Quasi-delict may also be rejected on this ground.) By recourse to quasi-
contract, two features of neighbourhood law obligations are brought out: adoption of 
the obligations is involuntary; and the nexus of rights and obligations resembles a 
contract. 
 
Pothier defines quasi-contract as:  
 
“le fait d’une personne permis par la loi, qui l’oblige envers une autre, ou 
oblige une autre personne envers elle, sans qu’il intervienne aucune 
convention entre elles.”228  
 
                                                 
221 Gale v Rockhampton 2007 JLR 27, 35, para 13, per Bailhache, Bailiff; Rockhampton v Gale 2007 
JLR 332, 364, para 89, 374, paras 124 – 126, and 377, paras 131 and 132, per McNeill, JA. 
222 Rockhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 332, 380, para 141, per McNeill, JA. 
223 “Le voisinage est un quasi-contrat”: Pothier Traité du contrat de société 2nd appendix, para 230. 
224 Searley v Dawson (1971) 1 JJ 1687, 1701 – 1702, per Le Masurier, Bailiff, referring to Pothier 
Traité du contrat de société 2nd appendix. See: Zimmermann Obligations 14 – 21 for a short historical 
account of the classification of obligations. 
225 Browne v Premier Builders (1980) JJ 95, 105, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
226 Gale v Rockhampton 2007 JLR 27, 35, para 14, and 42, para 34, per Bailhache, Bailiff; 
Rockhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 332, 386, paras 160 and 163, per McNeill, JA. 
227 2007 JRC 237, unreported, para 9, per Bailhache, Bailiff. 
228 Pothier Traité des Obligations para 113. Pothier’s definition is not dissimilar to that in Bell’s 
Dictionary 878: “A quasi-contract differs from a proper contract in this, that it is not constituted by 
express consent, but ex re–that is, by one of the parties doing deeds which import an obligation on 
him in favour of the other party, or vice versa”.  
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According to this definition, there is one active el ment in the creation of a quasi-
contract: “le fait d’une personne”. If the “fait” is a juridical act (a “lawful volitional 
act intended to have legal consequences”)229 it is hard to see how this definition 
applies to voisinage:230 the obligations of voisinage are not voluntarily assumed. 
Interpreting “fait” as a juridical fact (an event to which the law attaches certain 
consequences without the intervention of the will of the obligee) does not advance 
the matter: there is still no change of circumstances to which the law could attach 
consequences because one is always in the state of being a neighbour. This is not true 
of other quasi-contracts. Unjust(ified) enrichment a d negotiorum gestio are two of 
the examples of quasi-contracts which follow Pothier’s definition.231 For each of 
these, there is a clear juridical fact. 
 
If voisinage does not fit easily into quasi-contract, the category itself can also be 
criticised. It may be observed that Pothier’s definitio  of quasi-contract is wide 
enough to include tort law,232 and so does not explain the difference between the two. 
A similar observation may be made about the definitio  of quasi-contract in the 
French Civil Code.233 This definitional problem and the lack of coherenc between 
the nature of the different quasi-contracts tends to support the criticism that the 
category is insufficiently precise to be meaningful. Peter Birks has referred to the 
quasi categories as “hopeless”, and observes that they are little more than an 
ineffective attempt to respond to “the challenge of the residual miscellany” left 
behind by acceptance of “Gaius’s two main causative events, contract and wrong”.234 
This acceptance, he notes, “all too easily metamorphoses into the rather different 
affirmation that they [other obligations] arise eith r from a quasi-contract or a quasi-
wrong”.235 This “is only a variation upon the theme that all birds be either pigeons or 
sparrows. It merely says that all those which are neither pigeons nor sparrows must 
                                                 
229 Garner Black’s 26. Also, for example: Litvinoff Transactions vi. 
230 Or any other quasi-contract. 
231 Pothier Traité des Obligations 56, para 113. 
232 The same can be said of Houard’s definition of quasi-contract: Dictionnaire vol 4, 3. 
233 Art 1371. 
234 P Birks “Definition and Division: A Meditation on Institutes 3.13” in Birks Classification 18. Also: 
Zimmermann Obligations 15 – 16. 
235 Birks ibid 18 – 19. 
 248
be counted either as though they were pigeons or asthough they were sparrows.”236 
Classification as a quasi-contract also overlooks the fact that voisinage (like 
nuisance) is always found in the context of particular relationships to land. 
 
Louisiana law presents an alternative explanation for what it calls “vicinage”:237 a 
legal servitude. Legal servitudes, however, stand i the same relationship to 
conventional servitudes as quasi-contracts do to contracts. In other words, the legal 
servitude itself is something of a “quasi” category, and does not improve on a quasi-
contractual analysis.  
 
Whatever may have been the view of at the time of Pothier, modern legal analysis 
tends to discard quasi-contract, often by re-classifying obligations as tortious, or 
simply as obligations arising ex lege. With the exception of Louisiana, in the 
jurisdictions considered, this area of the law is regarded as entirely tort-based. Of 
particular significance for Jersey is the fact that French law has rejected Pothier’s 
classification in respect of troubles de voisinage in favour of tort.238 Given the 
analytical difficulties attendant to understanding voisinage as a quasi-contract, it may 
be that Jersey law will choose to develop in this direction in the future. As matters 
stand, quasi-contract suffices as a convenient label, s long as no legal consequences 
are attributed to voisinage merely on the basis of that appellation. 
 
E. PREREQUISITES FOR LIABILITY  
 
For both nuisance and voisinage, two fundamental questions must be answered: 
where is the threshold above which liability attaches; and, is the presence of fault 
necessary? The method by which the threshold for liability is determined differs 
according to whether it is a matter of nuisance (interference with enjoyment) or a 
matter of voisinage (physical damage) because, although each involves balancing the 
                                                 
236 Ibid 19. 
237 For example: Yiannopoulos Servitudes para 32. 
238 Although unjust(ified) enrichment (art 1376 et seq) and negotiorum gestio (art 1372 et seq) are still 
classified as quasi-contracts. 
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respective rights of the neighbours, the considerations taken into account in order to 
strike that balance are not the same.239 
 
(1) Nuisance  
The threshold in an action for nuisance is determined by reference to a number of 
circumstantial elements (considered below). In all c ses, some abnormality about the 
circumstance must be present.240 A person is expected to tolerate reasonable 
interference241 and what is reasonable is calculated in relation to “the needs of the 
average person in the particular neighbourhood”.242 Was the inconvenience “so great 
as to exceed in degree that which the average person sh uld have to accept”?243 In 
essence, the rights of one party must be balanced against those of the other. 
 
The threshold determined, must the victim prove the wrongdoer’s fault before the 
court will award damages for (non-physical) harm? In English law and in Scots law, 
this fault requirement exists. In English law, fault in nuisance is not identical to that 
required for liability in negligence, but “some degr e of personal responsibility is 
required”.244 The presence of fault is determined by reference to the degree of 
foreseeability of the harm occasioned;245 where the degree of foreseeability is 
sufficient, fault will be imputed. The Scottish position is similar. In RHM Bakeries 
(Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council,246 the court held that, damage and 
causation being proved, the onus was on the defender to show lack of fault.247 In 
English law and in Scots law, an injunction to prevent the action complained of may 
be obtained by demonstrating that there is a nuisance, but damages will not be 
awarded unless fault can also be shown.  
                                                 
239 See: Key v Regal (1962) 1 JJ 189, 193, per Le Masurier, Bailiff. 
240 As in French law: Viney & Jourdain Conditions 1218, para 953. Also: ch 9 A(4), above. 
241 Key v Regal (1962) 1 JJ 189, 192, per Le Masurier, Bailiff. Also: du Feu v Granite Products 
(1973) 1 JJ 2441, 2446, 2451, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff; Yates v Reg’s Skips 2007 JRC 237, 
unreported, para 13 “the noise was intolerable”, per Bailhache, Bailiff; Reg’s Skips v Yates 2008 JLR 
191, 202, para 36, per Jones, JA. 
242 Key v Regal (1962) 1 JJ 189, 192, per Le Masurier, Bailiff; Cornick v Le Gac 2003 JLR N43, per 
Le Cras, Commissioner. 
243 Key v Regal (1962) 1 JJ 189, 192 (also: 194) per Le Masurier, Bailiff. Also: du Feu v Granite 
Products (1973) 1 JJ 2441, 2447, 2448, 2449, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
244 Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callagan [1940] AC 880, 897, per Lord Atkin. 
245 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty [1967] 1 AC 617, 639, per Lord Reid. 
246 1985 SC (HL) 17. 
247 Ibid 45, per Lord Fraser of Tullybelton. 
 250
A fault requirement is not discussed in the Jersey cases on interference with 
enjoyment. However, if fault may be inferred from the facts, the presence or absence 
of a fault requirement may yet be discerned from the cases. The question is this: if 
the alleged wrongdoer’s use of land breaches the threshold of acceptability, can 
immunity from damages be obtained by proving absence of fault? In practice the 
wrongdoer would be required to show that he or she was ignorant of the nuisance. 
Three cases are of particular interest. 
 
In du Feu (dust), the plaintiff was awarded damages in respect of the interference 
with enjoyment of his land.248 The defendant’s argument that the quantity of dusthad 
never been unreasonable or excessive was rejected by the court. Further, the court 
noted that it was “only recently that the defendants [had] taken really effective steps 
to reduce the emanation of dust”, steps which “could, and should, have been taken 
much earlier.”249 This last statement may be indicative of fault on the defendant’s 
part. These comments appear in the court’s own presentation of its conclusions, 
where, presumably, the court presents only the points directly affecting its decision. 
Nonetheless, when the court sets out the “relevant rules”250 to be applied, “striking a 
just balance”251 is considered and fault is not. If fault is important, it is odd that it is 
not mentioned. 
 
In Magyar, an injunction was granted, with the court leaving over “the question of 
damages for past nuisance.”252 The “beneficial owner” of the defendant company 
(Mr Racz) described the noise complained of as “horrifying”, 253 both parties 
“expected [that the glass-blowing activity] could be carried out without causing 
inconvenience by noise”,254 and Mr Racz “took immediate steps to try to change 
matters.”255 However, it seems that the steps taken did not include turning the 
                                                 
248 Du Feu v Granite Products (1973) 1 JJ 2441, 2451, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
249 Ibid 2450. 
250 Ibid 2447 – 2449. 
251 Ibid 2448. 
252 Magyar v Jersey Strawberry Nurseries (1982) JJ 147, 155, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
253 Ibid 149. 
254 Ibid 148. 
255 Ibid 149. 
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machinery off (doing so would have caused irreparable damage to the furnace.)256 
Arguably, there was fault in the continuance of the activity, because the defendant 
was apprised of the noise nuisance. 
 
Damages were also sought in respect of noise nuisance in Cornick. According to the 
note of the decision: 
 
“in order to claim damages, the nuisance must be sustantial to the person 
occupying the property irrespective of his position n life, age or state of 
health […] when considered as a whole the defendant’s actions were 
unreasonable and the plaintiff was entitled to damages for nuisance.”257 
 
Thus put, the determinative factor for an award of amages appears to be whether the 
nuisance was “substantial”, and whether the defendant’s actions were 
“unreasonable”. Is unreasonableness a synonym for fault in this context? Perhaps it is 
not. The note of the judgment makes reference to unreasonable inconvenience. 
“Unreasonable” action in the quotation above seems to refer to that. Arguably, 
therefore, what is required for an award of damages according to Cornick is a 
substantial nuisance, which is also an unreasonable (or abnormal?) inconvenience. 
Both conditions are calculated objectively. 
 
Fault is not considered expressly in these cases. Coupled with the conclusions of the 
court in Cornick, this tends to support the view that showing fault is not a necessary 
prerequisite for an award of damages. On this point, therefore, the Jersey position 
appears to be closer to one of no-fault liability. Nonetheless, although its presence is 
not necessary, it may be that fault is one of the facts and circumstances that can 
contribute to a finding of liability.258 A number of other factors are also taken into 
account.  
 
                                                 
256 Ibid 152. 
257 Cornick v Le Gac 2003 JLR N43, per Le Cras, Commissioner. It is also stated that “it was open to 
the court to award damages even if the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction to halt the 
defendant’s actions. The sum awarded would represent th  sum which the plaintiff could reasonably 
have demanded as a quid pro quo for allowing the infringement of her rights.” However, this 
statement relates to the matter of trespass, not nuisa ce. 
258 For a similar conclusion on Quebec law see: Popovici “Poule” 247. 
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Time: An activity which could not give rise to complaint at one time may do so if it 
is carried out at another. For example, in Cornick a neighbour’s nocturnal external 
improvements were held to be unacceptable.259 
 
Location: The character of the neighbourhood is taken into account.260 However, this 
“does not mean that a person who lives in […] a noisy neighbourhood can never 
complain of any additional noise”.261 Rather, the effect is that the total level of noise 
required to cross the threshold of unreasonableness is higher. What is considered to 
be a nuisance differs according to the context in which it is set.262 That the plaintiff 
came to the nuisance is no defence.263  
 
Manner: In Magyar, there is a suggestion that the manner in which the activity is 
carried out is relevant to liability.264 It is not clear what this means. It may refer to 
whether the defendant has taken steps to limit the problem, which the defendant in 
that case had done.265 
 
Intensity, continuity and duration have also been given by the court as issues for 
consideration.266 Continuity and duration are likely to come together. The precise 
quantative requirement will depend wholly on the circumstances, but it is likely that 
one occurrence will be insufficient. In du Feu (dust), three alleged occasions 
sufficed.267 
 
                                                 
259 Cornick v Le Gac 2003 JLR N43. House construction (which impliedly includes renovations and 
repairs) is (normally) a reasonable use of land: Key v Regal (1962) 1 JJ 189, 194 – 195, per Le 
Masurier, Bailiff. 
260 For example: Key v Regal (1962) 1 JJ 189, 192, per Le Masurier, Bailiff. 
261 Du Feu v Granite Products (1973) 1 JJ 2441, 2449. Also: Magyar v Jersey Strawberry Nurseries 
(1982) JJ 147, 150 – 151, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
262 For example: Yates v Reg’s Skips 2007 JRC 237, unreported, para 12, per Bailhache, Bailiff. 
263 See: ch 9 F(3). 
264 Magyar v Jersey Strawberry Nurseries (1982) JJ 147, 150, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
265 Ibid 149. 
266 Ibid 154, 154, 150, respectively. For continuity and duration, see also: du Feu v Granite Products 
(1973) 1 JJ 2441, 2449, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
267 Du Feu v Granite Products (1973) 1 JJ 2441, 2451, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
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Finally, what is unreasonably excessive is calculated objectively.268 The 
hypersensitivity of the plaintiff will not increase liability, nor give rise to it where it 
would not otherwise be present.269 
 
(2) Voisinage 
Physical damage was at issue in Searley, in Browne and in Rockhampton. In each of 
these cases, the damage was “serious”,270 or more than trivial,271 or “substantial”.272 
This indicates that, as with an action for nuisance, th  problem must be above a 
certain level before there is liability, but it provides no guidance for determination of 
the minimum. In Key, physical damage was alleged, but the plaintiff was 
unsuccessful on this point273 because causation was not proved. Further, the cracks in 
the plaintiff’s property were described by the court as “insignificant”.274 If it is 
possible to prove causation in a case of insignificant damage, would liability exist? It 
seems likely that it would not. Arguably, the guiding principle should be de minimis 
non curat lex. The law should not concern itself with trivialities. To do so could 
encourage frivolous or vexatious litigation. 
 
According to the Court of Appeal in Yates, the essential facts which must be proved 
for both nuisance and voisinage are the same: that the damage exceeded the limit any 
ordinary person was supposed to bear.275 If that is correct there is no fault 
requirement. From the facts in some of the cases,276 it could be argued that fault was 
present, but this does not make fault a necessary prerequisite to an award of 
damages. Nonetheless, its presence may be one factor leading a court to hold a party 
liable. 
                                                 
268 Magyar v Strawberry Nurseries (1982) JJ 147, 153, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. Also: du Feu v 
Granite Products (1973) 1 JJ 2441, 2450, Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff; Yates v Reg’s Skips 2007 JRC 237, 
unreported, para 26, per Bailhache, Bailiff; Reg’s Skips v Yates 2008 JLR 191, 201, para 31, and 209, 
paras 63, 64. 
269 Magyar v Strawberry Nurseries (1982) JJ 147, 149 – 150, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
270 Searley v Dawson (1971) 1 JJ 1687, 1698, per Le Masurier, Bailiff. 
271 Browne v Premier Builders (1980) JJ 95, 102, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
272 Gale v Rockhampton 2007 JLR 27, 30, para 2, per Bailhache, Bailiff. 
273 And every other. See: ch 9 B(2). 
274 Key v Regal (1962) 1 JJ 189, 193, per Le Masurier, Deputy Bailiff. 
275 Reg’s Skips v Yates 2008 JLR 191, 201, para 31, per Jones, JA. 
276 For example: Searley v Dawson (1971) 1 JJ 1687; Browne v Premier Builders (1980) JJ 95; and the 
Rockhampton litigation, 2007 JLR 27, 2007 JLR 332. Also: du Feu v Granite Products (1973) 1 JJ 
2441; Magyar v Jersey Strawberry Nurseries (1982) JJ 147; Cornick v Le Gac 2003 JLR N43. 
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Unlike the Court of Appeal in Yates, the judgment of the court in Key seems to 
separate the two types of interference, and bears the reading that exceeding the 
degree the average person should have to accept277 applies to interference with 
enjoyment, whereas for physical damage it need onlybe shown that (significant) 
damage occurred as a result of the alleged wrongdoer’s activity.278 However, the 
same principle is at work in both instances: when no -trivial physical damage is 
occasioned, this is an example of interference exceeding the degree the average 
person should have to accept. 
 
The courts have stated that, in cases of physical damage, the obligation in voisinage 
only arises between neighbours whose properties are contiguous.279 This rule may be 
criticised as drawing an arbitrary division between damage caused to immediate 
neighbours, and damage caused to those who do not share a boundary with the 
wrongdoer but who are, nevertheless, closely proximate. For example: A’s land and 
C’s land are separated by that of B. A’s activities damage C’s land. C may have an 
alternative basis for an action against A, such as an action for negligence, but if there 
is none and contiguity of properties is requisite, C has no redress, simply because C 
and A have no common boundary. Given that this ruleis not applied in any of the 
other systems examined, it should be re-examined.  
 
(3) Conclusion 
In Yates, the Court of Appeal said that the essential facts to be proved were the same, 
whether the action was one of nuisance or of voisinage: the court had to be satisfied 
that the “activities were productive of noise which, on an objective view, exceeded 
that which the ‘average’ or ‘ordinary’ or ‘normal’ person could be expected to 
tolerate.”280 That much may be accepted. Where, however, the Court of Appeal 
appears to err is in suggesting that voisinage applies to interference with 
enjoyment.281 Further, there is a difference between voisinage and nuisance 
                                                 
277 Key v Regal (1962) 1 JJ 189, 193, per Le Masurier, Deputy Bailiff. 
278 Ibid. 
279 Searley v Dawson (1971) 1 JJ 1687, 1701, per Le Masurier, Bailiff; Rockhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 
332, 384, para 154, per McNeill, JA. Pothier Traité du contrat de société 2nd appendix, para 230. 
280 Reg’s Skips v Yates 2008 JLR 191, 201, para 31, per Jones, JA. 
281 See: ch 9 C. 
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regarding the way in which the threshold for liability is determined. For voisinage 
the physical damage must be more than trivial. For nuisance, the threshold is 
determined in reference to certain circumstantial elem nts. The contiguity 
requirement for an action in voisinage would be another difference in the essential 
facts to be proved, but it is argued that this ruleshould be rejected.282 In either case, 
it is not clear whether liability is fault-based. It is suggested that it is not, but, in the 
case of an action in nuisance, the presence of fault is one of the elements considered 
in ascertaining whether the threshold for liability has been breached. 
 
F. LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
 
(1) Personal Injury  
Some of the earlier cases deal both with interference with property and with personal 
injury and do not distinguish them as separate claims.283 Later cases are unclear over 
whether personal injury caused by the activities of a neighbour is part of the doctrine 
covering interference with property. In both Key and du Feu, personal injury to the 
plaintiff was alleged.284 In the latter case the question was not decided. In Key, it was 
said that, although the plaintiff’s illness was theresult of the defendant’s action, this 
“does not necessarily make him liable in law”.285 “Necessarily” suggests that the 
defendant may be liable in some instances. In a later case it was said that “it is not 
necessary in an action for nuisance […] to show that ere had been injury to 
health”.286 Conversely, the Court of Appeal in Rockhampton opined that voisinage 
does not include personal injury claims.287 
 
Personal injury may be distinguished from interference with property because there 
is no necessary connection between the victim and the land.288 This is not so, 
                                                 
282 See: ch 9 E(2). 
283 For example: Keough v Farley (1937) 12 CR 373; Coutanche v Lefebvre (1955) 249 Ex 390. See 
also: Rockhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 332, 375 – 376, paras 128, 129, per McNeill, JA. 
284 Key v Regal (1962) 1 JJ 189, 192, per Le Masurier, Deputy Bailiff; du Feu v Granite Products 
(1973) 1 JJ 2441, 2443 – 2444, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
285 Key v Regal (1962) 1 JJ 189, 195, per Le Masurier, Deputy Bailiff. 
286 Magyar v Jersey Strawberry Nurseries (1982) JJ 147, 153, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
287 Rockhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 332, 384, para 154, per McNeill, JA. 
288 See: Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655, 706, per Lord Hoffmann. In Scotland, it seems that 
recovery in nuisance for personal injury is possible: Whitty Nuisance para 80. 
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however, where personal injury is a consequence of either physical damage to land 
or interference with enjoyment of it. Thus it is suggested that, in cases of voisinage, 
provided the physical damage to the land is sufficiently serious as to give rise to 
liability, damages may also be awarded for some instances of personal injury which 
were direct consequences of the damage to the land.Similarly, in an action for 
nuisance, recovery for personal injury consequent on the interference with enjoyment 
ought to be possible in some cases. As with voisinage, however, damages should 
only be awarded where there is a successful claim for some harm to the land (in this 
case, interference with enjoyment) because, without that, there would be an 
insufficient (or no) causal link between the alleged wrongful act and the damage for 
which compensation is sought. Even where a claim for personal injury under 
nuisance or voisinage can be made out, there is no reason why there should n t be 
concurrent liability in negligence. 
 
(2) Identity of Parties 
(a) Who can be sued? 
The party who has caused the loss can be sued. The cases indicate that liability may 
be ascribed to an owner or a lessee.289 By analogy this should also be true of a 
usufructuary.290 It is submitted that these conclusions apply to both nuisance and 
voisinage. 
 
In Searley the court said that the obligation arising in voisinage on an owner could 
not be divested “by transferring it to another”.291 In Yates, where the defendant was a 
tenant, it was held that the plaintiff could also have pursued the owner.292 Therefore, 
it seems that the owner remains liable, even when not in occupation. However, where 
land is subject to a usufruct or a lease, seeking to enjoin the owner (or bare-owner) in 
a bid to prevent further interference with property would be ineffective. Where 
damages are sought (assuming fault is not a necessary condition), both the occupier 
and the owner may be sued.  
                                                 
289 Lessee: Reg’s Skips v Yates 2008 JLR 191, 207, para 54, per Jones, JA. 
290 It may also be true of a licensee: Mercer v Bower (1973) 1 JJ 2453, 2454, 2458, per Le Masurier, 
Bailiff. Note, however, that this case was decided on the basis of a contract between the parties. 
291 Searley v Dawson (1971) 1 JJ 1687, 1702, per Le Masurier, Bailiff. 
292 Rockhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 332, 354, para 54, per McNeill, JA. 
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For voisinage, Pothier’s notion of the parties appears to be basd on their relationship 
as neighbours.293 A question, therefore, arises over the precise nature of a neighbour. 
If voisinage is based on quasi-contract, is the unlawful occupier art of this nexus? 
This question may also be raised in relation to whocan sue. 
 
(b) Who can sue? 
The owner can sue,294 but it may be that the victim property is lawfully occupied by 
someone other than the owner. The lawful occupier may sue, whether it is a case of 
voisinage or of nuisance. Can a non-occupying owner also raise n action? This 
should be possible in voisinage, whatever the remedy sought, because the owner has 
the right to stop or vindicate physical damage to the immovable. For nuisance, 
whether an award of damages can be made will depend upon whether the non-
occupying owner has suffered loss (although an injunction is the primary remedy). 
Where the property is subject to a lease, it may be that failure of a tenant to renew 
could be construed as loss for this purpose. Where t  land is subject to a usufruct, it 
is hard to imagine a situation where a bare-owner will suffer loss as a result of 
interference with enjoyment. Therefore, it seems likely that bare-owners will only be 
able to sue in respect of physical damage. 
 
(3) Defences  
Showing that causation is lacking, or that the damage suffered is trivial, will prevent 
liability attaching to the defendant. These cannot truly be described as defences: the 
plaintiff’s case has simply not been made out.  
 
Arguing that the plaintiff came to the nuisance is not a defence.295 If a plaintiff has 
moved into a house, which was previously occupied by someone who was deaf, the 
fact that a neighbour has been playing the tuba from 2am to 3am five days a week for 
the past five years does not prevent the plaintiff from getting an injunction against 
this activity. If, however, there is no change of ownership and the victim tolerates the 
                                                 
293 Pothier Traité du contrat de société 2nd appendix, para 235. 
294 For example: Rockhampton litigation (2007 JLR 27; 2007 JLR 332); Magyar v Jersey Strawberry 
Nurseries (1982) JJ 147.  
295 Magyar v Jersey Strawberry Nurseries (1982) JJ 147, 148, 150, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. Reg’s 
Skips v Yates 2008 JLR 191, 211, para 70, 214 – 215, para 85, and 215, paras 86, 87, per Jones, JA. 
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tuba for three years, is there a right of action? The answer is probably no. Each new 
incident of tuba playing could be argued to constitute a fresh nuisance, thus avoiding 
the extinction by prescription of the right of action, but it seems likely that the 
taciturn plaintiff’s action might be vulnerable to a defence of estoppel.296 
  
 An action for compensation for physical damage occasioned during a previous 
owner’s tenure cannot be raised by a successor owner because the latter is not the 
person to whom loss has been caused. Of course, the rig t of action could be 
assigned to the successor owner. 
 
If the plaintiff has contributed to the problem, the defendant is liable only to the 
extent of his own contribution. For example, if construction work on the defendant’s 
land caused subsidence and damage to buildings on the plaintiff’s land, but the 
plaintiff’s own activities have worsened the problem, the defendant is not liable for 
all the damage. However, again, this is not strictly a defence, but a statement of the 
obvious: wrongdoers are liable only for the wrong that they themselves have 
committed. 
 
In cases of nuisance, if the problem has already ceased this may be sufficient to 
avoid the imposition of an injunction on, or an award of damages against, the 
defendant,297 unless it is likely that the problem will recur. 
 
(4) Remedies  
Where there has been, or is, interference with property the court can grant 
damages,298 an injunctive remedy299 or both.300 As well as prohibiting a particular 
activity, the court may also compel the wrongdoer to carry out certain action as a 
condition of being allowed to continue an activity. This occurred in Magyar, where 
                                                 
296 For example: Maçon v Quérée 2001 JLR 80. 
297 See: Curry v Horman (1889) 213 Ex 511, 513. 
298 For example: Lysaght v Channel Islands Property Holdings (1961) 253 Ex 204; (1962) 254 Ex 10; 
Searley v Dawson (1971) 1 JJ 1687; du Feu v Granite Products (1973) 1 JJ 2441; Browne v Premier 
Builders (1980) JJ 95; Gale v Rockhampton 2007 JLR 27. 
299 Chisholm v Glendewar (1924) 233 Ex 390; Yates v Reg’s Skips 2007 JRC 237, unreported. 
300 Dutton v Constable of St Helier (1901) 221 Ex 120; Magyar v Jersey Strawberry Nurseries (1982) 
JJ 147; Cornick v Le Gac 2003 JLR N43. 
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the defendant was ordered to take specified steps to reduce the amount of noise 
conveyed to the plaintiff’s property as a result of his glass-blowing works.301 It 
seems probable that awards of damages will be made only when the problem 
complained of has ceased, or will cease because an order to this effect has also been 
made, for damages will not be granted in order to legalise wrongful action302 (which 
would be the effect if they are granted where there is no certain prospect of the 
problem ceasing). 
 
G. NEIGHBOURHOOD LAW 
 
Voisinage is used in at least two different ways in the modern law. Voisinage as a 
specific legal doctrine has been considered above. Voisinage can also be translated 
more broadly, as “neighbourhood law”.303 In this sense, it is an organising concept, 
akin to family law, gathering parts of the law together on the basis of where they 
apply in the physical world, but not altering the legal nature of those parts.304 
 
The courts have observed that the law on éboulements, natural drain of water from 
higher to lower ground, water in general, enclosure of land and branchage all form 
part of this general area.305 (It has been suggested that these could be classified as 
natural servitudes,306 although some appear to be legal servitudes.) According to 
Pothier, a number of rules and regimes constitute the law of the neighbourhood. The 
obligation not to harm one’s neighbour by the use of one’s property is part of this.307 
His account also includes: bornage,308 the action to ward off rainwater,309 the natural 
servitude of drain from higher to lower ground,310 and the tour d’échelle.311 Le Gros 
                                                 
301 Magyar v Jersey Strawberry Nurseries (1982) JJ 147, 154 – 155, per Crill, Deputy Bailiff. 
302 Du Feu v Granite Products (1973) 1 JJ 2441, 2452, per Ereaut, Deputy Bailiff. 
303 For example: Gale v Rockhampton 2007 JLR 27, 38, para 23, per Bailhache, Bailiff. Fournel 
Voisinage concerns this sense of the word. See also: Yiannopoul s Servitudes 40, para 12. 
304 Rockhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 332, 356, para 60, per McNeill, JA. 
305 Gale v Rockhampton 2007 JLR 27, 38, para 23, per Bailhache, Bailiff. Also: Rockhampton v Gale 
2007 JLR 332, 357 – 358, paras 63 – 65, per McNeill, JA. 
306 Gale v Rockhampton 2007 JLR 27, 38, para 23, per Bailhache, Bailiff; Rockhampton v Gale 2007 
JLR 332, 357, para 65, per McNeill, JA. 
307 Pothier Traité du contrat de société 2nd appendix, para 235. 
308 Ibid para 231 et seq. 
309 Ibid para 236. 
310 Ibid. 
311 Ibid paras 244 and 246. 
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covers some of the same points,312 and, from his work, the following apposite 
additions may be made:313 clôture, or the right to enclose one’s land;314 enclave, or 
the way of necessity;315 the rules concerning fruits hanging over neighbouring 
land;316 further aspects of the law of water;317 branchage, or the obligation to cut off 
branches which protrude over a neighbour’s land;318 the law relating to tree roots;319 
and the regime relating to constructions on a boundary.320 It is interesting to note that 
the French Avant-projet de réforme du droit des biens321 employs a similar structure, 
where the title on voisinage includes troubles de voisinage, arbres et plantations, 
clôtures, mitoyenneté, les jours et vues, l’égout des toits, le bornage, and les 
servitudes légales.322 The law of the neighbourhood is the genus, under which there 




What is the law applicable when one neighbour, through use of his or her land, 
interferes with the land of another neighbour? The doctrine of voisinage provides 
redress where there is physical damage and the law of nuisance applies where there 
is interference with enjoyment. In both cases, an injunctive remedy or damages are 
available, but the doctrines also differ. Nuisance is tortious, whereas voisinage is said 
to be quasi-contractual. To an action in nuisance, the three-year extinctive 
prescription applies.323 To an action in voisinage, the period is ten years.324 The way 
in which the thresholds for liability are ascertained differs also. 
 
                                                 
312 Albeit with no reference to an overarching structure. 
313 Noted in Rockhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 332, 360, para 73, per McNeill, JA. 
314 Le Gros, 36. 
315 Ibid 38 (and T Hanson’s note, 517). 
316 Ibid. Also: Matthews & Nicolle, 15, paras 1.59, 1.60; Nicolle Immovable 45 – 46. 
317 Le Gros, 195. 
318 Ibid 222 (and T Hanson’s note, 546). 
319 Ibid 226 (and T Hanson’s note, 546). 
320 Ibid 18 – 20, 261 (and T Hanson’s notes, 514, 550). 
321 A proposal for the reform of the property provisions in the French Civil Code. 
322 http://www.henricapitant.org/node/70, accessed 12 August 2011. 
323 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Jersey) Law 1960, art 2(1). 
324 Rockhampton v Gale 2007 JLR 332, 392, para 182, per McNeill, JA. 
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How should the law develop? Three possible improvements are suggested. The 
contiguity requirement for an action in voisinage should be rejected. Also, the quasi-
contractual basis of the doctrine of voisinage could be replaced, possibly by 
assimilating voisinage into the law of tort. Finally, the existence of two doctrines is 
not ideal as in some cases it will be difficult to separate physical damage from 
interference with enjoyment. This problem would be ameliorated by rendering 




FINAL CONCLUSION  
 
Jersey law, and within it Jersey property law, have received little academic attention. 
If volume of legal research is proportionate to population size this is understandable, 
if unmerited. There is much to interest and occupy the researcher in Jersey law, given 
its rich historical development and the interplay of different legal traditions. This 
thesis has examined some specific areas of Jersey property law in detail before 
considering the nature and structure of Jersey property law as a whole. 
 
Jersey property law bears the influence of Norman feudal law, the civil law, and 
English common law. The first of these is largely, but not completely, extinct; indeed 
the extent to which it survives is itself an important question. The second and third 
have competed for hegemony, in property law as elsewhere in private law. One of 
the purposes of this thesis has been to consider whther the dominant voice in 
property law is the common law or the civil law. 
 
As the chapter on Feudal Land Tenure shows, feudal law has retreated so much that 
what remains today is a largely empty structure, save the duty of suit of court on 
fewer than a score of seigneurs and a handful of obligations on four seigneurs with 
respect to a visiting monarch. It can be seriously doubted whether any of these 
obligations would be enforced in the event of failure to perform. As the substance of 
feudalism has declined, so the conception of the right of the tenant, or vassal, at the 
bottom of the feudal chain has become more like the absolute ownership of modern 
civilian systems; as the influence of feudal law has retracted, so the civilian influence 
has expanded. 
 
Although Jersey law as a whole can be something of a battleground between the 
civilian influence of French law (both before and after 1804) and the common law 
influence of English law – as seen in the chapter on V isinage and Nuisance – there 
are clear indications that much of the foundations a d substance of Jersey property 
law are civilian. The sources refer frequently to Rman law and the ius commune 
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development of it, as well as to more modern French law. This has been seen in the 
chapters on the law of Servitudes, the chapter on the Classification of Property, and 
the chapter on Real Rights. Although the sources refer to English law also, such 
references are far less frequent than those to civilian materials. 
 
Further, it can be seen from the chapters on Real Rights and the Classification of 
Property that Jersey property law is largely civilian as to structure. Admittedly, 
Jersey law, like English law, remains vestigially feudal but, as the legal systems of 
France and Scotland demonstrate, the presence of elments of feudal land tenure is 
not a determinative marker of a common law system. In Jersey law, unlike in English 
law, there is no separation of Law and Equity. When the sources are synthesised into 
a whole, the overall impression is of a civilian system of property law. 
 
Comparative reference to other legal systems was also part of the approach adopted 
for this thesis. Given the relative paucity of native legal materials, this has been 
unavoidable but also invaluable, providing context, illuminating the present law, and 
assisting identification of appropriate possibilities for future development. As the 
first chapter explains, Jersey is a mixed jurisdiction, influenced by French law 
(broadly construed) and English law. And as well as French law and English law, the 
mixed jurisdictions of Louisiana, Quebec, Scotland, South Africa, and Guernsey 
(Jersey’s sister jurisdiction) were obvious systems for comparative study. It is further 
noted in the first chapter that property law in mixed jurisdictions tends not to be 
mixed, but almost entirely civilian, and that the same may be said of Jersey property 
law also. 
 
Finally, a thought to the future: the main language of Jersey is English. Since the 
cessation of conveyancing in French in 2006, all legal business is conducted in 
English. Old commentaries, court reports, legislation, conveyances and other 
sources, however, remain in French. As proficiency in French amongst the legal 
profession declines this presents a problem, for example, with respect to continuity 
of doctrines and concepts. Further systematic writing on Jersey law will be needed 
before the sources become inaccessible to those who practise it. 
